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
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


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## DEDICATION

*This 105th issue of the Darshana International  
is most respectfully dedicated to*

**Prof. Dr. Indra Sen** (born in 1903)

Retd. Professor of Philosophy and Psychology of  
Delhi and at present serving the Sri Aurobindo Ashram  
with his scholarship.

Dr. Indra Sen is an eminent thinker and is a profound  
scholar of all systems of Philosophical and Psychological  
Thought. He is a great scholar of Shri Aurobindo's  
Thought and has personal experience of Integral Yoga.  
He has to his credit several books on Yoga and Sri  
Aurobindo and the last one recently published is *Integral  
Psychology* which is based on the Psychological System of  
Sri Aurobindo.

Even at the age of 85 he is an active scholar devoted  
to study and writing.

May he live long to serve the cause of Philosophy and  
Psychology, specially Shri Aurobindo's Thought and Yoga  
which is dear to him.

**Anurag Atreya**  
Managing Editor



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# Ignorance and the Limits to a Pure Phenomenology

George J. Seidel

## INTRODUCTORY WORDS

Our purpose is to contribute—in some way—to clarify P. F. Strawson “Intention and convention in speech acts”.

The philosophy of language must consider the reality of language in its essential integrity, in what we could call with Husserl its “spiritual corporeity”.<sup>1</sup>

The language is in the man and for the man expression of all his concrete and real life; transform philosophy in pure philology or linguistics is frequent in the history of thought. Gusdorf, in his beautiful book “La parole” — remembering Plato’s “Cratyle” wrote: “Philology is the beginning of philosophy.”<sup>2</sup> This sentence has an indiscutible historical value and may be we can say that this initial philology of Plato’s dialogue pointed precisely to this: showing that the real knowledge it is not in the mere words but we must discover out of them an ideal value that don’t belong to the words but to the ideas.

The language, obviously, possess a logic and the study of this logic is the object of the philosophy of language. In Strawson’s essay we can see the study of the logic of language explaining J. L. Austin’s notions of the illocutionary force of an utterance and of the illocutionary act which a speaker performs.

We must insist that this kind of study it is not recent in philosophy of language. Plato’s Cratyle historically constitutes the first stone in the big building of philosophy of language. Jenofont<sup>3</sup> tell

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1 Cf. E. Husserl, *Logique formelle et logique transcendente*, Paris, 1957, p. 31.

2 Cf. George Gusdorf, *La parole*, Paris, 1953, p. 19.

3 Cf. *Memorabilia* III, 14, 2.



us how in a banquet in Athens the people there entertained themselves discussing on the proper uses of words. The intellectual weight of the sophists was based, precisely, in an analysis of the theoretical possibilities of the "logos" serving the "praxis".\*

In contemporary philosophy Heidegger also could be presented as an example of this kind of philosophising (in a philological way), supported by trying to find in the new-born-word the richest experience of being (Sein) and things.

### ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND ILLOCUTIONARY ACT

P. F. Strawson begins by saying that in this paper he wants to discuss some question regarding J. L. Austin's notions of the *illocutionary* force of an utterance and of the *illocutionary* act which a speaker performs in making and utterance.<sup>4</sup>

The above underlined word doesn't appear in "*Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*" but we can find in it "*locution*": (1) A particular form of expression or a peculiarity of phrasing. (2) Style of discourse: phraseology.

In spite of this, there are two preliminary matters we must mention. First, Austin contrasts what he calls the normal or serious use of speech with what he calls "etiolated"\* or "parasitical" uses. His doctrine of *illocutionary* force relates essentially to the normal or serious use of speech and not, or not directly, to etiolated or parasitical uses.

The second preliminary remark concerns another distinction, or pair of distinctions, which Austin draws. Austin distinguishes the *illocutionary* force of an utterance from what he calls its "*meaning*" and distinguish between the *illocutionary* and the *locutionary* acts performed in issuing the utterance.<sup>5</sup>

The meaning of a (serious) utterance — as conceived by Austin — always embodies some limitation on its possible force; that is, there may be no more to the force than there is to the meaning; but very often the meaning, though it limits, does not exhaust, the force. Similarly, there may sometimes be no more to say about the *illocutionary* force of an utterance than we already know if we know what *locutionary* act has been performed; but very often there is more to know about the *illocutionary* force of an utterance than we know in knowing what *locutionary* act has been performed.

"The performance of an *illocutionary* act involves the securing of uptake; that is, it involves bringing about the understanding of the

\* Both words logos and praxis are derived from Greek. Logos could be translated as; reason, word, study... and praxis could be understood as the opposite of theory.

4 All references, unless otherwise indicated, are to *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford, 1962.



meaning and of the force of the locution (pp. 115-16). Perhaps we may express the relation by saying that to know the force of an utterance is the same thing as to know what illocutionary act, if any, was actually performed in issuing it."<sup>6</sup>

Strawson says that Austin gives many examples and lists of words which help us to form at least a fair intuitive notion of what is meant by "illocutionary force" and "illocutionary act". Besides this, he gives us certain general clues to these ideas, which may be grouped under four heads :

(1) Given that we know the meaning of an utterance, there may still be a further question as to how what was said was meant by the speaker, or as to how the words spoken were used, or as to how the utterance was to be taken or ought to have been taken (pp. 98-9). In order to know the illocutionary force of the utterance, we must know the answer to this further question.

(2) A locutionary act is an act of saying something; an illocutionary act is an act we perform in saying something. It is what we do, in saying what we say.

(3) It is a sufficient, though not, Strawson thinks, a necessary, condition of a verb's being the name of a kind of illocutionary act that it can figure, in the first person present indicative, as what Austin calls an explicit performative.

(4) The illocutionary act is a "conventional act; an act done as conforming to a convention" (p. 105). As such, it is to be sharply contrasted with the producing of certain effects, intended or otherwise, by means of an utterance. This producing of effects, though it too can often be ascribed as an act to the speaker, is in no way a conventional act (pp. 120-1).

"... The use of language with a certain illocutionary force, that it may... be said to be conventional in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula (p. 103). The remark has a certain authority in that it is the first explicit statement of the conventional nature of the illocutionary act..."<sup>7</sup>

### ILLOCUTIONARITY AND CONVENTIONALITY

Why does Austin say that the illocutionary is a conventional act, an act done as conforming to a convention? Strawson first mentions, and neutralizes, two possible sources of confusion. First, we may agree (or not dispute) that any speech act involves at least the observance or exploitation of some linguistic conventions, and every illocutionary act is a speech act. (The same conception on the conventionalism of language had Democritus, who considers the

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\* It was also very difficult to find an adequate meaning for this word: to bleach and alier the natural development of (a green plant) by excluding sunlight.

5 Cf. Katz, *Philosophy of Language*... p. 23.

6 Katz, p. 24.

7 loc. cit.



founder of this theory, of course his basis are very different from those of Austin)<sup>8</sup>

Second, we must dismiss as irrelevant the fact that it can properly be said to be a matter of convention that an act, for example, warning is correctly called by this name. For if this were held to be a ground for saying that illocutionary acts were conventional acts, then any describable act whatever would, as correctly described, be a conventional act. The contention that illocutionary force is a matter of convention is easily seen to be correct in a great number of cases. For very many kinds of human transaction involving speech are governed and in part constituted by what we easily recognize as established conventions of procedure additional to the conventions governing the meanings of our utterances.

"Thus the fact that the word 'guilty' is pronounced by the foreman of the jury in court at the proper moment constitutes his utterance as the act of bringing in a verdict; and that this is so is certainly a matter of convention that if the appropriate umpire pronounces a batsman 'out', he thereby performs the act of giving the man out, which no player or spectator shouting 'out !' can do..."<sup>9</sup>

Austin gives other examples, and there are doubtless many more which could be given, where there clearly exist statable conventions, relating to the circumstances of utterance, such that an utterance with a certain meaning, pronounced by the appropriate person in the appropriate circumstances, has the force it has as conforming to those conventions.\*

It seems equally clear that, although the circumstances of utterance are always relevant to the determination of the illocutionary force of an utterance, there are many cases in which it is not as conforming to an accepted convention of any kind that an illocutionary act is performed. It seems clear, that is, that there are many cases in which the illocutionary force of an utterance, though not exhausted by its meaning, is not owed to any conventions other than those which help to give it its meaning.

"Here is another example. We can readily imagine circumstances in which an utterance of the words 'Don't go' would be correctly described not as a request or an order, but as an entreaty. I do not want to deny that there may be conventional postures or procedures for entreating: one can, for example, kneel down, raise

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Frag.* 24 (Diels II, 148).

<sup>9</sup> Katz, p. 26.

\* Examples of illocutionary acts of which this is true can be found not only in the sphere of social institutions which have a legal point (like the marriage and the law courts themselves) or of activities governed by a definite set of rules (like cricket and games generally) but in many of our relations of human life.



one's arms and say, 'I entreat you.' But I do want to deny that an act of entreaty can be performed only as conforming to some such conventions"<sup>10</sup> We do not think it necessary to give further examples. It seems clear that, if at least we take the expressions "convention" and "conventional" in the most natural way, the doctrine of the conventional nature of the illocutionary act does not hold generally. Some illocutionary acts are conventional; others are not (except in so far as they are locutionary acts). Why then, Strawson asks, Austin repeatedly affirm the contrary.

It is unlikely that he has made the simple mistake of generalizing from some cases to all or fall the conclusion just like some logicians like to call it. We may recall that oddly qualified remark that the performance of an illocutionary act, or the use of a sentence with a certain illocutionary force, 'may be said to be conventional in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative\* formula (p. 103).

"Whatever it is that leads Austin to call illocutionary acts in general 'conventional' must be closely connected with whatever it is about such acts as warning, entreating, apologizing, advising, that accounts for the fact that they at least could be made explicit by the use of the corresponding first-person performative form."<sup>11</sup>

There are two points at which we shall apply this. One is the point at which Austin maintains that the production of an utterance with a certain illocutionary force is a conventional act in that unconventional sense of "conventional" which he glosses in terms of general suitability for being made explicit with the help of an explicitly performative formula. The second is the point at which Austin considers the possibility of a general characterization of the illocutionary act as what we do, in saying what we say. He remarks on the unsatisfactoriness of this characterization in that it would admit as illocutionary acts what are not such; and we may see whether the suggested analysis helps to explain the exclusion from the class of illocutionary acts of those acts falling under this characterization which Austin wishes to exclude. These points are closely connected with each other.

At the other end of the scale — the end, Strawson says, Austin began — we have illocutionary acts which are essentially conventional. The examples we mentioned just now will serve — marrying, pronouncing sentence, giving a verdict. Such acts could have no existence outside the rule — or convention governed practices and procedures of which they essentially form a part.

<sup>10</sup> K. Z., p. 27.

\* expression that serves to effect a transaction or that constitutes the performance of the specified act by the use of its utterance.

<sup>11</sup> K. Z. p.



"Let us take the standard in which the participants in these procedures know the rules and their roles, and are trying to play the game and not wreck it. Then they are presented with occasions on which they have to, or may, perform an illocutionary act which forms part of, or furthers, the practice or procedure as a whole; and sometimes they have to make a decision within a restricted range of alternatives, for example, to pass or redouble, to pronounce sentence of imprisonment for some period not exceeding a certain limit..."<sup>12</sup>

Between the case of such acts as these and the case of the illocutionary act not essentially conventional, there is an important likeness and an important difference. The likeness resides in the fact that, in the case of an utterance belonging to a convention-governed practice or procedure, the speaker's utterance is standardly intended to further, or affect the course of, the practice in question in some one of the alternative ways open, and intended to be recognized as so intended. We should not find such complications discouraging; for we can scarcely expect a general account of linguistic communication to yield more than schematic outlines, which may almost be lost to view when every qualification is added which fidelity to the facts requires.

### FINAL REMARKS

Acts belonging to convention-constituted procedures of the kind we have just referred to form an important part of human communication. But they do not form the whole nor, we may think, the most fundamental part. It would be a mistake to take them as the model for understanding the notion of illocutionary force in general (as Austin perhaps shows some tendency to do when he both insists that the illocutionary act is essentially a conventional act and connects this claim with the possibility of making the act explicit by the use of the performative formula.)

It would equally be a mistake, as we try to point out, to generalize the account of illocutionary force: for this would involve holding, falsely, that the complex over intention manifested in any illocutionary act always includes the intention to secure a certain definite response or reaction in an audience over and above that which is necessarily secured if the illocutionary force of the utterance is understood.

Nevertheless, we can perhaps extract from our intent of two contrasting types of case something which is common to them both and to other types—if any—which lie between them. For the illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is intended to be understood, and the understanding of the force of an utterance in all cases involves recognizing what may be called broad-



ly an audience-directed intention and recognizing it as a wholly overt, as intended to be organized.

It is perhaps this fact which lies at the base of the general possibility of the explicit performative formula; though, extra factors come importantly into play in the case of convention—constituted procedures. Once this common element in illocutionary acts is clear, we can readily acknowledge that the types of audience-directed intention involve may be very various and, also, that different types may be exemplified by one and the same utterance. It is not hazardous that the best way of communication we have is our language; so it is a milestone to clarify (as better as possible) its proper and correct use.

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# Sufism

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## A. PHILOSOPHY

### 1. Etymology and Meaning

The word 'Sufi' means literally 'woolen' and by extension wear of wool. Woolen dress was associated with spirituality in Pre-Islamic times. Prophet Mohammad also said, "The Moses was clothed entirely in wool when God spoke to him." The word was first applied to small group who wore wool, and then extended to all the mystics, whether they wore wool or not.

The word, 'sufi' may also have emerged from the word 'safi' (pure). A sufi is one who keeps his heart pure.

Most commonly, sufi or wool or woolen garment is considered to be an emblem of purity, simplicity and austerity. Thus a spiritual or godly person who wore such a garment was called a 'sufi'. These persons, as early as 8th century A. D. preached some special doctrines, beyond what was given in at Quran, although they were Muslims through and through. They also interpreted some Ayats of Al-Quran in their own mystical or philosophical way. Thus their cult, a progressive off-shoot of Islam was called sufism. The emphasis in it was on mysticism rather than ritualism.

### 2. The Birth of Mystic Idealism

Mysticism is an eternal yearning for the human soul to have direct experience of the ultimate reality. This basic quest has been common to all religions of the world.

In Islam, the birth of mystic ideal was due to several factors.

- (i) A group of believers (Ahali Sufa) with strong religious emotions went beyond the rituals and ceremonies. Even Prophet Mohammad had a band of 70 followers who stayed with him in the mosque and practised Zikr (reciting the name) continuously.
- (ii) Islamic mysticism was also a reaction against over intellectualism and formalism. A lead was given by Al-Qushairi (1965 A. D.).



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- (iii) Many who were not satisfied with formal and static aspect of religion, sought for higher religious values, they said 'You cannot see God in *Kanz* or *Hidayat*. Look into the mirror of your heart, for there is no look better than this'.
- (iv) The Umayyad Imperialism, shook the religious sentiments of some Muslims, who thought Islam has not come to build empires. They also did not approve of *Jihad*. and aggression as against peace for which Islam stood. They wanted (a) personal spiritual prayers coupled with (b) service to humanity through contemplation and service.

## 3. Quranic Base of Mystic Ideology

Although it is observed that in course of time when Sufism spread to other countries, many extraneous ideas entered it, but it is fairly well established that beginning of the ideology can be traced back to the Quran.

- (i) The Quran contains a number of verses explaining Sufi concepts including Divine Love (Mohabbat) unity of Being (Wahdat-ul-Wajud) Gnosis (ma'rifat) Remembrance (Zikr) need of a spiritual guide (pir) spiritual allegiance (ba'yt).<sup>1</sup>
- (ii) Prophet himself occupied a pivotal place in mysticism, He was a mystic. Some 70 persons, known as Ahl-i Suffa, lived in his mosque and prayed day and night. He himself was the teacher of the three paths—  
(a) the external law (shari'at) (b) the mystic path (Tariqat) and the gnosis (Haqiqat).

Some scholars trace the origin to Greece and connect the visit of Plotinus to Iran during the time of Nausherwan. But this has least validity.

## 4. External Influence

Muslim saints of Iraq and Iran formed a distinct cult of sufism inside the broader religion of Islam. The extraneous influence of the neighbouring religions is very clear.

- (a) It is a historical fact that the cultural contacts between Iran and India existed wide and deep in the 8th century A.D. or as early as the reign of Emperor Nausherwan. Scholars of both lands exchanged thought and Indian Vedantic thought influenced Muslim thought as a result of the cultural exchange. The influence of Vedanta and Indian philosophy is quite evident in Sufism."<sup>2</sup> Besides,

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<sup>1</sup> 'Islam' by Panjabi University, Patiala, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Sufism had compassion towards animals. Razia Begam was a vegetarian. Beasts would surrender to her. Abu Sujun (716-777) would give away bread to a dog rather than eat it himself. He would buy and release a caged bird. Sahl (815-896) of Khuzestan, had affinity with animals. He would feed wild beasts and lions that would come from forest to his house.



the emphasis on Non violence (not taking meat)<sup>3</sup> contentment, austerity and pacifism can be traced to Buddhism.

Some scholars believing sufism as a result of personal mystical experiences of a certain group of spiritual Muslim devotees, has an independent origin. Spiritual advancement need not necessarily be borrowed, but can be the result of personal effort. But the connection of Sufism with Vedanta is so evident, that we cannot dismiss the extraneous influence on Sufism. Great Sufis like Rumi and Mansur believed in the immanence of God, rebirth and transmigration of soul in the line of Vedanta, and also expounded essential unity of all religions. Rebirth is a concept which is foreign to Islam. While music is prohibited, Rumi introduced 'Sama' a devotional dance on the line of Hindu Kirtan. Mansur was executed because he declared 'Anal Haq' (I am the truth) on the Vedantic lines. Bayazid, Attar and Juniyad, and many other sufi saints made statements exactly like the Mahavakyas of Upanishads. Attar said, 'verily I am God, there is no God but me'.<sup>4</sup>

### 5. Reaction Theory

According to some scholars Sufism grew as a reaction against the prevailing practices of Islam. The hostile attitude of Umayyad Caliph (Khalifa) created pessimism in the minds of a class of Muslims, who took recourse to contemplation and meditation. They became mystic saints, attained some divine powers like yogis of India, and lived a complete austere life. Poverty was considered to be an aid to mysticism, and affluence as a hinderance. There was a clear distinction between the sufi path and the common Muslim path.

The Quran gave importance to rituals (like the five obligations) and the Sunnat (reason). But Sufis did not get any satisfaction through these and they attached more significance to the activities of the inner self. Theirs was the mystic path, to obtain knowledge

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3 Bistani of Khurasan announced 'Glory be to me. How great is my majesty.' In meditation he saw the tree of oneness (ahadiyya) realised; "All that is illusion. It is myself what-is all that." Compare it with (*Aham Brahmasmi*' Also) Trishanku said, I cut the tree of life. My majesty is supreme.'

4 Bistani propounded the theory of total destruction of the empirical self (Fana) in God, as is taught in upanishads. He advocated Pranayam also. Al-Junaid also propounded unification with God. Mansur said, 'An al Haq, I am truth' Shibli would cry, 'who is there in both the worlds, but I.'? Al-Arabi talked about pure Monism, wahdat-ul-wajud the unity of truth. He identified absolute with Zat (essence). He also reached the Shiva-Shakti aspect, when he said, Reality was both father and mother. Rumi and Al-Arabi gave too much stress on love or devotional aspect.



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in communion with God. Their efforts were for 'Kashf' or illumination, the direct revelation from God through contemplation and meditation.

The Jihad campaign of some politically motivated Muslim leaders also brought forth a reaction 'Islam is not for building empires', they said.

### 6. Hierarchy of Spiritual Paths in Sufi Philosophy

(a) Islam incorporates three paths for the fulfilment of the goal of life viz.

- (i) The external Law—Shari'at.
- (ii) The Gnosis—Ma'rifat and Haqiqat.
- (iii) The Mystic path—Tariqat—Sufism emphasises, the third path i.e. Tariqat.

(b) Sufism accepted the following teachings of Islam in toto, and built a new edifice on the basis of mystic experiences :

- (i) Divine Love—Mohabbat.
- (ii) Unity of Being—Wahadat-ul Wajud.
- (iii) Gnosis—Marifat.
- (iv) Remembrance—Zikr.
- (v) Need for spiritual guide—Murshid or Pir.
- (vi) Spiritual allegiance—Ba, Bayt.

### 7. Concept of God in Sufism

To Sufis God is absolute Beauty and Pure Being. He is everything, everywhere and pervades in all the beings. He is inside the human body and can be found in the journey of inward path self-realization, after tearing veil (Hejab) after veil which conceals God from man,

### 8. Goal of Life

The goal of life according to Sufism is the same as according, to Vedanta i.e. Self-realization, or realization of God in ones self, as God resides in the self. The sufi proclaims, 'I am Truth' (An-al Haq) or 'you are truth' (Haq-Tūi)<sup>5</sup>.

Beyond the worldly path (Qusi Nazul) there is the spiritual path (Qusi Aruf) i.e. from Pravrtti Marga to Nivrtti Marga. So they emphasised, 'look within (Dar Nazar Kun Jumla Tan Ra Dar Nazar Dar Nazar Rav Dar Nazar Rav Dar Nazar Haq ba Jan andar niban,

<sup>5</sup> Bistani said, 'Glory be to me. How great is my Majesty!' Compare, Ashtavakra's proclamation, 'Hail myself, homage to me' 'Aho Aham, Namō Mahyam Jesus said, 'I and my Father are one'.

So said, Rumi : "O pilgrims for the shrine, where go ye, where ? The beloved is here, come back, come back."

So said Saidi : "I am none else than thou, and thou than I. I am thy body, and thou art my soul. Let none say hereafter, I am other than thee, and thou other than I."



Jan ba dil andar nihan, andar nihan, andar nihan). The spiritual path is the path of renunciation (Tark) i.e. (Tyaga).

### 9. The Path of Self-realization :

Sufi state the following seven stages of the path of self realization :—

- (a) Service i.e. observance of law and service to God.
- (b) Deep love of God, i.e. devotion (Bhakti of Hindus).<sup>6</sup>
- (c) Renunciation of all worldly desires—Tark i.e. Anasakti or Tyaga of Hindus.
- (d) Knowledge, Ma'rifat i. e., CONTEMPLATION of the nature of God, attributes and works of God, i.e. Jnana Marg of Hindus.
- (e) Contemplation of God, culminating in ecstasy—saruri Javidane i.e. Parma Ananda of Samadhi.
- (f) Union with God i.e. seeing God face to face i.e. Visal or Istighbraq which means Yoga or Laya in Hinduism. It also compares with Safujya State in Bhakti Yoga.
- (g) Absorption in the essence of God, the eternal being, merging with God in the state of liberation, Najat.<sup>7</sup>

Another classification of stages of spiritual progress has been given as :

- (1) Purification (compare Shaucha in Yoga) includes abstinence, voluntary poverty, renunciation (Tark)<sup>8</sup> repentance of evil action (say Pashchatapa and trust in God (Iman, faith or Shraddha).
- (2) Devotion, which itself includes Love of God (Mohabbat) longing for God, intimacy with God, nearness to God, tranquility, contemplation, meditation and resignation to God.<sup>9</sup>

6 Here is famous exhortation of Ibn-al Arabi on Love: 'Love is the basis of all forms of worship. To worship is to love the object worshipped. But love is a principle which pervades all beings and binds them together. It is one universal kind although it appears a multiplicity in forms. It is an essential unity, the divine essence itself. Therefore, the highest and the truest object of worship, the highest manifestation in which God is worshipped is Love. I swear by the reality of Love that Love is the cause of all Love. Were it not Love residing in the heart, Love (God) would not be worshipped (of Fuses, 357 399).

7 The same thing as Rumi said, 'I have become you and you are I.

8 A sufi saint has said, 'Upon my head I bear a four-fold helm of four renunciations viz renunciation of (i) this world, (ii) the next world, (iii) personal teacher and (iv) renunciation itself.

9 These compare favourably with the various stages of Bhakti Yoga, where Prema, Parama Vyakulta, Samipya, Shanti, Ananyata and atma nivedanam have been discussed by Narada and other authorities on Bhakti Yoga. Devotion, Bhakti is called Tariqat in Sufism, while as Karma is called Shariat, Jnana is called Haqiqat.



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- (3) Deification includes certainty, illumination and realization—the last stage. It is the same as the seventh stage mentioned earlier, which is marked by liberation Najat.

It may be observed that austerity or abstinence was one of the greatest conditions of Sufi path. All Sufi saints, imposed object poverty on themselves, disregarded even the basic necessities of life (food, clothing and shelter). They were Sanyasis or Bhikshus, from that point of view. They were devoid of all possessions and would distribute among visitors if any body brought any gift.

A sufi despised any worldly ambition. He ridiculed the Islamic rulers who amassed wealth and built empires in the name of Islam. He gave in charity whatever he possessed.<sup>10</sup>

A sufi believed in two selves—firstly the empirical self or the Ego (Ahamkara of Vedanta) and secondly the mystic soul, the transcendental self (The Atman of Vedanta).<sup>11</sup> Annihilation of the lower self is the pre-requisite for merger with God. Ego is an obstacle in the path of God-realisation.

A sufi gives great prominence to Love.<sup>12</sup> He considers even the worldly love (Ishqi Majazi) as a stage for the realization of Divine Love (Ishqi Haqiqi). One who cannot experience pure and chaste worldly love, how can he profess pure and chaste Divine Love? A good number of Mystics, like Umar Khayyam, have been misunderstood when they burst forth with poetry with terminology of worldly love. These poets meant nothing short of Divine Love. They wrote love stories in poetry, which allegorically referred to the Divine Love (Viz Love stories of Laila and Majnoon, Shirin and Farhad, Yusuf and Zulaikha).<sup>13</sup>

Love of God is a thing of his choice. That is why a Sufi saint blesses with such words as :

10 It is said about Ibn-al' Arabi, that while he was in Damascus in a big house presented by the Governor of Asia Minor, a beggar approached him and asked if he could give him anything in the way of God. Sheikh Arabi bestowed him the same house and marched out.

11 Compare the two bird parable of Upanishads. Abu Wazid said, 'I cast off my ownself as a serpent caste off its skin, and then I considered my own self, and I found that I was he'.

12 Famous quotation of Ibu-al Arabi on love is given above, (cf. Path of Self-realization)

13 Jami a Sufi poet, states in his 'Yousuf Zulaikha': God plays hide and seek with his lovers. He vivifies a form and makes it appear more beautiful than the rest; we are drawn to it; but by the time we are there, he leaves it and goes to vivify another. And so the game goes on, form after form. He makes us pursue in search of him-self, till by chance, in our desolation, we get a glimpse of the very spirit of beauty.



"May God grant you his Love.  
May God make you his own."

According to Sufis love of God should be extended to the whole humanity, Service to man also is service to God, and hence love of God equals love of Humanity, without any distinction. (Recall story of Abbau Ben Adam, who loved humanity, and was put at the top of the list of persons who loved God) Abu Sujar (716-777) would give away bread to a dog rather than eat himself. He would buy a caged bird and release it. Sahl (815-896) of Khuzistan (Iran) had affinity with animals. He would feed wild beasts and lions that would come from forest to his house. So would Begam Rabi march in forests with a retinue of all types of wild animals'.

A Sufi will not make any distinction between high and low, man and woman, man of one faith and man of another faith. He does not make distinction as he showers love even among the pious and the evil. He acts as Khalil Jibran has said, 'The only good man is he who goes with every bad one'.

#### 10. Intense Ascetic path of Sufi Mystics

There is an intense path for disciples who want to become sufis themselves. This includes :

- (i) Reciting Allah loudly-Zikri Jihar
- (ii) Reciting silently-Zikri Khafi
- (iii) Regulating breath-Pasi-ul-nafs
- (iv) Absorption in mystic contemplation-Marqubah
- (v) Confirming in 40 days in deep contemplation Chillak.

Beside these, there are three supplementary practices viz. Sama and Qawali (something like Bhajan and Kirtan, group dance while singing or praying), celebration (urs) and community dinner (langer).

#### 11. Universal Faith

Sufis maintain a universal faith. All religions of the world lead to the same goal. Regarding antagonism among various religions they quote a story from Masnavi of Rumi: Four friends a Persian, an Arab, A Turk, and a Greek, while on an excursion found a coin and quarrelled over the fruit they must purchase with it. The Persian wanted 'Angur' the Arab 'Inab' the Turk 'Uzum', the Greek 'Astafeel' not knowing that these—four words denoted the same fruit-grapes.<sup>14</sup> In some philosophical principles sufi saints went

<sup>14</sup> Rumi has further stated about unity of faiths. "A Church, a temple or a Kaaba stone, Quran or Bible or martyr's bone. All these, and more my heart can tolerate. Since my religion now is love alone." Al-Arab also have given his conviction about unity of faiths in beautiful words:

"My heart has become the receptacle of every form. It is a pasture for gazelles (i. e. objects of love) and a convent for



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even beyond the accepted doctrines of Islam. Transmigration of soul and the theory of rebirth was proclaimed by sufi saints like Ahmad Ibni Safit, Ahmad Ibni Yabus, Abu Muslim of Khorasan, Sheikh-ul-Ishraq, Omar Khayyam etc. They also quoted Quran (i) Surat ul-Baqara, verses 61-92, (ii) Surat ul-Maidah, verses 55.

Sufi saints preached vegetarianism, as if influenced by Ahimsavad of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. Their principle of Vahdat-ul-Vajud or unity of reality is Advaitavad of Vedanta.

They justify many religions on the quotation of the holy Quran—*Alturqu al-alahi Kun Nufusu Bani Adam* i.e. 'There are as many ways to God as souls.'

Bulle Shah a Sufi poet of Panjab had a complete Advaitic vision. He saw God in all pervading spirit, in all and independently of all religions. Like a true Vedantin he sees Him not only in friends and believers but also in heathens and opponents :

"I have found, I have found something. My true Guru has made manifest the unmanifest. Somewhere it is an enemy. Somewhere it is a friend. Somewhere it is Majnu. Somewhere it is the disciple. Somewhere it is a thief, somewhere it is a bestower of gifts. Somewhere it is a mosque, somewhere it has become a temple. Somewhere it is a Vairagi in meditation absorbed, somewhere it becomes clad as sheikhs. Somewhere as Muslims reading prayers, somewhere a Hindu devotee repeating God's name"<sup>15</sup>

Such a vedantic concept was held by Bulle Shah, Bayzzid Al-Hallaj, Rumi, and many others in Iran and in India.

### 12. Sufi Philosophy in India

When sufi saints from Iran came to India in the 11th and 12th century A. D. and onwards, and when indigenous saints also rose, there was a prominent synthesis of Indian philosophy and Iranian sufism. This was virtually affected by such Indian sufi saints like a Farid-ud-Din Ganj-i-Shakar, Ali-Hujwain, Mian Mir, Dara Shikoh (son of superior Shah Jehan) and Abul Fazl and Fayzee (the two luminaries in Akbar's court). They captured and imbibed the following Hindu doctrines :

- (i) The doctrine of rebirth and transmigration.
- (ii) The Law of Karma.
- (iii) The Principle of Ahimsa (and thus abstaining from taking meat).

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Christian monks. And a temple for idols, and the pilgrim's Ka'ba. And the tablets for Torah and the book of Quran. I follow the religion of Love; whichever way it comes. For this is my religion and my faith."

<sup>15</sup> Bulle Shah ; Kanuni-Ishq (The Law of Love) Kafi. 55.



- (iv) The worship of deified God (Sagun Brahman) through pictures, idols, as an optional mode of worship (although this is forbidden in Islam).
- (v) The inclusion of musical 'Sama' like Kirtan.
- (vi) The essential unity of all religions, thus treating Islam at par with other religions and the Quran on a par with other holy scriptures.
- (vii) Equating Prophet Mohammad to the rank of other prophets.
- (viii) Accepting Mayavad of Shankara (by some Sufis) and holding the view that the world is an illusion or Maya and nothing is real except God.

### 13. Three Schools of Sufi thought in India

There grew three schools of thought :

1. The Orthodox school : The Sufis of this school believed in conversion of one faith to other, and they hold Quran in highest esteem.
2. The philosophical school : They were nearest to vedanta, preaching the path of contemplation and self-knowledge, and denouncing all rituals and dogmas.
3. The popular school : They synthesised the beliefs of various faiths in India, and accommodated other prophets also in the list of prophets.

### B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SUFISM :

Development of Sufism can be viewed in five stages :

1. First phase, 600. A.D. to 750 A.D. the early beginning stage.
2. Second phase, 750 to 900. A.D. the formative stage.
3. Third phase 900-1300 A.D. the climax stage.
4. Fourth phase, 1300 onwards in Iran.
5. Fifth stage, 110 A.D. onwards in the Indian soil.

#### 1. First Phase 600 to 750 A. D.

We know Prophet Mohammed migrated to Madina in 622 A.D. what is called 'Hijrat'. He himself was a mystic and thus he can be named as the first Sufi. He lived in a masque with 70 persons known as Ahli-Suffa, and prayed day and night. After the departure of Prophet in 632 A.D., Islam spread in Iraq and other neighbouring countries. Islam Hasan Basri (642-728) was the first sufi saint who hailed from Basra (capital of Iraq). Basra produced another great sufi saint Rabia (717-801) who is the first outstanding woman saint and mystic. She emphasised love for the sake of love, and not for going to heaven or any selfish gain. She was a vegetarian and beasts would surround her. Swami Vivekanand, during his tour in America referred to her many times.<sup>18</sup>

Abu Sujan (716-777) was highly compassionate towards animals. He would give bread to a dog, rather than take it himself. Abu Abdullah Sufiyon (715-778), belonged to the same period.



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In this way 4 centres of sufism developed, viz Macca, Medina, Basra and Kufa (the two cities of Iraq). Mysticism now spread to Iran and Khurasan.

## 2. Second Phase. formative stage, 750 to 900 A.D.

Abu Yazid Bistani of Khurasan (also called Bayazid) belonged to the 9th century A. D. His revolutionary proclamation 'Glory to me, how great is my majesty shocked his contemporaries. In meditation, he saw the tree of oneness (ahadiyya) realised. He propounded the theory of total destruction of empirical self (Fena) in God, (compare it with the principle taught in Upanishada). He advocated Pranayama also.

Mansur al Hallaj (857-922) proclaimed An-Al-haq. He was imprisoned for 9 years in Bagdad, and hung on gibbet after merciless tortures,

Mansur believed in incarnation (*hulul*). He wandered through India also and acquired knowledge of Vedanta.<sup>17</sup>

Sahl (815-896) of Khuzistan (Iran) had affinity with animals. He would feed wild beasts and lions that would come from forest to his house.

In the 8th century A. D. Ibrahim of Balkh (730-778) spread sufism in Balkh, Nishapur and Khurasan. Ibrahim's conversation with Khalifa Harun al-Rashid is interesting. Muhasibi (781-837) also worked in Bagdad. His nephew Juniad (810—) defined many concepts of Sufism and propounded unification with God. Shibli (859-946) was chained and put into mental asylum. Formative stage of sufism ends with Shibli.

## 3. The Third Phase Climax of Sufism in Iran

We know about Firdausi (932 1020) of Gazni who was disappointed by the king, after he wrote Shahnama. Abu Sai'd Fazlu'kah

16 Her prayer is note wrothy :

O my Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of hell,

Then burn me in Hell fire.

If I worship Thee from hope of paradise,  
exclude me from paradise.

But if I worship Thee for Thine own sake

Then with-hold not from me Thy eternal beauty.

Rabia would also take fire in one hand and water in the other.  
Fire to burn heaven and water to extinguish it after the heaven  
is burnt.

17 Mansur's quotation given below is famous :

"I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I.

We are two spirits swelling in one body.

If thou see'sts me, thou see'sts Him".

18 Ansari says similarly :

"If thou cast walk on water, thou art no better than a straw.  
If thou cause fly in air, thou are no better than a fly.

Conquer thy heart, That thou mayest become somebody".



(967-1024) of Khurasan lived like an ascetic in a mosque. Asadi and Ansari (1006-1089) of Herat were poet mystics. Umar Khayyam of Nishapur (1022-1123) was a poet, philosopher astronomer and mystic. Farruk (1038—) wrote a panegyric of Sultan Mohd of Gazni. Mohammad Ghazali (1055-1111) of Bagdad was an outstanding scholar, mystic and saint. He wrote a number of works. Sheikh Abdul Qadri Jilani (1078-1166) established his own school called Qadriya order.

The most outstanding mystic of this age is Ibn-al Arabi (1165-1240). Born in Spain he settled at Damascus. He wrote mystic poetry and 25 works. He is famous for his doctrine 'Unity of Reality' (Wahdat ul-wajud). He held Monism like that of Shankara. He propounded unity of faiths, and the doctrine of Divine Love. Suhrawardi (1097-1168) was a disciple of Ghazali. Attar (1147-1220) of Nishapur, Nizam (1140-1202), come next. Yusuf-ul-Hamdani (1140—) of Hamdan originated his own school 'Khawajgan'. Sheikh Saidi (1184-1292) wrote *Gulistan* and *Bostan*, two famous literary treasures of didactic poetry. After Sheikh Shihab-ud-Din Sukrawardi (1145—) and Kubra (1145-1201) of Khwarazm, we have the next outstanding mystic Maulana Jalalu'd Din Rumi (1207-1273) with his title (Takhalus) 'Shamsi Tabrez'. He was born at Balkh, migrated to Quaniya, went to Damascus in 1246, and died in Quniya. He wrote *Diwan* which contains *gazzals* and *Rubaias*. He then wrote his masterpiece *Masnavi* in 6 books with 26600 couplets. He declared Divine Love as the highest, believed in rebirth, Karma and unity of faiths.

#### 4. Fourth Phase of the Silsilahs or School of Sufism

The last and the most significant phase in the rise of special schools (orders) called *silsilahs*. These schools were founded by veteran Sufis in the 11th and 12th century, but these grew on account of the followers. Iran, Iraq and Turkey constitute a vase area. Bagdad in Iraq, Damscus in Turkey, Hirat, Turkistan and Chist in Iran became strong centres. Tabriz Hamdan, Shiraz, Nishapur, Basra, Tirmiz, Ghazni and Chist became— famous because of great Sufi saints who lived there. The five most important *Silsilahs* that grew were :

1. Qadiriya Silsilah, whose founder was Gilani (1077-1166) but which was perpetuated by Sufis like Hamdani (1140—) and their teachings went to Morocco, Egypt, Turkistan and India.
2. Khawajgan Silsilah founded by Khwaja Ahmed Atta Yasin (1166) and followed by Attar, Gajduwani (—1220) etc.
3. Naqshbandi Silsilah, founded by Bahaud-Din Naqshband (—1389) and developed by Jami and others.



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4. Suhrawardi Silsilah was founded by Najib Abdul Qadir Suhraward (1087-1166) a disciple of Ghezali and developed by Shahabud-Din Suhrawardi (1145-1234) and others.
5. Firdausi Silsilah was founded by Saif ud-din of Bakharaz (near Herat) and followed by other Sufis. He was respected by Mughal rulers.
6. Shattari Silsilah was founded by Bistani of the 9th century and followed by Shah Abdulla, etc.
7. Chishtiya Silsila is one of the most important Silsilah as it grew in India, being founded by Khwaja Mu'n-Ud Din Hasan Sifzi of Chisht (Iran) who came to India during the reign of Prithviraj and set up a Chishti mystic centre at Ajmer. The order was perpetuated in India by Sheikh Hamid-ud-din Bakhtiyar Kaki (1236) and others.

## Importance of Silsilahs :

1. With the rise of special schools (Silsilahs), Sufi mysticism travelled far and wide.
2. Large scale establishment of 'Khanqahas' (Monasteries or Ashramas) took place, which provided shelter to many mystics and worked as a platform for spiritual discussions.
3. Strict discipline was maintained in Khanqahas and elaborate rules were laid down for the inmates to regulate the life of the Muslims.
4. Sama, Urs and Langar, attracted the common men in its fold.
5. Through the Khanqahas dynamic and progressive elements entered the social structure of Islam both in Iran and in India.

## 5. Vth Pase : Advent of Sufism in India

Mohammad bin Qasim is the first Muslim invader in India. His invasion in 710 A.D. only paved way to mutual communication between Hindus and Muslims. After Sultan Mahmud's conquest of Multan (between 1004), some sufis settled there. Khatali sent his disciple Zinjani whose disciple Hajwiri became famous in Panjab, and settled in Lahore, till his death (1067). He was called Data Ganj Baksh (distributor of treasure). His disciple Khwaja Mu'in'ud Din Chishti came to India during the region of Prithvi Raj and settled in Ajmer. He was born in Sistan, brought up in Khurasan. Born in 1141, he died in 1236 at Ajmer at the age of 95. He gave rise to his own cult in India, and attained a great fame and popularity among Hindus and Muslims both. His motto is known 'Develop river like generosity, sun like affection and earth like hospitality.' His miracles at Ajmer are well known. All Mughal rulers paid visit to his Khanqaha during their time.<sup>19</sup>

Sheikh Faridu'd Din or Baba Farid (1174-1265) settled in Ajodham (Pak pattan or Sutluj). His teachings in Panjabi verse have been incorporated in Adi Granth of Sikhs.

19 He said, 'Hajis walk around Ka'ba, but the Arifs circumambulated the heart.'



Sheik Nizam ud-Din Auliya (1238-1324) was the most popular mystic of his time. He settled in Delhi. Amir Khusro (1253-1325) was his disciple. Khwaja Ziya Nakhshali was Baba Farid's another popular disciple, followed by Khwaja Qutabu'd-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki.

Saiyad Muhammad bin Yusuf at— Hussain, popularly known as Khwaja Banda Nawaz or Gisu Daraz (1321—) worked in South.

In the Suhrawardi Silsilah Sheikh Bahaud-din Zakaria, and Shaikh Jalal-ud-Din Tabrizi worked in India. In the Firdausiya Silsilah Sheikh Saifu'd-Din Bakharazi deserves mention, Sheikh Ahmed 'Abdul-Haq worked in U. P. He died in 1434. Mir Saiyed Ali Hamdani (1314-1385) came to Kashmir in 1381 alongwith 700 sufis. Sheikh Shahab ud Din Suhrawardy was responsible for organising Khanqaha, centres of Islamic study and work, governed by a Trust call Waqf.

Sufi saints gave rise to Hindi poetry on sufi lines. Mallik Mohammad Jayasi, wrote Padmavat, an allegory connecting human Love with Divine Love. Usman and Qutaban wrote similar poetry in Hindi.

Makhdum Lal Shahbaq Qalandar, one of the disciples of Zakaria, carried Sufi teachings to Sindh. Sayyed Talat Bukhari also settled in Sindh. Ismailiya Sect became popular in Gujrat. Sadr-ud-Din compared Brahma Vishnu and Shiva to Mohammed, Ali and Adu. Sufi monastaries have been built all over India and amongst the various schools *Chisti school* is permanent.

### C. THE SUFI YOGA :

#### I. Yogic Discipline in Islam

##### 1. The fundamental doctrines of Islam are :—

- (i) Resignation to God.
- (ii) Union of the will of man with the will of God.

##### 2. For resignation to God, human effort is needed in the following form :

- (i) Purification of the self from worldly desires, mental defects and selfish motives. Here starts something like Chitta Vritti Nirodh and curbing or attachment.
- (ii) Physical ascetism like fasting for 40 days, and reducing the body to submission. This is like. (Tapas, Titiksha, Sham and Dam).
- (iii) Frequent, deep and prolonged meditation, which was latter recommended by mystics.

It might be recalled, Prophet Mohammad himself observed solitude in a cave for years together, and had a vow of silence. This is a prelude to meditation.

3. Islam also discouraged material prosperity. Mohammad himself did not believe in materialism (as of today). He found



## Sufism

contradiction between material desires and presence of God. He said, poverty is my pride.'

4. All sufi saints and aspirants adopted this doctrine of poverty and gave up wealth and pursued a simple life.

5. Islam also recommended the constant thought or remembrance of God (Zikr) as the means of union with God (Taqid) so that all the qualities of human nature would vanish (fana). This principle resembles closely with Nirvana of Buddha. As per this principle, man is lost in God. God continues but not man. This resembles the Sayujya state in Bhakti Yoga, or Leenavastha as the final goal of the life. In Vedanta, a ripple merges in ocean, a rivulet merges in the river, air in a balloon merges in atmosphere, and so does jeevatma merge with Paramatma.

6. The above spiritual tenets were actively adopted by a special group of Muslims in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, who wore a woolen garment as a mark. Some of them found their way to India and here they settled as Sufi Muslim saints. They adhered to strict self-control, control of desires, celibacy, simple living bordering to poverty, and meditation—a sort of ascetism and Sanyas.

7. In respect of ascetism, we have clear evidence about Prophet Mohammad himself. When Prophet Mohammed migrated to Madina in 622 A. D. (what is called Hijrat) he lived in a mosque., with 70 persons known as 'Ahli-Sufi and prayed day and night. This was the first evidence of ascetism in Islam.

## B. ADVENT OF SUFI YOGA :

8. 10 Indian Sufi saints adopted and learnt Hindu meditation methods. They also adopted the western Iranian practice, like wandering about with a musical instrument and singing devotional songs.

9. Sufi meditation developed as a result of introduction with Hindu Yogis—Buddhist Yogis, Vajrayani Siddhas, Hatha Yogis and Tantriks. But sufi meditation had a wider connotation. It meant also 'loveliness i.e. looking at the cosmos as a loving creation of the Divine, with old barren reasons divorced (Omar Khayyam verse 60), He suggested :

"Look with love and Divine intoxication of the wine will come".

So said, Maulana Roomi :


'Into my heart's night

Along a narrow way.

I groped and lo the light,

An infinite land of day'.

Love was the cardinal principle of most of the sufi saints like Al-Arabi Roomi, Saidi, Shible, Rabia etc,





## C. CHIEF ASPECTS OF SUFI YOGA :

10. Sufism has much in common with Vedantē. The doctrine of identity with God—Min-ul haq is the same as the Pancha Mahavakyas in upanishads or the chief motto of Shankara—Aham Brahmasmi. Shankara's EKD Brahman Jagan Mithya (there is but one God, and all else the universe, is an illusion) is the same as An-al-haq. Sufism further preaches the doctrine of Divine love—'Ishqe Haqiqi'. Here it coincides with our para-Bhakti. When we combine both these, we approach the Yoga taught in Geeta. Here Lord Krishna not only communicates Divine knowledge to Arjuna, but also emphasises one pointed devotion and love of God. Otto and Ranade call this synthesis of Jnana and Bhakti as 'Advaita Bhakti'. Sufi Sadhana is identical with such an 'Advaita Bhakti'.

11. In the form of actual Sadhana or religious practice, Sufi Yoga has many (stations and levels).

(a) The seven stations-Al-Sarraaj are :

- (i) Conversion from religion to the resolution to achieve.
- (ii) frame compare Bhakti Prema Rupa as emancipated by Narada.

The relation of sufism with Advaita will be discussed later.





# The Role of Analysis In the Development of Philosophical Thought

*Rajyashri Agrawal*

In this paper I am giving the role of analysis in the development of philosophical thought with special reference to logical analysis. In 1921, Wittgenstein wrote,<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thought. Philosophy is not a Doctrine but an Activity." Within a few years this view was widely circulated. It was adopted by logical empiricists and it developed in the form of linguistic movement. Thus, analysis has come to occupy an important place in the twentieth century philosophy.

But analysis as the method of philosophy, or the idea of clarification of thought, is nothing new. Analysis has always played an important role in the development of philosophical thought. Since the time of Plato, all the great philosophers made use of the method of analysis in order to provide solution to intricate philosophical problems, and also in order to bring clarity in thinking. Socrates was primarily concerned with answering such questions as, what is knowledge? What is justice? etc. It may be asked whether this is the only aim that philosophy can legitimately have? Why should it be so restricted? According to logical empiricists, because all other avenues of knowledge are thought to be pre-empted, a philosopher is directed to conceptual or linguistic analysis as the only field which he can profitably explore.

This conceptual analysis is also not new. Ayer, the advocate of logical empiricism, himself remarks that it is already implicit in the famous passage of Hume with which he concluded his book. An

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<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, P. 4.112.



**Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.** Hume writes,<sup>2</sup> "when we run over the libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and experience? Nor Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number? No; commit it then to flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." But Hume does not apply his criterion to his own philosophy. Indeed, the main business of Hume was concepts, with which he was concerned, not only to analyse but also to harness to the profit of his Scepticism.

Although there were some shortcomings in the argument of Hume and logical empiricists criticize him on the same, in fact, they are greatly influenced by him. The assumptions on which Hume was relying were taken up by the logical empiricists and embodied in what came to be known as the principle of verifiability, or the verification principle. This principle is expressed in the famous slogan that "the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification".

But it was not only Hume who had this credit, before Hume the credit goes to Locke and Berkeley too. For Locke, Epistemology should be the starting point and centre of all philosophical discussions. In his famous work 'An essay concerning Human Understanding'. Locke writes.<sup>3</sup> "Before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our abilities and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with". In response to this challenge, he wrote his 'Essay concerning Human Understanding'. In order to discover what is the origin of our ideas, to show what is the certainty, the evidence and the extent of our knowledge, to compel philosophy to abandon what surpasses human comprehension by making the limits of its capacity. In his view, language is the 'great instrument' of knowledge. 'Word' and 'Ideas' are 'closely connected. Locke devoted himself to the purely analytic tasks of definite knowledge and classifying propositions and displaying the nature of material things.

After Locke, it was Berkeley whose revolutionary philosophy of language, for the first time, systematically challenged the traditional assumption that all words are or should be used as signs of our ideas of things, and that any significant discourse must be regarded as a statement of fact about the nature of things. Berkeley never denied the Reality of material things but he denied the adequacy of Locke's analysis of notion of a material thing. Berkeley maintained that to

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2 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. XII, Part III.

3 Epistle to the Reader in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.



say of various "ideas of sensation" that they belonged to a single material thing was not to say that they were related to a single unobservable underlying 'somewhat' but rather that they stood in certain relations to one another. But, Berkeley committed the mistake of supposing that what was immediately given in sensation was necessarily mental. Berkeley criticized Locke because he asserted the existence of unobservable underlying entity of 'somewhat'. But he also asserted the existence of 'God' as a cause of ideas, which also is an unobservable entity.

Hume found that it is all due to the 'theory of causation' that Locke believed in 'somewhat' or Berkeley believed in 'God'. Thus Hume criticized the theory of causation itself. He affirmed that all events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They are conjoined, but never connected. According to Hume, we call one object Cause, the other Effect. We suppose that here is some connection between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity. But there is nothing in a number of instances, except only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. Hume asserted that "the necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in object; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies".<sup>4</sup> Though Hume does not actually put forward any view concerning the nature of philosophical propositions themselves, but those of the works which are commonly accounted philosophical are, apart from certain passages which deal with questions of Psychology, works of analysis.

Although English Empiricism has great importance in the development of philosophical analysis as it is foreshadowed of empiricist philosophers, it was Russell and Moore primarily around the turn of the century who challenged decisively the predominant philosophical views of the period and took the first giant step towards a new conception of Philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Ayer and Urnson<sup>6</sup> also regard Russell and Moore as the co-founders of the movement of analysis. They were against idealism, but they were not in complete agreement as to what is wrong with Idealism. Though Idealism was rejected by philosophers before Russell and Moore, but before Moore there was no philosopher who had concentrated his critical attack

4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Part III Sec. XIV, PP 165-166

5 Ammerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy, P. 3.

6 Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, P. 34 & Urnson, Philosophical Analysis, P. 4.



with such intensity upon the meanings of the metaphysical propositions which were advanced by the Idealists.

Though Russell has had a greater influence than Moore, not only in the world at large, but also through his purely philosophical writings, it was Moore, who was chiefly responsible for the restriction of philosophy to analysis. Analysis plays an important role in determining the character of Moore's philosophical views. Moore is a common sense philosopher and ordinary language philosopher. Accordingly, his method of analysis is based upon common sense appeals and in ordinary everyday language. He uses analysts not for the discovery of new facts about the universe but for the clarification of the concepts.

Moore makes his position very clear regarding the nature of analysis in 'A Reply to his Critics'. In his usage both analysandum and analysans must be concepts or propositions, not mere verbal expressions. Analysandum is what is to be analysed, and analysans is which does the analysing. Moore gives several examples of what he calls analysis. In his opinion the concept 'being a brother' is identical with the concept : being a male sibling'. In making this assertion, he is giving an analysis of the concept 'being a brother', and if his assertion is true, he is giving the correct analysis of this concept. In another way he gives the same analysis of the same concept by saying that the propositional function 'X is a brother' is identical with the propositional function 'X is a male sibling'. There is also a way in which the same analysis may be saying that to say a person is a brother is the same thing as to say that the person is a male sibling.

Another salient feature of Moore's analysis is his defence of Commonsense. Commonsense believes that there are at least two different kinds of things in the Universe—enormous number of material things and a very great number of mental acts of consciousness. In commonsense view, both material objects and acts of consciousness are in space and time. Accordingly, Moore affirms that all material objects, at any given movement, are situated somewhere or other in something which we call space. Likewise all material objects, all the acts of consciousness of ourselves and other animals upon the earth are in time.

Moore's refutation of idealism is based upon the commonsense view of the world. He refutes the internality of relations, which is accepted by the idealists in one way or another. He holds that 'some relations are purely external' and that "in the case of many relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter of fact; that the things in question might have existed without having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, seems to me to be the most important that can be meant by saying that



some relations are purely external". Thus the basic principle of idealism is false because it "flies in the face of commonsense".<sup>7</sup>

Bertrand Russell is another important philosopher of the analytic movement. The method of analysis is the fundamental event in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Although Russell and Moore are regarded as the co-founders of the analytic movement, their methods of analysis are quite different from one another. Russell was greatly influenced by Logic and Mathematics. In his philosophy, analysis comes in the form of 'theory of description'. By a description, he means a phrase of the form 'the so and so' or some equivalent form. In his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy he asserts that a description may be of two sorts, definite and indefinite or ambiguous. An indefinite description is a phrase of the form 'a so and so' and a definite description is a phrase of the form 'the so and so', in the singular. In philosophical analysis, by the term 'description', he means 'definite description', a phrase of the form 'the so and so'.

His assumption is that the meaning of a name is to be identified with the object which the name denotes. Anything that could be mentioned, was said by him, to be a term. Any term could be a logical subject of a proposition; and anything that could be the logical subject of a proposition could be named. This is the theory of description.

One of the great merits of Russell's theory of description, as Prof. Ayer says, is that it does throw light upon the use of a certain class of expressions in ordinary speech, and this is a point of philosophical importance.<sup>8</sup> For Russell and Moore, analysis, whether by means of the techniques of symbolic logic or by an appeal to ordinary languages, was primarily an instrument to sharpen and to clarify philosophical problems. The writings of Russell and Moore were to prepare the solid ground for the next more extreme phase of the revolution.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was the first anylast who argues the more extreme thesis that metaphysical questions are not questions at all. They are from their very nature unanswerable. In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all. According to Wittgenstein, we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but only can establish that they are nonsensical.

<sup>7</sup> Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, P. 289.

<sup>8</sup> Ayer, *Language Truth and Logic*, P. 23.



Wittgenstein divides all the meaningful propositions into tautologies, contradictions and propositions (by propositions, he means, true or false empirical propositions).

"Propositions show what they say; tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing."

"A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true, and a contradiction is true on no condition."

"Tautologies and contradictions lack sense."

"The sense of propositions is its agreement or disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of state of affairs."

Thus it is asserted, "a tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible".<sup>9</sup>

Although logical empiricism was not exclusively an outgrowth of Wittgenstein, some ideas of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* are endorsed by logical empiricists. Regarding the method of analysis, it is clearly assumed that he used this method only for the removal of misunderstanding, whereas logical empiricists use analysis not for the removal of cramps but for the clarification of conceptual confusions.

Contemporary analyst, Mr. Strawson, divides analysis into therapeutic and systematic. Warnock in his article entitled *Analysis and Imagination*, following Strawson, divides analysis into the same kind of divisions. Therapeutic analysis, as the title shows, cures the mind of its afflicting puzzles. Wittgenstein is the exponent of this type of analysis. According to him, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."<sup>10</sup> Systematic analysis, on the other hand, describes concepts and speech-forms systematically. The analysis of logical empiricists is mainly systematic, although it is at the same time therapeutic as it attempts to undo the knots of our thinking.

All logical empiricists are united in saying that all metaphysical propositions are meaningless. On this point they agree with Wittgenstein that metaphysical questions are unanswerable for they are not questions at all. All meaningful propositions are either (1) analytic or formal, or (2) empirically verifiable. The propositions which are neither analytic nor can be verified even in principle are devoid of sense. Such propositions are called 'pseudo propositions'. Rudolf Carnap, one of the major figures of logical empiricism, defines metaphysical propositions in such a way that they claim to represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all knowledge.

<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.003, 4.461, 4.2, 4.464 accordingly.

<sup>10</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, para, 109, P. 47.



Logical analysis has influenced contemporary philosophical thought to a large extent. Gilbert Ryle, John Wisdom, WVO Quine, John Austin are examples of this influence. The influence of logical positivism, however, did not come to an end with the demise of the circle. The ideas circulated by the founder positivists became topics of discussion throughout the world. By insisting that all metaphysics is nonsense, positivism eliminates religion automatically since most religions include theology and theology is considered as a kind of metaphysics. Positivism, from its beginning, had found many sympathetic listeners in the United States. Thus the original doctrine of Vienna Circle, the doctrine of positivism, has often been combined with the tradition of American Pragmaticism. Pragmaticism and positivism have always shared many features. There are some philosophers who have been able to write both traditions simultaneously. WVO Quine is an excellent example of an original thinker whose writings clearly show the influence of both positivism and pragmatism upon his thinking.

Gilbert Ryle and John Wisdom are two other important philosophers who are greatly influenced by logical analysis. Although they differ in many respects from one another or from logical empiricists, they shared a common interest in the analysis of ordinary forms of speech. The major work of Ryle is the *Concept of Mind*, which clearly shows the influence of logical analysis. The mental-physical dichotomy has dominated metaphysical speculation since the time of Descartes. Ryle attempts to show that this dichotomy is the result of a basic confession about our use of mentalistic terms. The writings of Ryle have been enormously influential in spreading interest in the methods of linguistic analysis.

John Wisdom was a student of Wittgenstein. He has given an original and exciting new kind of philosophical procedure to logical analysis. Though he rejects metaphysics by saying that it is mere nonsense, he also attempts to understand why metaphysicians talk in their linguistically odd ways?; why they feel compelled to talk in such ways? Wisdom puts stress upon the imperfect similarities between various kinds of statements in our language, and, according to him, that is the main reason why the metaphysicians are compelled to talk in their linguistically odd ways. John Wisdom tries to discover what is not valuable in the various attempts to solve metaphysical questions.

Some philosophers do not agree with Wittgenstein's view that there is no proper role for the philosopher beyond dissolution of linguistic confusions. These linguistic confusions are due to misunderstanding of the logic of our language. P. F. Strawson, who is the most discussed analyst, argues that there is no antithesis between

11 Ammerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy, PP. 8 9.



linguistic analysis and a certain kind of metaphysics. He distinguishes metaphysics into two kinds; Descriptive Metaphysics, which only attempts to describe the conceptual boundaries of our language, and Revisionary Metaphysics, which attempts to revise them. In 'An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics', Strawson attempts to show that, among other things, certain general conclusions about the world can be gained from an analysis of how we speak. According to Amermerman,<sup>12</sup> this is the very thing that Wittgenstein was saying that could not be done.

John Austin, another important philosopher, was also greatly influenced by logical analysis. He believed in the analysis of ordinary usages, whose function is to analyse the language which is spoken by ordinary people. Like Wittgenstein and Wisdom, he attempts to show that the great deal of metaphysicians is not so much false but it is misleading and confused. Although the procedure of Austin for dispelling this confusions is unique, he made few general pronouncements about the import of implications of his grammatical investigations. He speaks for the need of 'a science of language', and attempts to show that such a science will supersede a great deal of what is now done by analytic philosophers. Though in his analytic philosophy, Austin has general similarities to Wittgenstein, he differs from Wittgenstein as he never endorsed Wittgenstein's speculations about the ultimate fact of philosophy.

In this way, analysis has always given a useful and worthy programme for philosophy. Although the practice of analysis is not something new for philosophy, since all the great philosophers in the history of philosophy were interested in genuine philosophical analysis, it cannot be denied that contemporary analysis has given a new direction to analysis in the logical field of philosophy.

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12 Ibid. P. 12.



## IV

## Liberty—The Destiny of Simone De Beauvoir

*Ivanka Rainova*

When on the 14th April, 1986, at the hospital "Cochin", died the last representative of the "Saint Existentialistic Family", the French press qualified the personage of Mme Simone de Beauvoir in a quite different way: "a grand dame of the French literature", leaving "a great empty space" (F. Leotard); "a huge moment in the progressive thought" of France (G. Marchais); "a big intellectualist", "a post-modernist" (C. Prevost); a vulgarisator of Sartre's theses" (C. Jannoud); a force "that makes you realise your own weakness" (G. Gennari); "a symbol of engagement" (League of Women's Rights); "a significant feminist" (J. Greco); "a free woman confronted against slavery" (C. Serre); "a symbolic mother" (J. Savigneau). It seems as if the opinion prevailed that her decease marked "the end of an epoch" (J. Chirac, J. Lang, B. Poirot-Delpech). But an epoch in what? Who was Simone de Beauvoir, on whom a tens of books and a big number of articles were written still during her lifetime? Which is the basic problem that dominates in her creative work and determines her life, allowing a real new giving sense and estimation of her deed? Such are in brief the questions to which we shall try to give an answer with the present article.

If for the subjective, i.e. for the existential thinker the stages of thinking must follow the stages of personal experience, then this is—as we shall see—especially characteristic of Simone de Beauvoir.

Born on the 9th January, 1908, Simone grows up in a big bourgeois family. Her father, a lawyer in the seat of Paris, owned a shoe factory. Her mother educated her sternly and sent her to the catholic boarding school "Desir". But the temperance, inherited by her father, a non-believer, helps Beauvoir to get rid of



faith quite early, and later on thanks to the surroundings in which she happens to be, to break with her family. Still fifteen years of age she rejects religion: "I was an excessive extremist in order to live under the eyes of "God", she says in her first autobiographic novel (1, 192). The realisation of godlessness in the world determines in basic lines her further way of thinking and of life.

After finishing the middle school she wins the second place (after Sartre) in the competition for a philosophy lecturer. This happens in the for her decisive 1929, the year of her fateful meeting with Sartre: "I knew that he would never step out of my life," she later confesses. (1, 490).

In the Sorbonne she gets acquainted with a whole generation of future philosophers and intellectualists, that left behind a lasting trace in French thought of the XXth century. During the thirties, with the exception of Sartre, she was essentially influenced by P. Nizan, C. Audry, G. Poritzer, R. Aron, J. Hippolyte, Merleau-Ponty, S. Weil, E. Mounier, C. Levy-Strauss and others. From Herbaud she receives the nickname Castor (beaver), with which Sartre tenderly names her in his letters and in his dedications to "Being and Nil" and "Critics of the Dialectical Mind". This nickname "Castor" was shaped on the basis of the homophony of the English word 'beaver' and her family surname 'Beauvoir' (1,459). In French jargon it also means 'a young sailor' — a quite fitting by-name for her tempestuous life and numerous journeys described in her memoirs.

Beauvoir forms herself many sidedly just during the thirties: in 1931 she becomes a lecturer in Marseille; in 1932 she is moved to Rouan; in 1934 she stays for ten days with Sartre at the French Institute in Berlin and gets superficially acquainted with the ideas of the Husserlian phenomenology and existentialism; in 1936 she is promoted and appointed as a teacher in the Paris lyceum "Moliere"; she travels with Sartre to Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco and what is the most important — she makes her first steps in the field of literature. In spite of the fact that Polhan helps with the publication of some short stories of hers, her first novel "When the Spiritual Wins" is being rejected in 1938 by the publishing house "Grace" and appears hardly in 1979. It is disputed whether Beauvoir has indeed buried this first failur "with a smile", as she expresses it herself (2, 375), but doubtless is her ambition to continue her darings in the field of literature, to which she entirely devotes herself. As a result, in 1943, her first novel "The Lady-Guest" is issued, winning an enormous success. In succession follow the novels "The Blood of the Others" (1944), "All People are Mortals" (1949), "The Mandarines" (1954), that acquired the Goncours prize, "A Quite Tender Death" (1964), "The Beautiful pictures" (1966), "A Bent



Woman" (1968), the play "Unnecessary Months" (1945), the essays "Pyrrus and Cineas" (1944), "For a Moral of Ambiguity" (1947), "The second Sex" (1949), "Privileges" (1955), "Existentialism and the Wisdom of Nations" (1963), the travel notes "America by day and night" (1948), and the essay on China "The Long March", the autobiographical novel "Memoirs of a Decent Girl" (1958), "In the Bloom of Age" (1960), "The power of Things" (1963), "The Old Age" (1970), "The balance" (1972), "The Ceremony of Partings" (1981). Since 1945 she actively collaborates also with the magazine "Modern Times", around which are grouped Camus, Beckett, Vian, Sarraute, Queneau, Moravia, Ponge, Soupault, Blanchet, Leiris, Genet and others, and which she is heading after Sartre's death (1980).

It is clear how difficult it is to esteem such a rough and all sided creative work, but up to a point this is possible if seen through the prism of the basic topic piercing it—liberty. Not incidentally Beauvoir herself says that "art, Literature, philosophy are an attempt for a new creation of the world upon a determined liberty of man, the liberty of the creator", which makes it necessary "at first to set ourselves as liberty, in order to justify such a pretension" (3, II, 637). Thus on the one hand liberty is a condition, a basis and aim of every creation and on the other hand—it is the only explanation of *any* creation.

Comprehending liberty in the perspectives of existentialism Beauvoir proceeds from the basic positions, elaborated by J. P. Sartre in "Being and Nil" (1943) and "Existentialism is Humanism" (1946). In the first work Sartre examines liberty as an initial ontologic characteristic and differentia specifica of man: "Human's liberty foregoes the essence of man and makes it possible (...). Man does not exist *from the beginning*, in order to be free *afterwards*, because there is no difference between man's being and his 'free being'." (9, 61). Man is free, because his consciousness is an activity—it is an intention towards... (objects, people, the world) and is a free choice. Because "choice and consciousness are one and the same thing", it follows that the fundamental act of liberty is a choice—"it is a choice of me myself in the world" (9, 539). But similarly to Nietzsche, putting his moral "beyond the good and the evil", Sartre derives his conception "beyond egoism and altruism" (9, 720) declaring that "people are sentenced to hopelessness, because they realise that all activities are equivalent (...). So, that it is all the same whether you will get drunk or will govern the people" (9, 723). The absurdity of man, that found its expression in the thought the "man is a needless suffering" (9, 708) makes in fact the reasonings upon the freedom of choice superfluous, after every activity is previously predestinated by Sartre to a failure. Coming across with a great many of criticisms Sartre tries to soften these



ultimate conclusions in "Existentialism is Humanism", relating freedom and choice with personal responsibility and engagement. As far as he does not admit God's existence and also the existence of whatever determining principle, as much "man is condemned to be free" (10, 37). Thus for Dostojevski "if God does not exist, everything would be allowed" but for Sartre and Beauvoir, on the contrary—just because God does not exist, man is responsible, and his throwing away implicates the choice of his own being (10, 49; See 4, 23). But choosing himself, man "chooses all people" (10, 25) and that is why he is responsible before all of them. Something more—we can never choose the evil, because we always choose the good and nothing could be good for us without being good for all" (10, 25-26). The abstractness of this 'humanism' is clear and Sartre himself admits reluctantly that man not always chooses the best, that he can choose fascism, so that it becomes "the human truth, but the more evil for us (10, 53-54).

Towards shading off of these controversies of Sartre's existentialism are directed the theoretical works of Beauvoir: "For a Moral of Ambiguity" and "Existentialism and Wisdom of Nations".

By far more important in this respect are the delimitations she makes between "existence" and "authentic existence" on the one hand; and "liberty" and "liberation" on the other. Of course she says, "every man is initially free, in as far as he is spontaneously directed towards the world (...) but this movement would not justify an end, that has not been chosen" (4, 36). To choose liberty means "to perform a transition from nature to morality, basing upon the primary choice of our existence an authentic liberty (ibid.) In this sense to be moral and to be free is one and the same thing (10, 35), and that is why in any activity man must make a conscious choice, as liberty is realised singly by engaging himself in the world" (4, 110). In other words liberty is freedom of self creation, of the authentic existence and valuables. Man is not a God's creation, he is the choice of his being and he himself makes himself such a one, what he is. In this sense the Beauvoirian "moral of liberty" is ambiguous, implicating a positive and a negative moment: affirmation, a choice of something and denial of the contrary. Ambiguity is an imminent characteristics of man—he can choose the best, the authentic existence, but also the evil, the untruthful being. Herein lies the risk of the human venture, because real are both life and death, loneliness and connection with the world, liberty and slavery. "We have Stalingrad and Buchenwald and neither of them removes the other one" (4, 14), remarks Beauvoir. But whatever be the risks of future catastrophes, "we are free today and at that absolutely, if we choose to desire our existence in its extremity, open towards the unending",—the important is everyone to have real feelings of love, true revolts, true desires (4, 222 223).



In the last chapter of "Existentialism and Wisdom of Nations", entitled "Eye for eye", Beauvoir starts with Babeuf's words, that "but cutthroats have created bad habits" and reminds the nazist yoke (5, 109). It is absolutely necessary to punish the real criminals, she says, so as to affirm liberty itself too; "because punishment means admitting man to be free both in the evil and in the good, means to differentiate the evil from the good in applying human liberty, means to wish the good". (5, 143).

Putting liberty in the centre of the existentialistic teachings is also all the "wise" that nations could achieve. Against the attacks of existentialism, considered as a teaching that ignores the greatness of man, that describes only his misery and represents the most obscure doctrine, Beauvoir points out: "The definition of man as liberty has always been adherent to the optimistic philosophers" (5, 35-37). On the contrary, people who do not like the risk are afraid of liberty and therefore are afraid of a teaching that puts liberty on the first plan (5, 34). Together with this realisation of ambiguity of the human's fate saves, according to Beauvoir, the disappointments, ensuing from the "cultur towards false idols" (5, 47).

In more concrete and more vivid forms these two ideas find an expression in Beauvoir's novels and in her essay "The Second Sex".

Her first novel "The Lady-Guest" still represents a story on self-consciousness of a girl (Francoise) as freedom and choice of herself. Francoise invites a lady-guest, Xaviere, who in the following proves to be unbearable. Xaviere draws her friends away, impedes her freedom and torments her conscience. That is why Francoise decides "to get rid" of her. With this decision of hers she brings back her own freedom, because "at last she had made her choice herself" (7, 137). But not only the rescue from nuisances gives guarantee for the individual freedom. In "All People are Mothers" as also later in "The Mandarines" and "Memoirs of a Decent Girl", Beauvoir gets rid of the idea of God, that depresses her: "I have no need of him, she thought, raising up her head again (...) I am alone, I am strong, I have all done what I wanted to" (6, 19).

The real, personal contribution in the existentialist elaboration of the conception of liberty outlines itself in "The Second Sex", an attempt to reveal the real situation of the woman from antiquity till contemporaneity and outlining the directions of her emancipation. According to Beauvoir since Biblean times the woman (thought to have been created from Adam's rib) has not been looked at as an autonomic being, but has always been defined in respect of him: "She is defined and differentiated in relation to the man, but not he in relation to her. She is the non-essential, erected in front of the essential. He is the Subject, the Absolute: she is the Other One" (3, I, 15). Even in the loftiest image of the Other One, a "Truth,



Beauty, Poetry, she is everything (...), everything except she herself" (3, I, 375). Independently of the beautiful myths for the woman, she has always been "if not a slave of the man, then at least his vassal; the two sexes have never shared the world equally between them" (3, I, 20). The woman is economically and socially dependent on the man and even when she tries to free herself by working, she rarely succeeds as a result of the legal remuneration of the work. Most generally the subjugation of the woman by the man is expressed in this, that she, being also a subject, an activity, is changed into a poor passivity (3, II, 602). "In order to be a complete individual, equal to the man, the woman must have access to the world of men, so as the man has access to the world of the woman, to have access to the Other One." (3, II, 603). But this does not happen, because the man always places himself "the only subject: the imperial conqueror" (3, II, 608). The role that is assigned to her is to surrender obediently, to be simply an appendage to the man's world. Nobody admits her liberty. "In France, Beauvoir says, the free and the light woman are stubbornly mixed up." (3, II, 610). But not only men and the society as a whole deny the woman's liberty, women themselves forge their chains (3, II, 617), accepting to be appendages to the men—enamoured victims, wives, mothers, mistresses, secretaries, etc., instead of becoming conscious of accepting the burden of their own existence (3, X, 650). That is why, according to Beauvoir, "one is not born a woman: one becomes a woman" (3, II, 13). She must build up herself as a woman, because it is not nature that determines the woman, it is she who determines the nature, so that "rejecting one's femininity means to reject one's human share" (3, II, 601). Followingly one must admit the common ontological structure between the two sexes and to realise the woman "for herself"—as a liberty.

In spite of some extremities (denying motherhood for example) the positive in Beauvoir's conception is the examination of the women's emancipation not only as a woman's deed, but also as a duty of the whole mankind, without the making true of which it could not realise itself. "When slavery of the one half of mankind is abolished (...), mankind will acquire its authentic significance", says Beauvoir in agreement with the thought of Marx that the immediate, natural, necessary attitude of man towards man, is the attitude of the man towards the woman, from the character of which his self-realisation as an ancestral being, as a man, is determined (3, II, 662).

Thus, striving for the liberty and independence of every man Beauvoir opposes everything that could hinder, though even for a while, the self-determination of the personage. That is why, according to Claude Roy, the French scientists receive in the person of



Simone de Beauvoir a better lesson on "how to live", than any philosophical faculties or the catholic schools could give (8, 11).

But if one is not born a woman, but becomes a woman, he is even less born from his beginning as a free one. Because liberty is not brought only to the choice and the thought. From the very beginning the individual is depending on the world in which he was born and in this sense liberty is a realised necessity (Spinoza Hegel, Marx). So, thrown away in life, and later on in death, the man has not always the right of choosing, or at least he is not so free as Beauvoir could wish.

Indeed, with her death philosophy did not loose anyone of its original thinkers. But the history of philosophy and literature lost a witness, a part of the living history of existentialism, a fate, out-living itself by its own laws.

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## V

# The Value of Science

Francisco Zuniga

### INTRODUCTORY WORDS

The purpose of the present work. "The value of Science", is to present (in an abbreviated way) the most outstanding moments played by Science in its development constituting its real and definitive value.

Of course, this is not easy, because any simplification we do it will be incomplete; so, the work itself is going to be a consideration into what did some scientific geniuses in order to improve Science and (at the same time) mankind welfare. Obviously, we will not discuss the details of scientific discovery.

Our lines are going to be to close with Whitehead's *Science and Modern World*, because we considered this book a very good analysis on the role played by Science and its value since its not really known origin to our cybernetical world.

We will begin our work by talking about the origins of modern science. Next we will point out what Whitehead calls "the century of genius"; without entering upon a chronicle of the various stages of intellectual advance included within the sixteenth century but just mention the outstanding representatives of this epoch.

In section three we will refer to the eighteenth century as the complete antithesis to the Middle Ages. Lavoisier's insuperable efforts in chemistry; Maupertuis and Lagrange achievements; and Galvani and Volta electric discoveries.

In section four we will point out how nineteenth century was derived from three sources: the romantic movement; the gathering advance of science (which opened avenues of thought); and the advance in technology — which completely changed the conditions of human life.



As final remarks we will talk about the impact of science on modern world. We have consulted Huxley, Einstein, Stevenson, Frankena; but our main debt is with Dr. Kemeny's *A Philosopher Looks at Science*. In these conclusions it is our object to consider the wrong use of some scientific discoveries and their consequences in the future of mankind.

### THE ORIGIN OF MODERN SCIENCE

There have been great civilizations in which the peculiar balance of mind required for science has only fitfully appeared and has produced the feeblest result. For example, the more we know of Chinese art, of Chinese literature, and of Chinese philosophy of life, the more we admire the heights to which that civilization attained. For thousands of years, there have been in China — acute and learned men patiently devoting their lives to study, as Whitehead adds: "Having regard to the span of time, and to the population concerned China forms — the largest volume of civilization which the world has seen. There is no reason to doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual Chinamen for the pursuit of science. And yet Chinese is practically negligible. There is no reason to believe that China if left to itself would have ever produce any progress in science. The same may be said of India. Furthermore, if the Persians had enslaved the Greeks, there is no definite ground for belief that science would have flourished in Europe. The Romans showed no particular originality in that line. Even as it was, the Greeks, though they founded the movement, did not sustain it with the concentrated interest which modern Europe has shown."<sup>1</sup>

Anyway, we all know that on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean there was a very flourishing school of Ionian philosophers, deeply interested in theories concerning nature. Their ideas have been transmitted to us enriched by the genius of Plato and Aristotle. The Greek genius was philosophical, lucid and logical. The men of this group were primarily asking philosophical questions. Their minds were infected with an eager generality. They demanded clear, bold ideas, and strict reasoning from them. All this was excellent, it was genius; it was ideal preparatory work. But it was not, science as we understand it. The patience of minute observation was not merely so prominent. Whitehead says: "Their genius was not so apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense which precedes successful inductive generalizations. They were lucid thinkers and bold reasoners. Of course there were exceptions, and at the very top: for example, Aristotle and Archimedes,"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Whitehead, A. N. *Science and Modern World*, New York, 1950, p. 9.  
<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 11.



Certainly from the classical Greek civilization onwards there have been men and indeed groups of men, who have placed themselves beyond the acceptance of an ultimate irrationality. Such men have endeavoured to explain all phenomena as the outcome of an order of things which extends to every detail. Genius such as Aristotle, or Archimedes, or Roger Bacon, must have been endowed with the full scientific mentality, which instinctively holds that all things great and small are conceivable as exemplifications of general principles which reign throughout the natural order.

But until the close of the Middle Ages the general educated public did not feel that intimate conviction, and that detailed interest, in such an idea, so as to lead to an unceasing supply of men, with ability and opportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search for the discovery of these hypothetical principles. Either people were doubtful about the existence of such principles, or were doubtful about any success in finding them, or took no interest in thinking about them, or were oblivious to their practical importance when found. Whitehead comments : "For whatever reason, search was languid, if we have regard to the opportunities of a high civilization and the length of time concerned. Why did the pace suddenly quicken in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ? At the close of the Middle Ages a new mentality discloses itself. Invention stimulated thought, thought quickened physical speculation, Greek manuscripts disclosed what the ancients had discovered. Finally although in the year 1500 Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the year 212 B.C., yet in the year 1700, Newton's Principia had been written and the world was well started on the modern epoch."<sup>3</sup>

The Reformation and the scientific movement were two aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant intellectual movement of the later Renaissance. The appeal to the origins of Christianity, and Francis Bacon's appeal to efficient causes as against final causes, were two sides of one movement of thought.

The mind of Europe was now prepared for its new venture of thought. It is unnecessary to tell in detail the various incidents which marked the rise of science. Whitehead mentions : the growth of wealth and leisure; the expansion of universities; the invention of printing; the taking of Constantinople; Copernicus; Vasco da Gama, Columbus; the telescope..."<sup>4</sup>

The soil, the climate, the seeds, were there, and the forest grew.

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3. Ibid. p. 8.

4 Ibid. p, 23.



## THE CENTURY OF GENIUS

From their first efflorescence in the classical civilization of the ancient world, though the transformations which they underwent in the Middle Ages, up to the historical revolt of the sixteenth century, three main factors arrested attention: the rise of mathematics, the instinctive belief in a detailed order of nature, and the unbridled rationalism of the thought of the later Middle Ages. Whitehead says: "By this rationalism I mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which would thereby determine how things acted and functioned."<sup>5</sup>

The historical revolt was the definite abandonment of this method in favour of the study of the empirical facts of antecedents and consequences, in science it meant the appeal to experiment and the inductive method of reasoning.

The explicit realization of the antithesis between the deductive rationalism of the scholastics and the inductive observational methods of the moderns must chiefly be ascribed to Bacon; though, of course, it was implicit in the mind of Galileo and of all the men of science of those times. But Bacon was one of the earliest of the—whole group, and also had the most direct apprehension of the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was in progress. Whitehead adds: "Perhaps the man who most completely anticipated both Bacon and the whole modern point of view was the artist Leonardo Da Vinci who lived almost exactly a century before Bacon."<sup>6</sup>

But between all the names that we must mention (though the list will be incomplete): Galileo, Descartes, Huyghens, Newton. The issue of the combined efforts of these men has some right to be considered as the greatest single intellectual success which mankind has achieved. In estimating its size, we must consider the completeness of its range. It constructs for us a vision of the material universe and it enables us to calculate the minutest detail of a particular occurrence.

Galileo took the first step in hitting on the right line of thought. He noted that the critical point to attend to was not the motion of bodies but the changes of their motions. Galileo's discovery is formalized by Newton in his first law of motion: every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line except so far as it may be compelled by force to change that state. Whitehead says that "this formula contains the repudiation of a belief which had blocked the progress of physics for two thousands years."

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 57.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 62.



It also deals with a fundamental concept which is essential to scientific theory; I mean the concept of an ideally isolated system ""<sup>7</sup>

This conception embodies a fundamental character of things without which science, or indeed any knowledge on the part of finite intellects, would be impossible.

The great forces of nature, such as gravitation, were entirely determined by the configuration of masses. Thus the configurations determined their own changes, so that the circle of scientific thought was completely closed. This is the famous mechanistic theory of nature, which has reigned supreme ever since the seventeenth century. It is the orthodox creed of physical science. Furthermore the creed justified itself by the pragmatist test. It worked.

No picture, however generalized, of the achievement of scientific thought in this century can omit the advance in mathematics. Here as elsewhere the genius of the epoch made itself evident. Whitehead adds: "Three great French men, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, initiated the modern period in geometry. Another Frenchman, Fermat, laid the foundations of modern analysis, and all but perfected the methods of the differential calculus. Newton and Leibniz, between them actually did create the differential calculus as a practical method of mathematical reasoning."<sup>8</sup>

When the century ended, mathematics as an instrument for application to physical problems was well established in something of its modern proficiency. Modern pure mathematics, if we except geometry, was in its infancy, and had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to make in the nineteenth century. But the mathematical physicist had appeared, bringing with him the type of mind which was to rule the scientific world in the next century.

### THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Middle Ages were haunted with the desire to rationalize the infinite: the men of the eighteenth century rationalized the social life of modern communities, and based their sociological theories on an appeal to the facts of nature.

The common sense of the eighteenth century, its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering, and of the obvious demands of human nature, acted on the world like a bath of moral cleansing. Voltaire must have the credit that he hated injustice, he hated cruelty, and he hated senseless repression. Furthermore, when he saw them, he knew them. In these supreme virtues, he was typical of his century, on its better side.\*

7 Ibid. p. 68.

8 Ibid. p. 81.

\* Cf. Maurois, A. *Voltaire*, This is an excellent biography of this French genius. This paragraph (and other) is the product of



Based on it Whitehead comments : "But if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. The age had its limitations; yet we cannot understand the passion with which some of its main positions are still defended, especially in the schools of science, unless we do full justice to its positive achievements. The seventeenth century scheme of concepts was proving a perfect instrument for research."<sup>9</sup>

This was chiefly in the sciences of rational dynamics, and chemistry. So far as dynamics and physics were concerned, progress was in the form of direct developments of the main ideas of the previous epoch.

In the second half of the century. Lavoisier practically founded chemistry on its present basis. He introduced into it the principle that no material is lost or gained in any chemical transformations. This was the last success of materialistic thought, which has not ultimately proved to be double-edged. Chemical science now only waited for the atomic theory, in the next century. Whitehead adds : "I will however, endeavour to explain the main point of a joint achievement of Maupertuis and Lagrange. Their results, in conjunction with some mathematical methods due to two great German mathematicians of the first half of the nineteenth century, Gauss and Riemann, have recently proved themselves to be preparatory work necessary for the new ideas which Herz and Einstein have introduced into mathematical physics. Also they inspired some of the best ideas in Clark Maxwell's treatise."<sup>10</sup>

They aimed at discovering something more fundamental and more general than Newton's laws of motion. They wanted to find some wider ideas, and in the case of Lagrange some more general means of mathematical exposition. It was an ambitious enterprise, and they were completely successful.

Meanwhile Galvani and Volta lived and made their electric discoveries; and the biological sciences slowly gathered their material, but still waiting for dominating ideas. Psychology, also, was beginning to disengage itself from its dependence on general philosophy.

In the realm of practice, the age produced enlightened rulers, important institutions and the humanitarian principles of the French

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reading in past years, which was not undertaken with any anticipation of utilization for the present purpose. Accordingly it would not be impossible for us to give references to our sources for details, even if it were desirable to do so. But there is no need: the facts which are relied upon are simple and well known.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 87.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 89.



Revolution. Also in technology it produced the steam engine, and thereby ushered in a new era of civilization. Undoubtedly as a practical age the eighteenth century was a success.

### THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

What is peculiar and new to the century, differentiating it from all its predecessors, is its technology. It was not merely the introduction of some great isolated inventions. It is impossible not to feel that something more than that was involved.

In the nineteenth century, the process became quick, conscious and expected. The earlier half of the century was the period in which this new attitude to change was first established and enjoyed. Whitehead says that the greatest invention of the nineteenth century was "the invention of the method of invention". A new method entered into life. In order to understand our epoch we can neglect all the details of change, such as radios, telegraphs, railways spinning machines, etc. We must concentrate on the foundations of the old civilization.

The whole change has arisen from the new scientific information. Science, conceived not so much in its principles as in its results, is an obvious storehouse of ideas for utilization.

One element in the new method is just the discovery of how to set about bridging the gap between the scientific ideas, and the ultimate product. It is a process of disciplined attack upon one difficulty after another. The possibilities of modern technology were first in practice realized in England; accordingly, the industrial revolution started there. Whitehead adds: "In the past human life was living in a bullock cart; in the future it will be living in an aeroplane; and the change of speed amounts to a difference in quality."<sup>11</sup>

The transformation of the field of knowledge, which has been thus effected, has not been wholly again. At least, there are dangers implicit in it, although the increase in efficiency is undeniable. The discussion of various effects on social life arising from the new situation is reserved for our conclusions. For the present it is sufficient to note that this novel situation of disciplined progress is the setting within which the thought of the century developed.

One of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity pervading all space, even where there is an apparent vacuum. Also in the seventies of this century, some main physical sciences were established on a basis which presupposed the idea of continuity. On

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 142. We must take into account that Whitehead quotation was made in the first quarter of this century; if now he wouldn't mention aeroplane any more but a much more sophisticated aerospace vehicle.



## The Value of Science

the other hand the idea of atomicity had been introduced by John Dalton (to complete Lavoisier's work on the foundation of chemistry). This is a great notion. Ordinary matter was conceived as atomic: electromagnetics effects were conceived as arising from a continuous field.

The influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry. The living cell is to biology what the electron and the proton are to physics. Apart from cells and from aggregates of cells there are no biological phenomena. The cell theory was introduced into biology contemporaneously with, and independently of, Dalton's atomic theory. The two theories are independent exemplifications of the same idea of atomism. The biological cell theory was a gradual growth, and a mere list of dates and names illustrates the fact that the biological sciences, as effective schemes of thought, are barely one hundred years old. Whitehead adds: "Bichat in 1801 elaborated a tissue theory: Johannes Muller in 1835 described 'cells' and demonstrated facts concerning their nature and relations: Scheiden in 1838 and Schwann 1839 finally established their fundamental character. Thus by 1840 both biology and chemistry were established on an atomic basis. The final triumph of atomism had to wait for the arrival of electrons at the end of the century."<sup>12</sup>

The astronomers had shown us how big is the universe. The chemists and biologists teach us how small it is. When the century entered upon its last quarter, its three sources of inspiration, the romantic, the technological and the scientific had done their work.

### FINAL REMARKS

What is the value of Science? Where does all the scientific progress lead us? What can science tell us about the future of Mankind? Unfortunately, to answer these questions we need much more information than we now possess. But when questions touch us so deeply, how can we resist guessing?

Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for our peace of mind, the predictions as to our long-range prospects are very unreliable. They are long range, some of the information available is very rough, and many of the theories needed are in their infancy. As an example, let us ask whether the discovery of atomic energy will have a favourable or unfavourable effect on human history in the foreseeable future.

In spite of the hundreds of articles written in our magazines by experts, we must confess that we cannot evaluate the factors sufficiently accurately to say which the case is. The social sciences are far from being able to make accurate predictions, the facts are all not known, and very likely the mathematical problems are staggering.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 146.



Leading social scientists notwithstanding, the best predictions are no more than unfounded guesses; and when we come to such all important questions, your guess is as good as the expert's.

Science will provide all the means necessary for a heaven on earth, but how mankind will use them we cannot tell. Not only is science progressing, but this progress is getting to be more and more rapid. Dr. Kemeny says that Newton would have had little trouble grasping the science of the century after his death, but today every scientist must keep up with the latest periodicals in order not to be hopelessly out of date.<sup>13</sup>

There is no question as to whether, any space travel will be possible within this century; the question is only what use will be made of this and other developments? Will the new discoveries be used to kill millions and degrade the human stock, or will they be used for the betterment of all mankind?

A philosopher of science cannot help observe that the progress of physical science has gotten way ahead of our social progress, both scientific and ethical. And there is every indication that this will continue, unless a concentrated effort is made to promote the study of man and his goals.

Today we do not know the alternatives to choose from, and we do not even take the trouble to debate our various courses seriously. But can we be blamed for our neglect? Even if we decided which goal to work for, we would have no idea which path leads to our goal, and which to destruction.

No development of science alone will solve our great problems. Even if we give man all the means of achieving whatever goal he chooses, the final choice still rests with him. Science can but hope to present him with the alternatives clearly outlined, free from emotional slogans, free from superstitious misrepresentations. But beyond this, Science cannot tell man what is right and what is wrong. All the progress science can make throughout human history will be wasted if man fails to answer the eternal question correctly.\*

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\* Dr. Kemeny calls the last chapter of his book *Quo Vadis?* paraphrasing the biblical *Quo Vadis Domine?* Where do we go? Unfortunately, nobody really knows...



## VI

# On the Reconstruction of Early Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Nikolay Milkov

"The ideas of the great man are great only because they ceaselessly and clearly express what other people express incomprehensibly and unclearly".

L. N. Tolstoy<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Introduction

In this paper I shall try to show, that the above aphorism of L. N. Tolstoy, that may be found in one of the books, having influenced Wittgenstein extremely, may help us to explain the early philosophy of the latter in two ways: (1) On the one hand, it suggests that this philosophy only tries to express clearly what other people (and not only philosophers) have expressed unclearly. (2) On the other hand, it suggests us we should try to formulate clearly what Wittgenstein himself couldn't express explicitly by making reconstruction of his *real* theoretical assumptions.

In what follows, I shall try to apply these two suggestions in one single analysis. Actually, this is possible to be done only by the same method, by which Wittgenstein himself has analysed human knowledge. In the same way in which he tries to outline the ultimate scheme of human knowledge, I shall try to outline the ultimate scheme of this scheme. In the same way in which he tries to make a "synopsis" of all instances of the use of language<sup>2</sup>, I'll try to make a synopsis of all instances of his conceptual scheme, which

<sup>1</sup> L. N. Tolstoy. *How to read the New Testament*. In: *The Completed Works of Count L. N. Tolstoy, published Abroad*, St. Petersburg, 1907, v. 2, p. 15 (in Russian).

<sup>2</sup> See e.g. in this connection *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 43.



however, he failed to make explicit. So, the first task in this paper will be to make a new arrangement of the ideas of *Tractatus* and *Notebooks* 1914-16.

It is a well-known fact, that Wittgenstein's manner of writing remains unchanged in the years 1913-1951 : he carefully records his new ideas, and after that strives to make them a good synopsis: to select the more important ones and to give them a new arrangement. All this shows the Wittgenstein was conscious of the fact that the ideas, which he put down obeyed the one and the same logic, were built in the one and the same system, were (unconsciously, before his rearrangement) arranged in the one and the same scheme, which he strived unceasingly to demonstrate explicitly. The most telling testimony of his strife is *the attempt* to build such a system in *Tractatus*. Further, we have all reasons to suggest, that the principle motive for Wittgenstein not to publish his ideas while still living after 1929 was just he fails to construct and demonstrate their "real" scheme.

So, in spite of the fact that Wittgenstein realized that there is such a scheme, that in fact implies all his particular statements, he didn't realize clearly its structure. And my task in this paper will be to give the *real* scheme of the theoretical assumptions from which result all statements of *Notebooks* and *Tractatus* and even to show in some places all relevant statements that were not formulated by himself in this period or are formulated much later merely because he didn't notice them : in the same way the table of the chemical elements predicts the existence of still unknown elements. By the way, such a scheme to a great extent would be also a key for clearing up of the extremely entangled, chronologically and logically, writings of the late Wittgenstein, as long as the theoretical assumptions of the early Wittgenstein are theoretical assumptions of the late Wittgenstein. The gap between the two Wittgensteins was dug to a great extent by Wittgenstein himself because of his failure to comprehend the *real* logic of his ideas of 1914-18<sup>3</sup>.

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At the bottom of the real scheme of Wittgenstein's philosophy there are some simple philosophical assumptions and the most important among them is the acceptance of the subject and the world as separated. At that, the subject is related to the world in two ways—in space and in time. This relation is realized in a form of creative work which means that the subject makes copies (pictures) of the world in the form of propositions, theories, etc., with the

3 A similar interpretation can be found in A. Kenny. *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1984, in particular in ch. I of the book.



help of which it tries to abolish the difference between itself and the world.

## 2. The relation between the subject and the world in space.

This type of relation assumes the form of relation of belief to proposition. "In space", because according to Wittgenstein "the spatial multiplicity is also logical multiplicity" (*Nb*, p. 136), i.e. the processes that take place in our minds when we see a spatial figure, its "configuration", does not differ substantially from the processes (and their "configuration") taking place in our minds when reasoning logically. "That in the symbol, which symbolizes, is nothing else but the very spatial situation of the signs in it" (*Nb*, p. 94). The logical is nothing else but the correct "vision" of the spatial relations among the signs; it is not some second, additional entity, lying beyond the geometrical.

This conceptions of logic is in fact *fundamental* for Wittgenstein's philosophy (including ethics, as we shall see later). It is the premise from which follow all his statements concerning logic, namely: (a) the statement that the problems of logic "are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are" (*Tr*, 5.5563); his conviction that "the solution of the problems of logic must be simple, since they set the standard of simplicity" (*Tr*, 5.4541). (b) The assumption that in the same way as man can see the spatial configuration of the outlines of some *picture* without anything to be hidden from him, without the need to look for some opaque lines, in the same way the logical formulae are "transparent" and all truths connected with them could be settled ultimately. That is why it is possible a complete resolution of the sense (cf. *Nb*, p. 154). "Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decided by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado"—wrote Wittgenstein in *Tr* (5.551). (c) For the same reason, the answer of some question and this same question are the same thing (cf. *Tr*, 6.5). (d) As far as according to Wittgenstein the proposition and the judgement are one and the same thing (the proposition is only a means of a sensuous comprehension of the thought—cf. *Tr*, 3.1), everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly" (*Tr*, 4.116).

From this conception of logic follow all Wittgenstein's statements about the symbols of logic. At the bottom of all of them lies his assumption that "in a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions themselves" (*Tr*, 6.122). From this assumption follows that if something in logic is possible, it is correct (cf. *Nb*, p. 89). Hence, "in a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic" (*Tr*, 5.473): in the sense, namely, in which if we give in certain logical system to every sign a strictly determined meaning, then the language itself will prevent any logical mistake. For this reason,



the Occam razor says only "that unnecessary units in a sign language mean nothing" (Tr, 5.47321).

After clearly realizing these assumptions, the main aim of Wittgenstein was to lay down such a notation, that may be determined ones and for all, and in which there will be no unclear signs or any need for adjustments a notation in which "rules are equivalent to the symbols" (Tr, 5.514). Based on this consideration, Wittgenstein made total revision of nearly all logical and theoretical assumptions of Frege and Russell. One of the main thesis of his *logica nova* is that "signs for logical operations are punctuation-marks" (Tr, 5.4611), so far as they are void of meaning in the same way as the punctuation marks are, and only arrange the sense of expressions. The signs for logical operations only facilitate the comprehension of the truths they show; so conjunction, disjunction, the sign for implication, represent pseudo-relations. They are not "primitive signs" that may be introduced through intuition in the logical system and this is the reason why we can define them one by another.

At the end of our analysis of the spatial theory of logic we may conclude that with it Wittgenstein gave grounds for the main principle of his philosophy (he used it also in the analysis of the relation between the subject and the world in time): "The principle (let us call it so) of economy of entities", according to which the entities that are actually different manifestations and effects of *one* and the same entity, must not be presented as different entities,<sup>4</sup>

On the grounds of the relation between the subject and the world in space and of the creative work with its copies (propositions), besides logic are build natural sciences and mathematics.

In fact the only business of natural science is to organize its data logically; in it empirical and logical entities (terms) are given in synthesis (and this synthesis *may* be treated in Kant's manner) by virtue of the newly introduced by Wittgenstein term "primitive picture". In fact the only business of the propositions of logic is to "demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing" (Tr, 6.121). But as far as the synthesis of logical and empirical is developed on the ground of a logical structure, the necessity here is one—it is a logical necessity, whereas all propositions, picturing some state of affairs are contingent. For this reason, the laws of natural sciences are quasi-laws. There is only one type of laws: the logical laws.

4 This principle, which actually is the main principle of the whole analytic philosophy, is used for the first time (but rather unclearly formulated) from G. E. Moore in his analysis of the proposition "I believe that p" in which it is argued that it doesn't imply two things—believing and assertion—but just one.



From the standpoint of these theoretical assumptions Wittgenstein gives a critical argument against the laws of the natural science. In the same way in which "the primitive concepts" of PM are not explanations of mathematical operations, the laws of natural science are not explanations of natural phenomena, but are only projections of the laws of logic on reality. The laws of physics are *a priori* penetratings into all possibilities for correspondence of these laws to reality. "Indeed people even surmised that there must be a 'law of least action' before they know exactly how it went" (*Tr*, 6.3211). And they erroneously present this region as one covering the main concepts and problems of natural science.

And finally, mathematics constructs speculative models with the help of logical structures. It creates an "*a priori* pictures" (and this is the synthetic *a priori* in Wittgenstein): proofs, calculation techniques, etc., that guide the experience, while studying the logical forms of the structures (cf. *PhB*, 111). It is true that this conception of mathematics was developed from Wittgenstein explicitly only in the Thirties, but actually it is a consequence of his conception of it in *Tractatus*. According to it, mathematics is a pure contemplation of the logical characteristics of the world, i.e. a contemplation without participation of any "objective" entities.

### 3. The relation between the subject and the world in time.


At the beginning of his analysis in *Notebooks* Wittgenstein intends to analyse the structure and function of the logical symbols. So on 22 January 1915 he wrote: "My only task is to clarify the essence of proposition" (p. 129). Shortly afterwards however, he began to feel that all discoveries that he made in the sphere of logic are valid also in other spheres of human experience. In the summer on the autumn of 1916 he understood that all solutions of the problem of logic may help him to solve also the "problems of life". It may be noted, however, that actually Wittgenstein didn't understand in duly manner the unity of the logical and ethical knowledge in his own philosophical system. Owing to this his ethical remarks from 1916, compared with his logical remarks from 1914-15, are developed only fragmentary and entered in *Tractatus* very sketchy.

Before I switch on the analysis of the relation between the subject and the world in time (why "in time" we'll see later), let us consider the way in which Wittgenstein had realized the necessity of its theoretical investigation. In the spring of 1915 he began more and more often to ask himself the questions: "Is it impossible that there is something that can not be expressed by propositions and that is not an object? Is there a region beyond the facts? Is the language the only language? Couldn't it be a way of expressing, with which I could speak about the language. The music, e. g.?" (*Nb*, p. 143) Wittgenstein answered positively to all these questions.



He understood that the theoretical assumptions that he had accepted in the analysis of propositions oblige him to accept that what can't be expressed with propositions, can be expressed by art. Thus Wittgenstein began to assert that "the themes of music are in certain sense propositions" (*Nb*, p. 130). Shortly afterwards he came to conclusion that the works of art in fact correspond to tautologies ("The melody is a kind of tautology" asserted Wittgenstein on March the 4th, 1915, *Nb*, p. 130) and that the propositions of natural science correspond to the *Erlebnis* of the world as a whole *sub specie aeterni*.<sup>5</sup>

The relation of the subject to the world in space and the creation of copies of the latter in time are isomorphic to the same relation in space. But whereas there we had a relation of belief to fact (state of affairs), here we have a relation of will to a picture of imagination (*Vorstellung*). And in the same way in which the belief penetrated the state of affairs to which it is directed, and by virtue of this fact all states of affairs are organized in propositions, "the will penetrates the world of imagination". In the same way in which all states of affairs are contingent and unconnected one with another, the pictures of imagination are also contingent and unconnected. And here we can make the first simple scheme of the theoretical system of the early Wittgenstein:



It may be noted here that in many respects the connection between the subject and the world is clearer in time than in space. It can be discerned some peculiarities of the latter which are practically impossible to be noticed and indicated in it alone. And this in fact is the real advantage of the kind of study of Wittgenstein that I propose in this paper.

To the intellectual intuition of the logical symbols in space, in the sphere of the relation between the subject and the world in time corresponds 'the mystical'.<sup>6</sup> And in the same way in which the

5 The late Wittgenstein also pay attention to the connection between logical and aesthetical; see e.g. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, 527.

6 It is not by accident that B. Russell has called the logic of the early Wittgenstein "logical mysticism". See *My Philosophical Development* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 114.

ABBREVIATIONS:  
*Nb*—*Tagebucher 1914-16*.— In Wittgenstein, L. *Schriften*, Bd. I. Fr. a/M., 1969.

*Tr*—*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

*PhB*—*Philosophical Remarks*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975.



intellectual intuition is manifested in several creative work : in natural science, in logic, in mathematics, the mystical is also manifested in several creative works : (1) In the works of art and in *Erlebnis* it is the particular object seen, contemplated *sub specie aeterni*. (2) In the sphere of ethics it is (i) "the life" see *sub specie aeterni* and the acting according to such a *vision*. The good life (the happy life) is the life beyond the time, the life in which people do not ask questions of the sort : What will happen after my death ? etc., i.e. the questions about the immortality of the soul (of rational theology). (ii) If all questions, connected with the time drop out, then the desire of the people to dominate over other people will drop out too, and with it the problems of retribution will also drop out. In general, all questions and theoretical construction which emerge on the grounds of any consideration on death or on the "categorical imperative", all attempts to construct ethical propositions, are impossible as long as the objects of ethics are quasi-entities.

It is easy to make a conclusion from the above consideration that the most important relation in this kind of connection between the subject and the world is *the real time*, i.e. the time of the contemplation in its various sorts. The time spoken of in ethics and rational theology is "logical construction" in the same way in which the logical formulae (i.e., the logical space) are "logical constructions" out of propositions of the natural science and mathematics. And just "in real time", in the time of *Erlebnis*, there occurs "the relation of the subject so the world" of which we speak. (3) And finally, the world seen *sub specie aeterni* gives us the *sense* of the world (or of the God), the revelation. "The pray is some kind of thinking about the sense of the human life" (Nb, p. 165). It is pure contemplation of the time of the *Vorstellung*, without participation of this same *Vorstellung*: in the same way in which mathematics is pure contemplation of the logical characteristics of the world without participation of any "objective" entities (states of affairs, scientific propositions and theories, etc.).

Now, at last, we are in position to make the scheme of the creative works, of the various attempts the subject makes to copy the world in his strife to abolish the difference between himself and the world :

kind of creative work	relation in	space	real time	
			"material"	free
immediate contemplation of objects		natural science	art	happy life
abstraction of the general characteristics of the world (space and time) in the object		logic	ethics	"good" action
pure creative contemplation of the general characteristics of the world		mathematics	religion	revelation, mysticism



## VI

# “Man is Condemned to be Free”— An Exposition of J. P. Sartre’s Atheistic Existentialism

*G. Vedaparayan*

Indubitably, J. P. Sartre’s brand of Existentialism is highly anthropocentric and uncompromisingly unorthodox in its description of human existence; it rejects all forms of anthropomorphism and ‘spirit of seriousness’, and treats man as inalienably and absolutely free. It not only equates man with freedom but condemns him to be free and responsible without remedy and excuse. Consequently, it hails man as the autonomous and incontestable author of himself and the world around him.

The aim of this paper firstly, is to give a clear and brief description of the ontological fact that man is condemned to be free, and secondly, to give an elaborate exposition of its consequences for human action and responsibility.

### I

Sartre, in his phenomenological description of human existence, distinguishes between two radically different regions of being: the being-in-itself and the being-for-itself. The former is a being which is unconscious and completely determined by its essence. Sartre calls it the being of essence and equates it with the being of objects. He further describes it as follows: the being-in-itself is a being which is what it ‘is’; it is full of itself; it does not lack anything of itself; it is a being of opacity which knows no desire and choice; it is full of density which is in complete identity with itself; that is the being-in-itself does not have within its being ‘anything’ which is not itself; it is entirely in harmony with itself; it is a being of positivity;



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it knows no negation; it is a being which simply ‘is’; it is *solid* (*massif*).<sup>1</sup> Therefore it is not a being of time and becoming; it knows no otherness; it does not project itself into the future; it does not have a past to be modified; it is not a being of possibilities; it is not even a being of potentiality in order to be a being of possibility. “Being-in-itself cannot be ‘potentiality’ or ‘have potentialities’. In itself it is what is—in the absolute plenitude of its identity”.<sup>2</sup> That is, the being-in-itself is not a being of duality; it is a being which coincides with itself in a full equivalence and is inherent in itself without the least distance. Hence it is not free.

The being-for-itself, unlike the being-in-itself, is a being of consciousness, which is freedom. It is ontologically a being of Existence which is ‘empty’ within itself. It is a being which has ‘nothing’ or ‘nothingness’ in the heart of its being. “Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm”.<sup>3</sup> It is a being which is transparent, translucent and without essence. It is not a being of fullness but a lack which makes it a being of choice and desire. It is a being which has a rupture within its heart and hence its being is a decompression of being; it is a being of ‘totality’ detotalized and ‘integrity’ disintegrated. While the (being of the) being-in-itself ‘is’, (the being of) the being-for-itself ‘is not’. The being-for-itself is what it is not and is not what it is. Its being is such that in its being its being is always in question in so far as its being implies a being other than itself. That is, the being of the being-for-itself lies outside itself and in projecting itself into the future. It is always an *elsewhereness* to itself. It is a being of potentiality, possibility, negativity and non-substantiality. Hence it is free.

The being-for-itself is free because it is always ahead and beyond its essence whether the essence be a concrete object like a table, a chair, and an ink-well, or a psychological fact like past, motive, end, and passion. Though it exists in an ineradicable relation with its essence it never becomes one with it, since ‘nothing’ exists between itself and its essence. Thought the for-itself creates its essence, it always exists at a distance and as a separation from its essence. It never gets glued to its essence but exists as a rupture with it. It never gets determined by its essence, since the essence exists only by means of the nihilating power of the being-for-itself. Sartre equates such a being with the being of man.<sup>4</sup>

1 J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 9th Printing. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes, Washington Square Press, New York, 1977, p. 28.

2 Ibid., p. 150.

3 Ibid., p. 56.

4 Sartre calls the being-for-itself variously as consciousness, freedom, nothingness, human reality, human existence and freedom. For him, all these terms mean one and the same and can be used interchangeably.



Man, according to Sartre, is ontologically free in the sense that he has altogether different qualities from that of the being-in-itself. Man is free in the sense that there is in him the permanent possibility of nihilating what he is in the form of 'having been'. Man is by 'nature' without essence; for man, to be is to have been; he is nothing other than the constant nihilation of his being; he never 'is'; he ever 'is not'; his being is 'not yet'; he is always already beyond all the determinations, the properties and the designations given to him; he is always something other than what can be said about him. That is, man is a being of 'non-being'; he is something in not being it; as already mentioned, he is what he is not while not being what he is. This implies that man's existence precedes and conditions all essence. Hence man is (a being of) absolute freedom. Freedom is not his accidental character; it is not a quality added on to him but an ontological stuff which constitutes his very being. Man and freedom are one and the same. Man = Freedom. Sartre says, "what we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the 'being' of 'human reality'. Man does not exist 'first' in order to be free 'subsequently'; there is no difference between the being of man and his 'being-free'."<sup>5</sup>

The condition of man is that it is impossible for him to be free from freedom. He is free but not free to be not free, since his very existence entails freedom. He is the foundation of all that is there in the 'world' but he is not the foundation of his being which is freedom. Therefore, man can never be a being other than 'himself'; he can never cease to be (a being of) freedom and attain the status of the being-in-itself; he can never reduce himself to the level of an object which is not free. Man is not only not free to be not free but he is free without limits. Nothing can limit him or freedom except himself or freedom itself. Man knows no borders except those which he invents by and for himself. Thus man is by ontological necessity condemned to be free for ever and without limits. His freedom is irremediable and absolute as well. Sartre says, "I am condemned to be free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free".<sup>6</sup>

Sartre equates freedom with choice; freedom and choice are simultaneous; man being freedom, his very existence implies choice; man does not exist 'first' in order to choose 'subsequently'; man and choice are one and the same; as a result, man is free to choose but he is not free not to choose; just as man cannot but exist and cannot but be free, so also he cannot but choose; just as man is condemned to exist and condemned to be free, so also he is condemned

5 J. P. Sartre. *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 567.



to choose without remedy; he is abandoned to constant choosing; it is impossible for him to remain without choosing, for even not-choosing implies choice. Sartre says, "I can always choose, but I must know that if do not choose, that is still a choice".<sup>7</sup>

## II

The first consequence of the ontological fact that man is condemned to the freedom of choice is that man is not created by God; man is not ready-made like an object, the existence of which is already determined by its essence as conceived by its creator. For instance, the production of a book is the sum of the qualities which its creator, the writer ascribes to it. That is, the existence of an object is preceded by its essence. The general concept or the idea is the foundation and background of the existence of an object. But man is not created in accordance with a plan. He is not an object to be first designed and then produced. There is no God who creates man in accordance with a universal formula formulated in his mind. Man is not a realisation of a concept or a definition dwelling in the so-called divine understanding. It is badfaith to believe that there is a God who creates man according to a conception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paper-knife, following a procedure and a formula.<sup>8</sup>

As already mentioned, man, according to Sartre, is not a being-in-itself; he is not a fungus or a cauliflower; he is of higher existence than that of an ink-well or a table, he is a being of consciousness which is free; he is a being of conscious decision and aware of being so; he is a being of "subjectivity" which/who<sup>9</sup> exists before it/he can be defined and propels towards the future projects. Man is not a predetermined being: he does not have the so called permanent "human nature"; he is not born with a fixed essence. On the contrary, man is what he does; he is what he decides himself to be. To start with, man simply 'is';<sup>10</sup> it is only afterwards that he becomes something or somebody; it is man who defines himself as "this" or "that".

<sup>7</sup> J. P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, Trans. Philip Mairet, Methuen, London, 1948, p. 48.

<sup>8</sup> Sartre holds that thinkers like Descartes and Leibnitz are wrong in treating man as being created by the supernal artisan called God and at having a universal and predetermined essence. Sartre also holds that thinkers like Diderot, Voltaire and Kant have failed to reject the idea that each man is a particular example of the universal essence called "human nature", though they repudiated the idea of God as the Supreme Creator. Sartre deplors that all those thinkers have put the cart before the horse in entertaining the idea that man's essence is prior to his existence.

<sup>9</sup> In French Sartre uses the term "il" which stands for both the forms of third person singular "it" and "he". It refers to human reality subjectively as man objectively as for itself or freedom or consciousness.



That is, man is what he makes himself to be; he shapes his future which is not preordained but virgin and pure; his future is not laid down by God in advance but it is man himself who fashions his future. He is entirely free to have the future he chooses to have. Sartre says, "If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it".<sup>11</sup>

Man, according to Sartre, is not a set of predetermined reactions as all kinds of materialism and idealism treat him to be. He does not possess set patterns of behaviour. Instead, man is a being of autonomous and absolute freedom. Nothing, not even passion or motive or end or heredity or environment, can curtail his freedom to be or to become what he chooses to. For instance, no man is born a coward; a coward is a coward not because of his stunted physical organism or abnormal psychological temperament or unfavourable and unhygienic environment; it is not because of his weak heart and lungs or poor blood or defective cerebrum that he is a coward. Instead, a coward is a coward just because he chooses himself to be so. It is his choice that determines him to be a coward. But man finds comfort in believing in the power of some 'alien' factors like heredity, environment, etc., over him and finds excuses for his behaviour by saying, "you see, that is what we are like, no one can do anything about it".<sup>12</sup> But in reality, a coward makes himself a coward and a hero makes himself a hero; it is one's choice that determines what one is or will be.

Man is what he does; it is his action that defines him. A coward is one who has done a cowardly act; a coward is one who behaves like a coward; a cowardly act defines one as a coward. And whatever one does, it is entirely by one's choice; all actions of man are freely chosen. Therefore, there is no cowardice apart from an act of cowardice; so also there is no love apart from a deed of love and there is no genius apart from that which is expressed in the works of art. "Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is".<sup>13</sup>

10 When Sartre says that man simply 'is', what he means is not that man 'exists' in the manner of the being-in-itself, but that man does not have an essence which is not chosen by him and that he is not a puppet in the hands of any superhuman idealist and sub-human materialist categories like God and Unconscious respectively.

11 J. P. Sartre, *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 41.



Thus man being condemned (to be free) to be the incontestable author of himself, he is condemned to be responsible for what he is. The destiny of man lies in his own hands. Sartre says, "That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into the world he is responsible for everything he does".<sup>14</sup> That is, man's life will be as he decides it to be. There is no play of non-human factors in man's life; it is man who gives meaning and significance to everything that is there in his life; it is 'through' him that everything comes into 'being'; there is no non human event or situation in his life; nothing can be different from what man intends it to be. "In reality things will be such as men have decided they shall be".<sup>15</sup>

The second consequence is that man is alone in being responsible for what he is. He is responsible without any help and excuse for all his decisions and actions. He has to judge and choose by himself. There is no God to help him choose what is right. There are no guiding principles a priori which can help man take right decisions in his life. He is not provided with any absolute and unfailing laws of behaviour that can evaluate and legitimise his actions. He cannot depend on any pattern of behaviour as the foundation of his decisions and actions. Neither the biblical commandments nor Kant's ethical principles can justify unequivocally his action as ultimately valid. Sartre substantiates man's desperate condition in choosing between two equally important alternative course of action with an example of a pupil who came to him for advice as he (the pupil) was confronted with the dilemma of deciding between two equally 'valid' but different modes of action: one of staying with his old mother for whom he was the only consolation and the other of going to England to join the French Forces in order to fight for his nation and avenge his brother who was killed by the Germans. The former is concrete, immediate and directed towards only one person while the latter is ambiguous, remote and connected with a collectivity. Sartre contends that the commandments like 'act with charity' and 'love thy neighbour' are ineffective to enable the pupil to choose decisively any one mode of action. Even the Kantian principle 'never regard another as a means but regard always as an end' can hardly be of any help to the pupil, for if the pupil chooses to be with his mother then he would be treating his fellowmen as means, and he can join the French Forces only at the risk of treating his mother as a means. He is in the vicious circle of fulfilling one mode of action at the cost of the other and none of them seems to be indisputably superior to the other. Consequently, he vacillates between

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 40.



two kinds of morality : the one is the morality of personal devotion and sympathy, and the other is the morality of wider scope but of debatable validity. And there is no infallible guide whatsoever which can help him out of the dilemma by pronouncing in clear terms that he owes his mother more love than his country.<sup>16</sup> The Christian doctrine which says, 'deny yourself for others' and choose the way which is harder' cannot decide satisfactorily for whom he has to deny and sacrifice himself, and which is the harder way. Neither an advisor nor an ethical scripture of any authority can be of any help to him.<sup>17</sup>

Sartre is of the view that even if an individual chooses and acts in accordance with a prescribed principle or a time honoured doctrine of behaviour, it is only because of one's choice that the principle or the doctrine becomes a guide to his choice and action. No ethical formula can be an authentic and a priori guide to a certain course of action unless man treats it so. It is man's choice that makes a particular ethical rule a guide to action. It is because man interprets it as a valid guide that it is so. So also, no course of action is 'good' or 'bad' by itself; it is only man's choice which makes a particular course of action good or bad. Sartre says, "If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad".<sup>18</sup> Sartre is also of the view that if an individual goes to an adviser for advice, again, he chooses the kind of adviser he wants — the adviser who will give the advice he wants. He first chooses the advice before choosing the adviser.<sup>19</sup> Sartre says, "But if you seek counsel from a priest, for example — you have selected that priest; and at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would advise. In other words, to choose an adviser

16 The pupil cannot take even his inward feeling as an impulse to action. He cannot even consult his sentiment as a guide to action, since it involves play-acting. Sentimentally to decide that he loves his mother by staying with her is to play a comedy, since the feeling of sentiment is formed by the deeds that one does. Here Sartre is one with Gide in saying that there is hardly any difference between sentiment as play-acting and sentiment which is vital. There is no such thing as vital sentiment. All sentiment is play-acting.

17 J. P. Sartre, *Op. cit.*, p. 35-36.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

19 Sartre holds that the pupil who selected him for advice knew the kind of advice he would receive from him. So he showed reluctance in advising him, though he was able to give him some practical advice. He allowed the pupil to decide on his own because he is free. He said, "you are free, therefore choose — that is to say, invent". Sartre claims that he knew what the pupil was going to do and eventually he did exactly what Sartre expected him to do.



is nevertheless to commit oneself by that choice".<sup>20</sup> Thus, as there is no general rule or morality which can show man what he ought to do, as there are no signboards which can guide him to take 'right' or 'good' decisions, as there is no God of any kind, as there is no fatalism, and finally as man is totally free to choose his course of action, he is abandoned to be totally responsible without any help and excuse, not only for his life but also for the world around him. There are no 'accidents' in the world; no situation in the world can be taken as a result of man's whim or caprice; each and every situation is voluntarily, consciously and freely brought about by man; man decides the kind of the world that is there; it is 'through' man that there are events like theft, poverty, war, etc; therefore, man's accountability is overwhelmingly abundant; it is so abounding that man often tries to escape it into badfaith. But again the plight of man is that he is not free not to be responsible, for even the choice or the act of not being responsible involves responsibility; man is responsible for not being responsible. For instance, if one chooses to commit suicide in order to escape responsibility, he is still responsible for it. Like freedom, responsibility is protean, since it manifests itself in all the decisions and actions of man. Man is responsible for everything he does except for the fact of his very responsibility itself; he is not the foundation of his responsibility; he did not choose to be born responsible; but once he is born, he is born with the fact of responsibility from which he can never be free. This is the "facticity" of human condition in a world without God. Thus, man carries the weight of his existence and the world alone without any person or anything to lighten the burden of his responsibility. Sartre says, "I am *abandoned* in the world, not in the sense that I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile universe like a board floating on the water; but rather in the sense that I find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for an instant. For I am responsible for my very desire of fleeing responsibilities. To make myself passive in the world, to refuse to act upon things and others is still to choose myself, and suicide is one mode among others of being-in-the world".<sup>21</sup>

The third important consequence of Sartre atheistic existentialism is that God being absent, man is condemned to invent values. Sartre says, "If I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values".<sup>22</sup> Values are not ready-made; they are not 'given' and eternal; no value is sacred by itself; no value is by

<sup>20</sup> J. P. Sartre, Op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>21</sup> J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 710.

<sup>22</sup> J. P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 54.



itself incumbent on man; man is not obliged to succumb to any value unless he chooses to. That is, values are not there like mountains existing independent of and prior to man. Instead, it is man who creates and ascribes them the meaning and significance they have; it is man who gives them the weight through his voluntary choice; it is man's subjectivity that is the foundation of all values. For instance, values like honesty, humanity and progress do not have any meaning without man: they do not have significance of their own. But they have precisely the significance given to them by man. There is no God or Infinite and Perfect consciousness to think and formulate values as having fixed validity; there is no Heaven where it is written that 'this is the good', 'one must be honest', and 'one must not lie'; values do not fall from the blue. But it is only man who brings all values into being. The existence of man precedes the values he invents. Accordingly, man's life has precisely the meaning he gives it. It does not have an intrinsic and prevenient significance of its own. It is not a consequence of divine plan. It is not governed by any kind of superhuman or subhuman universe. Instead man's life is a sheer accident on the surface of the earth and it is what he makes it to be. The meaning of life is nothing else but what man brings about through his choice. Sartre says, "To say that we invent values means neither more nor less than this; that there is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose".<sup>23</sup>

To conclude, man's freedom of choice and responsibility is not ecstatic and blissful but diabolic and dreadful; it is more a curse than a boon; it is a constant source of anguish and dread for man. But it would be impertinent to treat Sartre's notion of freedom as being pessimistic and tragic. Indeed it is not to plunge man into despair that Sartre rejected God and endowed man with absolute freedom of choice and responsibility but to enable him face the reality of his existence totally and directly. It is to show man the reality of his existence as it is and to enlighten him on his condition on the earth. Though freedom is of dread and anguish, it does not lead man to despair and quietism. On the contrary, dread and anguish are the condition of authentic choice and action. True life begins only on the far side of dread and anguish. So Sartre urges his readers to face the dread and anguish without escaping into bad-faith by investing freedom in idealistic escapes and materialistic excuses. Man being condemned to be free and responsible, he is condemned at every moment to construct himself and the world without remorse and respite. He is the sole architect of his life and the world around him.

23 Ibid.,



## VIII

## Scientific Aspect of Philosophy of God

*S. Misra*

A Scientist's view of GOD is different from that of an ordinary man. It is more a scientific rather than a philosophical presumption. A scientific presumption is based on deduction, proofs and experimental evidences. The ordinary experience attributes to God the observation of not so common events and as supernatural or parapsychological. These phenomena have a reasonable explanation within the framework of scientific investigation and natural laws. God may be presumed as the power controlling and regulating the laws pertaining to these phenomena. To study these controlling power one has to relate science and the knowledge regarding the event. The knowledge and science are related to each other in a way. Science we may call as the route and systematic way to gain what we want to know. That means what we want to know is the knowledge. Certain things we can know by our senses, by seeing, hearing, touching, smelling and such physical senses. Certain things we have to imagine being possible and their presence is derived from facts and experiences resulting out of the senses. The presence of such imaginary beings is not false but only derived and confirmed by the senses. Like human perception of sound is limited to a range of 20 Hz to 20000 Hz. Sound having a frequency of more than 20000 Hz and below 20 Hz is there, but a human being cannot observe it. This is known as ultra sound. Certain animals are able to observe and sense sound frequencies above and below this 20-20000 Hz limit. Like wise the sensitivity of human eyes is limited to visible spectrum only i.e. 400 nm to 750 nm, (violet to red). But the electromagnetic spectrum, which contains visible as a part of it, is very big. The electromagnetic spectrum ranges in frequency from



50 Hz to 1000 THz (1 THz = 1000 GHz, 1 GHz = 1000 MHz, 1 MHz = 1000 KHz). Above the ultraviolet the frequency goes upto x-rays which have a wavelength of 0.1 nm (1 Å). These waves are detectable by special means and devices like the photodetectors. The brain waves lie within this spectrum.

To explain these super human phenomena may be called as approaching the God. To gain the knowledge of such events artificial means may be applied. This has to be done systematically. The ultimate goal of science is to achieve the truth and the knowledge of truth. Arriving at the truth is reaching the God. There are two types of approach. One is to imagine a possible phenomenon or event and then extend the scientific investigations to observe the phenomenon. Another approach is to put forward a hypothesis to explain the observed phenomenon. Both these methods are complimentary and sometimes supplementary to each other. Very often, an overlapping of the two approach is needed to explain a phenomenon, or happening. The theory of knowledge is known as Epistemology. It is the philosophical discipline that deals with the aims, methods and achievements of cognition. Subject matter for epistemological analysis is exemplified by the perceptions and opinions of daily life, by the procedure and laws of natural science, by the axioms and deductions of mathematics. The sense combines the function of experience and reason in the construction of knowledge. For example, the antiquity in the Pythagorean mathematics gave rise to rationally constructive and deductive system for number and geometrical figures. Plato explained the possibility of mathematical knowledge by the theory of ideas or form, which were exact, and so on. A basic problem of theory of knowledge is the relation of concept to sensory experience.

A scientist, difficulty and inquisitiveness tries to find out what has been termed as God gifted or will of God, on the basis of set principles of natural science. A scientist does not believe in something supernatural. It may be supernatural in ordinary sense but it can be detected and observed by suitable means. The methods and instruments may take ages to get developed and acquire a reasonable sensitivity. But the so called supernatural, God wished phenomena can be explained by the rules of nature. These rules of nature, or the nature itself, a scientist happily can agree to call as God. They are definite, certain and unambiguous. Any deviation from the set observations is also certain and unambiguous. The famous physicist Einstein concluded that concepts which arise in thoughts and in our linguistic expression logically are free creations of thoughts which can not be derived inductively from sensory experiences. These may later on be proved by experimental observations.



A scientists exposition of scientific methods starts with the concept of bodily object and then introduces concepts which are fashioned for daily life and refined by science. From ordinary experiences to theories of the phenomenon one has to pass through levels of knowledge. A primary level has the closest relation to sense impressions. The primary concepts framed on this level are connected intuitively and directly with typical complexes of sense impressions. Concepts on deeper levels are significant for experience only to the extent that they can be brought into relation with primary concepts through proposition. Among proposition are definition of concepts as well as proposition logically deductable from them. Natural laws (like cosmic laws, laws of physics, gravitation are propositions which are not deductable from definitions but which assert relation between primary concepts and there by between sense impressions.

Einstein stated about the importance of the scientific knowledge:

"I can say with certainty that the ablest students whom I met as a teacher were deeply interested in the theory of knowledge. They liked to start discussions about the axioms and methods of science and proved their obstinancy in the defence of their opinions that this issue was one important to them". This is enough to describe the importance of the theory of knowledge. Which one in ordinary sense call the philosophy. The philosophy of the development of human world of intelligence and evolution of civilization is the basis of the knowledge. Wisdom is the knowledge of principles and causes. Metaphysics may therefore be called the highest wisdom. From our knowledge of principle by the method we learn in science. Science has to do on the other hand with general ideas. Science provides us the correlation of the two. We need to complement the science of physical nature by the science of man. In order to understand not only the science itself but also the place of science in our evolution, its relation to ethics, politics and religion, we need a coherent system of concepts and laws which within the natural sciences as well as philosophy and humanities have their place. The new theories have always aroused excitements beyond the small group of scientists and philosophers. The Einstein's relativity theory and quantum theory could not be formulated by using common sense concepts of velocity and position, cause and effect, freedom and determinism and so it caused thrill to philosophers of the time. The interest in science that is not due to its technical application may be called philosophical interest. For the systematic study of natural laws the concept of space and time play a fundamental role. Everything possible or every phenomenon possible has a position in space during an epoch of time. It may be assigned coordinates in time-space, which is a four dimensional space. In physical sciences the definition of these concepts are progressively reformed and sharpe-



ned for the investigation of processess in space and time under controlled conditions. The characteristic property assigned to a bodily object is existence independent of subjective time and of sensory perception. The primary concept for the theory of space and time is bodily object. This hypothesis leads to the relativity theory of Einstein. The general and special theory of relativity form the basis of explanation of the macroscopic (cosmological) and microscopsc (atomic level) phenomena. The theory of relativity yields the following philosophically important concepts.

1. The constancy of the velocity of light. 2. The equivalence of mass and energy  $E=mc^2$ , which merely is a representation of immortality of the mass. The mass simply changes shape to energy and energy can be converted to mass. The great Pythagorean statement that God is always doing mathematics is supplemented by the theory. The theory of constancy of velocity of light yields the relativity of spatial and temporal measurements. Space has no objective reality except as an order or arrangement of the objects we perceive in it and time has no independent existence apart from the order of events by which we measure it. Before Einstein theory the general belief was that the nature can only affect the mind. The theory of relativity has secured definitely for the mind its place in the objective physical world. The spatial and temporal qualities are objectively not at all divisible. In fact Spatiality and temporality are nothing objective at all. Motion is merely appearance which arise by splitting the world continuum into space and time. It is merely our consciousness which goes along with the world line of our body and the objectively real is precisely the four dimensional (x, y, z, t) continuum (aakash). This is called Minkowski's space, a world of absolute existence, the eleatic world. However, one may raise that time is by no means a physical matter. Time is the form not merely of our outer but of our inner sense. Everything is of temporal order. Everything is fixed in space time four dimensional world. The outcome of the theory of relativity is, the matter could be taken as a three dimensional substance only in appearance. Whereas the reality behind it is something infinitely more subtle, a four dimensional space-time continuum. It is no different than something like soul or spiritual concept. The theory of relativity prescribes the observance of an event in different shapes at different times when the observers are situated in different frames of reference. It indicates that an event taking place at time  $t_0$  in system  $S_1$  may have already occurred as referred to a system  $S_2$  or will occur latter referred to a system  $S_3$ . This may result to the predetermination of the future. The many events of our mythological happenings like knowing and predicting the future are explained this way.



The metaphysical aspects of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are similar. A mental element, an imaginary concept to explain physical phenomena has been introduced through quantum concept. The natural scientists restored honesty the threads from these science to all higher values of human life, to God and soul, freedom of will etc. After this a revolution in the atomic concepts rushed through. The atomic physics support the spiritualism. Said Wenzel, this world is a made up of elementary spirits (like elementary particles). The relation among them are determined by rules taken from the realm of spirits. These rules can be formulated mathematically. The quantum conditions that determine for example, the energy levels in the hydrogen atom are interpreted as forms, in which lower spirits manifests themselves. The laws of quantum theory that cannot be expressed in common sense language are interpreted by common sense analogies like the behaviour of spirits, just as the sunrise and sunset were attributed to human like super organisms.

The root equation of quantum mechanics, the Schrodinger equation describes the behaviour of de Broglie waves associated with matter. The solutions of Schrodingers equation are imaginary or spiritual. The wavefunction is an imaginary concept, comprising the probabilities, which is a mental phenomenon that happens in human mind depending upon spiritual powers. The hydrogen atom is therefore a product of spiritual powers. The creation of matter analogously is a spiritual power of God which in turn is spiritual power of man. Similarly inertia and gravitation are spiritual powers. In the Newtons equation of motion if we substitute force  $f$ , by spiritual force the action in  $f = (m \times a)$  can be explained as the motion of free will. The divining phenomenon, scientifically can be regarded as the philosophical raising of the human mind and psychological strength, which is to some extent supernatural. Scientists generally dislike being involved in any research which deals with the supernatural, paranormal events and problems. The scientists in general reject this philosophical part without critical analysis as being non-scientific and of interest only to charlatons. Only a small number of people appear to possess the capacity for divining. They are afraid of undergoing scientific tests. Our mind rejects the things that do not fit into the frame of scientific or philosophical beliefs. Much too often the scientists will believe that facts that can not be explained by current theories do not exist. However, there have been many experiments carried out by the help of magnetic and electrical measuring instruments attached to diviners rods indicating the electromagnetic behaviour of these observations. The confirmation of such phenomenon involves firstly to establish whether the divining phenomenon really exists, secondly to study the disturbing factors and thirdly the analysis of the reactions of



diviners for their use as indicators for certain external physical conditions. Experiments made by magnetic and electrical instruments using artificial magnetic fields and sensitive galvanometers yield that the divining phenomena are not due to charlatanery and suggestion but really exist and the number of people sensitive to these phenomena is quite high. The physical and psychological factors might cause errors in the registration of these phenomenon by our means and this explains the failures of scientific tests on diviners. These phenomena can be explained by physical and physiological laws and there is nothing supernatural or paranormal. However, the effect of magnetic and electric fields on the physiological processes of the human organism, including effect on brain waves is a very complex phenomenon. Special bio-electronic or biomechanical studies have to make and methods to be developed to explain these. Efforts are being made to develop parallel analogue models and computer simulations of the electro-physiological and bio-physiological interactions of the electromagnetic fields on human body. Quantum mechanics as such, which is a strong tool for explaining the physical phenomenon and the most complicated processes ranging from cosmological observations like evolution of stars and planets upto the creation of subatomic particles, is now being applied to explain the electro-magnetic fields associated with the force of vitality, the soul. The energy associated with the source of vitality (soul) is interchangeable with the matter  $(E=mc^2)$ . It is an established fact that there is an electro-magnetic field associated with a living organism. They are termed as bio-electricity, luminescence etc. The cells possess electric field. The cell division gives rise to electromagnetic waves, this in turn causes new cell divisions in other organic cell groups. This radiation is called mutagenetic radiation and observes the same laws as the physical or artificial electromagnetic radiation, of reflection, refraction, polarization etc. The wavelength of this radiation is different from the visible radiation. If kept in dark along with such a cell dividing root a man can feel a radiation. The human cells are also sensitive to external electrical and mechanical pressures. Study of the interactions of living organism with the physico-chemical influences, indicate that because of this fundamental property of living matter, human beings and other animals can live on certain planets only within certain physical limitations. These limitations are, required temperature atmosphere, gravity, exact ratio of elements constituting the earth, and the specific distance to the moon. This eventually limits the sensitivity of the protoplasm to physico-chemical influences. Hence the perception of a normal man is limited to a certain extent and the events and observations beyond the perceptions are called supernatural or parapsychological. Eventually they, in normal course of life, remain unexplained and are



taken as creation or will of God. The divining capacity therefore has been called as heavenly or God given favoured to only a few persons. The capacity to predict certain processes or phenomenon in non perceptible world around man can be explained on the basis of the presence of the most complicated web of electromagnetic forces in the non perceptible world surrounding us. This is analogous to Einstein's space. This electromagnetic continuum regulates a great many mental and physiological processes of our body. The supernatural and ordinary physiological processes in our body, are only gradations; not qualitatively different but quantitatively. Both are most complex physical phenomenon in the world of organic compounds similar to the crystals being the highest form of physical process in the inorganic world. After being registered by our nervous system these unperceptible phenomena are amplified and transformed into phenomena known in the perceptible world. This transformation capacity is not possessed by everyone. The examples are Rhabdomancy and Pallomancy. A specific phenomenon of magnetic interference of the human electromagnetic fields is hypnosis. Reich assumes that besides the physical energy the world is permeated with a non material orgone energy, the source of fundamental phenomena of life. This is analogous to the physical elementary particles, electrons, neutrons, and protons. He termed it as bions. The bions fluid show fluorescence phenomenon. The organic potency of the fluid can be determined by its fluoro-photometric value. Injections of bion water of high organontic potency into living organisms result in vigorous vagotonic reactions, which according to the Reich, have a life prolonging effect. Does it not amount to Amrit or nectar?

The problems of parapsychology and supernatural in general are so extremely complicated that it is impossible for any, even the most gifted research worker, to study it individually. Only if a group of scientist work together in one laboratory in close cooperation, these problems of modern science might be solved. The solution is not of academic importance. There might be a new light on the medical, physical, chemical and biological processes caused by body organism. The infrared radiation of the body is electromagnetic in nature and these associated fields when interacted by the space time continuum definitely results in the observations, perceptible and non-perceptible by a man. The same may be true with the interference of mother's electromagnetic fields with that of the embryo. The example may be cited that of Abhimanyu.

To conclude it may be said that perception within our sensitivity limits is explainable on the known physical laws. The perception beyond our sensitivity that is the extrasensory, perception which is called the God gifted or heavenly, is also explainable but



only limitation is the boundary set on our sensitivity to such perceptions, within physical limits. The sensitivity of the human body and mind can be raised to the level of highest wisdom by properly controlling and regulating the interaction of body electromagnetic field with that of space-time continuum. The ability to (imaginary) transform of the body and mind to another frame of reference and then predict the events of the other frame of reference can be achieved by Yoga. This may be taken as the travel of the 'mana', the soul and mind in space-time. This 'art' of the science of the Yoga has been perfected long ago in India. Indian Yogis had a clear understanding of the capabilities of the highest states of human mind. It was possible for them to foresee in space and time. However, exact explanation and mathematical equations for such phenomena have not been enumerated so far. It is worthwhile now to take step in this direction.

By forming a system to determine the interaction of such forces the secrets of heavenly happenings can be understood and it is possible to have insight of the secrets and might of God.



## IX

## Wittgenstein and Idealism

*Kalipada Mohanta*

In both the works i. e. in *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and in *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein in a fairly recognizable way has developed what might be called his own form of Idealism. It might appear very strange that Wittgenstein could use the language of idealism. It is sometimes argued by a section of scholars that Wittgenstein is an antimetaphysician. The logical positivists treated the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* as their bible and tried to get intellectual support for their antimetaphysical position from it. The positivist position that metaphysics is meaningless, is claimed to be implied in the *Tractatus*. The *Philosophical Investigations* has also been interpreted in the similar manner by some scholars. Metaphysics is a muddle. Metaphysical theories are results of conceptual confusion.

An attempt has been made to show that Wittgenstein, as a matter of fact, continues the Germanic tradition of transcendental idealism. Before I argue out this position it will not be out of place to spell out in brief the idealistic thesis. "Idealism" popularly means belief in and commitment to "ideals". In this sense we sometimes say that so and so is man of ideals, that means he is committed to certain values and lives up to it. Idealism in this sense stands for certain values, beliefs and attitudes. But idealism as a philosophical theory has usually the following forms viz.,

- (i) epistemological idealism,
- (ii) metaphysical idealism,
- (iii) transcendental idealism.

Epistemological idealism relates to theory of knowledge. Metaphysical idealism relates to theory of reality. According to epistemological idealism the object of knowledge is dependent for its existence on the knowledge of the percipient. It got its classic expression in



Berkeley. Berkeley was an epistemological idealist. For him esse est-percipi. This means existence is perception. A thing cannot be said to exist if it is not perceived. This theory of perception compelled Berkeley to maintain that the external world is nothing but a series of perceptions,

Metaphysical idealism is a doctrine which claims that the nature of the object of knowledge is of the nature of mind. In other words the subject and the object are of the same type. The knowing subject and the object of knowledge belong to the same category. This type of idealism is sometimes known as metaphysical idealism. Hegel and Bradley are metaphysicians in this sense. Epistemological idealism is sometimes known as subjective idealism. Subjective idealism, historically speaking has resulted in solipsism. To use Perry's words, it has resulted in what is known as ego centric predicament. Objective idealism, has reduced matter to objective mind. Hegel argues that the world is an externalization of the spirit. Mind categories are the ultimate categories. But Hegel did not use mind in the subjective sense as a specific apparatus of knowledge of an individual.

But both the two types of idealism are reductionists in nature. Epistemological idealism reduces the world to a series of perceptions. Metaphysical idealism reduces matter to mind. The type of idealism which Kant advocated may be characterized as transcendental idealism. According to Kant there are certain ultimate, basic and fundamental conditions of human experience and knowledge. These conditions are transcendental in nature. That is to say they are not created or manufactured by us. They constitute the basic furniture of human knowledge. Without these categories and concepts no knowledge is possible. But at the same time we cannot transcend the limits set by these categories. These categories not only make our knowledge possible but set a limit to human knowledge. In other words they determine the nature and limits of knowledge.

In spite of the differences between epistemological, metaphysical and transcendental idealisms there are similarities among them. In other words they share in certain common points. Ideas or concepts are central to knowledge. Unfortunately the epistemological idealists used ideas in the sense of image or mental contents. To use Bradley's words the British empiricists psychologized logic. They treated logical issues as they were psychological ones. Ideas in the sense of images or mental contents are not the subject matter of philosophy. The British empiricists confused between logical and psychological issues. Bradley makes a distinction between ideas as images and ideas as meanings. Ideas in the sense of meaning can be studied by philosophers and the idealists study concepts or ideas.



Bradley examines the categories of knowledge. He came to the conclusion that reality cannot be known through categories. He treated them as make-shift devices. Ideas are of no use in knowing reality. Ideas present before us appearances not reality, that is why Bradley recommends a non categorial mode of understanding. It is a type of understanding where concepts and categories cease to operate. Bradley spells out in detail the contradictions inherent in ideas or categories.

Wittgenstein can perhaps be characterized as a transcendental idealist of the Kantian type. In both the works *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations* transcendental idealism is inherent. It is not visible on the surface. One can dig out the idealistic structure submerged in both the works. Let us first discuss the idealistic position held in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. The Tractarian world is a totality of facts. These facts correspond to the elementary propositions. Facts for Wittgenstein are both actual and possible. The totality can be exhausted only by actual and possible facts. The elementary propositions lie submerged under ordinary language. At this stage language pictures reality. The ideal language much talked of in the *Tractatus* is not a constructed ideal language. It is a language discovered by a particular type of analysis. The elementary propositions are treated as the pictures of reality. According to Wittgenstein both language and reality have isomorphic structure. This means that the multiplicity in elementary propositions correspond to the multiplicity in the facts. But this structure shows itself. That is why Wittgenstein claims that which can be shown cannot be said. This is the unsayable. The structure of the world is reflected in the structure of the language. This shows itself therefore it cannot be put into words. This is in fact the unspeakable. At this point Wittgenstein resembles Kant. Like Kant he sets a limit to human thought and communication. Kant warns us against transgressing the sphere of phenomena. Any transgression of the bounds of phenomena will result in antinomies. But at the same time Kant points out that there is an eternal impulse in man to transgress the bounds. Poets and mystics have always tried to transgress the bounds of the sayable and the speakable. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* may be characterized as a treatise concerned with setting up of boundaries to the world. Similarly Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* can be characterized as a treatise concerned with setting up of limits of meaningful discourse. Wittgenstein maintains that the limits of my language are the limits of my world. This has puzzled subsequent commentators. Some of them have read solipsism into it. But I wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not a solipsist. His argument that where of one cannot speak there of one must be silent is not symptomatic of solipsism; rather it tells us not to transgress the boundary of speech and



communication. Language sets a limit to thought and communication. Any attempt to go beyond the boundaries of communication is to land oneself in absurdities. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* maintained that only genuine propositions are descriptive ones. The propositions of natural sciences belong to this category. They constitute the area of the sayable. As Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* gave a metaphysical defence to Newtonian mechanics, Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* was trying to delimit the scope and boundaries of descriptive propositions of natural science. Wittgenstein is not a subjective idealist. He does not treat the external world as a series of perception in the mind of the perceiver. The following arguments could be given on his behalf. The subject of knowledge can never be made the object of knowledge. This is a position which is usually accepted by the transcendental idealist. The transcendental idealist makes a distinction between the 'ego' and the 'transcendental self.' The ego may be treated as an object of knowledge but the transcendental self can never be treated so. Kant made such a distinction. According to him the self is a transcendental unity of apperception. It cannot be caught in the process of perception. Its existence is logically postulated to account for the unity of perception. The Upanisadic text is full of such references. It has been argued in the Upanisads that 'I' or the 'transcendental self' cannot be treated as an object of knowledge. All knowledge is possible because of this transcendental self. The self is a unity of perception. That is why it cannot be treated as an object of perception. In the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara the self has been treated as a transcendental principle. It is not amenable to ordinary modes of perception. No categories can be applied to it because of the simple reason that the application of all categories are made possible because of this principle. Wittgenstein treats the self as Kant treats it. Therefore Wittgenstein can be treated as a Kantian in his treatment of the self. For him the 'I' or the self is a formal concept. There are no objects corresponding to these concepts in the world. Wittgenstein does not reduce the self to a series of impressions in the manner of David Hume. Hume reduced self to a string of impressions. His famous argument is that when one looks within, one never comes across what is known as the self. One only comes across a particular sensation or other but never what is known as the self. Hume committed the mistake which many other empiricists have done. The empiricists treated the self as an object and later on were disappointed when they did not find it. This is as good as raising the dust and complaining that one cannot see things. The formal distinction between subject compels one to posit that the self can never be made as an object of knowledge. The Advaitins were aware of this fact.



They made a distinction between perceptual consciousness and witnessing consciousness (Sāksicaitanya). The witnessing consciousness can never be caught in the process of perception. Any attempt to perceive it in the manner of an object will lead to infinite regress. The empiricist forgot to recognise the logic of perception that it is based upon a postulate of transcendental self. The omission of this fact has led empiricism to solipsism. There is no element of empiricism, consequently of solipsism, in Wittgenstein. He is neither an empiricist nor a solipsist. He is a transcendental idealist.

As I have pointed out Wittgenstein is not an empiricist he is not a realist too. He does not treat the world as a totality of things as a realist would do. Nor is he an advocate of common sense view of the world as G. E. Moore would like to uphold. His treatment of the world is Kantian in nature. The Kantian world is a categorised or conceptualized world. The world that we know Kant would argue that it is not the world per se. It is a world categorised. The world becomes intelligible to us through these categories. The categories so to say give a shape to the world. One comes across similar views in the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein. He treats the world as a totality of facts. These facts consist of objects. The fact is a configuration of objects. But how did Wittgenstein arrive at this? In answer to this it can be said that Wittgenstein arrived at this theory of the world through extensional analysis of language. He treats language as truth functional. A truth function is a compound proposition whose truth value can be determined by the truth values of its component propositions. Thus in the process of analysis we arrive at elementary propositions. A compound proposition is decomposable into elementary ones. An elementary proposition lies hidden behind the compound proposition. The elementary propositions in their turn picture facts. The elementary propositions can be, with some reservation likened to Kantian categories. As the Kantian categories are empty without the content so is the case with elementary propositions. The categories of Kant give a shape to the world. But the world and the elementary propositions according to Wittgenstein have the same structure. They are isomorphic in nature. The elementary propositions, so to say, are the categories of knowledge. They are impersonal and objective in nature. They are not like the subjective impressions of the Humean variety. In other words they cannot be treated as a string of fleeting impressions. The elementary propositions have an objective status even though Wittgenstein refused to give an example of it. But what is the nature of the world without these elementary propositions? As the world for Kant cannot be made intelligible without the categories similarly the world for Wittgenstein is unintelligible without elementary propositions. The elementary



propositions in a way give a shape to the world. This is an idealistic position.

The *Philosophical Investigations* also has an idealistic undertone. This is the line of continuity between *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*. In the *Philosophical Investigations* language has been treated as a form of life. It is a prism through which we look at the world. What does it mean? Wittgenstein's remark that there cannot be 'seeing' as such but always 'seeing as' is a pointer in this direction. This means that there cannot be any 'seeing' in perception without application of categories. This is really a Kantian position. Knowledge is conceptual. Without concepts and categories no knowledge is possible. An object is an object only when it is seen through a category. The world cannot be said to exist for us unless we apply these categories. The world without the categories is the Kantian nou mena which is unknown and unknowable. It is through the network of language games that the world becomes intelligible to us. The difference between Kant and the latter Wittgenstein is that Kant believed in fixed categories whereas the later Wittgenstein does not believe in the fixity of categories. For him language is a form of life. Sometimes the old language games become obsolete and new language games come into being. Wittgenstein's language games are the counterparts of Kant's categories with the difference that Kant's categories are fixed and static and Wittgenstein's language games are dynamic in nature. Language games grow, become obsolete and new language games come into being. But the fact remains that the world is intelligible to us only through language games. Language has been treated as a form of life. This is an idealistic thesis in disguise. This means that language and life are inalienably connected. To understand life means to understand language game and to understand language game means to understand forms of life. Language cannot be understood without relating it to human context and situation. Wittgenstein in the manner of F. H. Bradley treats the world as an organic whole. Bradley points out that to understand one thing is to relate it to other things. This is in short the cardinal feature of idealism. The idealist like Hegel maintains that the world is organically related. Any idea contains limitless possibilities. The idea of being for example not only contains limitless potentialities but also the idea of its self-annihilation that is non-being. 'Being' even contains the idea of 'non-being.' This might look very strange and contradictory. How is it that both 'being' and 'non-being' which appear contradictory in the surface go together? This cannot be understood without unearthing the Hegelian philosophical motives. I wish to point out in this connection that Hegel was concerned with exploring the limitless potentialities of basic ideas of thought. Ideas constitute an



## Wittgenstein and Idealism

organic unity, so does thought. Thought and reality have the same structure. This brand of Germanic idealism is very much present in Wittgenstein's work. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* narrates an incident in the following manner. Suppose somebody comes across a nail on the way but how do we recognise it as a nail. A nail is a nail only when it is related to certain other things. This means that the idea of purely unrelated object is a myth. All language games are internally connected. According to Wittgenstein experience is semantic in nature. Non categorised pure experience without any semantic touch is a myth. In other words pure experience is not possible at all. An experience in order to be an experience has to conform to the categories. It can be said in this connection that the totality of language games is actually the totality of facts for us. In the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* Wittgenstein thought that these language games in the form of elementary propositions are fixed for all time to come. But in *Philosophical Investigations* he comes to the conclusion that there are infinite and innumerable language games. Therefore there are innumerable ways of looking at the world. It is the language games, the modes of representation that bring us closer to the world. Without these language games the world will not be world for us. It is only through language games we know the world and talk about it. In the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* Wittgenstein characterizes these totalities as both actualities and possibilities. The world is totality of facts both actual and possible. It is interesting to note that in the totality of facts Wittgenstein included possible facts. Why did he do so? In answer to this it can be said that logically speaking the totality has to include all possibilities. Without this totality will not be complete. The actual language games do not exhaust the totality of language games. The totality of language games is constituted by both possible and actual language games. This is the meaning of totality. In this connection I wish to point out that this is much more a *Hegelean* brand of idealism that is recognizable in the works of Wittgenstein. It is very difficult to say whether Wittgenstein read Hegel and Kant and was influenced by their writings. But the fact remains that the Germanic idealistic element can be discovered in Wittgenstein.

One of the major themes of idealism is that the world is a system of ideas or concepts. These ideas are not subjective impressions of human mind but objective in nature. As Hegel points out that the world is an externalization of ideas. The world is ultimately a system of ideas. Virtually there is no distinction between the ideas and the world. Now the question is what is the nature of these ideas? Are the ideas language bound, context bound or they are independent of language and context? Answers to these questions



will open up new dimensions. If it is argued that language conditions thought then one will argue with Sapir and Whorf that our perceptions are determined by our language. In other words this will lead to linguistic determination of human perception. One will be forced to accept the view that the categories of language are the categories of reality. Some philosophers have pleaded for this view. Russell argues that the linguistic structure of Indo-European languages has been conducive to subject predicate logic and substance attribute metaphysics. In this connection he further argues that language devoid of nouns and adjectives perhaps will not have substance attribute metaphysics. Substance attribute metaphysics is contingent upon linguistic facts. Sapir and Whorf go to the extent of saying that language not only determines reality but the world view as well. There is a close and intimate connection between the structure of language and the structure of thought and reality. Is Wittgenstein Sapirian? Does Wittgenstein accept the Sapir Whorf hypothesis? These questions are of fundamental importance. I wish to point out that Wittgenstein is not a Sapirian. He will not agree with Sapir and Whorf that the categories of reality are dependent on linguistic categories of specific languages. The views of Sapir and Whorf tie reality to specific languages. Thus it will lead in the direction of not only metaphysical relativism but cultural relativism too. In other words linguistic relativism will ultimately lead to ethnocentrism. There will be as many pictures of reality as there are languages. Sapir and Whorf accord place of primacy to linguistic categories and these categories are language specific. Therefore it can be said that different linguistic groups will have their own picture of reality as determined by their linguistic categories. But what is the status of these linguistic categories? To this question, Sapir and Whorf will probably tell us that the linguistic categories are autonomous in nature. In that they determine and condition our thought. The linguistic categories condition the nature of reality by way of conditioning the nature of thought. For Sapir and Whorf there is only one way traffic between language and reality. But this will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. To interpret Wittgenstein as a Sapirian is to commit a mistake. It is true that for Wittgenstein experience is semantic in nature. It is true that perception and knowledge is category based but these categories are not contingent upon specific languages. Though the categories and concepts are expressed by and embodied in languages, yet they are not dependent on languages. This means that categories and concepts are independent of any specific languages which embody them. In this sense Wittgenstein may be characterized as a Kantian but not a Sapirian. There is a sense in which it can be said that the basic categories and concepts are not language dependent.



They are trans-linguistic and trans cultural in nature. The twelve categories of Kant and seven categories of Kanada belong to this type. The Vaisesika Padarthas and the Kantian categories are not linguistic in nature. They are the categories of thought, speech and communication. These categories cannot be explained in accordance with the Sapir Whorf hypothesis. There is a sense in which there is a bed rock of human thought and knowledge. Kant and Kanada seek to discover such a bed rock. These categories may be termed as basic, primary and fundamental categories. These primary categories are not language bound, context bound or culture bound. They are trans-linguistic and trans-cultural in nature. As opposed to these there may be a group of categories known as the secondary ones. The primary categories do not change, they are stable and fixed. To use Strawson's word they are basic or primitive categories. The secondary categories are amenable to change. In a certain sense these categories can be said to be bound to context and culture. The derivative meanings of words in the Sanskrit language is a case in point. A close look at the formation of compound (Samāsa) and morphophonemic analysis (Sandhi) of words in sanskrit language tells us a lot about the social and cultural condition prevalent in ancient India. There is a rule regarding compound formation in Sanskrit language. It is this: an expression denoting a group of people who are treated as untouchable (aniravāśitasudra) cannot be compounded with expression denoting higher class. This grammatical rule and consequently the expression aniravāśitasudra are indicative of the social and cultural conditions prevalent in ancient India. But this does not go to prove the Sapirian hypothesis. It simply indicates that there is a constant interplay between language and thought in the sphere of secondary concepts. Sometimes new thoughts give rise to new grammatical and linguistic categories. It may so happen also that these grammatical categories shape our perception and thought. At this stage the question of cross cultural communication and understanding becomes prominent. How do people belonging to one culture understand others belonging to another culture? To this question a solipsistic answer may be given. It may be argued that one cultural and linguistic group in principle cannot understand another for the simple reason that both of them have two distinct and different linguistic categories. We want to maintain in this connection that this position will not be acceptable to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein surely believes in infinite and innumerable number of language games. He will even go the extent of conceding that different linguistic and cultural groups have their specific language games. But what are the language games? Are they really private, to such an extent that one group cannot understand another? The idea of linguistic privacy and solipsism goes



against the very idea of language games. Language games are public. To say that language is a 'game' is to say that it is governed by rules, and to say that it is governed by rules is to say that others can understand it. It is true that certain cultural categories prevalent in one group cannot easily be made intelligible to others. There might be difficulties, inhibitions and obstructions in the way. But this does not go to prove linguistic and cultural solipsism. To understand another group may be very difficult but not impossible. The logical impossibility of cross cultural understanding is a myth for the simple reason that it goes against the very idea of language games. The Oriya proverb that 'mature girls and ghee should not be kept for a long time at home,' may appear very ludicrous to an outsider. They may think that these people are barbarians, uncultured and uncivilized because they do not want to keep their daughters and ghee at their home. One who passes such judgement fails to take into account the culture and tradition of the people who have this adage. What I wish to suggest is this: to understand one culture is to understand the form of life and way of life of the people; otherwise misunderstanding and misinterpretation are likely to ensue. As a matter of fact many European scholars passed such types of biased judgements on Asiatic civilizations in the beginning of 19th century. Different language games are not isolated islands. They criss-cross and overlap each other. This shows that language games are interconnected. Different language games have contact points. This interconnection among language games makes it possible for one culture to be intelligible to another. To overlook this is to misunderstand Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is an idealist but never a solipsist. To read solipsism in Wittgenstein is to misinterpret and misunderstand language games.





# Historiography of History of Science

*Cemil Akdogan*

History and history of science have been artificially considered as separate enterprises, mostly to the detriment of history of science, which lagged well behind history historiographically, and even made a headway in the wrong direction. In order to catch up with historiography of history, history of science lost some precious time. Therefore not to suffer further drawbacks, history of science should unite with history to where it really belongs.

## I

Ironically enough, both disciplines, first history, later history of science, have been given the necessary historiographical tools by history of philosophy, which is always in advance in seeing future developments.

The ecclesiastical history of Medieval Ages was turned into a scientific history by the eighteenth century philosophers who rejected the Medieval Age as superstitious and supplied history with documentary and critical methods. But in two aspects the Age of Enlightenment, which confronted Gods, was faulty and unhistorical. First it ignored the Medieval Age as an age of intellectual eclipse and secondly it put its own standard on the past ages because of its own idea of progress. This rationalistic outlook of the eighteenth century changed only towards the end of the same age with a reaction from the romantic school which felt a sympathy towards past ages by describing them in a literary style from the standpoint of themselves<sup>1</sup>

However, the first real historiographical revolution in history occurred in the nineteenth century which united the documentary and critical methods of the rationalistic school with the stand of the romantic school. Thus the imagination of romantics was checked

<sup>1</sup> George Basalla, *The Rise of Modern Science*, Lexington, Mass. 1968, pp. VII-VIII.



and the Medieval Age became pre eminent historically.<sup>2</sup> Until the second half of the nineteenth century history mainly dealt with political events, and the opening of archives further enhanced this kind of history.

But in the middle decades of the nineteenth century with the chemistry oriented dyestuff industry science and technology united in a real sense<sup>3</sup> and from then on science undoubtedly became a pivotal point in the society. Historians could no longer ignore the significance of science and technology in social and cultural changes. After the ramifications of the Industrial Revolution historians broadened their scope and became interested in the whole realm of the human achievement on earth—intellectual, economic, social, political, and scientific. Because of expanding interests, history also began to demand a rigorous training from historians in many different sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other sciences depending on the research area in addition to principles of research in documents, inscriptions, monuments, archeology, physiological chemistry, endocrinology and human pathology.

## 2

After having shortly reviewed the historiography of history, now we can turn our attention to the historiography of history of science. As mentioned above briefly, the establishment of history of science as an independent discipline could not be possible before the Industrial Revolution broke out. After science became a significant factor in changing society through technology, historians started to pay more attention to history of science. However, they did not approach history of science historically. Instead, to the detriment of history of science, they emphasized on some external factors such as Reformation, rational thinking in Renaissance, and the experimental method to obtain a break with the past concerning the Scientific Revolution. Thus, they relieved themselves of going into those unpleasant technicalities of science, by making the scientific development a quasi mechanical procedure.<sup>4</sup> From the seventeenth century on science, they thought, had developed automatically. What historians achieved was to create a wrong image of the Scientific Revolution in the minds of laymen.

Besides historians, philosophers and scientists also dealt with history of science. Having an incurable Whiggishness, they projected today's point of view to the past. Due to their lack of the historical method, they just listed the positive achievements of scientists chronologically. They ignored the mistakes and the wrong theories. Their figures were mostly heroes triumphing over prejudices and subjectivity. Religion was seen as a hindrance to science.<sup>5</sup>

2 T. S. Kuhn, "The History of Science" in *The Essential Tension*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, pp. 106-107.

3 T. S. Kuhn, "The Relations between History and the History of Science" in *The Essential Tension*, p. 142.

4 *Ibid*, pp. 136-137.

5 T. S. Kuhn, "The History of Science" in *The Essential Tension*, p. 107.



At last, in the twentieth century the history of science got its identity methodologically from a French historian of philosophy, Alexander Koyre, who, in 1939, for the first time, applied the historical method to Galileo's works. He examined Galileo not from today's standpoint, but from the standpoint of himself. Koyre brought into the picture the near predecessors and the immediate successors of Galileo and the influences that he got from his education, from his colleagues and friends and from the books that he had read.<sup>6</sup> But Koyre emphasized the internal factors and made the history of science a history of ideas, since he picked up the Scientific Revolution as a topic, in which external factors played almost no role.<sup>7</sup> The history of ideas correlates with the intellectual history in traditional history. Thus, even Koyre's historiographic revolution in the history of science was not complete, for he went to the other extreme as opposed to general historian who had emphasized only the external factors.<sup>8</sup>

Due to Koyre's one-sidedness and as a reaction to Koyre, Thomas S. Kuhn, a philosopher, in 1962 completed or achieved bringing the historiography of history of science to the level of the historiography of history by also taking the external factors into consideration besides the internal factors.

In a paradigm change both internal and external factors are simultaneously in effect. This is why Kuhn brings the community of scientists into the picture<sup>9</sup>. Therefore we have to deal with scientists themselves and see the community of scientists as a unit in a larger cultural atmosphere. External factors that Kuhn put emphasis on correlate with socio-economic and cultural factors in the general history. Furthermore, Kuhn also suggests in a parallelism with the historiography of history that the historian of science be trained in psychology and sociology. Thus Kuhn showed that the history of science indeed belongs to history and has a parallelism to the historiography of history historiographically.

History of science did not develop as a part of the practice of the historical profession, because general historians shunned away from the unpleasant technicalities of science.

The isolation of the history of science from traditional history contributed to the lack of the historical method among historians of science. After losing some precious time history of science finally got its historical method from history of philosophy.

This article outlines the development of both the historiography of history and the historiography of history of science and establishes some striking and interesting resemblances and parallelisms between their methodologies.

<sup>6</sup> See Alexandre Koyre, *Etudes galileennes* (Paris, 1939).

<sup>7</sup> T. S. Kuhn, "The History of Science" in *The Essential Tension*, p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>9</sup> T. S. Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms" in *The Essential Tension*, pp. 293-298.



## XI

# Operation of the Law of Karma According to Bhatta School of Mimamsa

*G. L. Chaturvedi*

The doctrine of Karma is the basic tenet of Indian philosophy and religion. It seeks to ensure moral justice with or without the divine dispensation in the universe and hence has been jealously espoused by the Theistic as well as atheistic orders of Indian thought. The term 'Karma' itself has come to signify in the form of a number of meanings. Karma (1) as a physical occurrence motion or energy underlying it, (2) involuntary behaviour, (3) as the law of reciprocal justice, (4) as the law of conservation of value.

The first usage of the term, i.e. Karma as energy inhering in the matter (dravya) as the Naiyayikas put it, is the widest connotation of the term, covering both the animate and the inanimate world. Obviously this notion of Karma as a mere physical occurrence, cannot be of any direct relevance to moral philosophy. The second view of Karma as involuntary action is common to the biological world. When the Gita speaks of Karmic determination e.g., the elemental forces subsist in the elements<sup>1</sup>, 'when the beings are led by nature what can abstinence do'<sup>2</sup>, it often resorts to cite examples from these involuntary acts.<sup>3</sup> Obviously, these involuntary acts too do not come within the scope of moral determination as they lack the notion of doership (Karttriva). Karma as a law of reciprocal justice, represents the common man's view of the doctrine of Karma. It is taken to ensure appropriate reaction to the deeds accurate and

1 Gita, III. 28.

2 Gita, III. 33.

3 Gita, V. 9.



measurable as any reaction on the physical plane. It has been vividly illustrated in a verse of 'Hitopadesa': "Whence, whereby, in which manner, when, for which-ever duration, where, whichever deed good or bad is done, the doer of it thence, thereby in that very manner, that very time and place and for that very duration is rapid for it."<sup>4</sup>

It is this mechanical account of reciprocal justice, that probably tempted the jainas to view 'Karma' as 'matter' (pudgala), because only the matter is known to operate with such blind measurable accuracy. Full of pity for the slaughtered animals in the Brahminical sacrifices, they could think of nothing else but retributive justice to the offenders. This view clearly recognises the moral character of the doctrine of Karma, but owing to its rigid and mechanical approach, it fails to rise to the stature of a comprehensive philosophy of value. It is the notion of Karma as merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) that raise it to the level of value beyond the mechanical operations of reciprocal justice. The 'adrasta' as postulated by the Naiyayikas and the 'apūrva' of the Mīmāṃsakas, seek to explain the conservation of Karma as value, till spends itself into results not permissible within the scope of reciprocity<sup>5</sup>.

Kumarila Bhatta who has made a notable contribution in shaping the doctrine of Karma as a comprehensive postulate of moral philosophy, gets the opportunity of exposing the insufficiency of the reciprocal theory of Karma, as he elaborates the definition of 'dharma'. It is formulated as 'codanā lakṣaṇortha dharma—Merit is that which is enjoined by the scriptures and is conducive to good. In view of it, the Mīmāṃsā scholarship takes up the issue whether the hawk sacrifices (śyenayāga) undertaken with a view to destroy the enemy is dharma or not. It is enjoined by the scripture 'śyenena abhicaran yajet' one should accomplish the death of the enemy through hawk sacrifice. But it cannot be called conducive to good because it involves twofold violence (himsā) i.e., to the hawk as a material of sacrifice and to the enemy as the result thereof. The Mīmāṃsā position, which will be examined here is that the hawk sacrifice is not morally good and hence not dharma in so far as its objective is concerned. The destruction of the enemy leads to sin (pratyavaya) since it is violative of the injunction 'do not kill the living beings' (mā himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni). However, the sacrifice of the hawk is a part of the process and is not the counter-positive of the negation enjoined by the said scripture.

Against this, it is pointed out that violence whether committed as a part of sacrifice or otherwise is not morally good. There are suggestions in the Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras that a person who

<sup>4</sup> Hitopadesa.



donates coin gold etc., is rewarded after his death with happiness commensurate with the happiness the recipient feels on receiving the donation. Similarly violence, which entails an exact amount of suffering to the doer in the next birth, cannot be good, even as part of sacrifice. It may be brought out by the following syllogism: The violence under dispute brings about an equal amount of suffering to the doer, being a specific act, like the act of donation enjoined by Sastras.<sup>5</sup>

Kumarila subjects the reciprocal account of the Karma theory to close scrutiny. It leaves little scope for complex moral situation. He cites the sinful acts of drinking and reduction of teacher's wife as counter examples to disprove the above syllogism.<sup>6</sup>

The idea is that drinking being a one-man act, there is no scope for the operation of reciprocity. That these sins entail sufferings of hell to the sinner is accepted by all. However, the act of seduction, whereby the sinner imparts happiness to the mistress, entitles him to happiness of equal amount and not the suffering of hell, if the reciprocity is accepted in the strict sense of the term. Besides, the act of charity enjoined by the scriptures is said to yield hundred and thousand times magnified result, and not in equal amount. Hence the object, the result of equal amount is absent in the example, the enjoined donation' of the above syllogism.<sup>7</sup>

Kamarila emphasises that the moral worth of an act cannot be subjected to reconsideration. Śāstra alone is our source regarding the value of non-violence as a virtue. When conflicting scriptural utterances are available, the rule is that the general law becomes restricted, so that the law with limited scope may become operative 'do not kill living beings (Mā himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni) is a universal maxim, whereas one should accomplish the death of the enemy through hawk sacrifice' (śyenena abhicaran yajet) is a maxim of specific nature. Hence the universal maxim enjoining non-violence has to be so restricted as to allow violence enjoined by the Śāstras.

Against this it may be pointed out that the inherent sinfulness of an act, say the sacrificial violence, cannot be set aside, simply because there is an injunction prescriptive of it. The scriptures (śāstras) simply inform us about the inherent capacity of things and acts. But they cannot be said to change the inherent nature of faith.<sup>8</sup> Notably violence is a single act the undesirability of which is revealed by the negative injunction 'mā himsyāt servā bhūtāni'. The injunctive scripture informs us that the enjoined act, say sacrifice, has the

5 Slokavarttika, II, 235.

6 Ibid. 236.

7 Ibid. 238-39.

8 Ibid. 249.



capacity to bring about certain desirable effects but it does not have the capacity to set aside the sin (*pratyavāya*) already inherent in it.

Kumarila meets these objections by pointing out that action is not an isolated occurrence. It is a complex, having not only specific time space co ordinates, but is also closely related to the subjective context of the doer. The same act may lead to different results among different persons. Food being the same, it may show different effects in the healthy and ailing persons.<sup>9</sup> In support of his contention, he cites the following injunctions: 'A Brahmin should not take to drinking (*Brāhmaṇo na Surāṁ pibet*), 'one of trading class should accomplish *vaisyastoma yaga* (*vaiśyo vaisyastomena yajet*), 'one should perform new moon and full moon sacrifices' (*darśa-pūṇa-māsābhyāṁ yajet*) etc. They serve to demonstrate that the merit and demerit are not inherent in the act but are results of so individualised complex operation. The finding is significant as it recognises the universe of value in its own right.

Coming back to the issue of violence in sacrifice, it is again pointed out that the injunction '*mā himśyātsarvā bhūtāni*' is a universal maxim, without specifications or conditions, and as such different from the scriptures cited above. It condemns all violence as sinful without exception. Taking up the issue Kumarila points out that injunctive intention has three parts: the end (*Sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) and the mode of operation (*itikartavyatā*). In the sentence such as '*Syenena abhicaran yajet*' and '*agnisomiyam pasu-mālabhet*' the negative sentence '*mā himśyāt sarvā bhūtāni*' negates only the end part of intention and not the means and model parts of it. The point is that the two types of violence i.e., the violence as means and violence as mode of the act are not sinful. Only that which is pursued as an end, and has its springs in emotions such as anger and lust e.g. killing the enemy through hawk sacrifice or the killing of the animals for the pleasure of meat eating is sinful (*anartha*). But the hawk sacrifice as a performance is not productive of sin. The violence that is part of the process of the sacrifice either as means or mode thereof is technically called *Kratvartha* i.e. for the sake of sacrifice and not for the sake of the doer, and hence not *puruṣārth*. It imparts certain excellence to the sacrificial act and exhausts, and as such its effect cannot be said to abide in the doer (*puruṣaṇiṣṭha*). Hence, it has been said: 'The result of an act as part of the process cannot belong to the doer'<sup>10</sup> Violence as means, to sacrifice cannot be called sinful.<sup>11</sup>

We can safely draw certain conclusions from the aforesaid cross-section of the controversy which serves to highlight the Mimamsa

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 257.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 262.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 264.



approach to the doctrine of Karma. In the first place it rejects the reciprocal theory of Karma which treats it on a par with the natural law of action and reaction, and prepares ground for the recognition of the universe of value in its own right. It imparts requisite flexibility and comprehensiveness to the doctrine of Karma, as a basic postulate of moral philosophy.

The Mīmāṃsā stand on non-violence further bears out the above conclusions. The moral value of an act is not the sum total of the values of the occurrences forming part of the act. The intended accomplishment alone should form the subject of moral judgement. Of course, we are used to hearing the law courts pronouncing separate sentences for burglary and murder to a man who breaks into the house with the intention of killing the master and kills him. Judging the crimes separately and pronouncing separate sentences on them may be legal, but not necessarily moral. Morally, only the final, intentionally accomplished act has to be judged, other crimes, i.e., acquiring the arms, breaking into the house, are parts of the process, and need not be judged separately in the moral assessment of the offence. The insight of the Mimamsakas is a distinctive gain to moral philosophy and is the import of the saying 'gahana hi Karmaṇo jatih'.



## Catoptrics and Albert the Great

Cemil Akdogan

Albert the Great deals with catoptrics in his *Questio de forma resultante in speculo*, an extract from question 21 of *De homine*. In that short treatise he primarily wants to determine the existence, the place, and the perception of the image in the mirror. Our purpose in this paper will be to examine Albert's arguments on catoptrics closely.

Albert the Great begins his inquiry with ontological concerns. He first asks whether image exists or not. If the image is something real, then it will either be a body or not. Assume that the image in the mirror is a body; this would be ridiculous, since body has depth. But the mirror does not have such a depth. Assuming that the image is a body, then there will be not two bodies, but one, because if there were two bodies, a body in the mirror having the same depth as the original body would be seen. Moreover, this body would have to be elevated from the surface of the mirror; the thickness of the mirror is not equal to the depth of the original body. The sense shows that this is not the case, for the mirror is not seen as elevated. Therefore, only one body must exist since the mirror does not occupy a major place. Therefore, the image is not a body.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> D. Alberti Magni, *De Homine*, ed. Augusti Borgnet, second part, Paris, 1890, Question 21, p. 198: "Et queritur primo, Utrum sit vel non? Et videtur, quod non: quia forma quae videtur in speculo, aut erit corpus, aut non. Si corpus, tunc duo corpora erunt in eodem loco: quia speculum propter ipsam non occupat maiorem locum. Praeterea, Cum omne corpus habeat profundum, oporteret, quod forma non videretur jacens super speculum, sed elevata superficiem speculi secundum quantitatem profunditatis corporis illius: quod cum sit falsum, impossibile, est illam formam esse corpus."



But the image moves locally. It goes from one place to another in the mirror. If the locally moving image were not a body, this would not be the case. Albert the Great here follows Aristotle. A moving thing is in a place and unless there is a body, nothing is in a place. So the image must be a body. If the image is moved, it is moved per se or per accidens. It cannot be moved per se, because the image does not move by itself, but is moved by the motion of the original object. So it is a non-body. It cannot be said that a non-body moves by its body. If it is moved per accidens, it must be either on the mirror or in the air that touches the mirror. By the motion of the mirror or the medium, the image may be moved, because the mirror or the medium is a body and it can move the image. However, this is not the case. Though the mirror stays unmoved and the medium unchanged, the image moves. Therefore, it seems that the motion of the image is not per accidens. From these arguments Albert the Great concludes that the image will be neither a body nor a non-body. It will be nothing<sup>2</sup>

But this is not what Albert intends. He proposes some arguments to nullify this conclusion and wants to establish that the image is something. The image is the cause of sight. It moves and alters the sight. Whatever moves and alters something does exist. Therefore, the image does exist. Moreover, something which is seen per se or per accidens also exists. We see the image per se or per accidens. Therefore, the image exists. But if it does exist it will be a body or a non-body or a substance or *accidens*. Albert the Great concludes that it is a mobile body, because whatever changes its position, it is moved and it is a mobile body. The image changes its position since it is at one place of the mirror at one moment and at another place of the mirror at another moment. Therefore, the image is moved by the original body and it is a mobile

2 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 198; "Si autem dicatur, quod sit non corpus quod videatur moveri motu locali super speculum, movebitur non corpus motu corporis, quod multis rationibus impossibile esse probatur. Dicitur enim in *Sex principiis*, quod impossibile est non corpus corpore moveri, hoc est, motu corporis. Et in *VI Physicorum*<sup>1</sup>, quod omne quod movetur, est corpus continuum. Et in primo de *Anima*, quod omne quod movetur, est in loco: et nihil est in loco nisi corpus. Praeterea, si movetur, aut movetur per se, aut per accidens. Non per se, ut probatum est. Ergo per accidens: sed per accidens movetur localiter, quod movetur motu ejus in quo est: ergo cum non sit nisi in superficie speculi et in extremitate perspicui tangentis speculum, movebitur motu illorum tantum: sed nos videmus, quod speculo immoto manente et similiter extremitate perspicui, movetur imago ad motum adspicientis ad speculum: ergo videtur ipsa non mota esse per accidens; et non erit non corpus, neque corpus, et ita nihil erit."



body<sup>3</sup>. Thus, he finally concludes that the image does exist. To illuminate this point, he gives the example of light. When an illuminans is present, light is generated. Here *illuminans* is essential and the existence of light depends on that. Likewise, the image in the mirror is generated with the motion of the object or the mirror or the medium. With the motion of the mirror or of the object, the image is destroyed and a new one is generated. From this account it can be concluded that the image is not material. For the image resembles light. As light is a form of *illuminans*, the image must also be the form of the object. The essential thing is the object itself. The object can be moved but the image cannot be moved locally. When the object or the mirror moves, the image moves<sup>4</sup>. Consider next the other condition.

If the medium between the object and the mirror is moved, is the image moved? The medium can carry something without retaining it. Albert the Great retains this feature for air, but with relation to water he retreats from this qualification, since water retains the image. Air cannot hold images, and the transference of the image through the medium is instantaneous, but as a medium, air moves in time. It cannot hold the image, so, when the air between the object and mirror is moved, no difference or extension in the image is seen. As for water, the situation is quite different. Water retains forms. Because of this, when the water is moved, the part of the water that is moved will still keep the image in itself. In the new part of water which replaced the original part, a new image will be produced. For this reason, a larger image, sometimes two or threefold, will be seen. In this way, Albert the Great succeeds in explaining the experimentally known events such as the image's moving with the object or the mirror. The ultimate conclusion is

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, Qu. 21, p. 198: "1. Quidquid agit aliquid immutando, actu est: forma illa actu agit immutando visum: ergo actu est. 2. Item, Quidquid videtur per se, vel per accidens, illud est; forma illa videtur per se, vel per accidens: ergo est. Si autem est, tunc erit corpus, aut non corpus, vel substantia, vel accidens. Et videtur, quod sit corpus mobile. Quidquid enim variat situm, movetur et est corpus mobile: forma illa variat situm, videlicet quia modo est in una parte speculi, modo in alia: ergo movetur et est corpus mobile."

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, Qu. 21, pp. 200-201: "Et ad hoc quod obijctu de motu ejus, dicendum quod non movetur motu locali, sed potius generatur; sicut enim supra diximus de lumine, quod habet semper novam essentiam generatam ad novam praesentiam illuminantis, ita dicimus hic, quod tribus modis forma generatur in speculo, scilicet ex motu adspicientis, et ex motu aeris intermedii. Et hoc contingit ideo, quia recta opposit to exigitur ad immutationem speculi, et illa potest immutari ve ex parte situs adspicientis, vel ex parte speculi; et ideo corrumpitur una, et generatur altera.";



that a new image is always generated depending on the motion of the object, mirror and water.<sup>5</sup>

He shows that the image exists. Now he begins to ask where the image is. It seems that the image is not in the mirror. Something which is in another thing moves with that thing. If the image is in the mirror, it must move with the motion of the mirror. The mirror stays unmoved but the image again moves according to the motion of the original object. The image changes its position coming and going while the mirror stays in place. If the image were in the mirror this would not be the case. The image would also have to be constant. Thus, the image is not in the mirror.<sup>6</sup> Certainly such a result cannot be entertained, as the above mentioned argument negates the possibility of the image being in the mirror. Albert the Great did not follow a perspectivist point of view even if he knew Euclid's reflection law. He simply followed the sense which deceived Albert the Great. This is, perhaps, natural; he is, first of all, a philosopher. As a result, he arrived at a wrong conclusion.

Albert the Great, accepted the notion that the image is in the mirror. He says that believing the image is not in the mirror is an incredible error, since it is against our sense, for we see the image in the mirror. However, seeing something at a particular place does not always constitute a truth. This is the fault of Albert the Great; if the senses alone are followed, the image seems, indeed, to be in the mirror.<sup>7</sup>

- 5 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 201: "Medium autem quod est deferens, etiam corrumpit eam si ipsum variatur: sed ad mutationem ejus non videtur forma moveri: et hoc contingit duabus de causis. Quarum una est, quia transitus imaginis per medium est subito, sicut et luminis: sed mutatio aeris de loco ad locum, non est subito. Secunda est, quia medium est receptibile formae, sed non servabile, ut habetur in libro *de Sensu et sensato*: et propter hoc statim quando medius aer extra rectam oppositionem inter speculum et adspicientem, non apparet amplius in eo. In aqua autem secus est: quia illa magis servat: et propter hoc in aqua mota apparet facies majoris quantitatis: quia pars aquae quae movetur extra rectam oppositionem, tenet formam a materia diu, et illa pars conjuncta cum parte formae quae est in recta oppositione, facit formam majoris quantitatis apparere, et quandoque duas, vel tres formas. Sic igitur patet, quod ista forma non movetur neque per se, neque per accidens, sed semper nova generatur".
- 6 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 198: "Quaeritur etiam ulterius, Si est, in quo sit sicut in subjecto? Et videtur, quod non in speculo dicit enim Philosophus in *Topicks*, quod moventibus nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Si igitur esset in speculo, moto speculo moveretur et ipsa: hoc autem videmus falsum esse: quia videmus, quod speculo manente immoto apparet forma veniens et recedens, et varians situm ad motum adspicientis,"
- 7 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 198: "Si autem non dicatur ibi esse forma, erit incredibilis error in vulgo sequente sensum, licet hoc probabilius sit dicere."



## Catoptrics and Albert the Great

Albert the Great discounts the possibility of the image being in the air that touches the mirror by saying that if this were the case, the image would be seen without the mirror. This is false.<sup>8</sup> He simply looks at the air that touches the mirror and cannot see any image there. The eye sees that the image is in the mirror and this seems to be true. The image cannot be behind the mirror, since again the image behind the mirror is not seen by the sense.

Also, with respect to position and place, the image does not differ from the mirror, so it is in the mirror, for whatever does not differ from something with respect to position and place must be in that thing.<sup>9</sup>

Some people say that the image is not absolute and for this reason it can be compared to the shadow of something. In both cases the original body is important. But Albert the Great says that in the shadow all features of the object cannot be seen distinctly. However, the image in the mirror shows all features of the object clearly. Moreover, the object, in the first case, is between *illuminans* and the shadow, since the shadow is produced behind the body. In the case of the image, light directly illuminates the face of the object and no shadow is seen between the object and the mirror. Therefore, the image is necessarily in the mirror.<sup>10</sup> Thus, Albert arrives at a clear-cut answer to the second question about the place of image. The image is in the mirror. He rejects the idea that the image is in the air which touches the mirror. Albert the Great says that the image may be in the air that touches the mirror as well as in the mirror; but, he says, the image in the mirror comes first causally. According

8 *Ibid.* Qu. 21, p. 198: "Et propter hoc innuitur, quod sit in extremitate aeris tangentis speculum: sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia tunc videretur etiam sine speculo, quod falsum est."

9 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 198: "Praeterea, Unumquodque ei, in illo sicut in subjecto a quo non differt per situm et locum: forma speculi non distat per locum et situm a speculo: ergo est in ipso ut in subjecto".

10 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, pp. 198-199: "Ad praedicta voluerunt quidam solvere dicentes, quod in veritate forma illa nihil est absolute, sed tantum est comparatio quaedam adspicientis ad speculum, sicut etiam umbra privatio lucis est ex objecto corporis opaci resultans ad lumen. SED CONTRA hoc est, quod in umbra non resultat imago sei opacae expresse secundum omnia lineamenta, sed confuse tantum secundum ea quae primo intercipiunt transitum luminis: in imagine autem in speculo resultant omnia. Praeterea, In umbra sic est, quod semper projicitur post corpus opacum, ita quod opacum corpus inter umbram et corpus luminosum est: sed in speculo imago sic resultat ex hoc quod lumen directe illuminat faciem adspicientis ad speculum sine omni umpra media quae sit inter adspicientem et speculum: ergo forma illa de necessitate est in speculo."



to Albert the Great, the image can be carried to the air from the mirror.<sup>11</sup>

Thirdly he asks what category the image is in. It seems that it is a passion or a perceptible quality. Whatever makes an impact on the sense organ or whatever carries passion to the sense organ is a passion or a perceptible quality. The image carries the passion to the sense organ because it changes the sense organ. Therefore, it is a passion or a perceptible quality. But Albert the Great argues that every passion or perceptible quality has a contrary, but the image does not have any contrary; hence, it is not a passion or a perceptible quality. It is determined by the figure of the object.<sup>12</sup>

At this point Albert identifies the image with species. The image, he says, is in the category of quality with relation to the species which is *habitus* or *dispositio*. What he means here is very clear. The image is related to the object which has color as a quality. Color is a *quality*, so the image in the mirror is not a quality but a species of that quality. Then image is species. Therefore, there is not an image or form but there is a species of image or form. Also, there is not color but a species of color. Color is also a quality and there is no quality of color in the mirror or in the medium; rather, there is a species of it.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the same qualification is true for length and width. In the medium there is not a length and a width of something but only a species of length and a species of width. With these species the figure of the object is known just as colors with the species of colors are known. Epistemologically, species are the principles of knowing something.

11 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 201: "... dicimus, quod est in speculo ut in subjecto ... dicimus quod error est, quod sit in extremo aere tangente speculum sicut in subjecto: sed est in ipso sicut in extremitate perspicui quod confert ei actum immutandi visum..."

12 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 198: "Et si hoc dicatur, tunc quaeritur, Si est accidens, in quo sit praedicamento? Et videtur, quod sit passio vel passibilis qualitas. Omne enim quod infert passionem in sensu, est passio vel passibilis qualitas: forma illa infert passionem in sensu, quia immutat ipsum: ergo est passio vel passibilis qualitas. CONTRA hoc videtur esse, quod. 1. Omnis passio vel passibilis qualitas habet contrarium in specie: forma autem ista nihil habet contrarium: ergo non est passio vel passibilis qualitas... apparet forma sub quantitate determinata ad figuram adspicientis"

13 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 201: "Ad autem quod quaeritur, In quo praedicamento sit? Dicimus, quod est in praedicamento qualitatis secundum illam speciem quae est habitus vel dispositio... dicendum quod id quod immutat sensum per se ut primam agens, est passio vel passibilis qualitas, et hoc est color: sed non oportet, quod illud quod receptum est in oculo et spiritu visibili vel in speculo, sit color secundum esse coloris, sed potius erit species coloris, quae est principium cognoscendi colorem".



If there were something long or something wide and when that length and width were not terminated according to the limits of the air or the mirror, but according to the object, then the length and the width of that thing would be outside of the mirror which is incorrect. For this reason species of length and species of width which are terminated according to the limits of the air and the mirror are posited. Species also does not have a depth. The image in the mirror is species and a reduction of the length and the width of the original object. The mirror does not occupy a major place. Unless there are species of length and species of width how could a long and wide object be seen in a small mirror? This question can only be answered in terms of species, remembering that Albert does not accept the notion the image is behind the mirror. Spiritual species solves this problem.

Albert the Great qualifies species as *habitus* and *dispositiones*. The image in the mirror is also *habitus* or *dispositio*. It is in the soul simply as *habitus*, and in the mirror simply as *dispositio*, and it is even in the air. Thus, species or image becomes something knowable and sensible from epistemological and perceptual points of view. The image may be in the medium, in the mirror and even in the soul.<sup>14</sup> The image will come to the sense organ through the medium and make an impression on it.

# I

Albert the Great also treats medium from an Aristotelian point of view. With respect to medium, air and water are the best mediums for sensible species. The humidity in the air and in the water has a property of receiving and reporting the sensible to the sense organs. Air and water are not simply heavy or light. For this reason they do not oppose the movement of species. Humidity is lacking in the fifth matter and in fire. This indicates why fifth matter and fire are not good mediums for sensible species. Fire and the fifth matter are rarer than water and air. Air is also rarer than water. Potential transparency is caused by rare subtlety in the parts

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 201: "Est enim non proprie imago vel forma, sed species imaginis vel formae, et talis quae potest esse in anima ut in subjecto, et non est proprie longa vel lata, sed habet longitudinis vel latitudinis speciem: si enim longum esset vel latum, cum longitudo illa vel latitudo non terminetur secundum terminos aeris vel speculi, sed adspicientis, oporteret quod longitudo et latitudo alicujus essent extra ipsum, quod est inconveniens. Et propter hoc necesse est dicere, quod in veritate non est longum neque latum, sed species longi et lati, per quam cognoscitur figura adspicientis. Et cum tales species sint habitus vel dispositiones, erit illa forma habitus vel dispositio, et est etiam in anima sicut habitus, in speculo vero sicut dispositio, et etiam in aere".



of matter. When light is received, the potential transparency becomes actual. As a result, air is the best medium, for it has more transparency than water. In it humidity is more connected with transparency than in the water.<sup>15</sup>

Transparency has an aptitude for receiving species everywhere if light is present. The medium carries species but does not keep them as mentioned before. For this reason, visible species are present in the medium as in *potentia motus* and not *in actu*.<sup>16</sup>

Again following Aristotle, Albert the Great accepts the notion that the motion of light in the transparent medium is instantaneous and not in time. This poses a problem. Since light instantaneously illuminates the medium there must not be a motion, nor an alteration of the medium, but rather a generation of unchanging visible species in all parts of the medium. As mentioned above, Albert thinks of specific qualities as a cause and perception as an effect of

15 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, pp. 204-205; "Ad hoc dicendum, quod aer et aqua sunt medium, ut dicit Philosophus, non secundum quod aer et aqua. Et propter hoc non tantum sunt media, sed etiam alia in quibus est eadem natura, sicut quinta essentia in partibus non stellatis, et ignis in sphaera sua: sed non ita proprie sunt illa duo media sicut aer et aqua. Et hoc contingit duabus rationibus. Quarum una est, quod aer et aqua communicant in humido, et humidi sunt duae virtutes. scilicet bene recipere, et ad aliquid fluere: quia male terminabile est in se, Et propter hoc sensibilia bene recipiunt, et ad sensus bene fluendo reportant. Tale autem humidum non est in igne et quinta essentia. Alia ratio est, quia aer et aqua non sunt simpliciter levia, nec simpliciter gravia. Et propter hoc minus obviat motu sensibilibus per ipsa ad omnem proprietatem: et talis proprietas non est in igne. Et propter hoc non ita conveniens est medium. Est autem alia natura medii, scilicet quod ipsum sit rarum et parvum et illa magis est in igne et quinta essentia, quam in aere, et plus in aere quam in aqua: et propter hoc omnia haec differenter efficiuntur medium.

Ad primum ergo discendum, quod natura in qua communicant aer et aqua cum perpetuo superius corpore, duplex est: una ex parte potentia et altera ex parte actus. Illa quae est ex parte potentias, est diaphaneitas, et haec est transparentia quae causatur ex raro subtili in partibus materiae: et quanto illud plus abundat in aliquo corpore, tanto ipsum est magis pervium. Illa vero quae est ex parte actus, est lumen receptivum quod facit transparentes esse in actu esse transparentes ... Humidum autem sua duplici virtute in aere et aqua habet facilitatem mediandi, et praecipue in aere: quia ibi conjungitur humidum cum magis transparenti quam in aqua."

16 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 209: Haec autem est transparentia, quae est aptitudo ubique recipiendi speciem visibilem, ubi opponitur res colorata secundum actum lucidi. Dico autem *aptitudinem recipiendi* it deferens recipit, et non ut recipit tenens. Et hoc est quod volunt quidam dicere, quod visibilia sunt in medio ut in potentia modus, et non ut in termino, et actu."



that cause. Causally, the image must first be in the mirror, then in the medium, and lastly in the eye. With relation to time, certainly, this cannot be the case.<sup>17</sup>

## 2

Finally, Albert considers the sense organ itself. Since water retains images or species and the eye does have a watery substance which is black, it thus holds species and compresses it. The eye has visible species as *habitus* and as *dispositio*. Even color is in the eye as *habitus*. Species are in the eye as *in termino*, but in the medium they are just as in the road (in *via*); or, in other words, species are in the eye as *actu* (actually) and in the medium simply, as *in potentia* (potentially).<sup>18</sup>

## 3

According to Albert the Great, the image in the mirror is seen because air is changed by light, but this is not enough for sight. At the same time visible species must come to the eye with the motion of light. If the rays of light did not go to and reflect from the mirror, it would be impossible to see the image at all. Even if the rays are reflected from the mirror, sight is not complete unless the rays, which are in the air that touches the mirror, make color actual, come to the eye and are reflected again from it. Thus sight is completed. It is very clear that the light does not go out from the eye; rather, it comes to the eye from outside. Albert does not accept the existence of visual rays which come from the eye as do those in the Neo-Platonic trend.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 205 : "Dicendum, quod motus lucis in diaphano subito est, et non in tempore. Et cum color immutat actu luminis, erit immutatio coloris ad modum immutationis luminis. Hoc autem hic supponatur: quia in sequentibus hoc probabitur. Et propter hoc non est ibi proprie motus, nec alteratio, nec loci mutatio, sed generatio potius in omnibus partibus medii directe oppositis distantibus secundum proportionem secundum quam potest in immutabile visibile."

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, p. 210 : "Ad ultimum dicendum, quod tres sunt differentiae speciei visibilis in matre et in oculo. Quarum una est, quia oculus ex eo quod consistit in substantia aquae quae nigra est, et circumposita servat speciem et colligit eam ita quod apparet in seipso: sed hoc non facit aer. Secunda est, quia oculus habet speciem visibilem ut habitum vel dispositionem, quae est principium cognoscendi rem visivam: et propter hoc etiam color in oculo non est ut colorans ipsum, sed ut habitus qui est forma totius colorati et principium cognoscendi ipsum: et sic iterum non est in aëre. Tertia est, quia est in oculo sicut in termino, sed in medio sicut in via: etiam in oculo est aliquo modo ut in actu, sed in medio sicut in potentia, etc."

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Qu. 22, p. 214 : "Dicendum, quod quarta opinio vera est, quae est Aristotelis, et quam tenet Alpharabius, Quod autem non videmus ea quae retro sunt, non est haec causa, quod non



Thus far Albert the Great has shown how perception takes place. In Albert, as in other authors such as Grosseteste, Bacon and Pecham, species are also treated mathematically. He says that the image is in the mirror just as in points. He knows Euclid's reflection law and gives it in detail.<sup>20</sup>

### CONCLUSION

Albert the Great recognized that the image is seen because of the object. This is the same view that is held today. But by saying that the image is in the mirror he falls short of the modern view which accepts the image as being behind the mirror.

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fiat immutatio ad omnem partem: sed quia color non agit nisi secundum actum lucidi, propter hoc processio immutationis a colore in aere est secundum processionem lucis reflexae vel incidentis: lux autem quae est post nos abstrahens colorem immutat aerem ante nos, sicut demonstrative probatum est: sed immutatio aeris non sufficit ad visum: sed oportet etiam species visibiles in oculum procedere ad actum secundum actum lucidi. Cum igitur lux quae est post nos, procedit ab oculis nostris, et non in oculos nostros, ideo color rei visibilis quae est post nos, procedit removendo se ab oculis nostris, et non in oculos: et ideo non fit visus nisi fiat reflexio super speculum, quod est ante oculos nostros. Concedimus tamen bene radios esse tangentes oculos, sub quibus fit immutatio, sicut supra diximus: sed illi non egrediuntur ab oculo, sed a luce exteriori, et reflectuntur super oculum non a luce quae fit immediate circa oculum, sed ab illa quae est in extremitate perspicui, quae facit colorem actu esse, quia illa sola sufficit ad visum."

20 *Ibid.*, Qu. 21, pp. 199-200 and p. 202.



# The First International Conference of International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide (IPPNO) : A Report

*John Somerville*

At the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy, 1983 (Montreal), a group of philosophers representing a great diversity of views on the basic issues of traditional philosophy found that they were united by a new cosmic fear. This fear, which indeed haunts the whole contemporary world, arises from the historically new and increasingly evident capability of nuclear weaponry to annihilate the whole human world in one relatively brief conflict.

It was clear that to continue to call such a conflict "war" would be dangerously misleading because the thing that has always been called war, and has been with us since the beginnings of human society, has always been survivable by humankind, and has sometimes been conducive to social progress. Since the new weaponry; if used, could exclude even survival, let alone progress, nuclear conflict would be not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from war as we have always known it. Therefore, a new name that expresses the qualitative difference is needed. Hence the term nuclear omnicide—the killing of all humans by some humans, including themselves.

The need to prevent this kind of total and final suicide is obviously much greater and much more urgent than the need to prevent ordinary or conventional war. Hence, International Philosophers for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide (IPPNO). The keynote



of its first International Conference was sounded by the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, President of the University of Notre Dame, when he declared, "There is no greater problem in the world today than the nuclear threat to humanity... Unless we solve it there will be no more moral problems because there will be no more human beings to have moral problems".

IPPNO's first International Conference was held in St. Louis, Missouri, partly in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association May 1-3, 1986, then continuing at St. Louis University through May 5. Its General Theme, "Philosophy and the New Problem of Nuclear Omnicide—Analysis, Education, Action", was addressed by more than 70 prepared speakers from 11 countries and 4 continents in 2 multidisciplinary panels and 11 symposia meeting in morning, after-noon and evening sessions.

While the problem of preventing omnicide is peculiarly philosophical in the sense that philosophy in general has always been concerned with the nature and fate of the totality of which humankind is a part, and religious philosophy long ago created eschatology as a study of the possible ending, ending of the human world, it is also obvious that other disciplines can and must contribute to this problem in its contemporary setting. Thus, membership in IPPNO is open not only to professional philosophers but to other professionals interested in cooperating with the efforts of philosophers in this regard, and the conference itself was inscribed as "a contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace."

In keeping with this approach the multidisciplinary panels, organized by Alexander Gralnick, M.D., Medical Director of High Point Hospital, brought together specialists from the fields of medicine, psychiatry, international affairs, nuclear weaponry and industrial engineering as well as religion and philosophy. In these panel discussions, "Towards Preventing Nuclear Omnicide," the United Nations was represented by Ben Sanders of its Department for Disarmament Affairs, the (American) Center for Defense Information by its Director, Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque, U.S. Navy (Retd.), the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences by the Director of its Institute of Philosophy, Professor Vladimir Mshvenieradze, and by Professor Alexander Kalyadin of its Institute of World Economy and International Relations, medicine and psychiatry by Dr. Helen Caldicott, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Dr. Alexander Gralnick of the Einstein College of Medicine, international affairs by Edward Doherty, retired U.S. foreign service officer, present advisor to the United States Catholic Conference, industrial engineering by Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University, and religion by the Reverend T. Michael McNulty, S. J., of



## The First International Conference of International.....

Marquette University. United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was invited, but did not respond.

The symposium topics and speakers were as follows,

- (1) Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Sanity: James Sterba, Michael Allen Fox (Canada), William C. Gay, Joseph C. Kunkel, Ronald Hirschbein, George Hampsch.
- (2) Star Wars and Earth Peace: Paul Allen III, Patricia Mische, Sivashadan Bhattacharyya (India), Stan Dundon, Rudolf Steindl (Czechoslovakia), Corbin Fowler.
- (3) Ideology, Human Rights and World Peace: Morton Winston, John Somerville, Michael Howard, Mona Abousenna (Egypt), Charles Webel, Sergei Lazarev (U.S.S.R.).
- (4) Politics, Religion and Omnicide: Vincent C. Punzo, Leo Groarke (Canada), Vasil Prodanov (Bulgaria), Peter N. Kirstein, Frans Nelson, Howard Parsons.
- (5) Nuclear Deterrence, Omnicide and Morality: Patricia Ann Murphy, Jerald Richards, Claire Sherman Thomas, Duane Cady, Jonathon Schonscheck, Norman Freund.
- (6) Third World Perspectives and Nuclear Issues: J. P. Atreya (India), Joseph Prabhu, Mourad Wahba (Egypt), Ramjee Singh (India), C. M. P. Oniang'o (Kenya), Geoffrey Hunt (UK).
- (7) Education for Peace in a Nuclear World: David Weinberger, Edna Ruth Johnson, Ronald J. Glossop, William Eckhardt, Fulvio Cesare Manara (Italy), Milton Lowenthal.
- (8) Philosophy, Religion, Art and Industry in the Peace Movement: Robert Ginsberg, John Francis Phipps (UK), Patricia T. Birnie, Mark McGinnis, Arthur O. Roberts, Harry James Cargas.
- (9) Human Civilization, Ordinary War and Nuclear Omnicide: Stephen Knaster, Ha Poong Kim, Edward McClennen, Thomas Clough Daffern (UK), Alphonso Lingis, Thomas Auxter.
- (10) Analytical and Political Issues in the Contemporary Peace Movement: Gray Cox, Robert L. Holmes, Ronnie Littlejohn, Laura Westra, Tony Terrar, Daniel Efrati (Israel).
- (11) Educational and Psychological Factors in the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide: Joseph Grassi, Herbert Spiegelberg, Carroll Richardson, H. R. Friedman, Robert Litke (Canada).

What of the future of IPPNO? The constitution provides that full-scale international conferences should be planned biennially, but should not take place twice in succession in any country strongly identified with either Nato or the Warsaw Pact. The reasoning behind this provision is that the primary danger of full-scale nuclear conflict (omnicide) is centered in the relations between the U. S. A. and the U.S.S.R., since the nuclear arsenals that could annihilate



the human world are sited in those two countries. It follows that the international dialogue that is most necessary and urgent in the interest of mutual understanding increased cooperation and the strengthening of peace must be carried on between those two countries.

Since IPPNO's first full scale international conference took place in the U.S.A., it was hoped from the start that the second would be possible in the U.S.S.R. This hope came to fruition in the confirmation given in St. Louis by the Soviet representatives that the philosophers of the U.S.S.R. were prepared to host the second International Conference of IPPNO in Moscow in the latter part of June, 1989. This date rather than 1988 was chosen because 1988 is the year of the XVIIIth World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton, England, where IPPNO has already proposed a smaller-scale international program on the day reserved for meetings of philosophical societies. A similar meeting on the philosophy of peace is also being planned by the North American Section of IPPNO together with representatives of the Polish journal, *Dialectics and Humanism*, including its Editor, Professor Janusz Kuczynski. This meeting will be held in December, 1986, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Boston,

IPPNO's constitution also provides that each new International President be chosen from the country that undertakes to host and organize the next full-scale International Conference. Since this means that the international presidency changes with relative frequency, it was agreed that IPPNO should have two permanent secretariats to provide for continuity and cooperation in the keeping of records and documents, payment of dues (\$10 a year), and providing assistance to the organizers of the successive international conferences. It was further agreed that one of the secretariats, functioning in English, should be located in North America, and the other, functioning in Russian, in the U.S.S.R., each headed by a Co-chairperson elected for a term of six years by the membership of its own geographical area. Each co-chairperson will be responsible, separately and independently, for organizing the staff of the respective secretariat. At the St. Louis business meeting the North American delegates elected John Somerville as North American Co-chairperson.

It was agreed by all that IPPNO should set up a quarterly Journal of International Dialogue which would be published in two editions, one in Russian and one in English. Each of the two journals would be organized and funded separately and independently. Although the contents of each journal would thus be determined by its own editors, each editorial staff is encouraged to include international personnel, and material published in either journal would be available for translation in the other.



Whatever the form and contents of the respective journals, their common and central aim would always be dialogue that seeks common ground for the prevention of omnicide, the strengthening of peace, the increase of mutual understanding and cooperation. The ideal would be dialogue characterized by a sense of historically unprecedented emergency, seeking specific actions or steps that can be mutually helpful now. In keeping with such an aim each issue of each journal would have at least a third of its articles written by authors living and working in countries outside of the geographical-national limits and cultural conditions of the area in which the given journal is published. The readership of each journal should thus be made aware of living problems, ways of thinking, arguments, fears and hopes of which they had little or no previous knowledge. Agreement on ends does not automatically create agreement on means, in regard to which differing views need to be argued out. Such articles could be answered, and the answer could be answered, in dialogue significantly different from academic polemics that has no sense of urgency, and is unconnected with specific actions and socio-political programs. It would be different also from political polemics of the cold war type which is centered on what we can disagree with and condemn rather than what we can agree with and cooperate with. In mutually helpful dialogue no subject matter is barred, but success depends on the tone, which should be that of friend to friend.

It was decided to set up a number of committees that would help to carry out the work of IPPNO. Centered as it is upon the active prevention of nuclear omnicide, that work must extend beyond the purely cognitive aspects of knowledge and understanding. It must include affective qualities as well. That is, it must not only be aimed at teaching people facts they do not yet know about nuclear omnicide. It must also be aimed at making them really believe facts they already know, so that they will act upon them, which is a good test of genuine belief, especially in circumstances of an emergency. The incredible truth must be made credible, and indignation must be demonstrated to be a virtue. Feelings must be activated and emotions engaged. The best, perhaps the only, way to do this is to enlist the cooperation of the arts, including, perhaps especially, the popular arts. Thus a Committee on the Arts was formed.

A Committee on Peace Education was seen as equally necessary. Peace education as a separate discipline is gradually spreading, within different educational systems, from early grades to the university level, and in the "grass roots" community. Since the problems arising from the existence of omnicidal nuclear weapons represent the most important and urgent component of this new discipline, its



whole content and direction of development are of vital concern to IPPNO. This concern is perhaps felt with a special sharpness in the United States where, as "peace education" increased and spread among school systems and institutions of higher learning there was also an increase of the tendency to construe peace education as something not centrally concerned with the prevention of wars between nations, but rather with "the management of conflicts", with ways of "conflict resolution" in general. With this tendency the center of gravity shifts away from international politics to personal and group relationships uncontaminated by politics. What develops is not only something far different from the original intention of the discipline (however "safer" this different focus may be) but something that diverts attention away from the nuclear threat now confronting the entire contemporary world.

As a result of what happened in World War II, which was the most destructive conflict in human history up to that point, the United Nations as a world organization was established for the specific purpose of making sure that any disputes that might henceforth arise among nations would be settled peacefully by means of processes, rules and channels of negotiation agreed to by all nations, and always subject to further modification through agreed procedures. It stands as the most inclusive and extensive institution of its kind ever created. Its charter provisions, in terms of their method of adoption and their content, are in the mainstream of the modern democratic tradition. Though its jurisdiction is limited by collective agreement, and is sometimes flouted and evaded by state actions that openly violate the terms of agreement, its clearly stated principles, if observed and further extended, could effectively abolish war in general and the threat of nuclear omnicide in particular.

However, the facts of contemporary history show numerous instances of the deliberate choice of aggressive military actions to deal with disputes arising between nations rather than to choose the processes of peaceful settlement set up in the U. N. charter and implemented by its organs and agencies. Even worse in a sense are continued instances of the deliberate and explicit threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, repeatedly rejecting majority vote after majority vote (eleven times) in which the U. N. General Assembly explicitly condemned the first use of nuclear weapons as something that would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the United Nations charter. Therefore, one of the main lines of IPPNO's efforts must be to emphasize the immense danger that lies in violating the U. N. charter, or rejecting the repeated judgments of its most inclusive organ, or withdrawing from further participation in key agencies of the United Nations.



A Committee on United Nations Affairs was therefore set up with the aim of spreading the fullest possible knowledge of the uniquely important role of this world organization in the search for international peace, of encouraging all people to avail themselves of the vital information it provides to the public, and of encouraging all governments to use its resources to the fullest extent.

As the problem of preventing nuclear omnicide has similarly important relationships with social institutions like religion and industry, similar committees were set up in relation to them. In literal fact, if we look upon IPPNO as part of the effort to ensure a physical future for humankind in the face of the present nuclear threat of physically annihilating everything human, then everything human ought to resist. Every human institution ought to make its contribution to this uniquely fateful effort. It has often been said that the only thing capable of uniting all humankind in a common struggle would be some monstrous enemy suddenly appearing from outer space with weapons capable of exterminating every inhabitant of the earth. That enemy is no longer in the outer space of exaggerated imagining. It now confronts us daily in the all too real nuclear arsenals that could, by human decision or human accident, be exploded at any moment.





# Study of Religion: A Rediscovery of Man And His Values

Cassian R. Agera

In this paper I address myself to a seemingly simple question: Can a scientific study of religion (*Religionswissenschaft*) be a humanistic discipline? The question however is unpalatable to a student of religion. The more so because, since the pionnering work of Max Muller<sup>1</sup> in the mid nineteenth century on comparative mythology, that raised the expectations for a scientific study of religion, the discipline of religion is groping for a methodology<sup>2</sup> of its own. Without a well defined and commonly agreed upon methodology, it is incapable of chalking out for itself a distinctive place within the sphere of social and humanistic disciplines in the universe of knowledge that clamours these days for nomenclatures, purely for the pragmatic purpose of classification thought. In the course of this essay I would like to contend that a scientific study of religion can be a humanistic

- 1 It is Muller who coined the term. *Religionswissenschaft*. In spite of its literal meaning as the 'science of religion', it has defied an adequate translation in English.
- 2 Nowhere is the lack of a definitiveness in methodology more acutely felt than in the choice of a name for the discipline of religion; a few in vogue are: Religious Studies, Comparative Religion, Phenomenology of Religion. History of Religion, — to say nothing of the reductionists' attempts of the philosophers, anthropologists, ethnologists, comparative mythologists and sociologists. I am inclined to favour the use of 'Religiology', despite its languidness for such a dynamic category as religion. Its merit to me consists in being a systematic study of a corpus of religious phenomena.



discipline par excellence, since its objective is the discovery of the total man and the system of the perennial human values by way of laying bare the essential oneness of human nature against the backdrop of a plurality of religious ontologies in given cultures. As a corollary to this, I also prefer a few suggestions, brief and tentative though, for a methodology for the study of religion.

Unfortunately any enterprise, that one begins with in regard to religion, suffers from a preliminary handicap: there is not a universally accepted definition for so common a human experience that goes by the name of religion. It is perplexing how such varied religious phenomena as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, and even archaic and non-mainstream forms of religious experiences can all be clubbed together under a blanket term, 'religion'. They have belief systems, ontologies, code of conduct and rituals that not necessarily complement but more often contradict one another. But I must admit that, though it is possible to coin new terms for religion, it is inadvisable to do so. For the uses and abuses alike of the term have everywhere so intricately entered into the history of religion that it is not desirable to let it go. At any rate, while retaining the term, we will do well not to associate it necessarily with the concept of 'God'. But, how are we to define religion and its study? It surely is not that there are no definitions but that they are all conditioned hopelessly. Let me admit that my definitions too may be conditioned to some extent but, I hope, not narrowly. Since I believe somewhat after Rudolf Otto that religion is a feeling response to an objectively experienced numen, to me religion is an intentionality of the human consciousness to the sacred; and further, a study of religion, a *hermeneutics of the sacred*<sup>3</sup>. Since it is the latter definition that has a direct bearing on my present concerns, I shall first briefly explain it.

To begin with, what is 'sacred'? I would not like my response to be dictated by the theological considerations because, I believe, there is no one common theology for man; all theologies are narrowly conditioned religiously, socially and culturally. On the contrary, since religion is a human phenomenon (not in the sense that man originated it in some distant past, indeed questions of the origin of religion are to me irrelevant,<sup>4</sup> but in the sense that it arises out of

<sup>3</sup> This is also what Mircea Eliade (*The Quest: The History and Meaning in Religion*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969) understands by a study of religion, although I am not sure how much he would subscribe to Rudolf Otto's non-rational inquiry into *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford University Press, London, 1958 edn.).

<sup>4</sup> Freud's mistake lies here in the *Totem and Taboo* (Edt. J. Strachey et al., Standard edn. 13, New York, 1953). I have discussed this in detail in my essay, "Freud's Psychoanalytical Atheism: An Appraisal", in *Rationality and Philosophy* (Edt. V. K. Bharadwaja, Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1984).



man), I would like to ask, What does the sacred mean to the human mode of being? Theology may rightly claim to be a science of God but a study of religion must be a science of man, with man as its nucleus. It should respond to the central question of what it means to be human. Now, what is specific to the human mode of being is its typical human mode of consciousness. All human consciousness is fundamentally intentional in a twofold sense. In the first place, it is a consciousness inflected by the 'possessive' case. By this I mean it is a consciousness of the human subject; it belongs to the human being *qua* human. Secondly, it is a consciousness inflected by the 'genitive' case. By this I mean a consciousness modified by the object; it is a consciousness of the objective content, a *quid* given in any experience. In the language of the schoolmen of old, the *quid* of consciousness would be called being as such. I would however like to call it the 'irreducibly real' because it would be impossible for the human mind to function without the conviction that there is something irreducibly real. Indeed, it is the irreducibly real that is directly given in our experience; only indirectly and reflexively, that is, in the context of being aware of the *quid*, is given the awareness of one's own subjectivity. Hence it would not be wrong to say that, whereas one's own subjectivity is ontically prior to any sort of objectivity, epistemically however the awareness of one's subjectivity is only a reflex from the objective *quid* experienced. In the welter of the ever ephemeral and illusory nature of things, the human consciousness cannot but posit the irreducibly real, or the ultimate *quid*. If I now identify the irreducibly real with the sacred, it is because of its ultimacy in reality.

Going a step further, man apprehends, in virtue of his being a knowing spirit, the irreducibly real as the true. The intentional object of human consciousness is thus not only irreducibly real but also irreducibly true; it is the 'real-truth'. If I now identify the real-truth with the sacred, it is because of its plenitude of truth. Further, the total man is not a merely contemplating spirit, purely gazing at the real-truth in self-forgetfulness, but an interacting person, occasioning at once the myriad ways of commerce with the world around and in him. He is a subject capable of constant interaction with the objective universe as well as with the other centres of subjectivity. This interaction necessarily demands the apprehension of *meaning* in his experience, for every human interaction is a process of relating whatever we interact with to ourselves, in other words, of discovering their relevance, or meaning, to ourselves as the centres of the experience. Thus the human mode of being present to the world at once calls for a hermeneutics. Indeed, every scientific enterprise, in so far as it is a process of deciphering meaning structures, becomes a hermeneutics. In the same way, a hermeneutics of the irreducibly



real-truth puts man on the path of deciphering the meaning structures of our experience of the sacred.

Secondly, how does the hermeneutics (of the sacred) proceed? Going along the working of human consciousness, we may note that every human experience, or contact with reality, is a three pronged enterprise: a discovery of the real, the true and its meaning or relevance to the experiencer. Every act of human consciousness is the revealing of an ontogeny that becomes to a knowing spirit a gnosis, which in turn becomes a meaning structure to human life. It begins with an ontos, proceeds to a contemplation of it as truth but must end as a meaning configuration to one's life. In the experience of the irreducibly real-truth, which I have ventured to identify with the sacred in virtue of its ultimacy in reality and truth, there should necessarily be an ultimate meaning configuration to human life. Therefore the ontic and the epistemic enterprises are deeply associated with the religious enterprise, in so far as it turns out to be a hermeneutics of the sacred. Ontogeny and gnosis thus progressively lead to sacrogeny. But the discovery of the meaning of the sacred in his consciousness is to lead man reflexively to a discovery of himself and all that is specific to his nature.

If man is to decipher meaning out of his experience with the sacred, it becomes imperative for us to know the modes of manifestation of the sacred in the human consciousness. Generally speaking, meanings that reveal to human consciousness are many, to say nothing of the formal linguistic modes. Semioticians would readily understand the contention that the riches of the representations of meanings are not exhausted by the use of formal language alone. When it comes to the manifestation of the sacred, prelogical myths, symbols and rituals, no less than the conceptually formulated doctrines, can all be the religious modes of expression of the experience of the sacred. In every culture they stand witness to man's attempt to grasp the meaning out of his experience of the sacred. The study of religion, if it is a hermeneutics of the sacred, should be essentially for the deciphering of the meaning structures of the religious phenomena in diverse forms. What has been here the scholars' efforts over the years?

The fact that the sacred is a structure of human consciousness rather than a passing phenomenon in the development thereof is indicative of the coterminousness of religion with man. Every known culture and civilization bear witness to the existence of some form of religion or other, however unsophisticated it may be. No matter how unsystematic or scientific was his 'universe', man everywhere attempted to read into it reality, truth and meaning; indeed, without such attempts his universe would have only collapsed. His universe, it may be suggested, was borne on the wings of the sacred. Thus



his experience of the cosmos was also an experience of the *hagios*, making his cosmogony inseparably linked with the sacrogonny. Little to wonder then that in the history of human ideas philosophers should have been the first to be interested in a conceptual analysis of religious phenomena. It gave rise to a philosophy of religion.

But there is a serious flaw in the study of religion undertaken by the philosophers. This is in a special way true of the western philosophical tradition.<sup>5</sup> Two of the presuppositions, the one theoretical and the other practical, that the philosophers entertained in their studies on religion, determined rather arbitrarily both the content and the method of their enterprise and caused a considerable damage to the discipline. At the theoretical level, the philosophers, true to their concern with the 'transcendentality', forgot that religion is a *historical* phenomenon. In their blind hunt for pure essence of religion, they ignored its existence in his historical setting. But there is nothing called religion as such but only religions, found to exist in particular cultures, hence in space and time. Neither Aristotle nor Hegel, to give but two names in passing, stopped to take a 'historical' breath, when they discussed about the essence of the pure act and the absolute respectively. Hegel, who has the distinct honour of coining the term, 'philosophy of religion', even sought through his dialectical method to go beyond the welter of the ever changing history to the permanence of the eternal absolute. Hence philosophy of religion failed to become a truly philosophy of religions.

At the practical level however, the kind of philosophy of religion done in the west could not overcome paradoxically its own Judeo Christian moorings. Even a cursory glance at the problems identified for philosophizing would be sufficient for us to drive home the truth of their religious, social and cultural conditioning: creation and causation, transcendence and immanence, monotheism vs deism, pantheism and monism, reason and revelation, arguments for God's existence and the attributes of God and Providence and so on. Practically thus, the philosophy of religion passed for a philosophy of a (Judeo-Christian) religion. It does not surprise me if philosophy of religion in the west more than once came to be identified with *theodicy*, or natural theology; it only indicates its inability to free itself from its bondage to a host of religio-cultural, indeed narrowly ethnic, categories. Imagine a situation where the problems identified are the paradigms of man *qua* man, in the fulfilment of his basic needs of the human person and of his perennial value system (e.g. alimentation, sexuality, purification, learning of a skill, law, crime

<sup>5</sup> I will restrict myself to the western understanding of the philosophy of religion, since whatever is today studied in our faculties of philosophy under this nomenclature is substantially western.



and punishment, intersubjectivity, society and polity, contemplation of beauty, goodness and truth etc.); there could still be here a study of religion, a hermeneutics of the sacred. But, as yet, it is a distant cry in the western philosophy of religion.

But the rise of the positivistic sciences in the nineteenth century did a significant service in extricating the study of religion from the paradoxical situation that philosophy had landed it into. By the latter half of the century, the colonial spirit through its adventures of expanding the horizons of the known universe of the western man had, to say the least, made him aware of the fact of religious pluralism. If there are religions other than his own, and that too very different from his own, the study of religion ought to be a study of religions. Positivism thus discovered the historicity of religions of mankind. What is more, through the models of western education made readily available, the people of the colonial world themselves began to assume an active role in the shaping of their socio-economic and political destinies. The colonized man now began to assert himself more and more as the agent of history rather than its passive product. He owes it to the liberal spirit of the west, if he could rediscover his own rich ancient heritage to inspire in him a confidence hitherto sorely lacking. This positivistic spirit pervaded not merely his social, political and economic sphere of activity; it affected in a profound sense his outlook on religion as well.

The spirit of positivism inaugurates a new era in the study of religion. Besides retrieving it from the abstractions of the philosophers, the positivists 'materialized' the study of religion by bestowing on it its historicity. This proved to be not a small blessing to the discipline. Almost overnight, so to say, religion became the favourite subject matter to the investigations of the ethnologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists and even economists. These social scientists brought to light meticulously and methodically an amazing body of religious creations, literary or otherwise. They collected, codified, edited and published this voluminous material on the religious experience of mankind. The cumulative effect of all this painstakingly scientific enterprise of the social scientists, despite its disparate nature, was the unravelling of the cultural dimension of the study of religion. No culture, it came to be rightly argued, can be understood adequately in its variegated aspects, if its religious data are not analysed and studied thoroughly; no insight into a given culture is ever possible, if its deep-rooted religious moorings are not first laid bare so that we can see clearly their impact on the development or the degeneration of its particular aspects. Naturally, the scope of the study of religion now came to be extended to every aspect of human behaviour, ranging from what he does in his loneliness bearing on meditations, rituals and



obsessions to his collective social actions bearing on his economy, society and polity.

No one can dispute today that the discovery of religion as a cultural phenomenon has left an indelible mark on the study of religion. A student of religion ungrudgingly acknowledges religion to be a cultural item, thanks to the work of the positivistic social scientists. But he is also quick to acknowledge that the culture itself is deeply 'informed' by its religious moorings. For, if the cumulative study of the positivists in regard to religion has proved anything, it is that every culture, irrespective of the kind of association it has with a civilization, either 'primitive' or highly advanced, has its deep-rooted religious moorings. Precisely for this reason I am inclined to believe that a philosophy of culture tends to be a study of religion in its manifold aspects. It would not be far-fetched to claim that religion includes within itself almost all the known cultural forms. Such cultural forms may be represented no less in the so called secular institutions (e.g. a coat of arms, emblems, insignias a national flag, inscriptions on currency, a salute, a birthday celebration, an honour for gallantry) than in what may be specifically and exclusively said to be religious (e.g. an initiation ritual). It should be evident to the reader that I am not restricting the scope of religion to such cultural elements of the so called civil religion<sup>6</sup> in modern polity or of the protest-reform movements within a revolutionary society or of even the seemingly counterculture youth movements, but also extend it to those of the distinctively and manifestly modern 'secular' institutions (e.g. films, songs, art, a new legislation, the rise of a political party, and its democratic and socialistic manifestoes and ideologies, to name but a few at random). Behind the facade of the process of secularization, there are deep-rooted religious forms that constantly keep in forming the activities and the aspirations of the modern (secular) man.

But a student of religion cannot but realize that the significant service rendered by the positivists is not without a mortal danger to the cause of religion itself. If their contribution is not taken in a critical perspective, a merely positivistic study of religion threatens to swallow religion itself, on account of their reductionistic approach to religious data. If that should happen, it should be a tragic loss for man. For religion is the fundamental informer of our cultural patterns, and not merely one among the many cultural items. A study of religion, made subservient to the positivistic study of different aspects of culture, however beneficial to the latter, tends to be

6 Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", in *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World*, (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1970).



reductionistic, and thus would fail to be a genuine hermeneutics of the sacred. If every known cultural form has its deep rooted religious moorings, it is because every cosmogony is destined to become a sacrogony. As for man, the commerce between ontogeny and gnosis, on the one hand, and the sacrogeny, on other, cannot ever be snapped. The total man, whose fundamental intentionality of consciousness to the sacred cannot be negated without at the same time negating human nature, must not be reduced to the merely political, or psychological or the economic, or the ethnological, or the sociological man. If the total man cannot be sundered, either ontically or epistemically at any stage of his life, from the experience of the sacred, a reductive analysis of the religious phenomena would be fraught with an inner contradiction; it would be a grave error in a scientific enterprise as well. We have to contend with the basic fact that the total man can never be totally desacralized; for a total desacralization indeed would be equivalent to ceasing to be human.

In the light of what has been stated so far, an answer to our initial question, if the study of religion can be humanistic, should not be now so elusive as it appeared in the beginning. It is humanistic not because a great many social scientists now hold a brief for it but because the sacred, whose hermeneutics the study of religion claims to be, is the structure of human consciousness. Indeed, the kind of brief the positivistic social scientists hold for the study of religion would rob it of its specificity and ultimacy, in virtue of their reductive treatment of the religious data. For every reductionistic treatment of the religious data would implicitly take them to be insufficient in themselves, partial and less than real. On the contrary, if the sacred is the structure of human consciousness, its hermeneutics, or a scientific study of religion, necessarily gives us deeper insights into what man is in his totality, and thereby is bound to be a humanistic discipline par excellence. It is true that, in a sense, every social and humanistic discipline seeks to be in the final analysis a philosophical anthropology, in so far as it claims to give us a deeper insight into the human nature. But a scientific study of religion can legitimately envisage to be by far the greatest philosophical anthropology. One of the prerequisites however, it hardly needs an emphasis, is that the religious creations should be treated as autonomous.

In order to highlight the necessity of treating the religious creation as autonomous, we may fruitfully draw a parallelism with literary creation. A literary creation, say, *Kālidāsa's Śākuntalā*, surely lends itself to an analysis by a historian, a linguist and a critic within the literary field; nay more, even outside, by a sociologist, a political scientist and an economist. But it is important for us to



bear in mind that neither the historian nor the critic nor the linguist can grasp the exquisite beauty, the grandeur, and the originality of *Śākuntalā* as a literary creation, merely by analysing the style and diction of the fourth century Sanskrit, the literary genres employed and the selections and the arrangement of words therein; much less does the social scientist grasp them by analysing merely the social, the political and the economic conditions of the times of Chandragupta II, under which this unique work of literature was produced. No doubt, the literary work is everything that the critic, the historian, the linguist and the social scientist have got to say about but it is, in its essence, i.e. as a distinctively literary work, more and other than all that they say either severally or/and collectively. It is what the poetic genius of Kālidāsa has produced it to be on the scale of his immortal poetic spirit. In the poetic spirit is here immortalized, it is because over the centuries the work has been capable of rousing the universally present but mostly latent pathos and passions of the human spirit; there is something in it that is essentially human. The work has in it a secret literary message of its own that gradually unravels itself to a sympathetic reader.

Such is also the case with religious creation. A religious creation is an autonomous, a *sui generis* category, for it is a product of the human spirit and its transcendental aspirations. It too has a secret message that silently calls for being decoded. Be it a myth or a ritual or a symbol, it is an expression of an experience of the human spirit in its fundamental intentionality to the sacred. It is the human response to positions and situations that the human spirit finds itself in from time to time in the course of its personal and often collective history. Indeed, the farther back we go in human history, we are likely to find the response to primordial and prelogical, and yet, paradigmatic. Paradigmatic because they refer to what is fundamental and ultimate to human nature. Religious creations therefore have their own meanings, or the secret messages, that will have to be deciphered by way of laying bare the situations, or the predicament, of the human spirit. The heuristic considerations obviously call for a hermeneutics of the sacred. Devoid of the hermeneutics there would be no scientific study, and devoid of the sacred there could be no study of religion but only a study of fossilized culture.

The above comment is not meant to run down the importance of the study of culture. Religion surely has a cultural function but it transcends mere culture in so far as it has a direct bearing on our essential nature. Hence the transcendence of culture attributed to religion must not be understood as a mere cutting across the particular cultures and epochs. Rather, apart from cutting across all cultural and temporal barriers, it reaches the depth of the human



spirit to touch there a human chord in his essential predicament. This cannot be otherwise so long as the sacred is an essential and integral element of the human consciousness. The fundamental paradigms of human predicament in every culture and at all times have constituted an *imitatio dei*, irrespective of what they have understood by a *deus*. The *imitatio dei* has manifested itself in the universal hankering of the human heart to conform itself to the sacred, which, however may have otherwise been conceived, it at once the fulness of being, truth and meaning. 'Be ye holy as your heavenly Father is holy' — is not a mere command but a pure demand of human nature. That is why, at the deepest level, being fully human is equivalent to being religious. Human life then has a necessary sacramental value because it is the greatest sacrament, in virtue of its basic intentionality to the sacred. Therefore a dialectics of the sacred is bound to precede every other types of dialectics that has its origin in the human mind.

How then are we to determine the meaning of religious creations, grading that they represent the specific and ultimate human predicament? This directly brings us to our hermeneutical concerns. In his search for meaning, the student of religion should have an open eye for a number of common human existential situations. Initially they may look very diverse because they are often projected against a plurality of ontologies, no matter however primitive, prelogical and presystematic they be. The plurality of ontologies with the accretion of diverse institutions constitute particular cultures. All particular cultures, it may be noted, are private cultural 'universes', irrespective of the lesser or greater number of its adherents. A scientific study of religion should cut through the private cultural universes in order to lay bare what is essentially human in such situations. In a sense the study of religion is the study of cultures, but not in a superficial sense. Understanding a culture at its superficial level is laying bare the nature and functions of institutions around and of their supporting ontologies. It is understanding the mode of being in the world as an ethnic, or even a larger national group as distinct from another group. The purport of such a study is invariably a discovery of a cultural identity which most social scientists so painstakingly busy themselves with. On the contrary, understanding a culture at its deeper level is laying bare the meaning of being human, of the perennial human values, in short of the specific mode of being present to the world, both subjective and objective. Strictly speaking, it has no supporting ontologies which create the private universes. It rather operates on the strength of the intentionality of human consciousness. In this sense a study of culture, at the deeper level, is the study of religion, a 'pneumatology' indeed. For it is the search for meaning by the human spirit impelled by its intentionality to the sacred. Therefore



the understanding of the meaning of religious creations ends up with an understanding of the typical human mode of being present to the world.

Hence, if the religious creations are ciphers of meanings for the human spirit, representing the fundamental human situations, it goes without saying that these meanings once deciphered are not less relevant to the modern man than it was to the 'primitive' man; that they are not less relevant to the modern business magnet or a political activist than it was to a hermit. A deeper insight into the fundamental human situations with a view to grasp their universal meaning contributes directly to our understanding of human nature itself. Hence an academic enterprise with religion is bound to be humanistic. A hermeneutics of the sacred, with its exclusive concern with man and his value system at the deepest level, may even serve as an instrument for the inner transformation of man and his society, thus opening new vistas for a revolution of humanism never witnessed in human history.

There are religionists today all over the world, both practitioners and theoreticians, seriously engaged in the commendable task of dialogue and alliance. A religious dialogue surely has its inestimable. In a religiously pluralistic world, it has now become not only commendable but also imperative. This is yet another task that is assigned to the discipline of (comparative) religion by the well-meaning scholars and religionists. They spare no efforts in their study of not only the contemporary forms of religiosity but also its ancient and archaic forms. But, it must be noted, a study of the contemporary or the ancient or even the archaic forms of religion, on our part, is not merely for opening a cultural dialogue with the people of another religion, not merely to learn to understand the others' point of view, not merely to be sympathetic to their beliefs, and not merely thus to be tolerant to their way of life. The culmination of our intellectual enterprise with religion is not a mere toleration of the others' way of life. We tolerate only a nuisance. Rather, by elucidating the existential situation of *homo religiosus*, we obtain a greater insight into our knowledge of the total man at his depth dimension and of the perennial significance of the typically human values thereat. What it is to be ultimately human cannot be judged from man's behaviour, biological, psychological, political or economic. To be human is to be a spirit that interacts with the 'body' both within and without. The total man, that religion seeks to discover, is the spirit that is present to the world in ways that nothing else around him can be.

Therefore the kind of humanism that is envisaged in the study of religion, it may be ventured to be said, cannot be merely quantitative and static. There is to it something of a qualitative dimension.



sion and dynamism. It can be culturally fertile in ways that are totally unexpected. It can expose us suddenly to situations that are immeasurably creative. Indeed any encounter with the 'foreign' (*anyad, alienum( das Andere)*), the kind of which one has in the study of religion, may have creative potentialities rarely foreseen. Similar situations in other disciplines are not wanting : In the area of psychology, the discovery of the unconscious brought about revolutions in the schools of psychology. In the area of western art, discovery of cubism and surrealism, revived the western art. So too, in the area of western music, the encounter with the 'primitive' and the exotic, gave a new lease to its music. It is however true that such encounters with the totally unfamiliar has its own dangers and pitfalls. Human mind more often opposes than welcomes such innovations. The fear here is only normal because the encounter with the unfamiliar is likely to relativize the traditional positions held so far as sacrosanct and absolute. It often endangers the foundations of the traditional faith and engenders a spirit of iconoclasm against the official credos and the private, the ethnic and even the national cultural 'universes'. But fidelity to reality demands that we open ourselves up and be honest to the rightful claims of the unfamiliar, the other, the unknown on its own frame of reference. If we are prepared to exhibit an honest defence to man and his perennial value system, we will not fight shy of breaking the hegemony of anyone's or anything's lordship over us in the usurped name of man or god, howsoever sacrosanct be it in our private cultural universe, and acknowledge and accept ungrudgingly the perennial human values, howsoever alien or hostile they may seem to our private cultural universe. An honest deciphering of the religious creations will surely reveal the victory of the creative human spirit over the immediate data of experience, or what is hallowed unreflectively as sacrosanct over the years. Neither antiquity nor modernity is in itself a criterion for judging what is specifically human; rather it is the human spirit that creates its own values and valences here.

From the above discussion, it should be clear that no reductionistic method can ever hope to be a methodology for the scientific study of religion. A scientific study of religion should evolve a methodology, clearly different from those of the philosophers and the positivistic social scientists. For, while the philosophers' method fails to be a philosophy of religions, the positivists' method ends up being reductionistic. Hence I would like now to prefer some suggestions. Our method should aim at a rediscovery of the total man. That such a goal can be achieved by way of hermeneutics is amply shown by me. An adequate methodology for the scientific study of religion, or the hermeneutics of the sacred, should address itself to the following tasks :



In the first place, since the moorings of all the known cultural forms are religious and since it claims to be a science of the total man, a study of religion cannot afford to ignore whatever work the social scientists have done, or still doing, on religion. Therefore, to begin with, the study of religion must use, integrate and articulate the materials brought to the fore through the diverse methods of ethnology, anthropology, sociology, history, comparative mythology and linguistics. In the second place, we have to view this data against a historical perspective, as religion is a historical phenomenon. In so far as the religious data ultimately represent the existential situation that man had adapted in his personal and social history, the student of religion has got to locate them in his culture. A religious phenomenon is for sure a cultural symbol, a cipher, that demands to be interpreted and deciphered in its own context. It is here that a scientific study of religion tends to be ethnology in a broad sense, or a study of a particular ethnic culture.

In the third place, as a corollary to our second task, we must identify and determine the wider context that gave rise to the origin, development, modification and even degeneration, if any, of the said phenomenon. It is here that a study of religion tends to be a history of religion. Religious creation as a 'story' has its own history. No religion, even the one that claims to be eternal and without a historical founder, is an exception to this historical law. If a religious creation is viewed as a 'text', it surely has a 'context'; both text and context must be brought under the scrutiny of the hermeneutical analysis. There is a sense in which we may consider this enterprise to be an extension of our second task, namely, of locating the religious creations in their historical context. For what was originally located within the narrow, ethnic, cultural context is now extended to the wider, geographical, national, cultural context. Therefore a study of religion cannot afford to ignore the religious moorings of even the political activities. No religious datum is a pure datum but a typically human, therefore social, datum. It is a physical impossibility that man should live outside the boundaries of history. He is a *dasein*, a being circumscribed by space and time. Therefore every religious creation is bound to be both experienced and expressed in an idiom of a larger historical context. The lack of a historical perspective would turn the scientific study of religion a phenomenology of religion with its hunt for the pure essences. The philosophers who indulged in hunting the eternal essences ended up in subjective idealism and richly merited the accusations of Feuerbach, Freud and Marx that religion is a fancy, a pastime, an objectification of the subject, therefore, in the final analysis, a grand illusion both at the individual and the collective level.

Finally, the greatest and the most distinctive task that the study of religion should address itself to is the deciphering of the meanings



of religious phenomena by way of treating them as typically and specifically religious creations that emerge out of the human spirit,— a task that at once transcends all cultural barriers, narrowly ethnic or/and widely geographic. The hermeneutical task is fulfilled only when we take the history of religion beyond its history by asserting the supremacy of the creative human spirit. This obviously calls for a departure from the mere positivistic enthusiasm. For religious creation, we should remember, is a unique creation of human spirit that at once serves as a scale for the transcendental aspirations embodied in its perennial system of values.

In the past our 'mistake' in the study of religion has been one of fragmentation. The study of religion then easily passed either for philosophy of religion or sociology of religion or ethnology or even for the history of religion. The Dutch school, more philosophically oriented that it was, made it a sort of religious phenomenology. The Chicago school gave it an anthropological bias in so far as it attempted to substantiate its hypotheses on religion by way of 'case' studies of particular ethnic cultures. The Harvard school turned it into a history of religion in so far as it attempted to study a 'cumulative tradition' of a people. No doubt, the schools have succeeded in making the study of religion more and more scientific; thanks to their efforts, the study of religion is today a social and humanistic science. But the humanism envisaged by them, I am afraid, is still narrow.<sup>7</sup> The method that I suggest calls for acknowledging man as a human spirit with a transcultural and indeed transtemporal system of values. Man and his system of values should lie at the core of religion. Only then it should be possible for us to discover his fundamental intentionality to the sacred and thus to treat the study of religion as a hermeneutics of the sacred. Now, a probe into the structures of human consciousness gives us an insight into the oneness of common human nature and its value system, although on the periphery there may lie schematized a plurality of ontologies that diversely embellish it. Such a study cannot but be humanistic.

<sup>7</sup> Eliade (*op. cit.*) is the sole exception here. I gratefully acknowledge many of his ideas in this paper.



## IV

# On the Ontological Status of the Minkowski World\*

Vesselin Petkov

The problem of interpreting four-dimensional space, inferred by H. Minkowski in 1908, who described space and time joined in indivisible unity, has been the subject of discussion in the course of many years. It takes place in various forms (for example, in the form of contrasting the objective and independent theories of time flow), but its essence is precisely the problem of interpreting the space (or as it is also called the world) of Minkowski. This problem boils down to the question: 'What is the ontological status of the four-dimensional world of Minkowski?' or 'How is this four-dimensional world to be understood—as a theoretical construction, serving to describe the three-dimensional world evolving in time, the idea of which we receive from our sense experience (in this case the dimensionality of the Minkowski world *does not* correspond to the dimensionality of the three-dimensional world it describes) or as a mathematical model of a real *four-dimensional* world (with time as the fourth dimension)?' In other words the question is: 'Does the theory of relativity prove that the real world is four dimensional?' The purpose of the present article is to show that this question has a categorical answer.

A consistent and unambiguous argumentation of the view that past, present and future events are *equally* real, i.e. of the view that reality is a four-dimensional world, is contained in the analysis of the kinematic consequences of the special theory of relativity. This analysis *inevitably* leads to the inference that the theory of relativity is possible *only* if the world is four-dimensional; should we suppose reality to be a three-dimensional world, we reach an *insuperable*

\* The problems involved in the paper are still a subject of a discussion which has not come to an end.



contradiction with the consequences of the special theory of relativity. In actual fact, however, the widely accepted view of reality considers the world precisely as three-dimensional. According to this view all objects really exist *only* at the present moment of time, i.e. only present events are accepted as real. In other words, the present, defined as a three-dimensional world at the present moment, or as the set of present events (i.e. as a class of events taking place *simultaneously* at the moment *now*), is considered as the only reality. However, this widely accepted view of reality is classical in character, because it is founded on the premise that simultaneity is *absolute* (observer independent). Therefore it can in no way agree with the special theory of relativity, one of the basic consequences of which is the *relativity* of simultaneity.

To illustrate the contradiction between the view of the three-dimensionality of the world and the theory of relativity, let us consider two observers in relative motion. Owing to the relativity of simultaneity each of them has his 'own' class of simultaneous events at his 'own' present moment. Therefore, having *different* classes of simultaneous (present) events, the two observers also have *different* presents, i.e. *different* three-dimensional worlds. This inference is *inevitable*. However, it is not possible if reality is a *single* three-dimensional world. And indeed, if the world is three-dimensional, as a *single one*, it will also be *common* to the two observers. But, having a *common* three-dimensional world, the two observers will have a *common* present, and therefore also a *common* class of simultaneous (present) events. It follows therefrom that simultaneity has proved to be *absolute* (observer independent), which contradicts the special theory of relativity. Thus, the relativity of simultaneity categorically shows that reality cannot be a three-dimensional world. In that case, what is the dimensionality of the world? The inference that the observers in relative motion have *different* presents naturally leads us to the idea that we should consider all presents, i.e. the three dimensional worlds of all observers in relative motion as existing. But this is possible only if reality is a four dimensional world. This argument on the four-dimensionality of the world was put forward by Hilary Putnam.<sup>1</sup> It appeared, however, that it could be criticized along two lines. First, the objection could be raised that Putnam's argument is not consistent, because he uses the classical division of events into past, present and future ones. On another occasion this objection was raised by Landsberg.<sup>2</sup> He is right in maintaining that from a relativistic point of view the division of

<sup>1</sup> Putnam H. 'Time and Physical Geometry', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1967, 64, pp. 240-247.

<sup>2</sup> Landsberg P.T. 'Time in Statistical Physics and Special Relativity'. In *The Study of Time*, Edited by J.T. Fraser et al., Springer, 1972, pp. 59-109.



events takes place in another way: those events which are in the lower part of the light cone are past, while events in the upper part of the light cone are future. The question concerning present events is a more delicate one. It would be quite natural to accept as present events those which are outside the light cone, i.e. events which remain, if we separate past and future events from all those which exist in the Minkowski world. In such a case, if only present events are again considered as real ones, reality would prove to be a complex four-dimensional entity — the region outside the light cone, i.e. the region *Elsewhere*. Therefore, in this case also we should again have to accept the present as the only real one but already definitely as the region *Elsewhere*, while the past (the light cone of the past) and the future (the light cone of the future) would have to be considered as nonexistent. However, this view also meets insuperable difficulties — it is sufficient for us to realize that we can connect the light cone with *any* event of the Minkowski world to realize that in one choice of the light cone the events which are outside it and therefore exist, in another choice of the light cone they lie in its past and its future and are therefore nonexistent. This situation shows that the events of the Minkowski world are not *objectively* divided into past, present and future ones. The only inference which can be drawn from this is to accept that all events in the Minkowski world exist in an equal way, i.e. to accept that reality is a four dimensional world.

It would appear, however, that Landsberg sees another issue. According to him events which lie outside the light cone are neither past nor present, nor future ones. Leaving aside the question: 'What are these events then?' I should note that in this way Landsberg cannot avoid the answer to the basic and essential question: 'What is the dimensionality of the world?' He cannot consider it as three-dimensional, first because of the contradiction with the relativity of simultaneity noted above, and second, because in such a case he would use precisely such a division of the events into past, present and future in a Newtonian sense, to which he objects. The possibility is left of the world's being considered as four-dimensional. In this four-dimensional world events exist *equally* and are therefore not objectively divided into past, present and future. This fact also agrees with Landsberg's objection, because by emphasizing the fact that the theory of relativity shows the incorrectness of Newton's division of events it does not in the least follow that they are in any way divided.

Bearing in mind the equal existence of events in the Minkowski world, I shall further note that it is not correct to consider as a present event only one which is chosen at the tip of the light cone, as is sometimes done. The reason for this is that we can *completely*



arbitrarily choose an event as the tip of a light cone, i.e. as a present one. But for it to be a present event, it must be *objectively privileged* which excludes the possibility of choice.

The second line of criticism of Putnam's argument on the four-dimensionality of the world is connected with the objection raised by Robert Weingard.<sup>3</sup> According to him Putnam's argument does not attain its end, because it does not take into account the circumstance that even as regards one observer (or reference system) the definition of simultaneity of any events whatever is a matter of convention. It follows from the conventionality of simultaneity that, if we consider two observers in relative motion, crossing one another in an event which we choose at the tip of a light cone, we cannot define the events forming the presents of the observers: each of them can arbitrarily choose as his present a space-like slice of the region *Elsewhere* (the region outside the light cone). In order to avoid the unacceptable inference on conventionality also in relation to what exists (if each of the observers considers as existing only his 'own' present, i.e. only his 'own' three dimensional world) directly following from the conventionality of simultaneity, it is necessary to consider the whole region *Elsewhere* as existing. Then, the freedom of choice which each observer has in defining his own present will not lead to difficulties, because the observer chooses as his own present a spacelike slice of *equally* existing events in the region *Elsewhere*. In this way the conventionality of simultaneity forces us to accept that reality is not a three dimensional world, but the region *Elsewhere*. On reaching this inference Weingard puts forward the argument (used above in analysing the objection of Landsberg, when we reached the same inference that reality should be equated with the region *Elsewhere*), that if we chose two non coincident light cones, regions of the cones of the past and future considered as non-existent) of each light cone fall into the region *Elsewhere* belonging to the other light cone. From this Weingard draws the inevitable inference that all events in the Minkowski world are *equally* real and in this way, although criticizing Putnam, he gave a strong argument in support of the conclusion the latter had drawn on the four-dimensionality of the world.

So far we have analysed only one of the consequences of the special theory of relativity—the relativity of simultaneity—and we have seen that it unambiguously refutes the view on the three-dimensionality of the world. I think that the analysis of the relativity of simultaneity is sufficient to solve the problem of the dimensionality of the world in a categorical manner. All the more so as the relativity of simultaneity lies at the foundation of the remaining kinematic

<sup>3</sup> Weingard R. 'Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 1972, 23, pp. 119-121.



consequences of the special theory of relativity (with the exception of the twin paradox). However, I shall nevertheless briefly consider these consequences, because I think that their (even most cursory) analysis clearly shows the inevitability of the view on the four-dimensionality of the world. To be able to analyse the relativistic length contraction, the relativistic time dilatation and the twin paradox in the light of the problem of the dimensionality of the world, it is necessary to emphasize the following alternative. If the world is three dimensional, each object exists as a *single* three-dimensional object *only* at the present moment and does not exist in its 'own' past nor in its 'own' future. If the world is four dimensional, each object exists as a real four-dimensional object — the world path of the object considered. In other words, each object exists 'simultaneously' in *all* events of its history, and not only in one event, considered as a present one. Bearing in mind the alternative outlined on the dimensionality of objects, let us analyse the three consequences of the special history of relativity already mentioned, beginning with the relativistic contraction of length. We consider two observers in relative motion near one of whom there is a standard of length. As is known, the special theory of relativity foretells that the two observers will measure *different* lengths of the standard. The fundamental question here is: '*What does this relativistic effect mean?*' It turns out that the answer to this question has a direct bearing on the problem of the dimensionality of the world and particularly on the dimensionality of the standard under consideration. We saw above that the world cannot be three dimensional. Here this inference is again confirmed. If we accept for a moment that reality is the *sole* three-dimensional world, every object would exist only at the present moment as a *single* three dimensional object. The three dimensional standard under consideration as a single one would then be *common* to both observers. In that case, however, the observers would measure *one and the same* length of the standard and thus a contradiction with the special theory of relativity would be reached. The contradiction is avoided *only* if we accept that the standard exists as a *different* three dimensional object for each of the observers. What is more, this inference follows naturally from the relativity of simultaneity. As was shown above, from the fact that two observers in relative motion have *different* classes of simultaneous (present) events, it follows that they have *different* presents, i.e. *different* three-dimensional worlds. This means that the two observers have *different, non coincident* classes of three-dimensional objects. Therefore, in measuring *one and the same* standard, the two observers in reality measure *two different* three-dimensional objects. Rietdijk<sup>4,5</sup> drew attention to this. He

4 Rietdijk C. W. *On the Explanation of Matter Wave Interference*. Van Gorcum, 1973.

5 Rietdijk C. W. 'On the Four-Dimensional Character of Micro-Physical Phenomena'. In *The Wave-Particle Dualism*. Edited by S. Diner et al. D. Reidel, 1984, pp. 433-456.



showed that the relativistic contraction of the standard of length was based on a *different* ordering of its point-events for the two observers — the point-events of the standard which are future ones for the observer in relation to whom the standard is moving, are present for the observer with relation to whom the standard is at rest. Accounting for this fact reveals the *sense* of the relativistic contraction of the standard — the two observers measure *different* lengths of the standard, because they measure *different* three-dimensional objects, i.e. different space like sections of the world path of the standard. But if it is to be possible for *two different* slices of the standard's world path to exist for the two observers, it is necessary that it (the world path) should exist as a *real* four-dimensional object. It is obvious that this requirement has a place in a four-dimensional, and not in a three-dimensional world.

The reference that the world paths of the objects are real four-dimensional objects, and therefore the inference on the four-dimensionality of the world is also reached in the analysis of the remaining two kinematic consequences of the special theory of relativity — reciprocal time dilatation of the time intervals of the two inertial observers in relative motion and the twin paradox. I shall briefly sketch the basic points of this analysis, touching principally on the first consequence (for more details see my article<sup>6</sup>).

Let some kind of continuous process, for instance 3s be taking place at each of the inertial observers A and B in relative motion (who account for the duration of the processes according to their proper times). If a suitable relative velocity between the observers has been chosen, as is known, the special theory of relativity foretells that each of them will establish that the process near the other observer appears to take place in 4s. To analyse this fact, let us suppose that the observers cross one another at event O, i.e. this event is the intersecting point of their world lines (more precisely paths). We choose event O as the beginning of the process near both the observers. We indicate two events on the world path of A with K and L: we mark the end of the process ensuing from it with K (i.e. the moment  $t^A = 3s$  of A's proper time) and with L — the end of the process taking place near B, but accounted for by A's time (i.e. the moment  $t^A = 4s$ ). In an analogous way we mark with events M and N of observer B's world path respectively the end of the process near him (i.e. moment  $t^B = 3s$ ) and the end of the process near observer A, but accounted for according to B's time (i.e. the moment  $t^B = 4s$ ). If we examine reality as a three-dimensional world we should accept that each of the observers exists only at his moment

<sup>6</sup> Petkov V. P. 'The Problem of the Flow of Time According to Eleatic Philosophy and the Theory of Relativity'. In *Struktur und Dynamik wissenschaftlicher Theorien*. Edited by C. Tögel. P. Lang, pp. 121-149, 1986.



now as a *single* three-dimensional object and does not exist either in his past or in his future. If we accept that observers A and B exist respectively *only* in events L and N, i.e. that the event L examined as a moment *now* according to A, and event N—as the moment *now* for B, we reach a contradiction with the theory of relativity. The reason for this is that from the point of view of *both* observers, observer A will exist *only* in event L (i.e. only at the moment  $t^A = 4s$ ), while observer B will exist *only* in event N (i.e. only at the moment  $t^B = 4s$ ). In such a case, however, both observers would have to accept that events L and N are simultaneous, since *only* these two events exist on the world paths of A and B. This means that the observers will have a *common* class of simultaneous events (the simultaneity proves to be absolute!) and they will not account for any relativistic dilatation of the time intervals, because *for both of them* 4s would have passed from the moment of their meeting (since each of them exists only in his fourth second). However, as we know from the special theory of relativity, for the observer A the event L ( $t^A = 4s$ ) is simultaneous with event M ( $t^B = 3s$ ). He interprets this fact in the sense that according to his proper time the process near B has ended not in 3 but in 4s. By analogy, observer B considers that according to his proper time the process near A ended not in 3 but in 4s, because for B the third second of A's time and the fourth second of B's time are simultaneous, i.e. events K and N are simultaneous. For this inference to be possible observer A should exist 'simultaneously' at events K and L, while observer B should exist 'simultaneously' at events M and N. This is so, because, as we saw above, the fact that two observers in relative motion have *different* classes of simultaneous events can be explained *solely* by accepting that all events of these classes exist 'simultaneously', and so, the *sense* of the reciprocal dilatation of the times of observers A and B is that each of them exists not only in one event of his history (considered as a present event from the point of view of the three-dimensionality of the world), but at least in two. It is obvious that if we consider more observers in relative motion, each of them would have to exist in as many events as there are observers, and this is only possible if the world paths of the observers are real four-dimensional objects (i.e. only if reality is a four-dimensional world).

The same inference is reached in an analysis of the twin paradox: each of them should exist 'simultaneously' in all events of his history; in the contrary case—if the twins exist only in the their own present movements—the travelling twin *cannot* prove to be younger at the event of the meeting and thus contradiction is again reached with the theory of relativity (there is a more detailed analysis of this 'paradox' in my article<sup>6</sup>).

To my mind the analysis made convincingly and unambiguously proves that the world in which we live is four-dimensional all the events of which are equally real. It is necessary for us clearly to realize that the price of rejecting this situation and considering the world as three dimensional is an inevitable contradiction with the theory of relativity and the experimental facts which confirm it.



## V

# The Salutary Descent

*A Syrkin*

1.\* The theme "rise and descent", together with another closely related dichotomy, "upper part"—"lower part"; appears to be one of the most meaningful topics in the broad domain of cultural, anthropological and, particularly, religious studies. One can mention but a few equally important opposites that as directly reflect the most essential traits of our experience and, at the same time, pertain to the cardinal structural and semantic qualities of religious dogmatics, myth, ritual procedure, etc.<sup>1</sup> The many direct or indirect use of corresponding notions encompasses various spheres of human

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\* The following abbreviations are used below :

AN—Aṅguttara Nikāya; Bg—Bhagavadgīta; BP—Bṛāgavata purāṇa; BU—Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad; CbU—Chāndogya upaniṣad; DhP—Dhammapada; DN—Dīgha nikāya; EJ—Eranos Jahrbuch; JAOS—Journal of the American Oriental Society; KauU—Kauṣītaki upaniṣad; KeU—Kaṭha upaniṣad; MaU—Mānavadharmasāstra; MaU—Māṇḍūkya upaniṣad; Mbh—Mahābhārata; Mtu—Maitrī; upaniṣad; MuU—Muṇḍaka—upaniṣad; MN—Majjhima nikāya; MP—Matsya purāṇa; PS—Pāśupata sūtra; PU—Praśna upaniṣad; RV—Rgveda; Sn—Sutta nipata; SB—Śatapatha brāhmaṇa; SU—Śvetāśvatara upaniṣad; TB—Taittirīya brāhmaṇa; TU—Taittirīya upaniṣad; ZDMG—Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the role of this opposition in different traditions, cf. e.g.: L. Beirnaert. Le symbolisme ascensionnel dans la liturgie et la mystique chrétiennes—EJ, 1950, Bd. XIX, S. 41 63; M. Eliade. Das Heilige und das Profane, Hamburg, 1957, S. 69 sq.; C. Levi Strauss. Anthropologie structurale, Paris, 1958, pp 147 sq.; V. V. Ivanov, V. N. Toporov. Slavjanskije jazykovye modelirujuscie semiotičeskie sistemy, Moskva, 1965, pp. 98 sq.; 201 sq.; idem. Issledovanija v oblasti slavjanskix drevnostej, Moskva, 1974, pp. 157, 260; EJ. 1981. Aufstieg und Abstieg. Rise and Descent. Descente et Ascension (articles by U. Mann, D. L. Miller, D. I. Lauf, a.o.).



activity, each with different functions and evaluations concerning their surroundings.<sup>2</sup>

This dichotomy naturally refers first of all to spatial relations, appearing as a common modelling universal in different cosmologies. The examples are too numerous to be cited. Let us consider only the well-known threefold vertical division of cosmos in Vedic tradition (cf. *tridhātu* in RV I, 154. 4 a.o.) into three worlds: heaven (*dyāus*), midspace (*antarīkṣa*) and earth (*pr̥thvī*)<sup>3</sup> This division with occasional modification (heaven—earth—underworld) has been preserved throughout the millenia of Indian culture.

The categories of “ascent”—“descent” (like those of “upper part”—“lower part”) have from time immemorial transgressed the limits of the purely spatial, and have served in describing emotional and psychic (cf. e.g. Lat. “*exsultare*” derivatives) states and, consequently, ethic values. They have, thus, helped to model a kind of ethical continuum in which they describe a number of cardinal dichotomies—both directly (like those of “heaven”—“earth”; “heaven”—“underworld” and obliquely (resp. “day”—“night”; “light”—“darkness; “pure”, “in pure” etc.).<sup>4</sup> Corresponding opposites as a rule receive positive or negative ethical evaluation, respectively, here, such as “elevated”, “exalted” or “base”, “low”. Assuming this general usage, we shall try to note its modifications resulting from certain dogmatic peculiarities (such as e.g. Hindu approach to “life”—“death” opposition).

Regarding this model of ethical space one can speak of dogmatic, mythological, or ritualistic elements which serve here as organizing factors connected with vertical transference.<sup>5</sup> These are, within the framework of Indian sources, the oppositions of “this world” (the earth) and “that world” (the sky) (BU I. 5.4: *ayam lokaḥ ... asau lokaḥ*), or of “the path of the gods” (*devayāna*) and “the path

2 Such, for example, is the possibility of different evaluations of the same notion within the framework of common sense, on the one hand, and the non-pragmatic, idealistic approach on the other: cf. positive sense of “basic”, “earthly” and negative of “soaring over”, in the first case, and reverse evaluations in the second.

3 See: W. Kirfel. *Die Kosmograpie der Inder nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Bonn und Leipzig, 1920. S. 20 sq.; S. Kramrish. *The triple structure of creation in the R̥g Veda—‘History of Religions’*, vol 2, N. 1. 1962, pp. 140 sq.; J. Gonda, *Loka. World and heaven in the Veda*. Amsterdam, 1966.

4 Cf. Ivanov, Toporov. *Slavjanskije*, pp. 204 sq.

5 We do not refer here to manifold “horizontal” aspects of this organization and corresponding symbolism, correlated to a certain degree with our dichotomy (cf. resp. “right”—“left” opposition; see, e.g., *Right and Left. Essays on dual symbolic classification*, Ed. by R. Needham, Chicago, 1973).



of the gods" (devayāna) and "the path of the fathers" (pitṛyāna) (BU VI. 2. 15 16; ChU IV. 15; V. 10; cf. KauU 1. 2 sq.).<sup>6</sup> The Buddhist model likewise suggests the opposition of "this" and "that" world (lokiya — lokuttara) connected with the idea of corresponding transition, accomplished by a monk in the course of perfection.<sup>7</sup>

- 6 The following of these patha is vividly represented here in corresponding descriptions that present a number of opposites correlated with "rise"—"descent": resp. "flame"—"smoke"—"day"—"night", "North"—"South", "gods"—"fathers", "sun"—"moon", etc. Those who possess the genuine knowledge follow the first path through the flame, the day, the world of the gods, the sun, the lightning, and "to the worlds of Brahmā...of these there is no return" (The Principal Upaniṣads, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan, London, 1953, p. 314). The second path (of those performing regular rites) appears to be a partial ascent with subsequent descent (i.e. rebirth), a process repeated in the wheel of reincarnation; through the smoke (of the cremation fire), the night, the world of the fathers, the moon, etc. Then, passing from the space into rain with which they fall into the earth, they are born again. Cf. P. Thieme. Der Weg durch den Himmel nach der Kaushitaki—Upanishad— "Wiss. Zeitschrift der Martin—Luther—Universität, Halle Wittenberg", Jhrg. I, 1951/52, H. 3, Gesellschafts—und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, N. 1, S. 19 36; J. Jordens. The development of the idea of immortality in the Upaniṣads—"Journal of the Oriental Institute", Baroda, vol. 16, N. 1, 1966, pp. 1 17 etc. It is noteworthy that the right knowledge, securing the way to Brahman and exposed in previous paragraphs (BU VI. 2. 9 13; ChU V. 4.9) presents a theory, in an allegory of the five sacrificial "fires", of man's origin resulting from a process of descent. The first "fire" ("that" celestial world) impregnated by faith (śraddhā, brought forth as a kind of oblation) gives birth to the king Soma (the moon). The latter is sacrificed in the second "fire"—Parjanya (the god of rain) and the rain is produced. The libation of rain in the third "fire" (the earth) produces food. The offering of food in the fourth "fire" (man) produces semen, and finally, the libation of semen in the fifth "fire" (woman) leads to the birth of a human being. In another description of the dying person (ChU VI. 15 1-2) "his voice is merged in mind (manasi), mind in breath, breath in heart (rejas) and heat in the highest deity (parasyām devatāyām—Principal Upaniṣads, p. 465). Cf. Nobel Ross Reat. Karma and rebirth in the Upaniṣads and Buddhism—"Numen", v. 24, fasc. 3, 1977, pp. 163 sq. Concerning some analogies between birth and descent, on the one hand, and death and ascent of the soul, on the other, cf. M. Pulver. Die Lichterfahrt in Johannes Evangelium im Corpus Hermeticum, in der Gnosis und in der Ostkirche—EJ, 1943. Bd. X S. 266 sq; Eliade. Das Heilige, S. 83 sq. (on humi positio), C. G. Jung. The psychology of the transference, Princeton, 1974, pp. 105 sq. (on the iconography of the "Rosarium philosophorum").
- 7 J. G. Jennings. The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha, Oxford, 1947, pp. 623 sq; A. K. Warder. On the relationships between early Buddhism and other contemporary systems, — "Bulletin of



The function of the connecting link in this space can be fulfilled by a superhuman, yet anthropomorphic, being like *puruṣa* in Vedic cosmogony, *Viṣṇu* (cf. below), etc.<sup>8</sup> Among other organizing factors the cosmic tree is perhaps the most widespread<sup>9</sup> — both in spatial and ethical regulation (cf. BU III, 9 28; TU I, 10 1; KtU II, 3 1; SU III, 9; VI, 6; MtU VI, 4; Bg XV, 1-3, etc.). The ritual text can also

the School of Oriental and African Studies", vol. 18, N. 1, 1956, pp. 58, 61 etc. The evidence of DN XVI, 6 8 9 describes the attainment of *parinibbāna* in a peculiar manner. Buddha's ascent (*vutṭhabhivā*) along the nine states (*anupubba* = *vibhāra*) — the four stages of absorption (*jhāna*) and the five subsequent levels (*āyatana*) — is followed by his descent from the ninth state to the first, then by the second ascent to the fourth *jhāna*, after which "he immediately expired" (Dialogues of the Buddha, tr. by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, pt. II, London, 1910, pp. 173-175; cf. F. Heiler, *Die Buddhistischen Versenkungsstufen* — "Aufsätze zur Kultur — und Sprachgeschichte Vornehmlich des Orients", E. Kuhn zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, München, 1916, S. 357-387). This metaphorical ascent is accompanied by more traditional "spatial" signs of the gods' respect for the departing Teacher (heavenly flowers and sandal wood powder falling from the sky all over his body; streams of water from the sky extinguishing his funeral pyre; etc. — DN XVI, 5. 2-3; 6. 23).

8. Cf. J. Gonda, *Aspects of early Viṣṇuism*, Utrecht, 1954, pp. 55 sq.; F. B. J. Kuiper, *The Three strides of Viṣṇu* — "Indological Studies in honor of W. N. Brown", New Haven, 1962, pp. 137-151. Cf. also the role of *Agni* supporting the heaven with the help of firewood (RV III, 5, 10).
9. See O. Viennot, *Le culte de l'arbre dans l'Inde ancienne*, Paris, 1954, pp. 9 sq.; 75 sq.; E. O. James, *The tree of life. An archaeological study*, Leiden, 1966, pp. 129 sq. etc.; E. A. S. Butterworth, *The tree at the navel of the world*, Berlin, 1970; V. N. Toporov, *L'albero universale* — "Ricerche semiotiche" — Torino, 1973, pp. 148-209; J. W. Taylor, *Tree worship*, — "The Mankind Quarterly", v. 20, N. 1-2, 1979, pp. 79-141; etc. Cf. also iconographic material in R. Cook, *The tree of life. Image for the cosmos*, N. Y. 1974; G. B. Ladner, *Medieval and modern understanding of symbolism: a comparison* — "Speculum", v. 54, No. 2, 1979, pp. 250 sq., figures 1-24 etc. There are numerous reflections of the tree symbolism in folklore and fine literature (e.g. in: L. Tolstoy's "War and peace", R. M. Rilke's "Ich liebe meines Wesens Dunkelstunden"; B. Pasternak's "Zimnie prazdniki" a.o.). Cf. below, note 11. On analogous function of some other symbols (ladder, cross, thread) cf. e.g., M. Pulver, *Jesu Reigen und Kreuzigung nach den Johannes-Akten* — EJ, 1942, Bd. XIV, S. 174; Beirnaert, *Le symbolisme*, S. 48 sq.; M. Eliade, *Mythes et symboles de la corde* — EJ, 1960, Bd. XXIX, S. 109-137, esp. 114 sq.; Th. H. Gaster, *Myth, legend and custom in the Old Testament*, v. I, N. Y. 1975, pp. 184 sq.; V. N. Toporov, *Ob odnom klasse simvolicheskix tekstov* — "Balcano-Bal o Slavicu", Moskva, 1979, pp. 116 sq., D I. Lauf, *Maitreyas Herabkunft und Stufenwege zum Licht* — EJ, 1981, S. 377 sq., etc.



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serve such a link — cf. the function of the sacred syllable “om” (aum) which leads the believer to highest perfection (PU, V. 2.5)<sup>10</sup> when properly used in meditation. The same is said of other sacrificial formulas. As we know, this symbolism is variously reflected in iconographic tradition, with corresponding localization of individual symbols.<sup>11</sup>

10 “The sound *Aum*... is verily the higher and the lower *Brahman*... if he meditates on the element (*a*), he comes quickly to the earth (after death)... (if he meditates on this) as of two elements he attains the mind (*manas*)... the intermediate space... But if he meditates on the highest person with the three elements of the syllable *Aum* (*a, u, m*), he becomes one with the light... He is led.. to the world of *Brahmā*” (Principal Upaniṣads, p. 665). Cf. further, PU V, 7 (ibid., p. 666): “With the *ṛg* (verses) (one attains) this world, with the *yajus* (formulas)...the interspace and with the *sāman* (chants)... that which is tranquil, unaging, immortal, fearless and supreme”. Other evidence (MaU 1 sq) connects a u-m with past, present and future, respectively: with the cognition (*prajñā*) of external objects, of internal objects and a “mass of cognition” (*prajñāna=ghana*), etc; while the whole syllable is equal with *ātman* “which cannot be spoken of, into which the world is resolved, benign, non dual” (ibid., pp. 695 sq; cf. below note 97). The corresponding problem has been discussed at the earlier Eranos meetings (cf. e.g., papers of P. Masson Ouriel, C.A.F. Rhys Davids, J. Przyluski in EJ, 1936, 1937, Bd. IV, V.).

11 Cf. the Buddhist iconography: V. N. Toporov. *Zametki o bud-dijskom izobrazitel'nom iskusstve v svjazi S semiotikoju kosmologičeskix predstavlenij*—“Works on semiotics”, II. Tartu, 1965, pp. 225 sq; E. D. Ogneva. *Struktura tibetskoj ikony*—“Problema kanona v drevnem i srednevekovom iskusstve Azii i Afriki”, Moskva, 1973, pp. 111 a.o. Analogous regularities pertain to the sphere of sculpture (cf. P. Mus. Barabudur, N. Y. 1978, pp. 633 sq; B. Rowland. *Religious art East and West*—“History of religions”, v. 2, N. 1, 1962, pp. 21 sq. — on Buddha’s “cosmological stature”) and architecture—cf. e.g. the structure of Barabudur temple as the replica of the macrocosm (H. Zimmer. *Kunstform und Yoga im Indischen Kultbild* Berlin, 1926, S. 94 etc; Mus. Op. cit., p. 42 sq; cf. Rowland. Op. cit., pp. 26 sq; Anagarika Govinda. *Quelques aspects du symbolisme des Stupa*—“Samadhi. Cahiers d’études bouddhiques”, v. 8, N. 3-4, 1974, pp. 154-171; etc.). One can find similar regularities in Christian art: cf. correspondence of elements in the icon, where the three zones—resp. heaven, church (as the connecting link) and earth (or hell)—can be usually distinguished. (This device undergoes a certain modification in Renaissance painting, due to the introduction of the three-dimensional representation based on the horizontal scheme as, e.g. in Fra Angelico’s “The last judgement”; cf. I. Danilova. *Ot srednix vekov k vozroždeniju. Slozenie xudožestvennoj sistemy kartiny kvatrocento*, Moskva, 1975, pp. 39 sq. We find here also motifs of the tree, the ladder, etc (cf. particularly a dynamic image of ascent and sinners fall in the icon “Ladder of St. Jacob” from St. Cathe-



Nevertheless, this regularity does not always appear to be immutable : as we have already mentioned, it now and then permits different interpretations of the same concept. So, within the framework of separate traditions, and staying in the same system of the ethical space, we come across different meanings and functions of the "descent" phenomenon. On the one hand such a "descent" (literal or metaphorical) corresponds with the general evaluation of the "upper"—"lower" dichotomy (as well as with other correlated opposites) mentioned above. It is not necessarily connected here with the idea of subsequent salvation or ascent, but is influenced, rather, by the sum of previous deeds and qualities of the descendant (one may say, by his karmic state) and by his inclinations which have nothing to do with the purpose of salvation. It may even be opposed to it. With respect to godly descendants one can cite manifold anthropomorphic beliefs (e.g. as a result of passion in ancient Greek mythology) or the fallen—rather than descended—semigods (asuras, fallen angels, etc.)<sup>12</sup> The mortal variant is, e.g., returning (after temporary ascent, as in the evidence mentioned above, in note 6) to mother womb or to one of the lower worlds, with subsequent rebirth, which can be repeated many times. Other well known beliefs speak of a single decent to Hades, hell, etc., the final salvation being possible as a result of certain other activities and not of descent itself.

We are dealing here with another type of descent—one that serves a necessary device for subsequent ascent, liberation and perfection. As such, it can appear in its independent positive value, sometimes even without any explicit reference to the goal. This salutary descent is also characteristic not only, of god-like creatures (beginning with most archaic ideas of shaman's heavenly origin and ending with modern Messianic beliefs) but of mortals as well. It is connected with a large field of religious studies that go beyond the scope of the present paper. We shall restrict ourselves to a few aspects of this salutary descent—mainly those pertaining to ancient Indian sources.

rine's Monastery in Sinai; the composition of J. Bosch's triptychs; etc.). Cf. R. Cavendish. *Visions of Heaven and Hell*. N. Y., 1977. Cf. also concerning corresponding symbolism in church architecture: J. Sauer. *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes und seiner Ausstattung in der Auffassung des Mittelalters*. Freiburg, 1924; G. Bandmann. *Mittelalterliche Architektur als Bedeutungsträger*, Berlin, 1951; etc.

- 12 See, for example : L. Jung. *Fallen angels in Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan Literature. A study in comparative Folklore*—"The Jewish Quarterly Review", N.S. v. 15, 1924/25, pp. 467-502; v. 16, 1925/26, pp. 45-88; 171-205; 287-336; M. Rimeschneider. *Der Wettergott*. Leipzig, 1956, S. 35 sq. (on Hittite, Greek and other traditions).



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2 The widespread motif of perfection preceded or accompanied by denigration, descent, etc. can be illustrated by semantic usage, e.g. that of "humility", "humble" (Lat. "humus") — so typical of a pious context.<sup>13</sup> This attitude appears as an important feature in the ancient Hindu institution of brahmacārin ("leading a chaste life") whereby the pupil lives in the house of his teacher.<sup>14</sup> He must respect the latter like a deity (the father giving him birth is not as important as the father" who gives him the knowledge of Veda—Man II, 146). He must serve the teacher, tend his house, the sacred fires, the cattle; go begging for him when necessary. He sleeps on earth, washes his teacher's feet, always takes the lower seat, waits upon his relatives, and so on (Man II, 71 sq., 108, 130 sq., 198 etc.). According to Man II, 233, obedience to mother leads him to this world, obedience to father to midspace, while obedience to guru leads to heaven. He must avoid praise and strive for contempt (II, 162).

We can suggest that the student's state and the process of study itself are reflected in the corresponding texts. We refer to the genre of upaniṣads, the precepts that played a decisive role in Indian spiritual life. The etymology is fairly clear: a derivative from the verb upa-ni sad- "to sit down at" (evidently, "at the feet of another to listen to his words").<sup>15</sup> The notion of the genuine, mysterious,

13 Cf. the persistent emphasis on the advantages of inferior, dependent, despised state already in earlier Christian sources. We should mention, especially, the cases when humiliation is explicitly correlated to perfection and appears as a condition for elevation: Mt. 18.4; "Let a man humble himself, and he will be the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven"; Mt. 23, 12; "whoever exalts himself will be humbled; and whoever humbles himself will be exalted"; Lc. 14, 11; I Pet 5.5; Jas. 4.6; 10: see also: Mt. 5.3 sq.; Lc. 4.18; 6.20 sq.; I. Cor 1.28; etc. The device of intentional self denigration and humiliation, of hiding one's own merits, etc. is widespread in monastic tradition. Cf. e.g., W. Bousset. *Die verborgene Hielige*—*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* Bd. XXI, Leipzig—Berlin, 1922, S. 1-17 (the evidence of "Historia Lausiaca", Rufinus' *Historia monachorum*", etc.). Cf. also Beirnaert, *Symbolism*, S. 62-63. We shall touch upon similar traits below, with respect to the image of the "Fool for Christ's sake".

14 See R. K. Mookerji. *Ancient Indian education (Brahmanical and Buddhist)*. Delhi, 1960, pp. 93 sq., 184 sq.; H. W. Genichen. *Zum meister=Jungen=Verhältnis im Hinduismus* — "Wort und Religion. *Kalima ha dini*". Stuttgart, 1969, S. 340-353; W. O. Kaelber. *The Brahmacārin: homology and continuity in Brāhmaṇic religion* — "History of Religions", vol. 21, No. 1, 1981, pp. 77-99; J. D. Mlecko. *The Guru in Hindu tradition* — "Numen", vol. XXIX, Fasc. 1, 1982, pp. 33-61; etc.

15 M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefasstes Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, Bd. I, Heidelberg, 1956, S. 105; M. Monier-



esoteric knowledge (cf. SU V, 6; VI, 22; BU VI, 3. 12; ChU III, 11.5; MuU III, 2.11 etc.) thus developed from the original description of the posture of the pupil, listening to his teacher. Here one should consider the prefix *upa*— (Greek *hypo*, Lat. *sub*, etc.), bearing the sense of approaching, being in a lower state and, consequently, approaching from beneath, a respectful approach, etc. Hence the notion of *upāsana* (cf. ChU II, 1.1; KauU II, 7 etc.) from *upa ās*. “to sit near, at hand” (in order to honour or wait upon, to serve, to respect, etc.) denoting, evidently, the teachings of the *upanishads* and the act of genuinely understanding and worshipping them.<sup>16</sup> Cf. also such notions as *upapanna*—“approached” as a pupil, for protection; *upanayana*—a ceremony of *brāhmaṇa*’s initiation preceding his studies; etc.

A particular example of approach for knowledge is presented in the text of *Kaṭha upanishad*. During the sacrifice *Vājaśravasa* (called in *KtU* I, 1.10-11 also *Gautama* and *Auddālaki*, the son of *Aruṇa*—cf. below) gets angry with his own *Naciketas*, who doubted the efficiency of traditional rite, and swears to give him to Death. *Naciketas* (cf. possible interpretation of his name: “I do not know”) understands him verbally and goes to the abode of *Yama*, god of death. He stands there for three nights waiting for *Yama*’s return (*Taittirīya brāhmaṇa* III, 11.8) and the god being pleased permits him to make three wishes. First, the youth chooses to allay his father’s anger. Then he asks to receive knowledge of the celestial fire that leads to heaven (cf. ChU VI, 8.4 and corresponding allegories—see above, note 6)<sup>17</sup>. Finally, he wishes to know the fate

Williams, *A Sanskrit-English dictionary*, Oxford, 1951, p. 201; see also: A. B. Keith *The religion and philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads*, Cambridge, Mass., 1925, p. 489; L. Renou (Sur le sens du mot *upanishad*), in: “Seance du 9 fevrier 1945” — “*Journal Asiatique*”, t. 234, 1943/45, pp. 449, 450; M. Winernitz *A History of Indian literature*, v. I, Calcutta, 1959, p. 211; P. Deussen *The philosophy of the Upanishads*, N. Y., 1966, pp. 13 sq; etc.

16 Monier-Williams, *Op. cit.*, p. 215; cf. G. Oldenberg. *Vedische Untersuchungen* — ZDMG, Bd. 50. 1896, S. 457 sq. (deriving *upanishad* from *upa ās*); idem. *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*. Gottingen, 1923, S. 134, 300 Anm. 97; 98; E. Senart. *Upās — upanishad* — “*Florilegium*..... Melchior de Vogue”, Paris, 1909, pp. 575-587; M. Falk. *Upāsana et Upanishad* — “*Rocznik Orientalistyczny*”, t. 13, 1937, pp. 129-158; etc.

17 With respect to this evidence, W. D. Whitney’s interpretation of *Naciketa*’s second wish as being opposed to the *upanishadic* spirit seems to be unfounded (W. D. Whitney. *The Kaṭha Upanishad*—“*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*”, v. XXI, 1890, pp. 91 sq.)—see: J. S. Helfer. *The initiatory structure of the Kathopanishad*—“*History of religions*”, v. 7, N. 4, 1968, pp. 350 sq.



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of man after death. The plot of *Kaṭha*, noteworthy in particular for its dramatic initial point (father's wrath and son's obedience that lead to highest perfection), can be compared with the traditional genre of peregrinatio—a pilgrimage in quest of truth. The functions of Yama—god of death, ruling over spirits of the deceased, king of the South—evidently correspond to some of the notions discussed here and enable one to speak of descent, followed by successful ascent of the illuminated hero (cf. Yama's words to Naciketas "released from the jaws of death"—KtU I, 1. 11).<sup>18</sup> At the same time certain details—three night's waiting; a chain (*śrṅkām*) given by the god to youth (KtU I, 1. 16) etc. — suggest a peculiar initiatory rite, reflected in the text.<sup>19</sup>

18 Principal Upaniṣads, p. 599.

19 Helfer. Op. cit.; pp. 348-367; see also: B. Faddegon. *De interpretatie der Kaṭhaka Upaniṣad*. Amsterdam, 1923; J.N. Rawson. *The Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. Oxford, 1934; P. Deussen *Sechzig Upaniṣad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1938 S. 261 sq.; F. Weller. *Versuch einer Kritik der Kaṭhapaniṣad*, Berlin, 1953; H.D. Velankar. *The Rgvedic origin of the story of Naciketas* (Rv. X. 135) — "Melanges d'indianisme a la memoire de L. Renou", Paris, 1968, pp. 763-772; R. Rustomji. *Bargaining with death in Sanskrit literature* — "Literature East and West", v. 18, n. 24 ("Encounters with Death in Asian literature"), 1974, pp. 148 sq.; etc. See also concerning the "spiritual" and initiatory functions of Death: M. Eliade *Birth and rebirth: the religious meanings of initiation in human culture*, N.Y. 1951; J.B. Long. *The Death that ends death in Hinduism and Buddhism* — "Death: the final stage of growth", N.Y. 1975, pp. 52 sq.; "Religious encounters with Death. Insights from the history and anthropology of religion", ed. by F.E. Reynolds and E.H. Waugh, University Park and London, 1977, particularly: M. Eliade. *Mythologies of Death: An introduction*, pp. 18-21 (on M. Heidegger's approach); D.R. Kinsley. "The Death that conquers Death": *Dying to the world in Medieval Hinduism*, *ibid.*; p. 102, etc.; G.D. Bond. *Theravada Buddhism's meditations on death and the symbolism of initiatory death* — "History of religions", vol. 19, N. 3, 1980, pp. 237 sq.; 249 sq. etc. The motif of the hero's journey, connected with the search for treasure or remedy, with certain errand, etc. is widespread in folk lore (cf., e.g. the motif of hero's departure: V. Propp. *Morphology of the folktale*. Austin and London, 1968, pp. 39 sq.; E. Meletinskij, *Geroj vorsebnoj skazki*, Moskva, 1958, pp. 213-255, on the "low" hero of fairy-tales, etc.). We find a motif of pilgrimage where the hero's spiritual quest results in subsequent transformation, beginning with the most archaic epic texts down to modern fiction (as in H. Hesse's novels). These pilgrimages are, anyhow, marked by metaphorical (if not spatial) rise and descent. Such, for example, is the ancient Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh who goes in search of immortality through the land of darkness and the waters of Death (cf. particularly the tablets X-XI of Ninevian version; cf. eg. F.M. Th. de Liagre Bohll. *Die Fahrt nach dem Lebenskraut* — "Archiv Orientalni", v. 18,



The Upanishadic evidence also presents other images of pupils acting in less dramatic circumstances, though not less patient and self-denying. Satyakāma Jābāla, son of a maid-servant and unknown father, serves Haridrumata Gautama (ChU IV, 4 sq.) waiting for instruction. The teacher gives him four hundred thin, weak cows and he tends them for years till they number a thousand. Then he receives the right knowledge from a bull, the fire, a swan and a divingbird, yet, though enlightened, he asks the teacher for instruction. Afterwards, himself a teacher, he behaves still more strictly

N. 1 2, 1950, S. 107-122). On the symbolism of entering water cf. also: L. Beirnaert. *La dimension mystique dans le sacramentalisme chrétien*—EJ, 1949, Bd. XVII, S. 279-280. Cf. concerning corresponding themes (particularly in Dante's *Divina Commedia*): M. Baudkin, *Archetypal patterns in poetry*, N.Y., 1958, pp. 81 sq.; J. Campbell. *The hero with a thousand faces*, London 1975, pp. 90 sq.; 299 sq.; I. Baumer. *Wallfahrt als Handlungsspiel. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis religiösen Handelns*. Berne Frankfurt, 1977; M. L. Peel. The "Decensus ad Inferos" in "The teachings of Silvanus" (CG VII, 4)—"Numen", v 36, fasc. 1, 1979, pp. 23 49; D.A. Deeming. *Mythology. The voyage of the hero*, N.Y., 1980; D.L. Miller *The two sandals of Christ: Descent into history and into Hell*—EJ, 1981, pp. 154 sq.; U. Mann. *Geisthohe und Seelentiefe. Die verurteilte Achse der numinösen Bereiche*—ibid., S. 15 sq.; A.C. Yu. Two literary examples of religious pilgrimage: *The Commedia and the Journey to the West*—"History of Religions"—v. 22, no. 3, 1983, pp. 202 230; etc; concerning some more general aspects of the problem: C.G. Jung. *Die verschiedene Aspekte der Wiedergeburt*—EJ, 1939, Bd. VII, S. 420 sq.; M. Eliade *Mystère et régénération spirituelle dans les religions extra-européennes*—EJ, 1954, Bd. XXIII, p. 90, etc. Cf. also with respect to the meaning of a pilgrim's transference in space: H. Corbin. *Pour une morphologie de la spiritualité shiite*—EJ, 1950, Bd. XXIX, pp. 100 sq.; Ju. M. Lotman. *O ponjatii geograficeskogo prostranstva v russkix srednevekovyx tekstax*—"Works on semiotics". II, Tartu, 1965, pp. 210 216 W. Harms *Homo viator in bivio*. München, 1970; A. Ja. Gurevic. *Kategorii srednevekovoj kul'tury*. Moskva, 1972, pp. 65 sq.; etc. An example of corresponding spatial-ethic trasference is presented in the traditional Hebrew usage of words "ascent" ('ali'āh) and "descent" ('erid-āh) designating, respectively, setting foot in the land of Israel and leaving it (the usage remaining so relevant that the "rise"—"descent" dichotomy, when uttered in Hebrew, would be unequivocally understood by every Israeli to be an allusion to the burning social question of his country's life). The notion of pilgrimage is analogously expressed here as "ascent on foot" ('ali'āh leregel). One can note that its usual designation in European languages (cf. Lat. "peregrinatio" from "per-ager") is connected with the notion of transgressing the space (see below, note 33 on tr), while another tradition (cf. Fr. "pau-mier", Rus. "palomnik") has another significant connotation—the image of a tree,



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towards his pupil, Upakosala Kāmālayana, who tends his fires for twelve years (ibid. IV, 10 sq.) Satyakāma neither instructs him nor allows him to depart (like other pupils) notwithstanding his own wife's arguments. "Then on account of sickness (grief), he resolved not to eat. The teacher's wife said to him: "O student of sacred wisdom, please eat. Why, pray, do you not eat?" Then he said: "Many are the desires in this person, which proceed in different directions. I am filled with sicknesses (griefs). I will not eat" (ChU IV 10.3).<sup>20</sup> Thereupon, the sacrificial fires pity him and give him instruction (particularly about the ascent to Brahman—ChU, IV, 15.5; cf. above, note 6).

Divine creatures are subject to this trial as well. The god Indra and asura Virocana live thirty-two years with the teacher of gods, Prajāpati (ChU VIII, 7 sq.), who first gives an incomplete explanation of Ātman, in order to test them. Virocana believes it and departs, thinking he has found the truth; but in fact he has acquired a disastrous doctrine close to hedonism. Thus, the thirty-two years of study do not help him (cf. MtU VII, 10, where Brahman deliberately cheats the asuras who desire to know Ātman). Unlike Virocana, Indra remains unsatisfied, returns to Prajāpati, receive another incomplete admonition and so on, till at last after 101 years of study he receives genuine knowledge.

This humiliation is not only typical of pupils. Kavaṣa Anūṣa is not allowed by brāhṁṇas to participate in the sacrifice, but though rejected as a son of a maid-servant, he later shows them the way to knowledge. Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa, who has evidently accomplished his studies, lives in great poverty in a destroyed village and begs for food. Later, however, he becomes a priest and admonishes his less competent fellow-workers (ChU I, 10-11). A king, Brihadratha, leaves the kingdom to his son and goes into the forest to practice austerity for several years. Then he asks the sage Śākāyanya for instruction, denouncing in a characteristic manner (cf. below, note 67) the mortal body and speaking of his sorrow ("Be pleased, therefore, to deliver me. In this world (cycle of existence) I am like a frog in a waterless well"—MtU I, 4)<sup>21</sup>

The Upanishadic believer, though not necessarily suffering in his quest for truth, is always full of self denial, humility and devotion to his teacher. "Not by work; nor by offspring or wealth, only by renunciation (tyāgena) does one reach life eternal" (Kaivalya upaniṣad, 2; cf. ibid. 5).<sup>22</sup>

The pupil's trial, often connected with humiliation and suffering, seems to be natural enough with respect to the goal—the attainment

<sup>20</sup> Principal Upanisads, pp. 412-413.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 797.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 927.



of highest perfection beyond all worldly attachments. More surprising here is the following evidence, regarding the teacher's image; his behaviour occasionally exceeds the accepted norms of strictness and approaches cruelty. An evident heartlessness is displayed by Satyakāma Jābāla, who drives his pupil almost to suicide. In the same chapter (ChU IV 1 2) we read about the learned Raikva who is sought by Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa. The latter finds Raikva under a cart, whereupon the sage looking rather miserable, displays attitudes of coarseness, avidity and lasciviousness. He calls Jānaśruti (a kṣatriya) a śūdra, refuses to accept his liberal gift—a payment for learning (six hundred cows, a gold necklace and a chariot with mules) and agree only when Jānaśruti presents him with a thousand cows etc. together with his own daughter and the village where he lived. Lifting up the girl's face and evidently contented with it, Raikva comments: 'śūdra, merely by this face you would make me speak' (IV, 2. 5)—the words are plain enough, though softened in later allegorical interpretations.<sup>23</sup> One can say that the Upanishadic evidence somehow "lowers" the image of the preceptor: in a certain correspondence with the pupil's humiliation, we come across arrogance and cruelty on the part of the teacher, in other words, a certain degradation (this time a moral one).

Here we shall touch upon a peculiar and rather unexpected trait in exposing the admonition. The precepts of Yājñavalkya (a famous Upanishadic sage who preaches the essence of the doctrine) about Ātman are followed in BU III, 9.26 (cf. SB XI 6.3.11) by a curse on his opponent Śākalya, guilty of ignorance. He threatens that Śākalya's head will fall off (*mūrdhā te vipatiṣvati*) if he does not answer his question.<sup>24</sup> It is not a bluff; Śākalya is unable to answer, his head falls off and robbers take away his bones. In SB XI, 6.3.11, Yājñavalkya predicts the Śākalya will die in an inauspicious place and time, and that even his bones shall not be brought home. Thus it happens. Śaṅkara's commentary explains that Śākalya was punished for not having respected the knower of Brahman, yet the punishment still appears to be too cruel. Another threat is addressed to Gārgī Vācakaevī. Yājñavalkya warns the woman to be moderate in questioning: 'Gārgī, do not question too much lest your head fall off. Verily, you are questioning too much about a divinity about which we are not to ask too much' (III, 6.1)<sup>25</sup> This time Gārgī's curiosity is the crime. She, however,

23 Ibid., p. 404; cf. The Chāndogya upaniṣad, by Swāmī Swāhānanda, Madras, 1956, pp. 267-268.

24 Cf. W. Ruben. *Über die debatten in den alten Upaniṣad's* — ZDMG. Bd. 83, 1929, S. 241 sq.; A. Syrkin. *Notes on the Buddha's Threats in the Dīgha Nikāya* — "The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies". vol. 7, No. 1, 1984 pp. 150 sq.

25 Principal Upaniṣads, p. 223.



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keeps silent and remains alive. The same curse is used against Yājñavalkya himself. Uddālaka Āruṇi (another great sage; cf., in particular, his tat tvam asi, "that art thou"—in ChU VI, 8.7 sq.) threatens him in the same manner, but Yājñavalkya knows the right answer (BU III 7.1 sq.) In ChU, Śīlaka Śālāvātya (I, 8.6) and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali (I, 8.8) again use it in a talk. Later, Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa, mentioned above, uses it (I, 10.9-11; 11.4-9) while warning the priests not to recite corresponding texts without knowledge. Speaking to six brāhmaṇas, accepted by him as pupils, Aśvapati Kaikeya threatens each one with the loss of their heads, blindness, loss of breath, etc., had they not come to him for instruction (V, 12-2; 13.2; etc.). His curses are motivated by insufficient definitions which these brāhmaṇas give to Ātman. One could suggest that tribute is paid here to a traditional proverb (cf. also SB XI, 4.119; 5.3.13, etc.) which was evidently widespread (some parallels from Buddhist evidence will be adduced below). Yet the end of Śakalya renders this usage somewhat less harmless. We can possibly speak of a certain aggressiveness of teachers which reveals (together with their obviously benefactor function in preaching the highest Truth) a character of definite ambivalence to their image.<sup>26</sup> It has already been remarked that a tendency to frighten or humiliate the listener appears at first to be somewhat incompatible with preaching the wisdom that leads a believer to perfection and bliss. Nevertheless, these "incompatibilities" do not seem to be accidental, and we shall return to similar cases below.

3. We spoke above mostly of mortals—pupils and preceptors, whose behaviour can be characterized by a definite descent, metaphorical or verbal, in search of the Truth or in proclaiming it. Let us consider now examples of divine descent, the descent of those already possessing the highest perfection. The cosmological principle places the world of gods above the world of mortals and the idea of

26 We are not dealing here with the aesthetic aspect of such ambiguity — the combination of curse and grace in Kāṭha; of cruelty and virtue in Chāndogya; of threats and salutary admonitions in Bṛhadāraṇyaka; etc. One can suppose that such contradictions brought forward by literary text can lead to the "short-circuit" of opposite emotions and thus serve as an instrument of aesthetic effect (close to 'catharsis'). Cf. L. Vygotskij, *Psichologija iskusstva*, Moskva, 1968, pp. 270 sq.; A. Syrkin, *Zametki o stilistike rannix upaniṣad* — "Vestnik drevnej istorii", 1971, No. 2, pp. 99-100. The possible substitution of the guru or brahman preceptor for the father figure in Hinduist tradition (cf. Man. II 146 sq; 170 sq — see above) permits R. P. Goldman to suggest the elements of Oedipal conflict in respective (pupil-teacher) relations. Cf. R. P. Goldman *Fathers, sons and gurus: Oedipal conflict in the Sanskrit epics* — "Journal of Indian Philosophy" V, 6, 1978 pp. 325-392.



divine descent—whatever its function and whatever attitude it stimulates—naturally presupposes spatial descent in the original meaning of the word.

Ancient Indian evidence contains much data regarding the inter-ference of gods in human life. Hymns of RV speak of Indra's wandering on earth in different forms (I, 55.4; VI, 155.4; etc.); similar manifestations of Brahman, Varuṇa, Prajāpati, Rudra, etc. are depicted in vedas and brāhmaṇas.<sup>27</sup> We shall touch here upon certain aspects of Viṣṇu's descents, which, compared with those of other gods, have been more thoroughly described and have influenced to a greater extent Indian spiritual life.

The image of Viṣṇu appears entirely different in different epochs in separate trends of Hinduism—his functions, his place in Hindu pantheon, and relation to other deities suffer considerable changes.<sup>28</sup> In Vedic times he plays rather a secondary role, yielding to Indra, Soma, Agni, etc. However, in Vedic evidence we already find some characteristic traits of his image that were developed in later Hinduism. First of all, it is his ability to pervade all worlds (cf. a traditional etymology of his name: viś—“to enter”, “to penetrate”).<sup>29</sup> Another idea connected with his image is a quick transference in space (RV. I, 90.5; II, 34. 11; etc.) — cf. his epithets urugāya (“wide going”), urukrama (“wide striding”), etc.<sup>30</sup> This quality is displayed in a well-known motif of Viṣṇu's three strides, widely repre-

27 Cf. E. Hopkins, *Epic mythology*, Strassburg, 1915, pp. 197 sq.; J. Gonda, *Aspects*, p. 124; P. Hacker, *Zur Entwicklung der Avatāralehre* — “Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie”, Bd. IV, 1960, S. 52 sq. etc. Different functions of this universal device — fertilization, participating in the sacrifice, founding a kingdom (i.e. in ancient Korean legends) as well as cases of “substitutional” descent (see for example, Rev. 21.10. on seeing “the holy city of Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God”; or bringing down to earth the shrine of Viṣṇu-Rāṅganātha in Sanskrit and Tamil texts — cf. D. D. Shulman, *Tamil temple myths*, Princeton, 1980, p. 49) each present a complicated problem and cannot be discussed here. The same applies to different aspects of the Saviour's manifestation (cf. below) manifoldly reflected in the history of religions. (cf. e.g., some examples in: W. Ruben, *Krishna. Konkordanz und Kommentar der Motive seines Heldenlebens*. Istanbul, 1944, S. 48-49.).

28 Cf. A. Macdonell, *Vedic mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, pp. 37 sq.; R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and minor religious systems*, Strassburg, 1913; Hopkins, *Op. cit.*, pp. 202 sq.; Gonda, *Aspects*; A. Danielou, *Le polythéisme hindou*, Paris, 1960, pp. 229 sq.; etc.

29 Monier-Williams, p. 999; Gonda, *Aspects*, pp. 54-55 (A passage from Nirukta 12. 18: viṣṇur viśater vā, vyaśnoter vā) etc.

30 See Gonda, *Aspects*, pp. 68 sq. on the meaning of Vedic Uru=



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sented in later epic tradition (cf. above, note 8). Here, his first two steps are connected with earth and midspace, accessible to a mortal's perception, while the third is connected with the heavenly world (RV, I, 22.18-21; 90 9; 154. 1-5; 155, 4-5; VI 49 13; VIII, 29 7; etc.). This transference was identified by ancient commentators with the sun's path through the three worlds (another interpretation connects it with the sun's position in the East, the Zenith and the West),

At the same time, Viṣṇu appears in RV as a benefactors and preserver: generous (I, 156. 2 sq.), giving protection (III, 55 10), helping to āryas (I, 156.6), etc. He defeats demons (Vṛtra, Vāsa, a.o.)—like Indra with whom he sometimes appears as an ally. Another characteristic quality is his manifestation in different forms (RV III, 55. 10; VII, 100. 6; etc.), in particular, his epithet śīpivīṣṭa ("the smallest") in RV VII, 100.5 is connected perhaps with the image of a dwarf (cf. SB I, 2.5 5; V, 2.5.4. etc.; see below).<sup>31</sup> These traits which were developed later in brāhmaṇas (Śatapatha, Taittirīya) gradually draw his image nearer to that of epic Viṣṇu, so, e.g., here we find versions of his outwitting asuras in a dwarf's disguise (SB I, 2.5.5 sq.; TB I, 6. 1-5). There are also other motifs of Viṣṇu's incarnations, developed from brāhmaṇas evidence (as SB I, 8. 1. 1 sq; XIV, 1 2. 1; etc.).

An important process in the development of Vishnuism is the fusion (approximately from the middle of the 1st millenium B.C.) of Viṣṇu with other deities and heroes, which evidently lose their position as independent objects of veneration and are regarded as Viṣṇu himself or his manifestations. Likewise his fusions with Nārāyaṇa, Brahman, Kṛṣṇa. Of these, Nārāyaṇa, who appears in brāhmaṇas, was esteemed as the primordial cosmic man (puruṣa), the author of the corresponding Vedic hymn (RV X. 90). He was also traditionally connected with some of the upanīśads. Another name of Viṣṇu—Vāsudeva ("benefactory god")—refers to a deity identified in later Vedic texts with Viṣṇu and Nārāyaṇa, and regarded as a manifestation of the highest spirit.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Der Rig Veda, übers. v. K. F. Geldner, II T., Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 270. The variability of Viṣṇu's images (especially as a dwarf) is associated, in V. Machek's opinion, with magic (V. Machek, Origin of the god Viṣṇu — "Archiv Orientalni", v. 28, 1961, pp. 105 sq.).

<sup>32</sup> The genetic correspondences of the fusions, so important in later Vishnuite mythology and ritual (e.g., in sects of pañcarātrīn, bhāgavata, etc.), remain unclear in certain points. Moreover, the problems of Viṣṇu — Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu — Vāsudeva, etc. are subject to controversy (cf. Bhandarkar, Op. cit., pp. 30 sq.; Gonda, Aspects, pp. 160 sq; etc.). One can note that, although worshipping Viṣṇu beside other Hindu gods has survived till the present time, his cult as the unique embodiment of highest deity (a principle in a way originating in Vedic henotheism — cf. Macdonell, Op. cit. pp. 16 17) proved to be much more important in the history of Vishnuism.



Various manifestations of Viṣṇu often play quite an independent role and appear at very different levels—from the highest transcendent Being (Bhagavan, Nārāyaṇa) to a mortal endowed with human qualities. This complexity is already reflected in epos, cf. a list of his names in Mbh VI, 65. 61, or another more elaborate, though relatively later, list of a thousand names in Mbh XIII, 149.

We are interested here primarily in a traditional set of manifestations, marking the descent of Viṣṇu. It is noteworthy that these deeds received a name containing the same notion: *avatāra* (*ava tṛ*, "to descend").<sup>33</sup> This term, though applied to descent in general (and particularly to the descent of a god), acquired a special designation for descents and manifestations of Viṣṇu (although not of him alone).<sup>34</sup> A number of his *avatāras* appear in Mbh (cf. III, 102. 21 sq.; XII. 341. 104 sq.; etc.)—a corresponding theory is completed in later epics (*purāṇas*) which are fully or partly dedicated to him (Viṣṇu, Nārāda, Bhāgavata, Garuḍa, Padma, Varāha, etc.) These texts were compiled mostly in the second half of the 1st millennium A.D. and later.<sup>35</sup> Here the number of *avatāras* generally exceeds that of Mbh and varies in different sources—sometimes even

33 Cf. Hacker, *Op. cit.*, pp. 547-570, particularly pp. 549 sq., 558 q. on corresponding usage of *prādurbhāva* ("manifestation"), *avatarāṇa*, *bhātāvataraṇa* ("Abwalzen der Last von der Erde"), etc. It is noteworthy that the verb *tṛ*, *tarati* ("cross over", "surpass", "reach the end", etc.) became one of the main designations of spiritual salvation (as crossing over worldly sorrows, the flood of existence, of *samsāra*, etc.), while its causative *tārayati* refers respectively to saving others. Cf. KtU I, 1 12; 17 (*tarati janma mṛtyū* — "crosses over birth and death"); MuU III, 2 9; PU VI, 8 (*yo smākam avidyāyāḥ param pāram tārayasi* — "Thou ... who does take us across to the other shore of ignorance"), etc. (Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 602, 668, etc.). This usage is no less widespread in Buddhist tradition, in the notion of a person who has crossed the world of sorrows, crossed "the flood", attained *nibbāna* — *tiṇṇa*, *oghatiṇṇa*, etc. (DN. XXV, 21; DhP. 195; Sn 21, 178. 823. 10. 2, 1145, etc.). Cf. also the functions of Tārā deity, particularly in Mahāyāna Buddhism. See I. B. Horner, *The early Buddhist theory of man perfected*, London, 1936, pp. 259 sq.; E. Conze, *Buddhist saviours*, in: "Thirty years of Buddhist studies", Oxford, 1967, p. 35, etc. An evident connection of *tṛ* with *tīrtha* ("passage", "ford", etc. — cf. Mayrhofer, *Op. cit.*, Bd I, pp. 480, 507; D.L. Eck *India's tīrthas*: "crossings" in sacred geography — "History of Religions", vol. 20, No. 4, 1981, pp. 323 sq.; 329 sq.; etc.) makes this root most significant in Jaina tradition as well, where the concept of *tīrthanakara* ("creating a passage", "ford-finder" — an epithet testified similarly with respect to Viṣṇu and Śiva) designates the chief Jaina saint preaching salvation (cf. below, note 58). Cf. C. J. Bleeker, *The sacred bridge*, Leiden, 1963, S. 80 sq.; 84 sq. (*Die religiöse Bedeutung der Brücke*).

34 Cf. Monier-Williams, p. 99.



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within the frames of the same text, as, e.g., 16, 22, or 23 in BP I, 3; II, 7; XI, 4; cf. also Vāyu purāṇa 97. 72 sq.; 98. 63; etc. One of the fullest variants is found in a pāñcarātrin text *Ahirbudhnya saṁhitā* 5.50-57 (39 avatāras).<sup>36</sup>

At the same time we find in separate puranic texts (*Varāha purāṇa*, 15. 9 sq., MP; 285. 67; etc.) the lists of ten avatāras—a number that becomes canonical and from ca. XI century is found also in non-puranic Vishnuite poetry; in Kṣemendra's (XI c.) *Deśavatāra-carita*, a poem especially dedicated to ten avatāras<sup>37</sup>; in Jayadeva's (the 2nd half of XII c.) *Gītāgovinda* (I, 5 sq.); etc. They are: fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, dwarf, Paraśurāma, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Buddha and Kalki. Among other avatāras, important in Hinduism, one can mention Nārāyaṇa (see above): Sanatkumāra (an embodiment of eternal youth); sages like Nārada, Kapila; Yajña (an embodiment of sacrifice); Vyāsa (the legendary author of Mbh and other epics), etc. However, the list of the ten incarnations, mentioned above, became the most popular.

When the time of deluge approaches Viṣṇu appears in the form of a fish (*matsya*) before Manu, the legendary forefather of mankind, averts him from the cataclysm and shows him the way to salvation. As a result, Manu and his family, the great sages and Vedas are saved. The next apparition is connected with the consequence of the deluge that had swallowed the god's drink of immortality (*amṛta*). In the form of a tortoise (*kūrma*) Viṣṇu sinks to the bottom of the ocean and becomes a support for the mountain Mandara, used by gods for churning the ocean, so that in the end *amṛta* and other treasures appear on the surface (among them Lakṣmī, goddess of luck and beauty, who became Viṣṇu's consort). Some time after it, the earth is again submerged in the ocean by a demon *Hiraṇyākṣa*. Viṣṇu assumes the form of a boar (*varāha*), kills the demon, descends to the underworld and raises the earth on his tusk from out of the ocean.<sup>38</sup> This exploit already marks Viṣṇu's successful struggle against demons (*asura*) that take hold over the world, frighten

35 See, e.g., S. N. Farquhar. *An outline of the religious literature of India*, Oxford, 1920, p. 231; J. Filliozat, *Les dates du Bhāgavatapurāṇa et du Bhāgavatamāhātmya* — "Indological studies in honor of W. N. Brown", New Haven, 1962, pp. 70-77; U. Agrawal. *Worship of Vishnu His incarnation in India in the medieval period* — "Oriental Art", vol. 16, No. 3, 1970, pp. 252-258, etc.

36 Hopkins, *Op. cit.*, pp. 209 sq.; 217 sq.; Bhandarkar, *Op. cit.*, pp. 41-42; Gonda. *Aspects*, pp. 124 sq.; Danielou, *Op. cit.*, pp. 251 sq.

37 Cf. M. Winternitz. *A history of Indian literature*, v. III, Calcutta, 1959, pp. 60 sq.

38 The present world period in Indian cosmology (*kalpa*) is named *varāha* after this exploit.



gods and men, act lawlessly, etc. This struggle is characteristic of some of the following avatāras. Assuming the form of "man-lion" (narasimha), a creature never seen before, Viṣṇu tears to pieces the mighty invulnerable demon Hiranyakaśipu who oppressed all pious creatures.<sup>39</sup> Afterwards another demon, Bali, takes hold of the three worlds, threatening the gods. Viṣṇu appears before him looking like a dwarf (vāmana), asks to present him three paces of land and then becomes a giant, whereby he measures the three worlds, leaving for Bali the underworld (cf. above, note 8).<sup>40</sup> In the next

39 It is noteworthy that certain supernatural qualities, bringing Hiranyakaśipu, Bali and other demons to power and serving a cause for Viṣṇu's avatāras, were obtained as a boon for great austerities (tapas), humiliation, etc. or for a kind of "descent" (cf. above). However, regarding asuras, these trials bring them no benefit, but rather lead them to temporary "social" ascent accompanied as a rule by moral degradation. This result is contrary to that of pious men and to the gods themselves (see below). Cf. SB II. 2.2.6 on brāhmaṇas as the "human gods" whose descent leads to real perfection (cf. SB II. 2.2.9 sq: "The gods were left inferior. They went on practising and practising austerities, hoping that they might be able to overcome their enemies, the mortal Asuras ... and having ... become immortal, and unconquerable, they overcame their mortal conquerable enemies" — The Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, tr. by J. Eggeling, pt. I, Delhi, 1966, pp. 310-311). This difference corresponds to the traditional opposition between gods and asuras in Vedic and epic evidence. Cf. above (ChU VIII. 7 sq) concerning opposite results of Indra's and Virocana's studies — not only because of asuras' inherent wickedness, but also because of the god's scheming (cf. MāU VII, 9-10). This opposition of the genuine gods' and false asuras' ascent, in connection with moral superiority of the former and inferiority of the latter, is expressed most explicitly with subsequent ethical deduction in SB IX. 5.1. 16-17: "The gods spoke nothing but truth, and Asuras nothing but untruth. And the gods, speaking the truth diligently, were very contemptible, and very poor; whence he who speaks the truth diligently, becomes indeed very contemptible, and very poor; but in the end he assuredly prospers, for the gods indeed prospered. And the Asuras speaking untruth ... were very prosperous; whence he who speaks untruth diligently, thrives indeed ... and becomes very prosperous; but in the end he assuredly comes to naught, for the Asuras indeed came to naught" (ibid., pt. IV, pp. 257-258).

40 According to separate versions, with his third step Viṣṇu pierces the roof of the universe and intrudes into Brahman's Satyaloka. Thereafter, the divine river Gaṅgā flows from the crevice down to the earth, as a tribute to his deed (cf. BP VIII. 21. 1-3; Kūrma purāṇa I. 16. 56; Vāmana purāṇa 65. 32-34). Here we come across a well-known motif in Hindu mythology and iconography (cf. the famous relief "Descent of the Gaṅgā" in Mamallapuram), a motif also pertinent to our theme — a benefactory descent of the sacred river from heaven to earth (cf. note 27). The



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avatāra (Paraśurāma) Viṣṇu appears as a mighty brāhmaṇa and kills a wicked king, Kārtavīrya, together with numerous warriors that oppressed brāhmaṇas. The next is the image of Rāma, prince of Ayodhya, who saved the world from the demon Rāvaṇa (it is possible that a fusion with the historical king ruling in VIII-VII cc. B.C. took place). This avatāra is widely reflected in literary tradition (first of all—in Rāmāyāna epic). Then follows an avatāra which is, perhaps, even more famous in Indian culture—that of Kṛṣṇa. The latter often appears as an independent deity, his image being fused with that of Nārāyaṇa, Bhagavant, etc. Kṛṣṇa is born in the kṣatriya family. Yadu: his parents are persecuted by his uncle, the demon Kāṁsa, who received a prophecy that his nephew would kill him. The boy, born with black (kṛṣṇa) skin, grows up in the shepherd's house. His youth abounds with stories of childish tricks and amorous adventures with cowherdesses. Later exploits of Kṛṣṇa include victories over many demons, help to shepherds, successful rivalry with gods (Brahman, Varuṇa, etc.). He appears as a friend and protector of pāṇḍavas in Mbh—it is from him that Arjuna learns the great admonition of Bhagavadgītā.<sup>41</sup> Kṛṣṇa is, however, traditionally esteemed as the god connected with pastoral thematics, supervising over herds (cf. his epithets; gopati, govinda, etc.; see, e.g., BP X; Viṣṇu purāṇa V, 6 sq.; Agni purāṇa, 12 sq.; etc.) and as the conqueror of demons. This complicated image of shepherd-warrior—preceptor corresponding to a certain degree to the manifold character of Viṣṇu himself, is possibly derived from different prototypes, mythical or historical, fused to a single avatāra.<sup>42</sup> The

"mother Gaṅgā" is often personified in Hindu tradition as a river-goddess, wife of Viṣṇu, of Śiva, etc. Cf. e.g., S. G. Darian. The Ganges in myth and history, Honolulu, 1978, esp. pp. 17 sq.

41 Kṛṣṇa, son of Devakī appears also in ChU III, 17.6 where he himself receives from Ghora Āṅgīrasa an admonition leading to final liberation. Cf. S. K. De. The Vedic and the epic Kṛṣṇa, in: "Aspects of Sanskrit literature", Calcutta, 1959, pp. 31 sq.

42 Cf. Bhandarkar, Op. cit., pp. 35 sq.; R. Garbe, Indien und Christentum, Tübingen, 1914, S. 218; De. Op. cit., pp. 31-35; A. Ch. Chakravarti. The story of Kṛṣṇa in Indian literature, Calcutta, 1976; etc. Certain traits of Kṛṣṇa's image led to numerous comparisons with Christ—attempts which were sometimes justified from the typological point of view (motifs such as persecution of the divine child, pastor-saviour, etc.) They are, however, doubtful with respect to the possibility of genetic influence (e.g., thanks to the presumed activity of early Christians in India)—Cf. A. Keith. The child Krishna. — "Journal of Royal Asiatic Society", 1908, pp. 169-175; Garba, Op. cit., S. 201 sq.; Hopkins, Op. cit., p. 216, n. 1; etc.; cf. also E. G. Suhr. Krishna and Mithra as Messiahs — "Folklore", vol. 77, 1966, pp. 205-221.



next Viṣṇu's descent as Buddha (though with considerable alterations in the latter's image) presents evidence of mutual interaction between different religious trends in India. Some aspects of Buddha's salutary function will be noted below; here we should merely remark that the reception of Buddha in Vishnuite dogmatics as one of Viṣṇu's avatāras,<sup>43</sup> agrees with the well-known phenomenon of Buddhism's accommodation to different (particularly non-Indian) cultural traditions. On the other hand, Buddhist dogmatics accept (though with substantial hierarchical modifications) the Hindu pantheon. Here Hindu gods are subject to the laws proclaimed by Buddha whom they worship and whose admonitions they are seeking.<sup>44</sup> The tenth and last avatāra is that of Kalki—the future image

- 43 We find Buddha's iconographic representation, preserving some traits typical of him, among other Viṣṇu's incarnations in a Sirpur shrine (ca. VIII cent. A.D.) — cf. Bhandarkar, *Op. cit.*, p. 45. Concerning some characteristic modifications of Buddha's image within the framework of different traditions cf. P.H. Pott, *Plural forms of Buddhist iconography — "India Antiqua"*, Leiden, 1947, pp. 284 sq. Cf. also A. J. Gail, *Buddha as avatāra Viṣṇus im Spiegel der Purāṇas — 'XVII Deutscher Orientalistentag, Würzburg, 1968'*, T. III, Wiesbaden, 1969, S. 917-923 (evidence of BP I. 3. 24; MP 24. 47; Viṣṇu purāṇa IV, 9. 8, etc.). One can add that Buddha's image entered Christian (St. Ioasaph) tradition as well. See, for example, P. P. Alfaric, *La vie chretienne du Buddha — "Journal Asiatique"*, XI ser., t. X, 1917, pp. 269-288.
- 44 Buddhist dogmatics regard being born in the form of a god as the result of certain merits, which lift the mortal to a higher level. The latter, however, yields to the complete cessation of rebirths — the state of an arahant, of Buddha. See, e.g., the superiority of arahant over the previous state of anāgāmin ('non-returner') — a designation of the person who is born in a higher world of gods and does not return to earth, though he has not yet attained nibbāna. The motif of Buddha's admonition to the gods is found, e.g., in Sakkapañha sutta (DN XXI), where Sakka (or Indra, king of gods) asks him questions. In Mahā-samya sutta (DN XX) "the great concourse" of gods assembles to contemplate Buddha and other arahants (cf. also signs of gods' veneration in Mahāparinibbāna (DN XVI 52 sq. etc.)). Concerning the role of corresponding beliefs in Buddhism see: Swami Jagadishwarananda, *Buddhism and the Vedas — "The Scholar"*, v. 7, N 7, 1932, pp. 377-386; J. Masson, *La religion populaire dans le canon bouddhique pâli*, Louvain, 1942; T. P. Bhattacharya, *Brahma cult and Buddhism — "Journal of the Bihar Research Society"*, v. 42, pt. 1, 1956, pp. 91-115; B. Mal, *The religion of Buddha and its relation to Upanishadic thought*, Hoshiarpur, 1958, pp. 262 sq.; P. R. Barua, *Buddha and the gods — "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan"*, v. 14, N. 2, 1969, pp. 113-128; F. Story, *Gods and the universe in Buddhist perspective*, Kandy, 1972; K. R. Norman, *The Buddha's view of Devas — "Beitrage zur Indienforschung E. Waldschmidt zum*



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of Vṣṇu. In the end of the present kaliyuga (which began on the 18/11/3102 B.C. and lasts 432000 years) he will appear riding on a white horse, will punish evil, reward piety and, destroying the world sunk deep in vice, will re-establish the new golden age. This messianic apparition evoked many well-known parallels.<sup>45</sup>

The complex of the ten avatāras displays certain interesting semantic regularities.<sup>46</sup> First of all they are united by one main function; saving the world from evil, defence of the oppressed, for whose sake Viṣṇu from time to time assumes different forms and descents. He himself refers to it in the Image of Kṛṣṇa (Bg IV, 7-8); "For whenever of the right a languishing appears ... a rising up of unright, then I send myself forth. For protection of the good and for destruction of evil-doers, to make a firm footing for the right, I come into being in age after age".<sup>47</sup> (see also Mbh III, 272. 51; cf. XII, 341. 102 sq.; etc.). His descents are thus aimed at protecting and strengthening the dharma. Their chronological order is distributed within the framework of the four world periods (yuga) of Indian cosmology. In the first, the "golden" period (kṛtayuga), he appears in the first four avatāras: fish, tortoise, boar (cf. note 38) and man-lion; in the second, the "silver" age (tretāyuga), in the next three; dwarf, Paraśurāma, Rāma; in the third, the "copper" age (dvāparayuga), as Kṛṣṇa; and in the last, the "iron" age (kaliyuga), as Buddha and the future Kalki.<sup>48</sup> There is another regularity here

80 Geburtstag gewidmet", Berlin, 1977, S. 329-336; etc. Analogous reception of Hindu gods (like Indra, Kṛṣṇa, etc.) is also characteristic of Jainism, with its similar hierarchy placing these gods still subject to the karmic world, lower than the tīrthaṅkaras, who have completely destroyed their karmas (cf. The world of Jainism, ed. by V. Pandey, Bombay, 1976, p. 86).

45 Cf. E. Abegg. Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran. Berlin und Leipzig, 1928, S. 39 sq.; J. Przyluski. La croyance au Messias dans l'Inde et l'Iran. — "Revue de l'histoire des religions", t. 100. N. 1, 1929, pp. 3 sq.; Danielou, Op. cit., p. 277; Suhr, Op. cit.; cf. below, note 49.

46 Cf. Gonda. Aspects, p. 125; Chapters in Indian civilization, v. I, Dubuque, 1970, p. 19 (A. Bharati); A. Syrkin. Kharakteristike induistskogo panteona — "Oriental Studies", II. 1, Tartu, 1973, pp. 162-163; etc.

47 The Bhagavad Gītā, transl. by F. Edgerton, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, p. 23.

48 Concerning corresponding time dimensions cf. particularly: S. Schayer. Contributions to the problem of time in Indian philosophy. Krakow, 1938; M. Eliade. Le temps et l'éternité dans la pensée indienne—EJ, 1951. Bd. XX. S. 219-252; A. Bireau. The notion of time in early Buddhism—"East and West", v. 7, N. 4, 1957, pp. 353-364; K.K. Mandal. A comparative study of the concepts of space and time in Indian thought, Varanasi, 1968; A. Wayman. No time, great time and profane time in Buddhism — "Myths and symbols. Studies in honor of M.



—the progressive evolution of Viṣṇu's forms: as we see, his first three avatāras are theriomorphic, the fourth is mixed (man-lion), while the next are anthropomorphic.<sup>49</sup> Within the framework of this development one can trace further traits of "phylogenetic" progress from aquatic to amphibious and mammals, while the human image also develops from a dwarf to the perfect form of a Buddha (cf. traditional description of the latter's body). It is interesting that besides this physical perfection an ethical one can be found in corresponding avatāras (though not always to the same degree). While Viṣṇu's earlier descents are stimulated mostly by cosmic disasters, gods, (or especially brāhmaṇas') troubles and the demons' arrogance, his subsequent apparitions are more and more characterized by preaching, which gradually replaces his violent attributes. This tendency culminates in the image of Buddha (while the last avatāra of Kalki, as already noted, again combines benevolence and violence). As we see, the salutary function presupposes salvation in the broad sense of the word: physical help in danger and calamity, on the one hand, and spiritual help in delusion, on the other. These are the abilities combined in the image of Kṛṣṇa, though usually they are distributed between different avatāras<sup>50</sup>

These exploits do not, however, exclude certain ambivalent traits characteristic of Viṣṇu's image. His function of preservation and defence is accompanied by destruction and murder (e.g., in his

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Eliade", Chicago, 1969, pp. 47-62; W. C. Beane. The cosmological structure of mythical time: *kālī śakti*—"History of religions", v. 13, N. 1, 1973, pp. 54-83; J. Filliozat. *Le temps et l'espace dans les conceptions du monde indien*—"Laghuprabandhaḥ", Leiden 1974, pp. 170-184; etc. See also: "Philosophy East and West", vol. 24, N. 2, 1974; "Time and temporality", particularly pp. 161 sq. (papers of R. Panikkar, R. Puligandla, a. o.).

49 At the same time the last (Kalki) image can also be treated as mixed—anthropomorphic=theriomorphic—cf. his representations as a man with a horse's head, or even as a horse (Abegg. Op. cit., ill. I to p. 47). A certain ambiguity also marks the ethical image of Kalki whose salutary mission is accompanied by terrifying acts of destruction. The meaning of "Kalki" ("foul", "wicked", etc.) and its possible connotations with ideas of destruction, death, etc. (cf. Kala) are suggestive in this respect. Cf. Monier-Williams, p. 262; Mayrhofer. Op. cit., Bd. I, p. 183; see Abegg. Op. cit., pp. 47, 139 sq.; Przyluski, Op. cit., pp. 4 sq.

50 It is clear from the present exposition that we are dealing first and foremost with canonical and didactic evidence on the "spiritual" salvation. The problem of "physical" salvation, though closely connected with sacral thematics (and, as Viṣṇu's avatāras show, particularly with "salutary descents") more often passes from canonical texts to folklore, epics and other literary genres.



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apparitions as man lion, Paraśurāma, Kalki).<sup>51</sup> A number of his epithets connected with this function reflect notions of enmity, slaughter, etc. (names referring to victories over asuras, such as Kāmāri—"enemy of Kāmā", Madhuripu—"enemy of Madhu", Madhusudana—"killer of Madhu" etc.). Such epithets, often used in Krishnaite lyrical tradition, sometimes lead to peculiar oxymoron-like combinations (cf. e.g., the title of the IV canto of Gītāgovinda: *snigdhamadhusudana*—"the affectionate killer of Madhu").<sup>52</sup> Of all Viṣṇu's avatares this one (Kṛṣṇa) is, perhaps, most marked by human weakness and vice<sup>53</sup>—traits pertinent to different aspects of his activity. The epic evidence of Mbh, Harivaṃśa, purāṇas refer to his tendency to fraud (cf. his advice to pāṇḍavas in Mbh); while living among shepherds he steals, devastates gardens, seduces shepherds' wives. He is humanized in his lyrical type: his amorous states displaying grief, languor, repentance, subjugation, etc.<sup>54</sup>

51 Cf. Hopkins, *Op. cit.*, p. 202; L. Renou *L'ambiguité du vocabulaire du Rgveda*, — "Journal Asiatique", t. 231, 1939, pp. 224 a.o. (valuable evidence of ambivalent lexical usage, with respect to some Vedic gods); Syrkin, *K xarakteristike*, pp. 162; etc. Cf. below, note 107.

52 Cf. A. Syrkin, *O poetike "Gītāgovindy"* — "Narody Azii i Afriki", 6, 1970, p. 102; L. Siegel, *Sacred and profane dimensions of love in Indian traditions as exemplified in the Gītāgovinda of Jayadeva*, Delhi, 1978, p. 256 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 98 sq. about the fusion of the heroic and the erotic sentiments in the depiction of Kṛṣṇa).

53 Speaking of Kṛṣṇa's morals W. Ruben (*Krishna*, S. 253 sq; 284) comes to the conclusion that in spite of his positive role he displays a lack of such altruistic traits as constancy, patience, charity. Cf. Suhr. *Op. cit.*, pp. 211 sq; C. G. Hospital, *Paradox and divine wickedness in the Krishnakarnamrita: reflections on the uses of discrepant symbols*—"Journal of Asian and African Studies", XV, 1-2, 1980, pp. 59-71, etc.

54 The motif of subjugation in love is particularly expressed in Gītāgovinda: "like a slave" (11.22) Kṛṣṇa worships his beloved's feet, helps to restore her toilet (10.7; 24.17 sq.) etc. His love-effusions sometimes sound quite masochistic—see 10.3 ("give me a wound with the arrows that are your sharp nails."); 10.8 ("place the noble sprout of your foot as an ornament upon my head..."); cf. 10.11; 11.2; 12.11; etc. See Siegel, *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 sq.; 274; 279; A. J. Syrkin, *Interpretations of "Gītāgovinda" and their analogies* — "Darshana International", v. 19 N. 4, p. 15.

To be concluded—



## VI

# Substantial Dualism Vs. Linguistic Dualism

*Aminul Haque*

## I

The Cartesian and the empiricist traditions in philosophy, as is well-known, consider the questions of knowledge from a self centred perspective. Philosophers of this tradition hold that there is a conceptual gap between the mental and the physical, and hence, our knowledge of the former is, logically speaking, independent of our knowledge of the latter, and that the correlation, if there is any, between them is purely contingent. Mental states and processes, on their view, are 'private' or 'inner' experiences of their owner in the sense that their existence he can know with certainty, but other people cannot. Moreover, they think that what we claim to know about the public world and other people is based on our knowledge of our own private or inner experiences. Thus philosophers of the Cartesian and the empiricist traditions come to hold that mind is better known than body in the sense that the internal is more certain than the external, the private is prior to the public.

These philosophers further take it for granted that our knowledge of our inner experiences can be expressed in a language. They assume, it appears, that there can be words for private, just as there are words for public, objects, and that the use of words for private objects does not presuppose any acquaintance with the public world or other minds. They find ordinary language imprecise and vague, and begin to hanker after an ideally precise language. Anyone who accepts this much must believe in the possibility of a 'private language' in the sense defined by Wittgenstein: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another



person cannot understand the language"<sup>1</sup>. In other words, if a Cartesian *res cogitans* uses a language, it must be a private language in this sense<sup>2</sup>.

However, the Cartesians say virtually nothing about how language is related to the mental contents, nor do they ever conceive the distinction between private language and public language. The distinction, in fact, belongs to the 20th century philosophical sophistication. If, however, Descartes' substantial dualism between mind and body is mapped rigorously on our language, a linguistic dualism between private and public will have to be accepted as its consequence. His conception of how language is related to the mental contents is no doubt the same one that dominates British empiricism, and is expounded clearly by John Locke<sup>3</sup>. "Words", Locke proclaims, "in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but *the ideas in the mind of him that uses them* ... nor can anyone apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath"<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, the words of a private language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. In fact, Locke's theory of language, so proclaimed, appears to be an 'ideal type' to which the notion of a private language as defined by Wittgenstein approximates very closely<sup>5</sup>. Hence the distinction between private language and public language, or, in other words, the linguistic dualism, is a logical consequence of Descartes' substantial dualism. And if so, then it would follow that the denial of that distinction, which Wittgenstein aims at, necessarily would imply the denial of the substantial dualism too.

In this paper my purpose is not to concentrate on the much discussed controversy whether or not a private language is possible, but to consider a different question: Even if we accept, *per impossibile*, the possibility of a private language, can it yet really do the work for expressing our inner or private experiences as uniquely and exhaustively as hoped by the philosophers? Or, do we really require a private language in order to express our inner or private experiences? Or, is it at all possible to conceive the distinction between

<sup>1</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), Pt. I, Sec. 243.

<sup>2</sup> A. Kenny, "Cartesian Privacy", in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 362.

<sup>3</sup> N. Malcolm, *Problems of Mind* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), Bk. III, Ch. II, Sec. 2.

<sup>5</sup> P. M. S. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 224.



private language and public language as rigorously as implied by Descartes' substantival dualism?

## II

Mind, for Descartes, is *res cogitans*, and *cogitatio* includes not only intellectual meditation, but also volition, emotion, pain, pleasure, mental images and sensations. He has so extended the concept of thought because of a feature which he believes to attach to all the operations of the self. By *cogitatio* or 'thought' Descartes understands "all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought"<sup>6</sup>. He further adds, "*Thought* is a word that covers everything that exists in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it ... I have added *immediately* for the purpose of excluding that which is a consequence of our thought; for example, voluntary movement, which, though indeed depending on thought as on a causal principle, is yet itself not thought"<sup>7</sup>. What, then, is common to all the operations of mind which are inner or private is consciousness; this consciousness is immediate and carries with it indubitability.

Now, in order to examine the questions raised above, we classify our inner or private experiences into three types: (a) experiences of sense-data, i.e., awareness of objects as looking, tasting, feeling, smelling etc., (b) mental phenomena of thinking, understanding, recognizing etc., and (c) experiences of sensations and feelings. Let us begin with experiences of the first type.

The sense data are the characterization of physical objects as looking, testing, feeling, smelling or sounding so and so. They are one's immediate sense-experiences supposed to be known with absolute certainty. They exist only in so far as they are experienced, and they have whatever characteristics they are experienced as having. In this sense, sense-data are supposed to be one's inner or private experiences. But, how do we express them in language? It is usually supposed that one can describe his experience of sense-data by saying, for example, "It looks red to me". But, is it a private language? Surely this cannot be a private language for the reason that one's knowledge of how things subjectively are rests ultimately on one's knowledge of how things objectively are. It is indeed true that, as Wittgenstein rightly observes, we cannot speak of a thing's appearing red unless we have already learned what the word 'red' means, i.e., unless we have already learned the technique of using

6 Descartes, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970), Vol. I, Pt I, Principle IX.

7 *Ibid*, Vol II, p. 52.



the word. Learning to say "This is red", in this sense, is logically prior to the sense of "It looks red to me"; if one has learned the former, he can spontaneously say the latter<sup>8</sup>. This means that the concept of seeming thus and so is parasitic upon the concept of being thus and so. We thus see that although the sense-data are one's inner or private experiences, the sense-data language is not private. The sense-data language is ultimately dependent on a physical-object language, i.e., on the concepts of the objects of which sense-data are taken to be the sense experiences.

Another kind of inner occurrence includes the mental phenomena of thinking, understanding, recognizing, inferring, desiring, deciding, and so on. It is held by the empiricist philosophers that we derive the ideas of these mental phenomena by introspection, i.e., by observing in ourselves the operations of our own minds. For example, we remember some sensations we have got from external sense, and we derive our idea of *memory* by observing this operation of remembering. "And such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds;—which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses"<sup>9</sup>. But the difficulty of this view is that these mental phenomena themselves are not anything which we can single out from all of the accompanying phenomena; they themselves are not anything on which we can fix our attention. This is why they are such that they themselves cannot be described. The truth is that all these mental phenomena have always some intentional objects and we can talk of them only in reference to these objects. For this reason, simply to say "I have a thought". "I have a decision" or "I have a desire" is to utter some incomplete expressions. What we need to complete these expressions is a reference to their intentional objects; and such expressions, when thus completed, can hardly be the cases of a private language.

Let us now see how language is related to our experiences of sensations and feelings. It is true that our experiences of sensations and feelings are unlike the mental phenomena of thinking, understanding, desiring, etc., in the sense that they have no intentional objects. This is why we can describe a pain or a toothache, for example, itself, and the expressions "I have a pain", "I have a toothache" are all complete expressions. But although a pain-experience has no intentional object, it is an undeniable fact that, as we shall see below, the full description of a pain experience involves a reference to some physical state of affairs. The description of a pain-

<sup>8</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), Sec. 418.

<sup>9</sup> J. Locke, *op. cit* ; Bk. II, Ch. I, Sec. 4.



experience, in this respect, can be seen analogous to the description of a sense-datum.

A pain experience can, indeed, be called, one's private experience in the sense that the richness of the experience cannot be expressed in non-verbal pain-behaviour. We experience finer differences in quality of pains, but we do not find such different characteristic non-verbal expressions corresponding to them. So our pain-experience is richer in content than what can be exhibited in pain-behaviour. However, we can express our pain experience in our language which has a rich-vocabulary for this purpose. But how can we do this? It should be noted that simply the expression "I feel a pain" does not serve our purpose. For this is only a *rough* or a *general description* of someone's being in pain and *does not describe the richness* of one's experience. In order to describe the richness of pain-experience, we have to describe the *details* about pain, i.e., we have to describe the various 'phenomenological features' of pain, such as aching, throbbing, stabbing, searing, pricking, and so on. Now the important thing is that the description of the phenomenological features of pain consists in our taking the word, 'feel' to mean 'feels as if' — which is like our taking, as we often do, 'looks' to mean 'looks as if' and 'sounds' to mean 'sounds as if'. And the 'as if' clause here must be completed by a reference to some physical state of affairs<sup>10</sup>. I can thus describe the richness of my pain-experience by saying, for example, "I feel a burning pain" or "I feel a stabbing pain", and here I have to use the expression 'a burning pain' or 'a stabbing pain' in reference to *the physical state of affairs* such that the pain feels *as if* something red-hot is scorching me or something sharp is stabbing me. It then appears that although a pain-experience is one's inner or private experience, the richness of one's experience cannot be described without involving a reference to some public objects. One's experience of a burning pain, or of a stabbing pain, in fact, cannot be defined simply by private or mental ostension.

### III

An attempt was made by many to credit Wittgenstein with the view that pain-experience is identical with pain-behaviour. This is an interpretation which was common in the 1950's, but which most Wittgenstein scholars now think very dubious. Wittgenstein holds, certainly, (1) that we can only talk about pain because it is 'tied to' pain behaviour, (2) that my ability to make cross temporal judgments about my own sensations would lapse into vacuity if inner sensations such as pain were not 'tied to' pain behaviour, and (3) *that being in pain, and saying so is quite different from knowing that*

10 G. R. R. *The Concept of Mind* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 229.



*p* is true, and affirming *p*. None of these claims, however, amount to the doctrine that pain just *is* pain behaviour, and, in fact, someone who subscribed to that doctrine would find it rather difficult even to *state* (1) — (3), as above. The whole drift of what is called the *private language argument* in Wittgenstein is, surely, that it is *only* if it is possible to be mistaken about inner states that it is going to be possible to talk about them. Wittgenstein's reason for saying that I do not *know* that I am in pain is that there is not a *judgment* to the effect that I am in pain, which might be to varying extents supported by evidence of various kinds. There is just the *experience* of pain. Judgment, for Wittgenstein, only comes into play at the level of language, and pain experience is below the level language because it is part of the foundations of language<sup>11</sup>.

It is wrong to suppose that simply in words like 'pain', 'itch', 'ache' etc., defined by mental ostension, we have the beginning of a language in which to *report* or *describe* our inner or private experiences. Our pain vocabulary must ultimately depend on a physical-object language if we are to *report* or *describe* them. It, then, appears that even assuming, *per impossible*, that there could be a private language, it would be of no use for the unique and full description of one's inner or private experiences. A private language cannot do the work for expressing them, and we, if fact, do not require a private language in order to *express* them. If a private language is *at all* supposed to describe one's inner or private experiences, then it must lead us to think of the absurd consequence that there ought to be a private language not only for *private objects*, but also for *public objects*. If we are right in holding that the linguistic dualism between private and public is an impossibility, then the case for Descartes' substantial dualism becomes extremely weak, if not impossible.

<sup>11</sup> I owe this point to Professor Bernard Harrison, personal correspondence, dated August 31, 1984.



## VII

# The Bulgarian Indologist Sri Kantcho Kanev

*Alexander Atanasov*

The first publication of K. Kanev's as indologist dates back to 1961, and since 1981 he is already Sri\* Kantcho Kanev for the management of the organisation "Indian National Congress". The first Bulgarian indologist-marxist receives manifoldly thanks and greetings from the then prime minister — Srimati Indira Gandhi and from the former president Sri Venkata Giri. For what merits?

For more than a quarter of a century K. Kanev investigates problems of the ancient and contemporary philosophy and culture of friendly India. He is author of many articles and monographs on the views of one of the oldest philosophers in the world—the ancient Indian sage Uddalaka Aruni; on the humanist and social thought of India's great son — Jawaharlal Nehru; on the basic Yoga philosophical system.

To all those who might ask whether such investigations are necessary for our science I shall remind of the fact that Indian philosophy is not a somewhat exotical phenomenon, a subject of ordinary curiosity. It is generally known that India is the only country in the East, that has an independent from the West philosophical tradition, the most original and the most representative in the whole East. Today it is quite clear, that who wants to get free from the onesidedness and the Europocentrism and to elaborate for himself a global, i.e. a single scientific and modern view of the cultural and historical processes, must inevitably study the philosophy and culture of India, and, of course, from marxist positions. Besides, we all know

\* In India "Sri" or "Srimati" is one of the honourable prefixes put before the names of personages, being on high honour and merits in a distinctive field of life.



that the ancient Indian culture has points of tangencies also with the cultures of the nations that populated the Balkan peninsula since most ancient times, so that its study is ultimately necessary, particularly for us Bulgarians.

It is of course more important how our scholar succeeds to manage this responsible mission that he has deliberately taken upon himself. If you put an eye into the protocols of the scientific board sessions of the Institute of Philosophy, where K. Kanev's works were discussed and accepted, you will read categorically positive opinions of a whole number of well-known philosophers of ours. One year before his death the academician Todor Pavlov published in the paper "Narodna Cultura" ('National Culture') an article about his searches and findings, which remarks inter alia: "... and especially after the publication of K. Kanev's monography ('The first Indian Philosophical Doctrine of the Being' — the Oansanscrit "Sat-Vada", publ. by BAS, 1976) for me it was already clear that in the ancient philosophy of India there have also been materialistic atheistic directions... Pointing out this fact makes of course the monography of our scientific collaborator K. Kanev doubtlessly very valuable, independently of some other discussionable questions in it."

Our fellow-countryman's efforts are highly appreciated. Thus in a review printed in the magazine "Philosophy" (Prague, number 2, 1977), the Czechoslovak scientist Dr. Dalimir Haik writes: "Uddalaka Aruni belongs to the oldest philosophers in the world. The book of the Bulgarian philosopher and indologist Kantcho Kanev is the first enlarged monography on Uddalaka Aruni's deed. It is an undisputable contribution to the marxist study of the world philosophical history". Let me quote also the reference of the cand. phil. s.c. A. Kondratov from the Soviet Union: "The processes of Samyama with the yogis are also waiting for explanation in the light of the materialistic teaching for the brain. At that here are necessary not only physiological studies, but also a respective philosophical treatise. Up to recently this whole field was, in its essence, conceded to the philosophers idealists, to the theologists and the representatives of the various societies of mysticists, but there already began to appear also works of scientists, who are standing on materialist positions. For example a big interest was aroused by a series of articles by K. D. Kanev in the Bulgarian magazine "Filosofiska Missi" ('Philosophical Thought'). ("Nauka i religia" / 'Science and Religion', M., 1975, number 11-12).

With his studies on the yogist written classicists K. Kanev untiredly follows up the task to reveal from scientific positions the whole truth about this so ancient teaching, whose practical exercises find still more followers all over the world. K. Kanev rejects the



idealistic, spiritualistic and mystical speculations and forgeries and points at the rational, progressive and scientific in the ancient Indian philosophical system of Yoga.

As we learn, the first information about "Yoga" — as a psycho-physiological method date back to the fourth millenary B. C. But hardly somewhere between the IVth and IIInd century B.C. the Indian sage Patanjali summarises the up-to-then piled up heritage in his unique "Yoga-Sutras", where he presents "Yoga" as an all-embracing philosophico-dualistic system. K. Kanev analyses in full what was inherited from this ancient thinker, in his monography "The classical Patanjali-Yoga", which was accepted by the Scientific Board at the Institute of Philosophy in 1980 and is waiting for its turn to be printed. Here he convincingly reveals the dualistic nature of the Yoga philosophical system. Built up on the comprehension that the prime basis of the world are two supreme or substantial beginnings—the matter (Prakrti) and the spirit (Purusha), this philosophy considers that the spirit is not implicated with the modifications of the matter. It explains the universal variousness not with the creative role of divine or other supernatural forces, but through "the play" or dialectics among the three attributive qualities or properties—the so called "Gunas" (e.g. white, black and indefinite, unpleasant and neutral, etc.). Through the interaction among the three Gunas is explained the engendering of the mind or thought as well. As a true one is considered the cognition, built up on the sensual data, the logical conclusions and on authoritative sources. All this gives ground K. Kanev to underline the spontaneous-materialistic and the spontaneous-dialectic directedness in the ontology and gnosiology of the Yoga philosophical system. Some aspects of this monographic study are examined comparatively in greater details also in the first part of his research work "Anthology of the Yogist Literature" (so far this has been printed only on Xerox, on decision of NEC-Unesco in Sofia, in 1981). Here a greater attention is paid to the unique yogist "Pranayama", which as a mind controlled breathing is one of the key problems, with philosophical aspects. As a peculiar logical finish of the up-to-now studies of K. Kanev's on Yogism is also the publication of his work "Yoga—Basic Terms", in 1984. In fact this is an interpretative dictionary, representing a first attempt in world literature for a marxist interpretation of the basic yogist terms and conceptions. In this connection K. Kanev continues to receive enthusiastic responses. All there is no doubt, that the innovatory daring of our scientist, his solid marxist methodology, will disperse some still alive doctrinary prejudices and will at last make some unpolite voices be heard no more (Helas, the Rakshas—the demons of the evil—are not only active in "Ramayana"...).



In the conclusion of the translated book "The Alive and the Dead in Indian Philosophy" (published in Moscow in 1981) by the world-known Indian philosopher Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, the Soviet indologist N. P. Anikejev writes: "The marxist study of India's philosophical heritage is still at the beginning of its long way. But it becomes a still more influential factor in the keen ideological fight roused around it. Here we can designate the names of such already affirmed researchers as V. Ruben and M. Rustow—in GDR, Kantcho Kanev—in Bulgaria, D. Reippe—in USA; the study of Indian philosophy in USSR is being enlarged too, though by far not in the necessary speed". As it is seen the marxist researchers of the Indian philosophy in the world can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and one of them is the Bulgarian Kantcho Kanev.

In order that somebody should not think that the works of this scholar of ours are esteemed positively only outside of India, we may give word to the most eminent Indian marxist philosopher Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya: "I am very happy to see that you have rightly devoted to Uddalaka Aruni's materialism that place in Indian philosophical tradition, which he really deserves, but was neglected so far... Out of your summaries it is seen, that you have examined more circumstantially Uddalaka Aruni's philosophy. How I would like to read your work in the original!" (Letter to K. Kanev of the 5th Oct., 1973). And quite indicative is also the circumstance that this outstanding Indian philosopher gives his consent to be one of co-authors of two monographic research works on which the indologist K. Kanev is working just now.

In 1973 the big Indian magazine "Indian Philosophy and Culture" (issued also in English) prints more than ten extensive summaries of K. Kanev's articles under the generalising title "Materialism in Ancient India". This publication creates a still larger popularity of K. Kanev among the Indian scientific society. And in an interview (during his stay in Bulgaria) the bearer of the prize "Nehru", the Indian Harish Gupta, declares that the Bulgarian indologist K. Kanev "splendidly uses Sanscrit and is well acquainted with our culture".

During the World Philosophical Congress, that took place in Varna, 1973, the general secretary of the organisation "Indian Philosophical Congress" and publisher of the magazine "Darshana International" ('International Philosophy'), issued in Moradabad in English, and circulated abroad, Prof. J. P. Atreya, draws the indologist K. Kanev into the international Editorial Board of the magazine, accepting his condition to publish marxist articles too. Thus during the following years, through his reputed magazine more than 60 articles of Bulgarian philosophers found their way to readers



all over the world, after they had been assured and elaborated by K. Kanev, including also many studies of his own. A special number of the magazine was devoted to Academician Todor Pavlov, and three articles were dedicated to Academician Sava Ganovski as well. Over 30 of the articles were published in 1980 by Prof. J. P. Atreya and K. Kanev in a separate collection.

In the mean time our researcher wrote a book (in three parts) about the great son of India — Jawaharlal Nehru. One part of this research work — "The Humanism of Jawaharlal Nehru" — was printed in India in 1976. In the notice of the publishing house "Darshana International" we read: "We are very grateful to the author for giving us an opportunity of publishing his valuable book". And in the foreword belonging to the late university Professor B. L. Atreya it is said: "The book has been written by a great foreign scholar and does great justice to the outlook of late Jawaharlal Nehru..."

In 1983 two parts of the monographic study of J. Nehru were published under the title "Jawaharlal Nehru—Philosophy, Humanism". Here for the first time and comparatively full the attitude of J. Nehru towards the Indian philosophical heritage and his own views towards the philosophical heritage as a methodologic basis of his humanism and his social conceptions are examined.

As early as in 1975 Kantcho Kanev was invited to visit India. His one hundred days in the hot southern country are full of enormous effort. He visits nearly all big cities, scientific centres, institutes and universities, where he gives lectures. Everywhere he wins gratitude, he is overwhelmed with invitations to visit new towns and universities. That is how our country-fellow becomes a "Sri" and in spite of his objections is being titled "professor" or "doctor".

The list of commitments (temporary or permanent) of the indologist. — sen. sc. coll. and cand. of phil. sc. K. Kanev cannot go into one type-written page. I shall mention only some of them; he is asked to attend the Consultative Board of the Committee of Culture in Bulgaria, on the programme for cultural cooperation with India; for a long time he has been scientific manager of the theoretico experimental seminar on Yogism, that functioned 3 years ago under NEC-Unesco in Sofia. Nowadays (although retired) the indologist K. Kanev works as compiler, responsible editor and co-author of two monographical studies (together with eminent Indian scholars) entitled: "Bulgarian Indian Philosophical and Cultural Relations", and 2-3 volumes of "The Indian Philosophical Heritage" (under contract with the Publishing House "Nauka i Izkustvo"/Science and Art/). A separate theme is the huge correspondence that our indologist has lead with scientific centres, universities and foreign scholars from many countries.



If we say that the indologist K. Kanev has taken over himself the work and activity of nearly a whole institute, this would not be wrong. Such people, like him, ordinarily have collaborators, they teach aspirants (since one swallow does not bring spring), but he draws his chariot alone... However the admirable thing here is something else—how does he find craft in himself, and especially physical strength for all this? Perhaps this can be explained with his self-sacrificing love towards India—towards her ancient and modern philosophical thought, science, art and culture, towards the industrious Indian people?

The first Bulgarian put his foot on the North Pole, the first Bulgarian went to the Antarctica, the first Bulgarian went round the Globe in a yacht, the first Bulgarian flew into the Cosmos, a Bulgarian is the inventor of the computer, the first Bulgarians conquered Mount Everest. We are convinced that somewhere within this phalanx will also be the first Bulgarian philosopher-marxist and indologist who discovered for us based on Sanscrit prime-sources the ancient philosophy and culture of India. And we do not doubt, that Sri Kantcho Kanev will do still more for the enlargement and steadfastness of the bridge thrown between the philosophical cultures of India and Bulgaria.



## VIII

# The Concept of Non-being in Existentialism

C. M. Jha

The existentialists use the term Being and Non-being in a quite different context. For them, Being is not mere 'isness'. Being is a present participle of the Verb to be and hence it must imply dynamism. Etymologically, it implies a conscious effort to be. Therefore, the term Being can be spoken of only with respect to man who is capable of making conscious effort. In this context, Being is not only an abstraction, it is not a generalisation either. It is a fact of life, a fundamental mode of man's living. Being therefore is man's being. Man is not a thing in the world, man is Being in the world. Thus, Being is apprehended not by consciousness. One who frames the problem of Being is not himself outside of it, he is at the center of the problem. This Being is not merely an object of conceptual metaphysics, it constitutes the individual. The individual at times, lives unaware of the fact that is unauthentic Being and at times he has a vivid realization of Being that is authentic Being <sup>1</sup>

Although existentialists do not take being as a metaphysical entity, however, very often they tend to give a substantial treatment to being. It is obvious when Heidegger says, non being is neither absolute non-existence nor the negation of language but extraordinary manner of feeling or representation. Again he maintains that non-being is something more than the absolute non-existence. Here, it is easy to find leaning of the existentialists towards Indian principle of indescribability. In contemporary Indian idealism also we find that this non being is real and unreal both and hence, it is better to call it indescribable.

1 Lal, B. K. : The Viswa Bharati Journal of Philosophy; Vol. V., No. 1, August, 1968, pp. 38-39.



Existentialism prefers the term being as being of man and this being of man is not the general notion of being rather it refers to individuals with his entire environment. The being of man has Being in the world with others, it is being in life situation, and the situation that are taken note of, are, evidently contemporary. In all the analysis of the Being of man here is not metaphysical in the traditional sense of the term, but it is existential. This existential analysis has three parts phenomenological, psychological and the third as per common sense. It is phenomenological, because it tries to keep its root in experience, it is psychological because the being of man is analysed in his psychological set up and it is common sense, because it is partly based on a common sense analysis of the present day state of man. Naturally non being is also related to the human situations and environment. Since Being is neither a substantive nor a metaphysical category; non-being does not connote the absence of being rather it connotes these situations which make a man conscious of his being. Being is not concerned with the essence of man. And existence does not mean here something beyond experience, immutable, imperishable and permanent. Existence here means the existence belonging to the individual.

It is natural therefore that Being and Non-being are taken in human perceptive in existentialism. When Being is taken as a substantive then it is very easy to negate this concept by putting 'not' before it. But when Being is a human situation, it is very difficult to contradict it.

When an existentialist takes Being for the Being of man it means that Being has some feeling content meaning thereby that everyone vaguely feels his Being there in the midst of life situations. Non-being therefore also must have a feeling content. So, according to existentialists Non-being is not a denial of reality nor it is a reality having a nature opposite to that of Being. Non being stands for a vague feeling of nothingness. The basis for this feeling is not any logical principle of negation. This feeling is existential in nature. have a live experience of this in life.

In fact, existentialism is primarily a philosophy which takes for its objective human situation. Existentialism is a philosophy that confronts human situation in its totality to ask what the basic conditions of human existence are and how man can establish his own meaning out of these conditions. Its method is to begin with this human existence as a fact without any ready-made pre conceptions about the essence of man. There is no pre-fabricated human nature that freezes human possibilities into a pre-ordained mould; on the contrary man exists first and makes himself what he is out of the condition into which he is thrown.



J. P. Sartre comes nearer to reducing a mean proportion of the existing self with nothingness. The solution of his view is much clear. The inmost self is fundamentally free, it is radically alone in quality. Every characteristic that we can ascribe to the self must be self in its definiteness that is in non free look. The innermost part of freedom must be complete indeterminacy and therefore no object of knowledge at all. Knowledge is of being. Freedom is an excursion of non being in the plenum which knowledge searches for the purpose of discovery. The presence of this non-being in terms of what is to be found in being by reason of the encroachment of non being. In the kingdom of being, the for itself, the self in progress between being and non-being accumulates a position. At the very heart of the self, freedom of the for itself signifies a non-being.

According to Sartre, there are two types of Non-being. The non-being of knowing in man is the first whereas the possibility of non-being in transcendent being is the second. But there is also a third type of non-being, that is the non-being of limitation. This third type of being comes as a question, claims the truth and answer needs that it be thus and not otherwise. In Being as well as in man, this non-being has been disclosed. As an elemental of the real, this non-being becomes visible. Non being or nothingness is a clearly finding out. The essential condition for our saying not is that Non-being an everlasting presence in us and outside of us, non-being or nothingness inhabits being.

Sartre's regressive description has directed to negate beings. The question of human conduct as a sample involves an understanding of non-being. The man is solely responsible for that non-being on the basis of his basic reference to being, the man maintains a relation of individualising limitation to a being and this reference causes nicety to enter this non-being as the appearance of a permanent possibility of non-being. Either such a being nihilates annihilation or defensive measures which keep non being on the ground of only possibility.

When we throw a glance over the writing of existentialists, like Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers and Kierkegaard, we find that non being can be identified in at least four distinct feelings, viz., feeling of dread, feeling of emptiness, feeling of care and anxiety, and feeling of futility.<sup>2</sup> Existentialists hold that it is through these feelings that man realises his Being. A man with all his predicaments can serve as an appropriate example for explaining the realisation of man's being through his non-being or feeling of nothingness. Every man is surrounded with the feeling of anxiety is one of the essential characteristics of human existence. As soon as a man

2 Ibid. p. 42



becomes matured enough to think of his own Being, he finds himself amidst agony of various kinds. A unique sense of helplessness confronts him and it is amidst all the agonies, anxieties and sorrows that he tries to know himself. Now a question can be asked? What type of sorrows are we concerned with? Is it regarding our health prosperity etc.? Definitely, the answer is in negative because even the healthiest man has some anxiety. Even the most prosperous man on this earth is not free from worries. It simply indicates that these feelings of anxieties, sorrows and agonies are the vague feeling of nothingness.

Similarly, there are feelings of dread, emptiness and futility. Even the most successful man is in the grip of these feelings. There are waves of feelings. When man feels totally confused, all his efforts, all his achievements appear to him fruitless and meaningless. But there is no escape from these feelings. These feelings are precariously woven into human existence. This is why existentialists hold that man's living is understood and realised in and through non-being.

For Heidegger, to exist is to *ek-sist*, that is, stand beyond oneself within the world. The world must be given with the man as the *a priori*, horizon within which any individual facts at all can become objects of his care. We also get here a radical ontological doctrine that actuality is constituted by potentiality. Being is realised through non-being as against Kierkegaard's possibility is higher than actuality. This is why the words like death, care, anxiety, guilt (all used in the sense of non-being) have a different sense for him than in ordinary usage. For example—take death. As an ontic fact, it is the usual thing noticed in an obituary. As an ontological characteristics of existence on the other hand, death is the possibility not to be a possibility that continues with me so long as I live. Thus, it is not proper to refuse Heidegger's view on the ground that there are individuals who do not appear to feel any anxiety at the approach of death. Any such individual decision about one's attitude towards death is an ontic fact and as such can occur only in the given context of death as an ontological possibility. Only a being, that is whose living is disclosed to himself as capable also of non-being only such a being can make a decision as to what attitude he will maintain towards the event that finally actualises this possibility.

On the basis of a survey of existentialist philosophy we can say that there are three most important and basic features of the Being of man. The first feature is that man feels personally concerned about himself. This concern has been variously explained by different existentialists. For Sartre, this concern is a direct consequence of man's sense of freedom and responsibility and realisation that there is no God. For Kierkegaard, this concern results out of



the aesthetical and ethical despair. For Jaspers, this is a direct consequence of the realisation of the 'ultimate situations' and the consequent feeling of 'foundering'.

The second feature of the being of man is that it is determinable only in terms of what one does or what he does not do. The Being of man stands in innumerable relationship with the world he lives in. These relationships work upon him, he lives those relationships in the sense that he responds, reacts and makes his choices and decisions. It is for him to subject himself to follow the tradition or to make a new path of his own. As Heidegger puts it, he can accept himself just as one thing among other, thus subordinating selfhood to thinghood or he can project his possibilities in full awareness of his conscious being.

The third important feature, according to Heidegger, is that man's being is always in advance of himself. By this, he means that man's existence is prior to man's being conscious of it. Man's attaching meaning to his existence is only later than the fact of his existence.

As per existentialists, the above mentioned characteristics of Being are realized only through non-being or nothingness. The care and anxiety of a man is vague feeling of nothingness in the sense that man does not know why he is so anxious. Probably his anxiety is due to the tremendous responsibilities, he has to assume, as Sartre points out. This anxiety makes him aware of his life-situation in the world. Thus, it helps him in realizing his being.

Anxiety always causes feeling of fear and dread. Man keeps on swinging between hope and despair and consequently all the time he is in dread. It is what Kierkegaard calls sickness unto death. This dread is never felt against any particular object. It is vague feeling of nothingness which adds dimension to one's being.

Feeling of emptiness is probably the best example of the vague feeling of nothingness in the sense of non-being. This feeling is the feeling of 'alienation' that man experiences because of a mechanisation in human relationships. Even in the midst of his kiths and kins, he feels lonely and thereby, he gets more and more of his own being.

The feeling of futility too is inseparable element of man's being. Gradually he comes to realize that whatever he has succeeded in gaining materially in this world is futile. All his efforts are reduced to insignificance and he comes to be convinced that everything has arisen out of nothingness and to nothingness everything will return. This sense of futility again, makes him conscious of his predicaments which his 'Being' is put around.

Thus according to the existentialists non being is not a mere negation of Being. It is rather a positive but vague feeling which helps the man in realizing his Being.



## IX

Thinking with *blik*

Subodh Kumar Mohanty

Right *blik* is always a prerequisite to *authentic thinking, acting and valuing*.

While *thinking* with Richard M. Hare's *blik*<sup>1</sup> I was rather prompted<sup>2</sup> to inquire into its conceptual relevance with an oft-talked concept, *śraddhā*<sup>3</sup>, in the Indian religio-philosophical conceptual frame work. In what follows hereafter, I intend to lay bare the glimpses of my enquiry, exploration, and explication in the *analytical mode* of investigation in order that a philosophical illumination of the *relation*<sup>4</sup> obtaining between the two *living* concepts may perhaps be forthcoming. (I would make a modest claim in favour of a truly original and significant move in my relating the two concepts because these two were not hitherto brought into a common fold of relation earlier than the attempt evinced by me.) The two concepts respectively belong to the West and the East in their origin, evolution, interpretation and development. (So my enquiry faced quite difficult philosophical problems which I have in my way tried to deal with.) As for *blik*, so of *śraddhā*, both the concepts appeared to me to have taken the central place in our understanding of religious thought and practice. With this basic apprehension, I pursued my inquiry into *meaning* of religious language particularly relating to the concepts under reference. On this pretext, a host of neighbouring concepts, viz: faith, belief, concern, explanation, myth,

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I owe the coined concept of *blik* to its celebrated author R. M. Hare, Oxford.

<sup>1</sup> A. Flew and A. Macintyre, eds. *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, "Theology and Falsification Debate," London, SCM Press, 1955

<sup>2</sup> S. K. Mohanty, *The Concept of Blik* (U. U. Ph.D. Thesis) Anubooks, Meerut, India, 1987.

<sup>3</sup> *The Srimadbhagavadgītā*, esp. 17 : 2-3 p. 806.

<sup>4</sup> S. K. Mohanty, *The concept of blik*, Chap. V.



miracle, metaphor, trust, attitude, confidence<sup>5</sup>, *jñāna*, *karma*, *bhakti*, *mukti*, *svabhāva*, *svarūpa*<sup>6</sup> etc. in their respective climatic contexts had to be brought into penetrating discussion and protracted analysis.

Of the many difficult philosophical problems as I said above, the one relating to the status of *blik* and *śraddhā*<sup>7</sup> of the religious person which he naturally has in him, which he nourishes althrough and which he is not prepared to part with and which, if neglected, does not create a vacuum but creates a difference in his total personality (makes of himself a new creature or a different man, than before, altogether)<sup>8</sup>, seems to be of genuine philosophical significance. (This problem concerning their conceptual status is quite basic and prerogative to the problem of *meaning* of religious language. Inquiry reveals that a religious person both according to Hare and the *Gītā* must have *bliks* of some sort and both *śraddhā* and *blik* are indispensable to the choice of the kind of life the religious person opts to live or/and actually lives, Further *blik* and *śraddhā* point to faith and determination). Faith means and unflinching trust in something-sublime. Determination is a resolute force or a decision in favour of a life to live or one's whole way of living, thus orienting for him his world view or the outlook on life, or the *weltaanschauung*<sup>9</sup>. The world view is of utmost importance for any person, inculsive of a religious person. It is a *perspective*, a *direction* that explains and illumines the events of life that the religious person finds quite compelling. Thus it may be claimed that the two concepts under review<sup>10</sup> have more in common and less uncommon in their interpretations.

*Śraddhā* that originates as *svabhāva* or *svarūpa*<sup>11</sup> is not mere faith and is not allowed to work without control by *buddhi*.<sup>12</sup> But *buddhi* too is useless without *śraddhā*. Both *śraddhā* and *buddhi* are interdependent, co-completing and complimentary to each other. Reason does not allow faith to degenerate in dogma and faith does not allow reason to lose in speculation. Religious knowledge is reckoned as *śraddhā-labdha jñāna*<sup>13</sup>. Understood in this light in the epistemological frame-work, religious knowledge upholds its uniqueness. In

5 Ibid, p. 466,

6 The *Gītā*, esp. 18:17.

7 Ibid, 17 : 2 (See, special note below).

8 R. M. Hare, *Faith and Logic* ed. Basil Mitchell, London, George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1957, pp. 188-9.

9 J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends of Pluralism and Theism*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911, p. 405.

10 *Blik* and *śraddhā*.

11 The *Gītā*, 17:3.

12 Ibid., 2:49.

13 Ibid., 4:39.



Thinking with *blik*

the *Gītā* religious framework, religion is based on both *faith* and *reason*

It may also be noted that the *meaning* of *blik* or *śraddhā* is never *unilateral*. Rather they enjoy quite more different meanings. The historicity of the two concepts is a testimony to the equivocality of the concurring tools in the respective religio philosophical domains, in the Christian religion as well as the *Gītā*—religion by any name, however variant the names be<sup>14</sup>. The *Gītā* makes profuse use of the concept. It is used as the background key stone or the foundational presupposition, a *prolepsis*<sup>15</sup> that makes *jnāna*, *karma* and *bhakti* or, knowledge—devotion—action ready to obtain *mukti* or liberation. Thus the *śraddhāvān*<sup>16</sup> or the person with the right *blik* obtains true knowledge through his ardent faith, devotion and disposition. The *Gītā*, however, discriminates between *śraddhā* and *āśraddhā*<sup>17</sup>. *Āśraddhā* means the two lower *śraddhā*, *tāmasika* and *rājasika* in contrast to *sāttvika śraddhā* but not absence of *śraddhā* altogether. This is similar to *bilk*, right or wrong but not *no bilk* as Hare puts it: there cannot be no *blik* at all.

So much so good about their conceptual similarities as highlighted only briefly: but question as to their dissimilarities is rather more difficult to trace. This is, however, answerable from the point of view of their relative semantic heterogeneity. The difference is at least visible by a theoretical apprehension of certain points in practice the manner in which the two root concepts are wielded to their respective religio-conceptual frame work: the Christian religion and the *Gītā* religion. The religious manifestations in one sect or denomination is variant from that of the other or, in other words, each religion organizes its own practices differently. The distinctive arrangement of the peculiar basic presuppositions of one gives to it its quality. This is to say that religious denominations vary from each other in their actual make-up and practices. In fact, due to their distinctive practices, doctrines, worship, prayer, faith etc. each religious denomination claims superiority over the other. In spite of clarion call for, and beackon light on, the need of *unity* of religions from time to time issued in the history of religious developments, it is the difference that has been there and still works to continue. So, on the whole, a contrast, as the present attempt is, might be fruitful

14 For example, *Sanātana dharma* (The eternal religion).

15 *Prolepsis*: Notion, preconception: *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes, Bombay (India) Jaico Publishing House, 1957, p. 255.

16 *The Gītā*. 4:39.

17 *Ibid.*, 17:28.

18 R. M. Hare, *op. cit.* "Theology and Falsification" debate, *N.E.P.T.*



in citing, among the glaring points of similarity and difference, the logic of *inner innovations*<sup>19</sup>. This is, otherwise, called the *logic of human nature* that rules the events in the world or the *logic of response and remedies* which guides religious discourse. Viewed through the contrasting glance as above, yet in face of the logic of *bliks* or *svabhāva* or *human nature*, man doing religion is to listen to the voice of eternity, respond to changes occurring in the unfolding of reality constantly at work and go placidly, in face of chaos, noise, haste, drudgery and humdrum, for peace, serenity, delight and harmony.

Now, in consideration of what has been outlined in respect of the similarity and difference noticeable through conceptual *meaning-exploration*, it may be still asked, if there is anything of gaining sustenance in religion as *blik* or *śraddhā* irrespective of whether we opt in favour of their relative concord or discord. To this question it may be quickly suggested, by the way of an answer, that *conceptual meanings* are at their *base human meanings* and thus inextricable from *meaning of life*<sup>20</sup>. Religion, on the whole being a *complex* affair,<sup>21</sup> (for life is by nature a *complex* human scheme) would better be characterized in its appropriate wholesome sense, rather than paradigmatic models, for example, science, art etc. *The neo-logism*<sup>22</sup> of *bliks*, (or *śraddhā*, for that matter), promulgates a religion embracing and fostering a comprehensive way of *living, thinking* and *valuing*.<sup>23</sup>

The key-concepts of *blik* and *śraddhā* would thus afford to remain as a permanent legacy in the philosophy of religion as they are full of praise and promises as a *linguistic key*<sup>24</sup> to religious conceptualism, the very root of religion. Both could be taken as root-concepts regulating the meaning of religious language without the understanding of which religion cannot be made intelligible. So, the ultimate determinant of meaning of religious language (as *blik* or/and as *śraddhā*) is, however, resting on the facts of life as "the taste of the pudding is in the eating"<sup>25</sup> or "the fruits of actions are

19 "of innovations": Francis Bacon, cited by S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Culture*, Delhi, Hind Pocket Books (P) Ltd., 1968, p. 161.

20 "Meaning-of-life": J. E. Barnhart, *The Study of Religion: Its Meaning*, N.Y., Mouton Publishers, 1977, Chap. 12.

21 Life means a complex conceptual scheme.

22 *Neologism: Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion*, Earl R. MacCormac, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, N.Y., 1976.

23 F. Ferre: *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968.

24 Ibid.

25 K. P. Mishra, "Religious Language", *Bharati U. U. Journal*.



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in the actions actually performed"<sup>26</sup> or, "thou shalt reap the fruits of thy actions".<sup>27</sup>

It may now be said that by doing the aforesaid conceptual analysis, "I have, if at all", as it is already said, "only advanced the discussion of the most important problem atleast something clearer"<sup>28</sup>. Thus the two root concepts, *blik* and *śraddhā* may, in all fairness of facts and arguments, be treated as stabilizers, *per excellence*, of meaningful religious conceptualism. This is what could be assigned, without any reservation, as the *real and rare insight*<sup>29</sup> of Hare's philosophical technique for which philosophers would remain indebted to him<sup>30</sup>. And the case with the *Gītā* is pre eminently unique as the paramount guidance it fosters to issue to the mankind in order to mould its religious renovations from the time to time, especially when human life is risking an enigma of insurmountable uncertainties amid vast possibilities in spite of unending quest for certainty, serenity, integrity, and humility against strife, catastrophe, and conundrum beset in life and living.

The *authentic thinking* with *right blik* insures and strengthens the path of life with right religion and its worthy philosophy to bestow upon life on earth the actually deserving, yet wanting, *human integrity* and *humility*. Without proper understanding of these delicate conceptual device in the philosophy of religion, the whole business might turn out to be futile labour-loss: "Plumbing or plucking of fruits without the requisite appliances or knife etc". as Hare categorically forewarns<sup>31</sup>. Had this feature been taken serious notice of, in the tradition, much of what has been done would not have been done or done, if at all, quite differently.<sup>32</sup> Of course, that it has been neglected is a fact which cannot be denied but, better late than never, it has to be acknowledged and worked out to suit the present day needs in religion and philosophy of religion.

26 Ibid. Humanities, Vol. VII, July, 1973, No. 12. p. 12.

27 Oft-quoted from the *Bible*

28 R. M. Hare, "Religion and Morals", *Faith and Logic*, ed. Basil Mitchell, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957. p. 178.

29 "Rare insight": Gerd Brand, *The Central Texts of Wittgenstein* tr. RE Innis, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 165.

30 A. Flew and A. MacIntyre, eds, *N F P.T.* p. 107.

31 Bryan Magee, "Hare Magee Dialogue", *Man of Ideas*, N. Y., The Viking Press, 1978.

32 Cf. Hare's views: "The Simple Believer", *Religion and Morality*, ed. G. Qutka and J. Reeder, Oxford, Anchor Press, 1973, pp. 395-396.

I owe my indebtedness to Professor G. C. Nayak, Utkal University (India) for his original ideas on the contrast of *śraddhā* and *blik* incorporated in my original doctoral thesis, to Professor M. Miri, NE Hill University, Shillong, India for his critical examination and appreciation of the work and to professor V. V. Klive, Wittenberg University, Ohio, U.S.A. for his valued evaluation, and acceptance of my thesis.



## Book-Reviews :

M. R. Nandan : *Philosophy of Science — A Brief Introduction*, pp. 168+16, The Bangalore philosophy Forum, Maharani's Arts College, Bangalore 560 001, price : paper back Rs. 40/— Hardback Rs. 80/— (1987).

Mr. M. R. Nandan the author of this book has very systematically written this book 'Philosophy of Science—A brief Introduction'. It is indeed one of the best recently published books on philosophy of Science. The author has divided the whole book in seven chapters : I. Reason Vs. Experience. II. The problem of Induction, III. Explanation in Science, IV. Laws and Theories, V Methods. VI. The principles of Science and VII. Analogy, besides Foreword by Professor Dr. Srinivasa Rao, Professor of Philosophy, Bangalore University Preface, Introduction and Three Appendices : A. Albert Einstein on the Method of Theoretical physics, B. On Mathematical Induction, C. Dadaism Vs. Method, Index of Names, and Index of subjects.

Mr. Nandan has very ably discussed the main topics of philosophy of science which may be regarded the foundations of the philosophy of Science. The author has considered widespread and deep rooted misconceptions as far as the method of science is concerned. The author claims that his approach is essentially non-inductive and does not feel that meaningful discussion in favour of induction is impossible.

The author has taken into account each one of the misconceptions and has also given a convincing refutation of these misconceptions. He has very ably refuted the misconceptions. He has taken distinct stands in many of the current controversies in the realm of philosophy of science.

In Introduction he has discussed philosophy and the origin of science, and philosophy of science. In chapter I he has discussed Reason Vs. Experience and has critically examined Complete enumeration as considered by Aristotle which he regards as vague. The limits of the application of complete enumeration forced Aristotle to offer an alternative, i.e., Intuitive Induction. He has critically examined the Aristotle's views. In chapter II The problem of Induction, he has examined the views of Hume, Popper, Bertrand Russell etc., In chapter III Explanation in Science Consideration about science and common sense has been taken into account. In chapter IV Laws and Theories he has distinguished between a law and theory and distinguished between two



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kinds of laws : Experimental laws and theoretical laws. It is said that theories refer to abstract concepts and experimental laws refer to concrete entities. In chapter V Methods discussing Non-scientific and Scientific. Under non-scientific methods Tenacity, Authority, Intuition. Under Scientific method he has discussed the different steps involved are : (1) Observation, collection and classification of facts, (2) Formation of Hypothesis, (3) Verification of Hypothesis and (4) Proof of Hypothesis and establishing the scientific law. He has considered several methods including Newtons Concept of Scientific method.

Whewell's and Popper's Concept of Scientific method, scientific method and evidence, Scientific method and falsifiability, Scientific method and Biological science, Scientific method and social sciences, Scientific method and Scientific Induction, Function of Observation and Experiment. In Chapter VI the author has discussed The Principles of Science. In this chapter he discussed The Principle of Uniformity of Nature, Aristotle's View of Causation, Locke and the Activity View of Causation, Hume on Causation, Mill's View of Causation, Cause and Condition, Unconditionallness and necessity, Positive and Negative Conditions, Meaning of Immediate, Cause Invariance Experimental methods, Method of Agreement. Method of difference Joint Method of Agreement and Difference Method of Residues, Method of Concomitant Variation, Criticism of Mills Methods, Plurality and Causation and in Chapter VII Analogy he discusses Analogy and Induction Criteria of good analogical argument, Analogy and Metaphor, Negative analogy. The Role of analogy in scientific Method. It is really a good and brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Science and its basic principles and the author Mr. Nandan and the Bangalore Philosophy Forum deserve congratulations.

Subodh Kumar Mohanty. *The Concept of Blik*, pp. 280, Published by Anu Books, Shiva Ji Road, Meerut price Rs. 120/— \$10/— (1988)

Dr. S. K. Mohanty the author of this book is senior Reader and Head of the Honours Teaching Department of Philosophy in P. N. College, Khurda (Puri) affiliated to the Utkal University. He is author of a number of papers published in English and Oriya Journals. He is author of a book '*Falsifiability*' which is distinct contribution in the philosophies of science and religion. He has contributed articles on logic, metaphysics, epistemology, morality and religion

The present book '*The Concept of Blik*' is a testimony to Dr. Mohanty's merit, originality and thinking into the unexplored realms of knowledge. It is informative and very illuminating publication.



tion. It raises certain important philosophical problems and illustrates ability of independent thinking. It also provokes serious problems. This book is an important contribution in philosophy of religion as a serious analytical probe into the basic tenets of the problem of meaning of religious language. This concept is Richard M. Hare's unique invention. This is both an analytical and applied approach to the study of the concepting with several other religious concepts of Sraddha, faith, belief, concern, explanation, myth, metaphor and miracle in the Indian religious and philosophical materials.

This book is an evidence of the author's deep understanding and acquaintance with literature in the philosophy of religion. It is a very interesting and very important work on the problem of meaning of religious language in terms of the theory of bliks—fundamental human attitudes.

The whole book has been divided into eight chapters as follows: 1. Introduction. 2. Blik, 3. Concern and explanation. 4. Faith, belief, and Sraddha. 5. Language game, myth, metaphor and miracle. 6. Religious Knowledge. 7. The problem of meaning of religious language. A Critical reassessment, and 8. Conclusion. Every chapter is having in the end quite a large number of Notes and references which make the book very scholarly. In the end quite an exhaustive Bibliography of more than 300 books has been provided. This will help the researchers in the field to be acquainted with the vast literature mentioned therein. Index in the last will also prove useful.

The book is a scholarly contribution in field of the Philosophy of Religion, particularly Religious knowledge and religious language. It is simple and clear exposition of the concept and theory of bliks fundamental human attitudes. His exposition to relate bliks to Indian Religio-philosophical literature is quite an original piece of work, and has great philosophical and religious significance.

Dr. Mohanty's book will attract a large number of readers interested in religion and philosophy. The author deserves admiration and congratulation for bringing out this scholarly contribution and Anu Prakashan deserves thanks for publishing this book.

**Joseph Wayne Smith :** *The progress and Rationality of Philosophy as a cognitive Enterprise. An Essay on Metaphilosophy*, pp. 301, Avebury, Aldershot—Brookfield U.S.A. Hongkong, Singapore, Sydney (1918).

The author of this scholarly publication Prof. Joseph Wayne Smith, Professor Department of Sociology, The Flinders University of South Australia, has to his credit several publications and many essays in several International Journals.

This is an important publication of Prof. Smith. The contents of the book are : 1. Statements of the argument : is philosophy a



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degenerating research programme? 2. Dialectics, controversy and philosophical disagreements, 3. The problems and paradoxes of cognitive progress, 4. Scepticism and relativism, anarchism and nihilism in metaphilosophy, 5. Naturalised epistemology and externalist responses, 6. Internalist responses, 7. Mathematical responses, 8. Paraconsistency, antinomies of reason and philosophical disagreements, 9. Erotetic unsolvability and metaphilosophy, 10. The progress and rationality of philosophy I: a dissolution of the principal problem, 11. The progress and rationality of philosophy II: A theory of cognitive progress, 12. The progress and rationality of philosophy III: a theory of philosophical rationality, 13. Conclusion: state of the argument. And in the end quite an exhaustive Bibliography of about 300 books have been provided alongwith an index.

Prof Joseph Wayne Smith contributed scholarly articles to this volume. In the first essay he has discussed the problem 2. Responses to the problem of perennial philosophical disagreements. He has discussed four basic alternative explanations, 1. Eliminative Explanations 2. Causalist explanation, Methodological explanations, Internalist explanations. The aim of philosophy is to present truths about reality which he has discussed. The project will conclude with an image of cognitive life. Prof. Smith says we are encultured beings, we stand epistemologically, and cannot with justification rely upon social consensus as a criterion of truth. He quotes Brand Blanshard's quotation about philosophy and says, it is a continual effort, made by individual minds but sustained by a congenital and racial drive, to render its world intelligible.

In chapter 2. Dialectics, Controversy and philosophical disagreements, the Statement of the argument. In chapter 1 an introductory sketch of the principal thesis of this work was given and in this chapter the author has attempted to clarify key terms of the principal thesis. In has discussed by analysing the question, 'What is a perennial philosophical dispute? This analysis is comprised of two sub-tasks: (1) to state what a philosophical dispute consists of, and (2) to analyse the notion perennality. He has discussed resher on dialectics, Hamblin and Mackenzie on the logic of dialogue. In Chapter 3. The problems and paradoxes of cognitive progress includes: Statement of the argument, the problems and paradoxes of verisimilitude—Tichy's account of verisimilitude, Tuomela and Niiniluoto on verisimilitude, Verisimilitude and shared tests, Verisimilitude and short theorems, Bunge's theory of partial truth, Krajewski and Roserkrantz on verisimilitude, Wojcicki's account of approximate truth, Relevance logic and verisimilitude, Newton Smith on verisimilitude, Agassi: verisimilitude unsaved and lastly, Conclusion: state of the argument. In chapter 4. Scepticism and relativism, anarchism and nihilism in metaphilosophy he discusses the self referential



inconsistency of cognitive and protagorean relativism, Against orientational pluralism in metaphilosophy, Unger's hypothesis of philosophical relativity, Rorty's metaphilosophical scepticism. Metaphilosophical anarchism. Metaphilosophical nihilism. In chapter 5. Naturalised epistemology and externalist responses considers an Explication of the expression 'naturalised epistemology' (ENE) and psychoanalytic eliminativism, (ENE) and the Strong programme of the sociology of knowledge, (ENE) and Quine; Analysed naturalised epistemology (ENE) and Justificationist naturalised epistemology (JNE), In Chapter 6 Internalist responses: considers Kekes on the nature of philosophical inquiry, philosophical machismo and the adversary method. Dörner: truth and philosophy. Barber on philosophical disagreements, Gaille's essentially contested concepts and Absolute presuppositions and philosophical disagreements. In chapter, 7. He discusses Games theory, Routley's theorem and philosophical disagreements, Lehrer and Wagner's convergence of consensus theorems, and Bayesian convergence of opinion theorems. In chapter 8. Paraconsistency, antinomies of reason and philosophical disagreements he discusses in details Graham Priest on logic as an organon of criticism, the Logic of paradox and the paradox of logic, paraconsistent logic and the consistency of the world, a rhetorical criticism of paraconsistency. In chapter 9 Erotetic Unsolvability and metaphilosophy he discusses The idea of an unsolvable problem, Routley on unknowable truths and unsolvable problems, Basson and strong ontological insolubilia and The existence of insolubilia, philosophical progress and disagreements. In chapter 10. The progress and rationality of philosophy I: A dissolution of the principal problem, he discusses perennial disputes and rational disagreement, A second argument against the rational consensus view point, Disagreements in the natural sciences. In chapter 11. The progress and rationality of philosophy II: A Theory of cognitive progress discusses An explication of qualitative Verisimilitude, Verisimilitude and the sceptical metainduction, philosophy and the new theory of verisimilitude. In chapter 12 The Progress and Rationality of philosophy III a theory of philosophical rationality and discusses: On philosophical Methods, self-referential arguments The method of counterexamples, petitio principii, vicious infinite regresses and circularities, in objection: rationality scepticism metaphilosophy and monist-systematic perspectivism; And in the last chapter: Conclusion: General State of the Argument, have been dealt with.

The book is an exhaustive publication covering several aspects of philosophy. Every chapter has in the end Notes which are also self explanatory. It is a scholarly contribution by the eminent American philosopher and he deserves congratulations. The publishers Avebury deserve thanks for bringing out this outstanding book. It will certainly be as good addition to the existing literature on Metaphilosophy.



## The Salutory Descent\*

A. Syrkin

4. It may be interesting to compare the Vishnuite evidence with traits of Buddha (already mentioned with respect to Viṣṇu's avatāras) as reflected in Buddhist tradition. We shall restrict ourselves here to the early canonical evidence of theravāda. In the Buddhist dogma (including the Hindu pantheon in the sphere of Buddha's law—cf. note 44), the god's activities prove to be "lower" than the Buddha's preaching. Indeed, the divine beings, by descending to earth, merely change their appearance. Moreover, they have not yet transcended the cycle of rebirth and require salvation themselves, hence their striving for Buddha's admonition. On the other hand, the latter has already freed himself from the bonds of existence; he is neither god, demi-god, nor man (AN. IV, 36.2). His apparition among people, in order to preach the Truth, presupposes a greater descent—to an abyss between existence itself and non-existence.<sup>55</sup>

\* Continued from *Darshana International*, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1987 p. 39-61.

- <sup>55</sup> Concerning Buddha's salutory function cf. also: Conze. *Op. cit.*, pp. 33 sq; particularly, pp. 46-47 — analogies with Christianity (a problem often discussed; see e.g., I A. Sparks. *Buddha and Christ: a functional analysis* — "Numen", v. 13, 1966, pp. 190-204; B.H. Streeter. *The Buddha and the Christ*. Port Washington, 1970; etc.). One can remark that Conze's use of the word "Saviour" in corresponding title ("Buddhist saviours") arouses a methodological problem of semantics. It was particularly noted that the character of the Buddhist "salvation" is wholly different from that of the Christian. Cf. A. Prince. The concept of Buddhahood in early and later Buddhism—"Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia", v. 7, N. 1-2, 1970, p. 117. See in this connection: N. Smart. Problems of the application of Western terminology to Theravada Buddhism, with special reference to the relationship between the Buddha and the gods. —"Religion. A Journal of Religion and Religions", v. 2, pt. 1, 1972, pp. 37-41.



At the same time, Buddha's state of perfect illumination (*sammā=sambodhi*) assumes his function of proclaiming to others the Truth which he, himself, has discovered and realized. As we know, there was another, inferior, kind of Buddha—the "individual" *pacceka=buddha*, enlightened as well but unable to preach the Truth (cf. *Puggala=paññatti*, I, 29). The *sammā-sambuddha's* ability to teach is displayed in his last earthly existence, while in previous births he is regarded as *bodhisattva*.<sup>56</sup> The Buddha's biographies speak of his decision to stay with people and to instruct them, though he himself is freed and can leave this world (cf. *MN I*, 26 etc.)<sup>57</sup>. He remains with men till the end of his life; his subsequent leaving the world is, on account of this state, indeed his last. The liberation already achieved by him prevents further manifestation (heavenly or earthly) and his "descent" thus appears to be unique. Nevertheless, the natural need to perpetuate the possibility of salvation led to the doctrine of various Buddhas periodically coming into the world. One can see here a particular replica of god's multiple salutary apparitions. In the Hindu tradition, the salutary function is with a certain variation (cf. above, note 50) represented by the same godhead. In Buddhism, however, precisely the same type of salvation is personified in different teachers. The earlier canonical evidence speaks of seven Buddhas (in a possible connection with the number symbolism, cf. e.g. the Vedic tradition of seven ṛṣi). They are: *Vipassī*, *Sikhī*, *Vessabhū*, *Kakusandha*, *Kopāgamaṇa*, *Kassapa* and *Gotama* (cf. *DN XIV*, 1.4 sq.). Their biographies, with certain modifications, follow the same pattern, cf. the description of the first, *Vipassī's* life (*ibid.*, 16 sq.) which coincides in a number of important details with that of the last historical Buddha—*Siddhartha Gotama*. So, e.g., the separate events are formulated in the text as being typical of Buddha in a foregoing cliché: *dharmatā esā* ('it is

56 According to traditional concepts (cf. *AN IV* 127; *VIII*, 70; etc.) the last of these *bodhisattva* births (preceding the Buddha's birth on the earth) takes place in one of the heavenly worlds. This permits us to speak of Buddha's last spatial descent to this world previous to his "descent" to people as preceptor. Cf. e.g., the usual expression of "descent into a mother's womb" (*mātu=kucchiṃ okkamī*—*DN*, *XIV*, 1, 17 sq.; etc.). The Jaina tradition also speaks about the present heavenly abodes of those who will appear on the earth in the next world-period as completely liberated *tirthaṅkaras* (cf. P. Thomas, *Epics, Myths and legends of India*, Bombay, pp. 200 sq.).

57 Cf. also *Mahāvagga* I, 5; the emancipated Buddha doubts whether other men will be able to understand him and he becomes "inclined to remain in quiet and not to preach the doctrine" but, touched by Brahman's entreaties, he changes his mind (cf. *Vinaya* texts, tr. from Pāli by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, pt. I, Delhi, 1974, pp. 84 sq.).



## The Salutary Descent

the rule, that..."). Separate variations are connected here (analogously to the mythology of avatāras) with certain principles of Indian traditional cosmology, and its ideas of physical and moral degradation, etc.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the first three Buddhas lived in previous world periods, the last four in the present. Their span of life shortens, respectively, from 80,000 years of Vipassī to a hundred years of Siddhartha Gotama (cf. DN XIV, 1. 4 sq.). Cf. also on pubbā buddhā ("previous Buddhas") Samyutta nikāya, VI. 1.2.12; XXXV, 83 etc. Another version speaks of 25 Buddhas, whose biographies are given in Buddhavaṃsa. They live in the twelve previous world periods and end with Gotama (the last seven of them being those men-

58 Corresponding ideas (cf. above, note 48) are reflected in a number of earlier canonical texts. Cf. particularly, notions of Samvatta=kappa vivatta=kappa resp. periods of "rolling up", world dissolution and "rolling back", development, evolution of the world. (The opposite meanings, however, are also possible: DN I. 1.32; 2.2: XXIV. 2. 15; XXVII, 10; AN VIII. 62.2 sq.; etc.; cf. Pali—English dictionary by T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, London, 1972, pp. 637, 656) — i.e. of time-cycles with the alternative evolution and dissolution of the universe. The doctrine of world's degeneration (appearing as a kind of universal — cf., e.g., M. Eliade. *Dimensions religieuses du renouvellement cosmique* — EJ, 1959, Bd. XXVIII. S. 249 sq.) is illustrated in Cakkavatti-sīhanāda sutta (DN XXVI. 2-24) which presents a picture of consecutive degradation of a virtuous kingdom, accompanied by the growth of poverty, violence, fraud, etc. and a gradual diminuation of the term of life (from 80,000 to ten years). People again turn to righteousness and gradually attain the initial blissful state. Another example is presented in Aggañña sutta (DN XXVII 11-25) where physical and moral degradation is connected with the deterioration of men's food (see also: Mahāvastu, ed. E. Senart, t. I Paris, 1882, pp. 338-348). Cf. K. Seidenstücker. *Die Buddhistische Kosmologie und ihre Problem* — "Buddhistischer Weltspiegel", III, Jhrg. N. 1.3.1921, S. 18 sq.; 109 sq.; H. Gunther. *Die Buddhistische Kosmogonie* — ZDMG Bd. 88 1944. S. 44-83; U. Schneider. *Ein Beitrag zur Aggañña Suttanta* — "Indo-Iranian Journal", v. I, N. 4 1957, pp. 253-285; B. G. G. Khale. *The Theravāda-buddhist view of history*, JAOS. v. 85. N. 3 1965 pp. 354-360; idem. *The early Buddhist view of the state* — JAOS. v. 89, N. 4, 1969, pp. 731-738; etc. The Jaina cosmology distinguishes between the present degenerating period (avasarpinī) and the next regenerating (utsarpinī) one, that likewise alternate in the cycle of time. The 24 tirthankaras, usually referred to, are those appearing in the present period, while the former and the later periods each have the same number of tirthankaras. Cf. H. v. Glasenapp. *Der Jainismus. Eine indische Erlösungsreligion nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Berlin, 1925. S. 244 sq. (cf. ibid., S. 474, Anm. 81 on divergences in Jaina sources concerning the future period); A. Guérinot. *La religion Djaina*, Paris, 1926, pp. 99 sq.; W. Schubring. *The doctrine of the Jainas*, Delhi, 1962, pp. 225 sq.; Thomas. *Op. cit.*, pp. 195 sq.; etc.



## DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

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tioned above). Again we find here certain analogies with Jainas, whose list of 24 "saviours" also closes with a historical personage, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, a contemporary of Gotama.

As with Vishnuite eschatology, Buddhism provides the world not only with past and present Buddhas but also with a future one. His name is Metteya (Skr. Maitreya—"friendly", "benevolent"). The time of his appearance varies in different sources; thus, e.g., Cakkavatti-sīhanāda sutta (DN XXVI, 25) foretells his coming at the end of mankind's propitious regeneration.<sup>59</sup> At the present time, according to the doctrine (cf. note 56), he is worshipped as bodhisattva who lives in the heavenly world (the corresponding cult is more popular in Mahāyāna tradition).

The most important function of the "perfectly illuminated" Buddha is preaching. His stereotype descriptions refer to him as an incomparable tutor (sārathi) of men, teacher (satthā) of god and men, etc. His teachings, manifoldly reflected in canonic scripture, provide extensive evidence for analyzing the methods of Buddha's didactics. One should stress here the apparent pragmatic character of Buddha's approach to his listeners. It has already been noted that Buddha resorted to different means of instruction, combining "flexibility and order, authority and freedom", etc.<sup>60</sup> One can speak here of a certain ambiguity reminding us of somewhat similar traits, mentioned above with respect to Upanishadic preceptors. So, e.g., arguing with Ambaṭṭha (Ambaṭṭha sutta — DN III, 1.19 sq.) Buddha-like Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka and other Hindu sages — says: "if you do not give a clear reply, or go off upon another issue, or remain silent, or go away, then your head will split in pieces on the spot" (sattadhā muddha phalissati). Thereafter a godly spirit (yakkha) appears in the sky ready to split the youth's head with his thunder-bolt, and Ambaṭṭha "terrified, startled and agitated" changes his mind.<sup>61</sup> In Kūṭadanta sutta (DN V, 21) the brahmaṇa Kūṭadanta approves Buddha's words "for he who approves not as well-said that which has been well spoken by the Samaṇa Gotama, verily his

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Abegg. Op. cit., S. 145 sq.; G. P. Malalasekera. Dictionary of Pali proper names, v. II. London, 1974, pp. 660-662. Cf. with respect to this latter's descent: D.I. Lauf, op. cit., EJ, 1981, S. 373-402.

<sup>60</sup> See W. Stoesz. The Buddha as teacher — "Journal of the American Academy of Religion", v. 46, No. 2, 1978, pp. 139, 149 sq. With respect to the following exposition see more details in: A. Syrkin. Notes on the Buddha's threats in Dīgha Nikāya — "Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies", vol. 7, no. 1, 1984, pp. 147-158.

<sup>61</sup> Dialogues of the Buddha, tr. by T. W. Rhys Davids, pt. I, Oxford, 1923, pp. 116 sq. (cf. *ibid.*, note 3 — some parallels from Pāli sources). Concerning Buddha's "inconsistencies" one

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head would split in twain."<sup>62</sup> In another, *Pāṭika* sutta Buddha tells about his similar threats to *Pāṭikaputta* (DN XXIV, 1. 16 sq.), whereupon he adds some humiliating details of the latter's behaviour, repeating them in a mocking manner (*ibid.*, 1. 21 sq; 2.2 sq; 2.8 sq.).<sup>63</sup> The character of these scenes permits one to speak of Buddha's descent to the level of man's weak nature.<sup>64</sup>

These traits, as in previous Hindu evidence, appear against the background of rules defining the humble status of the Buddhist devotee, a *bhikkhu*, whose behaviour similarly combines the social descent and spiritual ascent. Here we find (particularly in *Pārājika* and *Samghādisesa* of *Pātimokkha* in *Cullavagga* V, X, etc.) numerous prescriptions concerning obedience, the periodical confessing of one's own sins, begging, etc.<sup>65</sup> In *brahmajāla* sutta (DN I, 1.8-27; cf. II, 43-62; etc.) Buddha enumerates different rules connected with food, sleep, entertainments, talks, earning one's living, etc.<sup>66</sup> All these restrictions, according to Buddha's words, must distinguish his order from other, non-buddhist recluses (*Samaṇa*) and *brāhmaṇas*. With respect to this discipline, a characteristic device regarding the body's denigration can be mentioned: "A brother reflects upon this very body, from the soles of his feet below upward to the crown of his head, as something enclosed in skin and full of diverse impurities..." (DN, XX, 5; etc.).<sup>67</sup> Corresponding rules and admonitions are intended, however, to bridle one's passions and usually

should also be reminded of his attitude to miracles (*siddhi*)—now denounced by him (cf. DN XI 3 sq: "I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders that I loathe, and abhor and am ashamed thereof"—"Dialogues of the Buddha, pt. I, p. 278) and now resorted to (cf. DN XXIV. 1.4 sq.).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pt. I, p. 181.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pt. III, 1921, pp. 19 sq.; 22 sq. Cf. P. V. Bapat. The different strata in the literary material of the *Dīgha Nikāya*—"Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute", v. 8, pt. 1, 1926, p. 13; K. Seidenstucker. *Humor in den Reden Buddhas*—"Buddhistischer Weltspiegel", Jhrg. III, N. 1, 1921, S. 37 sq.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Ruben. Krishna, S. 258 on some tracks of *Bodhisattva* in Buddhist narrative literature.

<sup>65</sup> See S. Dutt. *Early Buddhist monachism*, Bombay, 1960; Mookerji, *Op. cit.*, pp. 414 sq.; I. B. Horner, *Women under primitive Buddhism*, Delhi, 1975, pp. 118 sq; cf. also; A. Ellenjittam. *Monasticism, Christian and Hindu Buddhist*, Bombay, 1970.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. L. Feer. *Professions interdites par le Bouddhisme*—"Actes du Congrès International des Orientalistes", Leide, 1890, pp. 65-71.

<sup>67</sup> *Dialogues of the Buddha*, pt. II, p. 330. An analogous approach has parallels in Hindu tradition; cf. *MU* I. 3: "in this foul-smelling, unsubstantial body... what is good of the enjoyment of desires" (*Principal Upanisads*, p. 796); III. 4; *Manu* VI. 76 sq.; etc. Similar denigration is characteristic of Christian ascetics and especially *Fools for Christ's sake* (see below).



do not exceed the limits of reasonable reserve. Following his "middle way" principle, Buddha used to blame not only the indulgence in vice of some recluses and brāhmaṇas, but also their extreme ascetic austerities, which manifested themselves in self-torture, neglect of dress, starvation, dirtiness, loss of human appearance, etc. This, to certain degree, conforms to Buddha's criticism of orthodox Vedic tradition and is close to some traits of the Upanishadic approach (cf. *MtU* VII, 9). Such is the evidence of the earlier DN suttas on the naked ascetic who licks his hands after eating instead of washing them, wears rags picked up from a dust heap, plucks out his hair and beard, feeds on filth (like cow-dung, etc.), and so on. All these austerities, according to Buddha, are of no use "if the state of blissful attainment in conduct, in heart, in intellect, have not been practised by him, realized by him..." (DN VIII, 14 sq.).<sup>68</sup> In DN XXV, 8, arguing with a wandering ascetic (paribājaka) Nigrodha, Buddha says that these kinds of austerity are a blemish in ascetics and sets off the genuine Buddhist austerity against the former ones (cf. critique of certain practices in DN VI, 6 sq.).<sup>69</sup> One of the most vivid images is the naked ascetic, Korakkhattiya, who "wants to behave like a dog, walking on all fours, or sprawling on the ground and taking up food, whether hard or soft, with his mouth only (without using his hands)". According to Buddha's prediction, he is reborn, like other naked ascetics, in the fearsome shape "of the Kālakañjas, the very lowest of the Asura groups" (DN XXIV, 1.7 sq.)<sup>70</sup> The text evidently refers to a certain sect of ascetics who behaved like dogs (kukkuravatika). We read about such an ascetic (together with another, behaving like a bull) in Kukkuravatika sutta (MN 57) where Buddha says that they must be reborn either in purgatory or in the form of an animal.<sup>71</sup>

68 Dialogues of the Buddha, pt. I, pp. 226 sq.

69 Cf. *Dīghanikāya* in Auswahl, übers. v. R. Otto Franke, Göttingen und Leipzig, 1913, S. 305 sq., U. Dhammaratana. Buddha and ascetism—"Indian Historical Quarterly"; v. 33, N. 2, 1957, pp. 129-138; H. F. Holck. Typische Ausdrucksformeln der körperlichen Askese in Altindischer Literatur—"Asiatische Studien", XXIV, N. 1-2, 1970, S. 34-50. Cf. also concerning the psychopathological aspect of the problem: J. Moussaieff Masson. The psychology of the ascetic—"Journal of Asian Studies", v. 35, N. 4, 1976, pp. 611-625.

70 Dialogues of the Buddha, pt. III, pp. 11 sq.

71 It is possible that the well-known scene from ChU I. 12, depicting recitation of a certain ritual text by dogs (śauva udgītha) refers to this kind of ascetic. Cf. A. Hillebrandt. Weitere Bemerkungen zu den Upaniṣads—ZDMG, Bd. 71, 1917, S. 313-314; Winternitz. Op. cit., t. II, Calcutta, 1933, p. 50; A. Syrkin. K toikovaniju Chāndogya upaniṣad I. 12—"Jazyki Indii, Pakistana, Nepala i Cejlona", Moskva, 1968, pp. 463 sq.



## The Salutary Descent

This evidence characterizes a "middle" degree of "descent", practised by a Buddhist devotee proceeding along the Eightfold Noble path. At the same time it presents valuable material on specific types of austerity, sometimes going beyond the limits of normal behaviour and widespread in some Hindu sects. In this respect there is noteworthy evidence of certain austerities practised by Hindu aspirants — one more kind of "descent" reminding us of some of Buddha's opponents.

5. We are concerned with Shivaite ascetics called *pāsupatas* (from Śiva's epithet *Paśupati* — "Lord of cattle"). The Shivaite practices were especially noted for certain excesses — going about naked, eating impurities, cruel self-tortures in the sects of *kāpalikas*, *kālamukhas*, *aghorapathins*, etc.<sup>72</sup> The example of *pāsupatas* is interesting here, regarding some peculiar traits of behaviour cited in valuable evidence of *Pāsupata sūtras* (perhaps by Lakulīśa, ca. 100 A.D.) and in the commentary by Kaundinya (ca. IV c. A.D.).<sup>73</sup> The five periods of *pāsupata*'s life can be partially correlated to brāhmaṇa's traditional stages of life (*āśramas*). The first period already contains some eccentric details — in this period he is attached to the temple (PS I, 61). His worship of Śiva includes, beside prayers, acts of magical imitation: he lows like a bull, laughs, etc. (I, 80). In the second period he leaves the temple and purposely commits various ridiculous and improper actions. The next stages of his life remind one of more regular ascetism (living in a cave, in a cemetery, etc.). In this sequence the most peculiar is the second period, marked by his attempts to humiliate himself. Here he removes his sectarian marks (PS III, 1) in order not to be recognized by people, does everything possible to be despised (*avamata*) by them and wanders about like an outcast (III, 11 — *prsta*). He simulates abnormal states, plays the lecher, acts improperly, speaks nonsense, etc.; and all this "so that he may come to be ill treated" (III, 18). These masochistic eccentricities have, however, a serious purpose. They are based on the belief that the unfounded contempt of others, i.e. contempt and slander provoked by his apparent, degraded state, will transfer his own bad karma (*pāpa*) to these peo-

<sup>72</sup> Cf. H. v. Glasenapp. *Der Hinduismus*. München, 1922, S. 390 sq.; A comprehensive history of India, v. II. Bombay, 1957, pp. 393 sq. (J. N. Banerjea); D. Lorenzen. *The kāpālikas and kālamukhas—two lost Shivaite sects*. Berkeley, 1972; etc. Concerning the analysis of corresponding sources cf. Holck, *Op. cit.*; J. F. Sprockhoff *Samnyāsa. Quellenstudien zur Askese im Hinduismus*, I. Wiesbaden, 1976.

<sup>73</sup> *Pāsupata sūtras* with *Panchārthabhāṣya* of Kaundinya, ed. R. Ananthakrishna Sastri, Trivandrum, 1940; see: D. Ingalls. *Cynics and pāsupatas: the seeking of dishonor* — "Harvard Theological Review", v. 55, N. 3, 1962, pp. 281-298; Lorenzen, *Op. cit.*, pp. 173 sq.



ple and give him their good karma, thus liberating him from evil (III, 6-9)<sup>74</sup> for "a wise man, being ill-treated, accomplishes thereby all ascetism" (III 19)<sup>75</sup>. We see that this deliberate humiliation again directly serves as a step to ascent, to perfect liberation. The inspirations, however, according to some elements of Shivaite doctrine, are not quite equal to traditional Hinduist mokṣa. This liberation presupposes mastering the supernatural power by likening the believer to Śiva-Rudra (cf. the magic character of certain actions, performed by him during the first period of his life — PS I, 8; see above). At the same time a peculiar method practised by pāśupata, marks his "descent" not only from the social, but also from the moral point of view. Unlike brahmācārin the pāśupata—at least in this period of his life — aims not so much at improving his own qualities as at appropriating the merits of others. The results of his purely egoistic aims appear in some respects to be quite contrary to certain altruistic descents mentioned above. Indeed, hiding his real state (e.g., removing the sectarian mark he bears in the first period—cf. PS III, 1), he purposely leads his neighbours astray in order to rob them of their merits. His subsequent rise thus takes place at the expense of those deceived by him.

Some details of pāśupata's behaviour call forth analogies with a well-known phenomenon of Greek antiquity—the way of life led by cynics. In ancient sources ("De clarorum philosophorum vitis" of Diogenes Laertius, Orations of Dio Chrysostomus, etc.) we find evidence of certain excesses by Diogenes and his followers: Monimos, Krates, Hipparchia, etc. Thus, e.g., Diogenes likewise practised unusual austerities, insulted others, relieved nature in public, imitated dogs, justified stealing, etc. (cf. Diog. Laert. VI, 22 sq.; 32 sq.; 69 sq.); Monimos imitated madness (ibid., 82); Krates provoked people's mockery (90 sq.); his wife, Hipparchia, dressed like a man (97); etc. (cf. also Dio Chrys. VIII, 16). Some parallels are evident enough, e.g. imitating dogs that gave the name for corresponding schools in both cultures: 'Skr. kukkura (see above) — resp. Greek *kyon*, *kynikos*. On the other hand, their aspirations have less in common. The cynic's way of life similarly aimed at his own perfection (though substantially modified in comparison with Hindu

74 Belief in the possibility of corresponding transference (e.g., as a result of disrespecting brāhmaṇa, of appropriating the other's good, etc.) is testified in a number of Hindu sources — cf. Man III, 100; IV, 200 sq.; Pāñcatantra, text of Pūrṇabhadra, IV, 1; etc.

75 Ingalls, Op. cit., pp. 291 sq. Cf. Ibid. pp. 294 sq. on similar evidence outside this tradition, particularly on a number of "beast-vows": the bull-vow (govrata in Jaiminīya brāhmaṇa and other sources: cf. above on MN 57), the cock-vow, etc., with a reference to his review of D. D. Kosambi's Introduction to the study of Indian history (in JAOS, v, 77, 1957, p. 223).



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ideals); independence from physical discomfort; contempt for delights; following paths of virtue, the shortest in their opinion being that of cynism; etc. (cf. Diog. Laert. VI, 70 sq.; 104; Dio Chrys. VIII, 20; IX, 12; etc.). Thus the dishonour (*adoxia*) sought by them had, to a certain degree, the same function as that of *pāsupata's* *avamana*<sup>76</sup>. The cynic's behaviour is particularly interesting when regarded within the framework of a religious cult (however conditional a demarcation may seem). As we know, they esteemed Heracles as their patron and teacher, whom they tried to imitate (cf. a device of imitation in *pāsupata* worship) by despising pleasure, valuing freedom, etc. (cf. Diog. Laert. VI, 71; Lucianus, *Convivium, seu Lapithae* 16; etc.).<sup>77</sup> The image of Heracles himself is noteworthy enough, considering a number of essential details of his life — his birth from a god who descended to earth; his numerous misfortunes and humiliations suffered during his wanderings; his salutary exploits in fighting monsters and oppressors; his painful death and his regaining immortality in heaven.<sup>78</sup> These provide suggestive parallels to soteriological evidence partly mentioned above.

76 Ibid., p. 292.

77 Cf. F. Sayre. *The Greek cynics*, Baltimore, 1948, p. 89, etc. D. Ingalls (Op. cit., pp. 292 sq.) suggests some parallels between cynics' *eleutheria* and *pāsupatas'* *mukta*, as meaning in both cases "not only freedom from suffering but freedom to unlimited power". He draws further parallels between the club as Heracles weapon and symbol and the meaning of *pāsupata* teacher's name *Lakuliśa* ("Lord of the club"). However, his witty hypothesis (ibid., p. 296, n. 30) that *Lakuliśa* (which served also as Śiva's epithet) is derived from *Herakles* as a result of loss of the first syllable and R/L alternation, "in order to help out a folk etymology", seems rather dubious. He himself justly doubts (ibidem) the possibility of a genetic relation and suggests the parallel influence of archaic shamanistic practices (particularly in the phenomenon of the magical beast imitation — cf. above, note 75) on both traditions.

78 See, e.g., ancient Greek evidence of corresponding cult of saviour and benefactor (partly independent from Cynical tradition): Euripides. *Heracles*, 1252 (*eyergetes brotoisi*); Plutarchus. *Lycurgus*, XXX. 2; Dio Chrys. *De imperio orat.* I. 84: "This... was what made him Deliverer (*sotera*) of the earth and of the human race... And even to this day... you have in him a helper and protector" (Dio Chrysostom, with an Engl. transl. by J. W. Cohoon, v. I, London, 1949, pp. 44 sq.); Artemidorus, *Onirocriticon* II, 37; etc. Cf. L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, Bd. II, Berlin, 1875, S. 272 sq.; H. v. Willamowitz-Moellendorf, *Euripides Heracles*, Berlin, 1909, S. 102 sq.; F. Pfister. *Herakles und Christus* — "Archiv für Religionswissenschaft", Bd. 34, 1937, S. 42-60; M. Muhl. *Des Heracles Himmelfahrt* — "Rheinisches Museum", N. F., Bd. 101, H. 2, 1958, S. 106-134 (particularly, S. 133 — analogy with Christ); G. K. Galinski. *The Heracles themes*, Oxford, 1972, pp. 44, 126 sq.; etc.



At the same time, notwithstanding the mutual search for dis-  
respect characteristic of both trends, the cynics' achievement of  
perfection differs from that of pāsupatas in certain essential respects.  
Cynics associated their personal progress with the aim of improving  
other people. They compared the beneficial influence in their way  
of life with the benefit brought to the human body by medicine :  
"Just as the good physician should go and offer his services where  
the sick are most numerous, so, said he (Diogenes), the man of  
wisdom should take up his abode where fools are thickest in order  
to convict them of their folly and reprove them" (Dio Chrys. VIII,  
5; cf. X).<sup>79</sup> An altruistic approach is here opposed to the pāsupatas'  
egoism which causes harm to their neighbours. A noteworthy  
parallel to cynics' self denigration, more directly correlated with the  
sphere of religious behaviour, is found in later Christian tradition.<sup>80</sup>  
Thus we shall once again go beyond the domain of Indian evidence.

6. This parallel has another justification: a common typological  
trait serving an important factor in the traditions compared — a  
likening to the object of Cult.<sup>81</sup> It appears, on the one hand, in  
various symbolic forms (like communion). On the other, it appears  
in concrete imitation of certain deeds and states of the deity, deter-  
mining to a great extent the character of religious behaviour — not  
only in its ritualistic part but also in other less formalized spheres.  
A corresponding principle, relevant to some examples discussed  
above (imitating Śiva, Heracles), can motivate, in particular, imi-  
tation of the god's descent to typical of Christianity.

Certain aspects of Christ's descent, though connected directly  
with our theme, need special attention.<sup>82</sup> Regarding this problem

79 Dio Chrysostom, v. I, pp. 378 sq ; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 418 sq. Cf. also  
Pseudo-Diogenes. Epistolae 10. See Ingalls, *Op. cit.* pp. 293 sq.

80 Concerning some aspects of this influence cf., e.g., J. Leipoldt.  
*Griechische philosophie und fruhchristliche Askese*, Berlin,  
1961, S. 39, 62 sq.; etc.

81 Cf., for example, on corresponding evidence in archaic mental-  
ity: L. Levi-Bruhl. *La mythologie primitive*, Paris, 1935. pp.  
160 sq ; *idem*. *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieu-  
res*, Paris, 1951, pp. 68 sq.

82 Concerning this problem we shall briefly mention here one of  
the aspects connected with the following exposition: the "hu-  
manized" image of Christ as a substantial detail of his earthly  
apparition with certain opposite qualities marking this image.  
See, e.g., the Gospels's evidence (with respect to some traits of  
Hindu and Buddhist preceptors mentioned above) on wrath,  
condemnation, curses etc. combined with their opposite actions  
and states in Mt 10. 34 sq ; 11. 20 sq.; 12. 34 sq.; 13. 40 sq ; 23  
33 sq.; 25. 41 sq.; Mr 9. 19 sq.; Lc 9. 41; In 2. 15; etc. Cf., C.G  
Jung. *Answer to Job*. Princeton, 1973, pp. 44 sq.; 74 sq. (parti-  
cularly on the image of the "wrathful Lamb"); Syrkin. *K*  
*xa:akteristike*, pp. 165 sq.; 182 sq.; etc.



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we shall concentrate on a particular kind of imitation of Christ — that of the passion and humiliation suffered by him.<sup>83</sup> The image of a recluse or wanderer, who lives in poverty and humiliation, rejects social position (secular or ecclesiastical), hides his holiness under the guise of folly and is recognized only after death, is often found in hagiography — sometimes in obvious connection with typical folklore motifs (cf. above, note 13). The believer thus seems to participate in Christ's suffering, the self-humiliation practised by him becoming a device for salvation. It is natural that such an imitation often follows the main trait of the model: suffering for the salvation of one's neighbour.

We shall refer in this connection to a type of religious man esteemed as a saint and called *salos* ("fool") in Byzantine tradition (or more precisely, *dia Christoy salos* — "Fool for Christ's sake"; cf. Russ. "jurodivyj"). Though this designation already refers to the Saviour's image,<sup>84</sup> the "fool's" behaviour in some respects far exceeds Christ's example. Preserving its beneficent influence, it is characterized by certain eccentric actions which violate the established etiquette. A number of these "fools" were canonized in Byzantium and Russia.<sup>85</sup> The "fool's" way of life was not provided by the monks' statutes and belonged to the so-called optional "opera supererogatoria". We shall cite here the example of one of the earliest "fools", Symeon of Emesa (VI c.), whose life was written ca. the middle of the VII century.<sup>86</sup>

Speaking of his hero's youth, the author refers to a peculiar form of ascetism previously practised by Symeon: a life of *boskos* (133.3, "a grazing animal") who lived almost naked under the open sky feeding on wild herbs and roots.<sup>87</sup> Young Symeon lives in a

<sup>83</sup> Cf. the treatise of the same name (*Imitatio Christi*) by Thomas a Kempis. One can be reminded of the constant use of such words as "humble", "humility", "suumission", "infirmity", "self-denial", etc., sounding here like leit-motifs.

<sup>84</sup> cf. the characteristic formula of corresponding service (troparion): "your slave, o Christ... was a fool on the earth for your sake" (*Pravoslavnyj molitvoslov*, Moskva, 1970, p. 162). cf. in this connection: A. Smitmans. *Der Narr Jesus. Glauben wieder den Strich*. Stuttgart, 1974' S. 16, 45 sq.; etc.

<sup>85</sup> See i. Kovalevskij. *Jurodstvo o Xriste i Xrista radi jurodivye*. Moskva, 1900; S. Hilpisch. *Die Torheit um Christi willen — "Zeitschrift für Askese und Mystik"*, 6 Jhrg., H. 2, 1931, S. 121-131; E. Benz. *Heilige Narrheit — "Kyrios"*, 3, 1938, S. 1-55; P. Hauptmann. *Die "Narren um Christi willen" in der Ostkirche — "Kirche in Osten"*, Bd. 2, 1959, S. 27-49; G. p. Fedotov. *Sviatyje drevnej Rusi (X-XVII st.)*, New York, 1960, pp. 191 sp.; D. S. Lixacev, A. M. Pancenko, N. V. Ponyrko *Smex V drevnej Rusi*, Leningrad, "Nauka", 1984, pp. 72sq.; 79 sq.; Vs. Rochcau, *Saint Simeon Salos, ermite palestinien et prototype des "Fous-pour-le-Christ"* — "Prohc-Orient chre;jien", t. 28, 1978 pp. 209-219;



monastery with his friend, but decides to leave the desert and return to the world to save his neighbours (quoting I Cor. 10.24). He goes first to Jerusalem and then to Emesa, where his eccentric exploits begin. He enters the town dragging the carcass of a dog, disturbs the peace in the Church on the next Sunday, etc. Now and then he transgresses rules of decency — relieves himself in public, walks about naked, jumps, slaps others and receives blows himself. At the same time he performs miracles: drives the devil out, foretells death, and so on. This way of life appears to be opposed to that of *boskos* (which itself presents a kind of deliberate humility, along with elements of characteristic animal-imitation). The opposition *boskos-salos* thus marks the two parts of Symeon's life (as well as the structure of the corresponding text). Living as a "fool", Symeon systematically violates certain prohibitions followed by devotees (and particularly by *boskos*), while in rather a contradictory manner he simultaneously observes them. These violations refer to different spheres of behaviour, especially those directly connected with religious prescriptions. For example, preserving the utmost piety (cf. 122, 15 sq.; 154, 12 sq.; etc.) he roisters in church (145, 25 sq.); observing the fast (148, 20 sq.; etc.) he violates it (148, 10; 156, 25 sq.);<sup>86</sup> remaining chaste he disrobes before women, dances with harlots (147, 25 sq.; 154, 28 sq.; etc.); though in sound mind, he commits senseless actions (cf. 150, 20 sq.). It is characteristic that all these eccentricities are often accompanied by self denigration, provoking blows, etc. (147, 5 sq.; 15 sq.; etc.) or by humour and jokes (157, 17 sq.). His nightly prayers and lamentations are followed by morning gaiety (166, 7 sq.).

Symeon appears as an embodiment of divine folly which surpasses the wisdom of man (I Cor. 3.18; 4. 10; etc.). It must be stressed, however, that his folly is quite conscious and deliberate

idem, *Que savons-nous de Fous-pou, -le-Christ? — "Irenikon"*, t. 53, 1980, pp. 341—353; 501—512; etc. See more detailed exposition in: A. Syrkin. On the behaviour of "fool for Christ's sake"—"History of Religions", vol. 22, No. 3, November 1982, pp. 150-171.

86 See: *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca*, t. 93, Parisiis 1895, pp. 1659-1748; L. Ryden. *Das Leben des Heiligen Narren Symeon von Leontios von Neapolis*, Uppsala, 1963 (whose critical edition on pp. 121-170 we follow here); idem. *Bemerkungen zum Leben des Heiligen Narren Symeon von Leontios von Neapolis*, Uppsala, 1970.

87 See parallel evidence of Sozomenus, *Kirchengeschichte*, hrsq. v. J. Bidez, Berlin, 1960, S. 289 11 15; Ioannis Moschi *Pratum spirituale*, *Patrologiae*, t. 87, pt. 3. Parisiis. 1865, pp. 3028 sq.; etc. Cf. above, note 75.

88 Concerning these excesses cf. L. Ryden, *Der Asket als Fresser—"Eranos"*, vol. 67, 1969, S. 48—53.



(145, 25; 152, 4; etc.) He tries to conceal his wisdom and virtue, revealing them only to deacon John (cf. 157, 16; 160, 19 sq; 166, 18 sq)

Among other saintly "fools" in Byzantium one is reminded of Andrew (ca. 880-946),<sup>89</sup> similarly famous for his exploits, though perhaps less striking. Andrew deliberately performed them, "playing (*paizon*) like this wonderful Symeon of old" (648A). This tradition is perhaps still more popular in the Russian Orthodox Church. We find here a number of "jurodiryj" whose standard hagiographic images were evidently influenced by Byzantine prototypes. The peak of this tradition occurred in the XVIth century — the age of Vasilij Blavzennyj, Nikola Pakovskij a. o. Their exploits are often analogous to those of Symeon: they suffer blows and are sometimes aggressive themselves, violate public decency, play the lecher, etc.<sup>90</sup> This evidence, like similar trends in Western Christianity,<sup>91</sup> was compared with scenic performances of mimes, buffoons, etc.<sup>92</sup> Symeon's behaviour indeed looks sometimes like that of an actor — cf. his simulating in public and behaving "normally" otherwise (155, 19 sq.; 166, 5 sq.; etc.).<sup>93</sup> Here we find certain elements of comic effect as well. His eccentricities and inconsisten-

<sup>89</sup> patrologiae, t. III, parisiis, 1863, pp. 627—888; cf. S. Murray. A study of the of Andreas, the Fool for the sake of Christ. Diss. Munchen, 1910; Hilpisch, op. cit., S. 127 sq.; etc.

<sup>90</sup> See above, note 85; cf. also: I. I. Kuznecov. Svjatyje Blazennye Vasilij i Ioann, Xrista radi moskovskie cudotvorcy — "Zapiski moskovskogo arxeologiceskogo instituta", t. VIII, 1910, pp. 45 sq.; 84 sq; I. U. Budovnic, Jurodivye drevnej Rusi—"Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma", XII, Moskva, 1964, pp. 170 195; etc.

<sup>91</sup> Cf., e.g., the evidence on John of God (1495 1550), founder of the Hospitallers, who simulated insanity, received blows, etc. In the West, however, we do not find exactly the same tradition of the "fool", but, rather, separate details of corresponding behaviour. Cf. noteworthy traits of St. Francis of Assisi, who called himself and his pupils "joculatores domini". Though abstaining from certain obscene excesses he violates separate rules pertinent to laymen and clergy (cf. Celano. Vita prima, I, XV, XIX; Fioretti VIII, X; etc.). His disciple Juniper (Ginepro) rejoices in abuses, falsely accuses himself of indecency, etc. (Life of Juniper, I sq; V, VIII sq). Cf. K. Hefele. Die Bettelorden und das religiöse Volksleben Ober und Mittelitaliens in XIII Jahrhundert, Leipzig, 1910, S. 49 sq; G. Widengren, Harlekin tracht und Monchskutte. Clownhut und Derwischmutze — "Orientalia Suecana", v. II, 1953, S. 79; etc.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. H. Reich. Der Mimus. Hildesheim, New York, 1974, S. 822 sq.; J. Horovitz. Spuren griechischer Mimen im Orient, Berlin, 1905, S. 34 sq; 50 sq; Widengren. Op. cit. S. 77; Lixacev, Pancenko, Ponyrko, Op. cit., pp. 81 sq; etc

<sup>93</sup> Cf. similar behaviour of Russian Jurodivyj Fjodor (Zitie protopopa Avvakuma, Moskva, 1960, p. 99).



cies naturally arouse a similar reaction in the public (which corresponds to Symeon's aim: to provoke derision and to laugh at the world himself — 142, 26).

The "fool's" tradition, regarded within the framework of religious behaviour, helps, in our opinion, to establish certain regularities pertaining to our problem. It has been said that Symeon's first period of life can be correlated to a non-acceptance of the world (the state of a *boskos* as a form of monastic life). The Second part can be correlated to an acceptance, which is, however, on a higher level. The "fool" behaves "incorrectly" from the profane point of view and sometimes even "not correctly" from the monk's. However, he still remains in his lofty state, where these generally accepted opposites are no longer pertinent. One may say that on this higher level he neutralizes the "incorrect" — "correct" opposition.<sup>94</sup> He is found thus — in terms used in note 94 — between the II and the III levels. Indeed, we see how Symeon, surmounting the "incorrect" — "correct" dichotomy, overcomes such oppositions (pertinent to monks) as, e.g., "wisdom" — "folly" (insanity),

94 With respect to Orthodox Christianity we can speak here of the sequence: layman (*laikos*) — monk (*monachos*) — "fool for Christ's sake" (*salos*, *jurodivyj*) where the transition to a new level involves overcoming certain values, characteristic of the previous one. In the Eastern Orthodox tradition the first two levels were designated as "incorrect" — "correct" ("nepravil'nyj" — "pravil'nyj") respectively (cf., e.g., Ju. Lotman, B. Uspenskij. *Novye aspekty izuchenija kul'tury drevnej Rusi* — "Voprosy literatury", N. 3, 1977, pp. 162 163) — i. e. the layman's "incorrect" acceptance of the world and the monk's "correct" non-acceptance. These types of behaviour can be correlated to a scheme proposed by us on the basis of ancient Indian evidence, but probably applicable to a certain degree to other traditions as well. This scheme includes three levels: the first, the "acceptance" of the world, whereby a number of pragmatic, ethic, etc. oppositions remain pertinent; it is connected, e.g., with the state of *grhastha* ("staying at home" — the head of a family, who performs all social duties). The second level of "non acceptance" rejects certain pragmatic values pertinent to the first level, still preserving some ethical values and the relevance of the general oppositions of "acceptance" — "non-acceptance". Such are the states of recluses and wandering ascetics who more or less consistently renounce the world. The third level is the state of highest bliss (cf. notions of *brāhmaṇa*, *arabant*, etc.) where all the opposites resulting from distinctions between the subject and the object (including the "acceptance" — "non-acceptance") are neutralized. Consequently, the identity of the "subject" — "object", "Self" — "not-Self," and other more specific opposites is proclaimed (cf. below, note 97). See A. Syrkin. On some correspondences between ancient Hindu classification, "Darshana International", Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1985, pp. 15 sq.



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"purity" — "dirtiness" "honour" — "dishonour", etc. This ability naturally draws him to the state of highest perfection and, though his exploits were regarded as "opera supererogatoria" (cf. above), he is occasionally imbued with a degree of holiness that many saints fall short of. In this respect one can draw strong parallels between Symeon and Christ.<sup>95</sup> The "fool" leaves the desert and returns to the world to save mortals; he casts out the devil, miraculously provides food for people, etc. (cf. 123, 22 sq.; 150, 7 sq.; 162, 22 sq.; 163, 16 sq.). The final parallel is the disappearance of his body, taken to heaven after the burial (168, 26 sq.). The image of Symeon appears in a definite dynamics of elevation — from *boskos* to *salos* and to the highest sanctity with ascension to heaven, similar to that of Christ. This rise, however, suggests a transition from a non-acceptance state, marked by a set of prohibitions, to a state where these prohibitions are violated.<sup>96</sup> We have seen that his behaviour is condemned not only by laymen but by monks as well. Thus, the "fool's" spiritual rise becomes inseparable from a social, even moral, and intellectual degradation — a kind of trial that somehow differs from the model of Christ's passions and involves humiliations that befall the buffoon, lecher, etc. Like *pāsupata* or cynic, he deliberately provokes contempt, abuse, and beating and so descends to the bottom of the social hierarchy. However, contrary to *pāsupata* (and to a certain degree similar to the cynic) he has an altruistic aim: "first of all to save souls by the harm that he has inflicted constantly in derision, by the miracles he has performed in a foolish manner, or by the admonition he has given them behaving like *salos*" (157, 13 sq.). He returns to men in order to save not only himself but also others, by laughing at the world (142; 15; 26). As we see, besides this equivocal but salutary device, he now and then performs direct benefactions — saves from poison, cures demoniacs and so on (147, 15 sq.; 149, 27 sq.; 162, 12 sq.; etc.). Surpassing all wisdom and reason by his godly folly (169, 1 sq.) Symeon at his higher level is no longer defiled by prohibited "incorrect" things which his friend, *boskos* John, is still afraid of (122, 15 sq.; 149, 17 sq.; 154, 27 sq.; etc. — 142, 28; 143, 16 sq.). The

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Ryden. *Bemerkungen*, S. 25, 34 35, 78-79, 124-125, 130, 134 sq.; 138-140; etc.

<sup>96</sup> This state must be distinguished from another type of religious behaviour: that of especially prescribing the performance of definite prohibitions (e.g., in certain tantric sects practising special modes of sexual relations, the eating of meat, etc.). Violations of separate taboos can scarcely be correlated here to a higher level of behaviour (in the sense accepted above) since in this performance they acquire a new, positive significance. Remaining thus within the limits of the "acceptance"—"non-acceptance" level, they only suggest the reversed order of positive and negative values.



"fool" thus combines certain opposing qualities, providing an instance of *coincidentia oppositorum*.<sup>97</sup> In this case, the saint realizes both parts of different oppositions (cf. 169, 11 sq.) paying tribute to each. At the same time certain oppositions emerging from the "subject" — "object" discrimination, remain unsurpassed by Symeon. In an escapist manner, he still remains sensitive to some

97 Cf. a noteworthy analogy to perfection, that successively neutralizes corresponding values; "let a Brāhmaṇa after he has done with learning (*pāṇḍityam*), desire to live as a child (*bālyena*). When he has done (both) with the state of childhood and with the learning, then he becomes a silent meditator (*munih*). Having done with (both) the non meditative and the meditative states, then he becomes a Brāhmaṇa (a knower of Brahman)" (BU III. 5.1 — cf. Principal Upaniṣads, p. 221). Another parallel to the "fool's" immunity from evil is found in the same text: "He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works" (BU IV. 4.22; see also KtU II. 2.11; Chu VIII. 4.1; etc. — cf. Principal Upaniṣads, p. 279; etc.). BU IV. 3.22 presents another typical example of *coincidentia*: "there (in that state) a father is not a father, a mother is not a mother, the words are not the words, the gods are not the gods, the Vedas are not the Vedas. There a thief is not a thief, a murderer is not a murderer ... an ascetic is not an ascetic" (Principal Upaniṣads, p. 263). On these types of description (combining both opposites, expressing pure negation, etc.), particularly in Indian sources, see: R. T. Blackwood. *Neti, Neti — Epistemological problems of mystical experience — 'Philosophy East and West'*, v. 13, N. 3, 1963, pp. 201-209; O. Lacombe. *Approches negatives de l'absolu dans la pensee indienne — "La table ronde"*, N 182, 1963, pp. 46-50; Syrkin, *Correspondences*, pp. 26 sq.; B. Matilal. *Mysticism and reality: ineffability — "Journal of Indian philosophy"* v. 3, 1975, pp. 217-252; H. G. Blocker. *The language of mysticism — "The Monist"*, v. 59, N 4, 1976, pp. 551-562; etc. Cf. also M. Eliade. *La coincidentia oppositorum et la mystere de la totalite — EJ*, 1958, Bd. XXVII, S. 195 sq. Some opposites discussed here are neutralized in this *coincidentia* — not only in their metaphorical (social or moral) use, as in the examples drawn above, but literally as well. Cf., e.g., ChU VII. 25. 1-2: "That (infinite) indeed is below. It is above ... it is indeed all this ... I, indeed, am below. I am above ... I, indeed, am all this... The self (*ātma*) indeed is below. The self is above... The self indeed is all this ..." (Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 487-488). Similar equations can follow from the device of microcosmic-macrocosmic identifications, so important in the dogmatics of the Upaniṣads (cf. S. Schayer. *Über die Bedeutung des Wortes Upaniṣad — "Rocznik Orientalistyczny"*, t. III, 1927, pp. 57 sq.; A. Syrkin. *Sistema otzdestvlenij v Chandogja upaniṣade — "Works on semiotics"*, II, Tartu, 1965, pp. 278 sq.). An example of such neutralization with respect to tree-symbolism is presented in the universal image of a tree with roots above and branches below (*arbor inversa*). The tree image is equated particularly with Brahman in Hindu tradition, with Christ in Christian, etc. Cf. KtU II. 3.1; MtU VI. 4; Bg Xv. 1-3; etc.



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prohibitions (e. g. intercourse with women,<sup>98</sup> praise of people, etc.); partially neutralizing separate "incorrect"—"correct" (resp. acceptance)—"non-acceptance" opposites. Thus he realizes, as we have already said, a kind of borderline "II-III levels" situation. This peculiarity seems to be connected with more general traits of the religion's typology. we should remember, in particular, that Christian canonical tradition does not contain as explicit evidence of the "subject—and—object", "Self—and—not-Self", "God-and-individual" coincidence as the Hindu Scripture does.<sup>99</sup> At the same time, the Christian ideal of highest bliss and perfection evidently preserves the notion of individuality (cf. below). In this respect the "fool", notwithstanding his oddity, is still closer to a traditional Orthodox Christian than to a Hindu saint. His "weak" human points are displayed in the course of his (apparently abnormal and eccentric) premeditated salutary approach to men from a "non acceptance" state. These points clarify some aspects of his functional affinity to a divine creature who deliberately lowers his level for the sake of saving people.

7. The examples drawn above refer to different, mostly independent, traditions. This evident independence allows us to expose certain traits typical of the "salutary descent" phenomenon and pertinent to important aspects of religious study.

We have seen that rise and descent appear as the main characteristics of ethical space, in which the corresponding transference is closely connected with the moral evaluation of conduct. The "ethical" and "spatial" aspects often cannot be strictly demarcated. Their fusion appears, on the one hand, in most archaic cosmogonic

Cf. L von Schroeder. *Lebensbaum und Lebenstraum*—"Aufsätze zur Kultur=und Sprachgeschichte", München, 1916, S. 66 Sq., C.M. Edsman. *Arbor inversa. Heiland, Welt und Mensch als Himmelspflanzen*.—"Festschrift W. Baetke", Weimar, 1966, S. 85-109; J.G. Arapura, *The upside down tree in the Bhagavadgī āch. XV*—"Numen", v. 22, f. 2, 1975, pp. 131-144; etc.

98 Cf. an example of a more consecutive neutralization in behaviour of an Indian ascetic king Śikhidhvaṇa, practising intercourse with complete equanimity and not even stained by it. Cf. *Laghuyoga-vaśiṣṭha*, tr. by Narayanaswami Aiyar. Adyar, 1971, pp. 432 sq. (VI. 9).

99 See above, notes 95, 97; e.g., the Upanishadic motto: *tat tvam asi*—"That thou art"—Ch VI. 8.7 sq; cf. also BU I. 4.10: *aham brahmāsmi*; TU I, 5.1: *tad brahma, sa ātmā*; etc. The Christian analogies to this evidence are found, rather, in non-canonical later tradition of separate mystics and philosophers like Meister Eckhart, Jan van Ruysbroeck, Angelus Silesius, etc. It is not by chance that Meister Eckhart is often compared with Indian religious tradition. Cf. J. Politella. *Meister Eckhart and Eastern wisdom*—"Philosophy East and West", v. 15, N.1, 1965, pp. 117-133; etc.



beliefs and in folklore tradition<sup>100</sup> outside the sphere of religious dogmatics, on the other. Apart from certain "egoistic", "down-fall" descent (cf. above), "altruistic" descent in its direct (spatial) and metaphoric (social, physical, etc.) sense appears as one of the most important devices of salvation (from a certain calamity, oppression, etc., or from this worldly existence in general). The ethical connotation is already presupposed here by virtue of the purpose itself. This descent can also be traced, with definite modifications, in traditions that emphasize the necessity of the individual striving for salvation (as, e.g., in earlier Buddhism).

The descent motivates the subsequent rise, while the character of both substantially varies regarding the active and passive sides of the process: the saving and the saved, as we have seen, being capable of rising and falling in the drama of salvation. The saviour's descent is performed first of all by a divinity.<sup>101</sup> Here the situation of the earthly creature, helped by a heavenly one, presupposes the spatial descent, reflected in corresponding expressions with respect to Viṣṇu (avatāra), Christ, etc. We have seen that Buddhist dogmatics permit us also to speak of Buddha as of bodhisattva's last descent from heavenly to earthly existence. Upon the fulfillment of his task, the god's descent is necessarily followed by his ascent — his return to a genuine higher state, temporarily left by him. In principle such an act can be repeated by the same god. However, in accordance with the preached character of salvation, exactly the same function can be fulfilled by different persons ... Buddhas, tīrthāṅkaras (though one can also speak of salutary exploits performed by Gotama Buddha in his previous births — see the Jātaka). It can be placed not only in the past but in the future as well, constituting in this latter case different types of messianism (Kalki, Maitreya, tīrthāṅkaras of the next world-period, etc.).

The salvation can also be performed by a mortal creature, endowed with qualities of perfection—wisdom, piety, heroism. This person is sometimes close to divine incarnation and afterwards goes to heaven. The teacher can reach complete liberation after his death or even during his life-time (jīvanmukta), cf. for example, the Upanishadic sages preaching the tradition begun by Brahman (like

100 Cf. for example, Stith Thompson. *Motif-index of Folk-literature*, v. I, Copenhagen, 1955, pp. 94, 124, 205 sq.; v. III, 1956, pp. 10 sq.; etc. — v. I, pp. 94, 105, 118, 205; v. III, pp. 9, 14 sq.; etc. (on ascent and descent respectively).

101 The division of saviours and teachers into godlike and human-like is indeed rather conditional, particularly within the framework of the Hindu concept of transmigration. Neither does it always tally with the historicity of corresponding persons — so, e.g., the images of Gotama Buddha or Mahāvīra appear to be more authentic than those of some Hindu sages.



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Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka, a.o. — BU VI, 5. 2), or Christian saints imitating the divine Saviour and taken to heaven. Notwithstanding the subsequent, often literal, ascent, here the descent is naturally modified. Remaining a purposeful act, it becomes metaphorical, relating to certain social aspects of life in the manifold practices of Hindus, Jains, etc. It often involves physiological—and in some cases moral and intellectual—degradation as a deliberate device resorting to definite states simulated for the sake of didactics (cynics, “fools”). Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the teachers saving others and those saving themselves. So, the “fool’s” behaviour stresses the first function. In some ascetic trends, in cynicism, a corresponding mode of living is evidently intended to serve both aims; while in the case of pāsupatas one can speak of individual salvation only (cf. below). With respect to mortals such descent is naturally confined to the limits of the present worldly life of the teacher and in this sense remains single, without any past or future projections related to the same person.

The next category of descent refers to those actively saving themselves (but not others) or saved by somebody. They are usually mortals — at best on the way to liberation and immortality. In this case spatial descent is also possible, though, with respect to their location in the underworld, hell, land of spirits, etc. — a motif widespread in folklore and epics.<sup>102</sup> Its function often corresponds here to that of pilgrimage (“horizontal” transference), service with hard tasks and trials, initiation, etc. We find it, for example, in the story of Naciketas in KtU. However, in most of these cases we come across the allegorical — social or physical — descent. Cf. the practices (sometimes rather severe) of Shivaite, Jaina and other ascetics aimed at self perfection, or the tradition of Christian humility imitating the Saviour’s example in accordance with Mt 5.3 sq. and other canonical precepts (cf. note 13). This self-denigration can display itself in excessive, sometimes pathological forms. Such are the pāsupatas, whose eccentricities, though not unique, suggest, contrary to the rest, a peculiar kind of individual salvation at the expense of others. It is not always easy to differentiate between these relatively active aspirants, and those remaining more passive. Among the latter the most typical person is the pupil (brahmācārin). He is characterized in Hindu tradition by certain features distinguishing him from other āśrama states, also pertinent to the process of salvation — from the gr̥hastha (the brāhmaṇa householder appearing in the function of the teacher, like, e.g., Satyakāma Jābāla in ChU IV, 6 sq.) and from the recluse or ascetic (vānaprastha, śamnyāsin

<sup>102</sup> Cf. above, notes 19, 100. This symbolism is found in the latter as well (cf., e.g., the role of allegorical descent and the symbols of the well, the pit, etc. in T. Mann’s “Joseph und seine Bruder”).



as a rule following his individual path to salvation, but appearing also as preceptor).<sup>103</sup> In this state, apart from possible special tasks and trials, the regular social subordination takes place. The pupil lives for a definite period in his teacher's house, performing various duties (one can also find analogous evidence of a pupil's dependence and humiliation in other traditions). It must be stressed, however, that his humility is directly correlated to moral and spiritual elevation. Since the aspirant's liberation leads, according to Hindu dogmatics, to cessation of births (conceived also in the notions of spatial ascent), his way appears to be final. However, it may be repeated, in case of insufficient endeavour in pursuing the Truth, when after the partial ascent the deceased descends into the mother's womb and the cycle of rebirth continues (cf. note 6). One can observe that the ascetic's and student's life can also be led by divine creatures, the corresponding principles of behaviour remaining essentially the same. Nevertheless the aims of these aspirants and their achievements undergo considerable changes in the Hindu tradition. The divine or semi-divine ascetics aim, as a rule, at mastering an additional magic capacity and power.<sup>104</sup> The character of their subsequent elevation also varies — in the way in which gods and asuras use their power. Among gods, the image of Śiva is most typical in this respect; famous for his great austerities, he is venerated as the lord of yoga (Yogeśvara), patron of ascetics.<sup>105</sup> On the other hand, asuras (like Hiraṇyakaśipu, Bali, etc.) abuse their power, which leads them to moral degradation and causes suffering to other

103 Cf. note 94. See M. Winternitz. *Zur Lehre von den Āśramas — "Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festgabe H. Jacobi"*, Bonn, 1926 S. 215-227; F. Weinreich. *Entwicklung und Theorie der Āśrama-Lehre in Umriss* — "Archiv für Religionswissenschaft", Bd. 27. 1929, S. 77-92; A. Syrkin. *Nekotorye oboznaceniia asram v upanisadax* — "Księga pamiątkowa ku czci E. Śluszkiewiczza". Warszawa, 1974, pp. 230-233. Concerning the semantic structure of the corresponding group of notions and their correlation with some other basic Hindu concepts cf. also: Syrkin. *Correspondences*, pp. 19 sq.; 29.

104 It was traditionally sought not only by gods but by other legendary persons (like, e.g., vedic sages Viśvāmitra, Agastya, a.o.) and by mortals, particularly Śhaivite ascetics, like pāśupatas. This goal is accepted in Hindu tradition, where it is based on the belief in the supernatural effects of austerity and self-discipline and is often combined with moral superiority. At the same time it was more than once denounced by Buddha, who himself was endowed with such capacities (in this respect the divine pupils of the Buddha are nearer to the traditional student's image — cf. above, n. 44).

105 Cf. for example: W.D. O'Flaherty. *Ascetism and eroticism in the mythology of Śiva*, London, 1973, pp. 141 sq.; 173-9; 210 q



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creatures (hence the need for some of Viṣṇu's avatāras). The same difference displays itself in the process of study, for the salutary function of the Truth is similarly subject to this division of roles. the primordial enemies of gods, asuras, notwithstanding their efforts, are unable to grasp the Truth. Endowed with perverted minds, "desirous of a self different (from a true one)" — cf. *mU VII, 10*<sup>106</sup> they receive false knowledge, which leads them to destruction. However, as we have noted, this outcome occurs thanks to the premeditated stratagem of their godly preceptors.

Here we should like to recapitulate some peculiar features of the teacher's image, adding one more metaphorical shade to their descent. We refer to their evident aggressiveness — sometimes even cruelty — displaying itself in threats, anger, curse, etc. These latter obviously contradict the benefactory, salutary function (now and then explicitly expressed in benevolent world and deeds) and dispense corresponding images with a certain ambiguity. As we have seen, it refers not only to mortals (like Yājñavalkya, Satyakāma, a.o.) but, what might appear more strange at first sight, to divine teachers, embodiments of highest perfection (Viṣṇu) (Kṛṣṇa), Buddha, Christ.

One may suggest that these inconsistencies could be treated as an example of *coincidentia oppositorum*.<sup>107</sup> This phenomenon, however, cannot serve as a sufficient reason for the cases described above which relate to gods and mortals as well. Here we come across another aspect of the problem; directly connected with the process of descent (resp. "humanization"). The divine (or at any rate enlightened and perfected) creature, endowed with the highest knowledge, returns to the world to bring salvation to ordinary people. This aim obviously prevents him from neutralizing certain values, which remain pertinent to his function. Descending to a layman's level

<sup>106</sup> Principal Upaniṣads, p. 857. Cf. above, note 39.

<sup>107</sup> See Renou, *L'ambiguïté*; M. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions*. Paris, 1953, pp. 126 sq.; 393; A. Syrkin "Cernoe solnce" — 'Kratkie soobschenija Instituta narodov Azii', 80, 1965, pp. 27 sq.; O'Flaherty. *Op. cit.* pp. 33 sq.; etc. This attitude seems to be inherent in the religious cult, which needs a definite quota of those ambivalent characteristics that were not excluded but, on the contrary, canonized in corresponding texts. The specific gravity of this ambivalence evidently varies with respect to the object of cult. Thus we have a single or main relatively more ambivalent deity in the monotheistic or henotheistic systems, or one deity correlated with others in the dualistic or polytheistic systems, where the complementary distribution of corresponding traits is possible. Cf. Syrkin. *Karakteristike*, pp. 167 sq.; concerning the distribution of these characteristics cf. also: J.M. Roberts, Chiao Chien, T. N. Pandey. *Meaningful god sets from a Chinese personal pantheon and a Hindu personal pantheon* — "Ethnology", vol. 14, N. 2, 1975, pp. 121-148. Cf. also note 26.



which is even lower than the monk's "correct" state, overcome by him, he has to associate with people whose behaviour is characterized by "lower" categories. He should therefore resort to corresponding pragmatic devices, possibly including curses, threats, etc.; which, though sometimes contradicting his own principles (like Buddha's miracles—DN, XI, 3 sq; XXIV, 4 sq.; cf. note 61) seem to him necessary for success. The same refers to the "fool's" accentric devices marked by psychological and therapeutic motivation. In such a transition a perfected "Saviour" seems to be relatively degraded, and it is his "humanization", rather than the phenomenon of coincidentia oppositorum, that explains certain contradictions and inconsistencies displayed by him. As we see, this kind of descent sometimes appears in a correspondence to the believer's social humility and spiritual ascent. We refer to the image of the self-denying, suffering pupil in his relation to an illuminated though rude and merciless teacher: Janasruti — to Raikva, Upakosala — to Satyakāma, etc. However, the saviour's "humanization" is temporary, it is limited by the sphere of corresponding "lower" contact. The teacher does not change his perfection (already present or achieved upon the end of his earthly existence).

One should reconsider certain important doctrinal peculiarities mentioned here briefly regarding this transition. As we have noted, the Christian canonical dogmatics do not preach the state of complete "subject" — "object" or "self" — "not-self" neutralization; thus the saviour's descent with respective tribute to men's infirmities may look less inconsistent. At the same time, corresponding apparitions of Viṣṇu or Buddha, esteemed in terms of the highest "Self" — "not-self" equation (cf. notes 94, 99), appear more as a descent to a lower level of behaviour<sup>108</sup> — a discrepancy somehow modified by a traditional concept of the illusory character which these apparitions possess.<sup>109</sup> In this connection, a more consecutive way is represented by Jaina saint, tīrthaṅkara. According to dogmatics, he is above the desire of saving others (a particular instance of surmounting all desires) and appears rather as model and inspirer than helper and teacher.<sup>110</sup> In accordance with this, the Hindu aspirant, ascending to perfection, surmounts the world's

108 Note, e.g. the contrast between the god's terrifying theophany in Bg. XI, 10 sq. and his highest transcendent state (ibid. VI, 27 sq; VII, 24 sq; IX, 28 sq; etc.). Cf. R. C. Zaehner *Utopia and beyond: some Indian views* — EJ, 1963, Bd. XXXII, S. 296 sq.

109 Cf. e.g., Sparks, *Op. cit.*, pp. 192 sq.; J. Filliozat, *Docetisme chretien et docetisme indien* — "Laghu-prabandhāḥ", Leiden, 1974, pp. 53, 55; etc.

110 Cf. Thomas, *Op. cit.*, p. 196; *The world of Jainism*, p. 86; etc.



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temptations more consecutively and radically cf. note 98 on Śikhīdhvaja as compared to Symeon or other traditional image of a Christian saint).

These specific differences in the characteristics of the highest state are pertinent to another important aspect of our dichotomy, which deserves special attention. On the one hand every descent (divine or mortal) is marked by an individualized state where the person preserves (or subsequently resumes) his identity. On the other hand, in the Hindu-type traditions the ascent appears as a process of depersonalization and dissolution of the individual Self in the highest reality. At the same time, in Christianity the Self is preserved, though transformed to some higher level.<sup>111</sup> Modifications of this kind directly touch upon the specific character of theophany in different traditions.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Apart from the mystic tradition (cf. note 99) the Christian canonical evidence usually indicates such a "Self" — "not-Self" equation stressing the ethical aspect of the transformation — cf. the commandment "to love your neighbour as yourself" (Lev. 19 18 and later in Mt 22.39; Mr 12. 33; etc.). It does not, however, set forth this equation with Hindu categorical preciseness.

<sup>112</sup> Concerning some aspects of comparison between the Indian theophanic tradition and that of Christianity cf. Sparks. *Op. cit.* pp. 192 sq.; Filliozat, *Docetisme*, pp. 52-58; etc.



## A New Dimension in the Understanding of the Concept of Surrender in Bhagavad Gita

G. C. Nayak

Does the Gītā teach only a blind and complete surrender to God or Śrīkṛṣṇa at the cost of all rational considerations? How otherwise can we expect to understand the implications of those famous lines of the Gītā which are supposed to embody its final teaching, 'Sarva dharmān parityajya' etc. or even 'Tameva śaraṇam gachā' etc.? Does the Lord exhort arjuna to follow him blindly? Is Īśvara — Saraṇāgati only a blind following of the teaching of Īśvara? If Īśvara-śaraṇāgati is supposed to be a 'must' for attaining the highest summit of religious life, is it not tantamount to saying that the most perfect religious life involves a blind surrender at the cost of all rationality? But is it not an absolute surrender to God? Where is the question of blind following in case of man's relation to God? Is it not rather the fulfilment of reason through its rejection? But what does it mean to assert that reason finds its fulfilment by foregoing its claims in favour of faith which demands absolute surrender? Reason has to be destroyed to make room for faith! But what does it mean to say this? Must we sacrifice all rational considerations in matters of religion? But in that case it will be impossible to discriminate between the truly religious and a fake religion, between the religious and the irreligious. By what criterion can we distinguish between true religion and false religion, if not by reason? In the name of faith every nonsense would in that case be admitted to the fold of religion. But is it what the religious man, whether belonging to this order or that, would approve of? If all specific considerations of 'dharma' are to be sacrificed in favour of a blind following of a particular teacher or preacher of religion, may



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be be a Kṛṣṇa, Jesus or Mohammad, however great that teacher may be or in favour of a blind following of the Lord only because he is the Lord and if this is what religious life is, shall any sensible man covet for such a life? Any way, one may say, that is what religion is; there is a choice before every man, he may either accept this type of life or reject it at his own risk. Well and good. But is Gītā's teaching meant for promoting such a conduct and such a life? True that Arjuna was asked to surrender everything, all considerations of specific religious views, at the feet of Kṛṣṇa and to be free from all fears of sin in view of Kṛṣṇa's extraordinary powers, but there are certain other extenuating factors which should be taken into consideration before we conclude that this is an exhortation to blindly follow Lord Kṛṣṇa.

Most important of all, we must understand that Kṛṣṇa has all through in the Bhagavad Gītā tried to explain things to Arjuna in different ways but no where has he tried to silence him by condemning reason or independent thinking. Even in the same concluding part of the Gītā in the 18th Chapter where surrender has been endorsed, Lord Kṛṣṇa has asked Arjuna to consider the pros and cons of all that has been said by him and then to adopt the line of conduct which he considers fit after a thorough consideration. "Etat te jñānamākhyātam etc.". This shows that Kṛṣṇa's extraordinariness does not consist only in his being the Lord but in his allowing the free play of reason even in matters of religious conduct and even when the teachings are the teachings of the Lord Himself. So in surrendering to Lord Kṛṣṇa there is no question of blind following, for Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself is an advocate of free play of reason. That the dictates of reason are supreme for the Gita will be clear from another oft-neglected, line—"Buddhau saranamanvichha etc." Kṛṣṇa's exhortation to Arjuna for Buddhi saranāgati or taking respect to reason in 2.49 is either lost sight of or undermined in the study of the Bhagavadgītā by all those who regard it to be a holy treatise. Even Ācārya Śamkara speaks of his favourite Paramārtha jñāna here and thereby the typical form of rationalism advocated by Gītā is lost in the bush of Advaita. Other Ācāryas like Rāmānuja also do not give adequate attention to this facet of Gītā's teaching. Of all the commentators of the Bhagavadgītā, only Bairāgi Miśra, a rare genius in the field, regards Buddhi-saranāgati as the key concept of the Bhagavadgītā.<sup>1</sup> This raises certain interesting issues.

Statements of Gītā such as 'Buddhau śaraṇa manvichha' (Take resort to reason) need to be analysed and adjudicated vis a vis other statements made in the same treatise such as 'Tameva śaraṇam gachha' (Take resort to God) and 'māmekam śaraṇam braja' (Take resort to Srikrṣṇa). Bairāgi Miśra identifies Srikrṣṇa with Viveka

1 Cf. *Gītā* by Bairāgi Miśra (Second Edition, 1952)



Buddhi or discriminative understanding and consequently Śrī Kṛṣṇa śaraṇāgati is the same for him as Buddhi-śaraṇāgati. Although I admit that Gītā definitely promotes a rationalistic outlook I do not find any justification for identifying Śrī Kṛṣṇa with Viveka Buddhi. The religious overtone in the Viśvarūpa darśana and references to Īśvara in the Bhagavadgītā are too striking to be overlooked altogether. Śrī Kṛṣṇa exhorts Arjuna to take resort to Buddhi and also to himself. This can only mean that by taking resort to Śrī Kṛṣṇa one can develop the rational attitude which enables him to transcend the petty considerations of success, failure, merit, demerit and the like. The rational man is not swayed away by any hearsay, the apparent invincibility of traditional values or by what Bradley would say 'the ethos of one's people'. There is ofcourse another strand of thought in the Gītā which refers to 'One's station and his duties' and the consideration of 'the ethos of one's people', and also to 'Īśvara śaraṇāgati' but these become intelligible only in the context keeping in view the heritage and the personality of Arjuna to whom the teaching of Gītā, is addressed. The rational attitude of the Gītā, however, consists in not paying any heed to hearsay regarding heaven, hell etc. and in maintaining equanimity in face of adversity and amidst prosperity. That is why Gītā in 2.52 speaks of understanding overcoming all delusions when hearsay has no longer any impact on the person. As Russell would point out, "A man is rational in proportion as his intelligence informs and controls his desires. I believe that the control of our acts by our intelligence is ultimately what is of most importance".<sup>2</sup> The Sthita prajña of the Gītā may in certain respects at least be regarded as 'a rational man' in this sense and Buddhi Śaraṇāgati may thus be regarded as a key concept of the Bhagavad Gītā. This facet of the Gītā's teaching needs particular mention in view of the wide-spread misconception that the Gītā teaches only a blind and complete surrender to some higher power, may be God or Śrī Kṛṣṇa, at the cost of all rational considerations. And what is significant to note in this connection is that from the standpoint of the Bhagavadgītā Śrī Kṛṣṇa śaraṇāgati is not opposed in the least to Buddhi śaraṇāgati in as much as Śrī Kṛṣṇa Himself is viewed here, at least in certain characteristic aspects of His, as a world-teacher promoting rational outlook through and through. These findings are what I would call a new dimension in the understanding of the concept of śaraṇāgati or surrender in the Gītā; a failure to grasp the same has so far proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks to the understanding of the teaching of Gītā in its proper perspective.

<sup>2</sup> B. Russell, 'Can Men Be Rational?' *Sceptical Essays* (London, 1966) p. 37.





## Some Aspects of the Relation Between Literature and Mythology

*Ivan Bitsadze*

In our epoch the problem of the relation between literature and mythology assumes an extraordinarily significant theoretical and methodological importance. And not only this. It is particularly actual for the very practice of the creative work of art in the different ideal—artistic directions of the modern world art.

Generalising in some respect the above one must distinguish at least three main reasons for the unabated interest towards the examined problem. The first of them is of a gnosiologic character, the second of an axiologic and the third of a social one. Although they are in appropriate unit, it is advisable to examine at first from the point of view of the present study some moments of the gnosiologic character in the aspect of growing activity of the subjective principles in the relation between literature and mythology, "photographing" to this or that extent also the axiologic and the social sides of this problematics. At that it is particularly perspective and actual in theoretical aspect to examine this just on the example of the intellectualistic current of modern world literature.

In the first place it is necessary to underline that to the mythologic consciousness the unlimitedness between reality and fancy, between the subject and its reflection, between the subject and the objective world is inherent. The active syncreticity is peculiar to it. It is unable to move knowledge as to an infinite approach, after V.I. Lenin's words when he studies the process of knowledge by "consideration towards the object"<sup>1</sup>, the endeavour of the subject to destroy the separation "of the idea from the object"<sup>2</sup>, to subject to

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin. Philosophical Books, M. 1969, p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, Phil. Books, M. 1969, p. 176.



itself the nature and to generalise<sup>3</sup>, learn to apprehend the general in its phenomena<sup>4</sup>, to find out the dialectics of "coincidence of thought with the object"<sup>5</sup>. The mythologic conscience corresponding to a definite development of mankind's society is being demolished in the course of the further development of man's knowledge and of the socio-historical practice. The subjection of natural forces, as K. Marx puts it, becomes true in any mythology only within the sphere of imagination, fantasy, and it is especially necessary to pay attention to the fact, as he states, that mythology disappears from the moment "of real domination over these natural forces"<sup>6</sup>. By the way there is something resembling to the role of imagination in romanticism, of course with this essential difference, that what is inside of it compulsorily runs into what is outside, though the real domination over the world does not come true and it is in a state of uncessant formation of a controversy with them<sup>7</sup>. It is particularly important when we have in mind the characteristic lines of the creative activity of the subject in the intellectualisation of the art knowledge in the world of succession of the realistic-romantical tradition and in connection with the problem of the mythologisation of art.

That is why, in the light of the historical process of demythologisation, all well read stand on their place—the subject and the object are differentiated, and thanks to their cognitive-practical activity it detached from the object, reality acquired its distinctive features, crystallized, tore away its fruitless fantasy. In this respect it will be perfectly right not to accept the thesis of growing the mythological structure and function in art knowledge, of mythologisation and intellectualisation of the art knowledge. And it is not necessary any more to do this by stages, when the genuine mythos has died. And besides that, in man's spiritual culture appeared the folklore, so also did some different kinds and genres of art, and particularly the fiction, the belles lettres, which created an individual and more complicated subjective and objective attitude and a still further growing activity of the subject of creation and the art consumer as well. The collectivist archaistic myth consciousness was already demolished — within the sphere of art the individual consciousness affirmed itself, specifically reflecting also the dialectical interconnections with the social consciousness. The nature of man still more comes forward as a "totality of all social relations" (after the definition of K. Marx), relations which are already quite different

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 K. Marx and Fr. Engels. Works. Vol. 12, p. 737.

7 Ivan Bitsadze, Literature as a form of social knowledge. S. BAS, 1977



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from those existing at the time of the mythus and hence man's creative practical activity has already another contents and direction.

However it is natural that this does not mean that together with the world-outlook essence, mythus has lost all its creative possibilities of a distinctive generalisation of the reality and penetration into its regularity, into the variety of man's attitude towards it. The genesis of the art knowledge development reveals inexhaustible possibilities to use single methods of the achievements of reality, belonging to the mythological thinking. This problem has an immense significance within the world of dialectics of the concrete-sensual and the abstract logical in art knowledge and particularly in the process of its intellectualisation.<sup>8</sup> So the mythological thought, as I. M. Diakonov puts it, has used interaction of the metaphoric and metonymic generalisations instead of the abstract ones<sup>9</sup>.

Just as by means of intellectualisation, through the activity of the creative person, in modern art, as in general in society too, a further penetration of knowledge into reality is clearly seen. The various artistic conditional forms in the intellectualistic flow of art especially underline the differentiation between reality and imagination. A distance is created between the two worlds and the subject of knowledge and practice knows this very well. Besides, the interchange of the topic-space time reality, the inclusion of the psychological and the moral, etc. in the intellectualistic artistic work, and naturally not in the modernistic one is all directed only towards the aim to reveal fully and actively the genuine reality and not to interchange the imaginary reality, as it is in the mythus, with the genuine one. In this connection it is quite right what E. M. Meletinsky remarks, that mythologism in literature of the XXth century is not able to reveal the social problematica of the contemporary world.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand just in intellectualism a possibility for a break of the empiric and the rational, the sensitive and the abstract, as a counterbalance of the syncretic character of the mythologic consciousness is observed. Such a brak is particularly characteristic for modernism. The realistic and socialist-realistic literature too, cannot escape from this, in cases when the ideas turn into distinctive demiurges, when they detach from "earth", similarly to Antheus, in such a degree that they lose its power of influence and turn into a resonant drum. This reminds in some degree of the classicistic schematism. From here come also all possible ideal-artistic deformations of art, in fulfilling of which we often love the contrary contents.

<sup>8</sup> Ivan Bitsadze. Synthetisation of the art knowledge, S, BAS, 1984

<sup>9</sup> I. M. Diakonov. Foreword. In Mythology of the ancient world. Translated from English, M. 1971, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> E. M. Meletinsky. Poetic of the Mythus. M., 1966, p. 295.



However, essentially, here comes the accelerated process of the virtual demythologisation of art, just by way of its accelerated intellectualisation in the just genuine realistic art. This demythologisation started with an especially characteristic moment, viz. with the "development of the conscious fable".<sup>11</sup> In the realistic art remain only outside distinctive marks, deprived of their mythologic contents. Intellect and mythus are antipodes in their essence. Art is not a mythus and any reduction to it demolishes its genuine essence. One can think that it is possible to agree with this, that the "non dismembered unity (identity, sameness) of the subjective and the objective, of the images and the object, is characteristic for the initial stage of mythology development, for the most ancient, archaic myths. In the following this non-dismemberance unity gets gradually demolished and the mythologic image is already accepted not as a real being of the object, but only as its symbol, its partial incarnation, manifestation and formation".<sup>12</sup> That is why the destruction of this non dismembered unity of the subjective and objective, the removal of the mythological image of the object or phenomenon out of the mythological construction demolishes its possibility to be a genuine reality and acquires a conditional, symbolic character, which does not fully reveal this or that accentuated side of reality. Just the symbolic, abstract thought, as T. D. Shirokih rightly remarks, that is directly expressed, he continues "is only a part of the image contents. That is why the symbolic principle within the image "does not assume" the form of a reality, it is hardly hidden by these forms."<sup>13</sup> This was of course a step forward on the way to destruction of the reality, of the inessence unreal object, it demolished the non dismembering between subject and object, and hence between the objects, as V. I. Lenin stated it, of our represented ones by the represented themselves. On the other hand this step did not come out, in its essence, from the circle of mythologic knowledge, because when turning towards a conditional symbol, and not towards a subjective image, it does not escape from further destructions and negations of the non dismemberance.

The general myth image, when it discontinues to be real, turns into a symbol with all its conditionalities and in its essence premeditated incompleteness of the object, and does not reveal the mechanism of an adequate or true reflection of reality. And this is being done in the direction of an abstraction although fixed, but still fastly

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- 11 E. M. Meletinski. Mythus and historical poetics of folklore. *Int Folklore. Poetical System*. M., 1977, p. 30.
  - 12 D. M. Ougrinovitch. Essence of the primitive mythology and trends of its evolution. In *Questions of Philosophy*, 1980, p. 139.
  - 13 T. D. Shirokih. About the limits of application of the symbolic principle in the early Soviet paintings (1917-1926). In *Philosophy of arts in the past and nowadays*. M., 1981, p. 154.



connected with the concretely sensitive generalisation. An abstraction which is not fully reflected in the symbol and which strengthens in the mythological knowledge already in the direction of a further dismembering of the image and the object, its false understanding not as a subjective image of the objective world, the object, but as a conditional mark having nothing in common with the object. V. I. Lenin's criticism of the hieroglyphism has a huge significance just in understanding the examined problems.

However, together with this, in very contradiction with the symbol's nature tremendous possibilities for unfolding the association are hidden. That is why the use of the symbol in art assumes a character differing from the mythological and enlarges the horizons of the influencing forces of the fiction work. In the dialectics of interaction and mutual transition of the artistic image and symbol, in the fight against one another in a direct and indirect sense the artistic knowledge and the transformation of the world become deeper. The conditionality of the symbol manifests itself as a form of affirmation of the "existing" future, as a "being" in the nonbeing, as a thesis of the antithesis, as Hegel would nearly mark it. This conditionality displays it self in its social-practical and gedonistic-ideological function. The dialectics of the image and the symbol create new emotionally-rational syntheses,<sup>14</sup> in the development of the artistic knowledge.

In the intellectualisation of fiction literature the role of the subject of knowledge, the moment of introduction<sup>15</sup> at the determining state of the object of knowledge, is still more growing. In the activity of the subject of knowledge an essential role falls upon the growing of the dialectically contradictory unit of the form of consciousness and the relation of the artistic practice with the social-historical one. Thus unfolds a dialectics of a controversial unity of coincidence and non-coincidence of the different artistic-figurative knowledge components. In the activity of the creative principle the consciousness and self consciousness of the person is being shown. The activity of choice is based also upon already acquired knowledges; upon the social and personal experience. It provides the subject with knowledges, with the achievement of new, humanist in their direction and contents knowledges derived from the Marx-Lenin philosophy. Thus art turns into a powerful, by nothing else interchangeable form of educational influence, a rapprochement of people, as R. Tagore wrote about literature, their uniting appears, according to the true determination of M. Gorki as "man knowledge".

That is why the foundation for a supposedly unchangeable gist of man, for the instillation of the illusions by means of the neomythologisation of literature, actively counteract the development of man's progress, demolishes the confidence in the truthfulness of knowledge, in the power of the social-practical transforming, humanist activity.

14 Ivan Bitsadze. *Dialectic of the art knowledge*. Tbilissi, "Metsniereba", 1985.

15 Todor Pavlov, *Selected philosophical works*. Vol. 3, M., 1962, p. 166.



## IV

# The Philosophical Basis of Manavta Dharma

*Anjani Kumar Singh*

The aim of Manavta Dharma movement by Holy Sant Pt. Faqir Chand Ji Maharaj, is to help man to realize his divine or Spiritual nature. The true objective of the study of human beings is naturally the realization of his own true nature. It is, generally, due to ignorance of his true nature that Manava identifies himself with his physical, vital and mental being and forgets his true nature which is essentially divine and thus, loses contact with the Supreme Reality. Sant Faqir Chand Ji makes an effort to bring again in proximity of or in loving contact with the Supreme Being who is called by him Sat Purush<sup>1</sup> or Radha Soami Dayal.<sup>2</sup> This holy name of the Supreme Reality helps man to realize and attain God-consciousness because the Nami and Nama are one. The Nami has become embodied in a sound form, in the Holy Name.

Various holy sages and saints have given to the Supreme Being certain name and form as suggested to their imagination in a state of spiritual vision. The Vedic seers gave the name OM to Divine Being. The Mandukya Upanishad explains the symbolic and suggestive significance of OM which consists of four matras, of which three are audible and the fourth one is a matra which suggests the turiya (transcendental) state of the Soul which can be felt and experienced only by a process of meditation. The Vaishnava saints who were the worshippers of Supreme Reality in the Saguna and Sakara form of the incarnations of the Supreme Reality in the divinized human forms of Rama and Krishna, gave the holy names

- 1 The True Being, name of the presiding deity of Sat Lok.
- 2 The name of the true Supreme Being, vibrational connotation of the Supreme Name as such;



of Rama and Krishna to the Supreme Reality which helped them to realize the attributes of the Supreme Reality. These Vaishnava saints believed that the Supreme Reality, though transcendental, can descent on the human plane for the sake of redemption of Manavta which has fallen into a state of moral and spiritual degradation and consequently repleted the life of Manava with sorrow and pain. The Vaishnava saints also try to interpret the names of Rama and Krishna in a philosophical way. According to them, on the transcendental plane of bliss, Rama himself is the transcendental Soul. He is called Rama which etymologically means Ramante Asmin yoginah Sa Ramah (the Reality in which the Yogis are absorbed in the meditation, is Rama). In the same way, the Bhakti Yogis adore the Supreme Being as Krishna which etymologically means the Supreme Reality which is the perfect embodiment of Beauty, Love and Grace as Krishna because He Akarshayet or attracts all human beings (Manava), on account of his supreme attributes of perfect Beauty, perfect Love, perfect Bliss and perfect Passion.

The holy Sant Faqir Chand Ji calls the Supreme Reality as Radha Soami Dayal. This compound name consisting of three words, denotes one single Reality which, according to the holy Sant, is Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent and full of Love, Mercy, Grace and peace. The three components of the holy Name have been philosophically interpreted differently by the holy Sant Faqir Chand Ji in conformity with the tradition of Saints who belong to Radha Soami Faith or to his school of thought.<sup>3</sup> According to one interpretation, the word Soami denotes the ocean of consciousness and the word Radha denotes the original current not different from, but identical with the ocean itself. The two together form the Supreme Ocean of spiritual bliss and truth. The second interpretation suggests that the word Soami stands for the Supreme Beloved and the word Radha stands for the human Soul who is supposed to be the lover of the most beloved Supreme Reality. The third component of the holy Name is Dayal which is the divine nature of the Supreme Reality is called Dayal because He is full of mercy and grace and it is this inherent quality of the Supreme Reality which inspires hopes and confidence in the Soul of human beings that they shall certainly enjoy the bliss of grace, if they devoutly dedicate themselves with the Bhava of Sharnagati. According to the third interpretation, the word Soami means the Supreme Lord and Master of all human beings and the Supreme Sat, the word Radha means the

<sup>3</sup> The views expressed in the present paper are mostly based on the philosophical, religious and social discourses given by Pt. Faqir Chand Ji to his disciples from time to time in his holy Satsangs at different places, which are regularly published in the monthly magazine Manavta Mandir by Faqir Library Charitable Trust, Hoshiarpur, Punjab.



Chit Shakti of the Supreme Being (Satta) who is a conscious creative Force and the word Dayal means the ecstatic bliss arising out of the Grace or Anugrah Shakti of the Supreme Reality. Like the Vaishanava saints, Sant Faqir Chand Ji also believes that God-realization and attainment of God consciousness depend on two factors, the intensity of love on the part of the devotee and the Compassion and the Anugrah Shakti on the part of the Supreme Reality. Actually, the transcendental Reality being a great reservoir of Mercy and Grace, the magnitude of extending His Mercy and the Grace to the devotee exceeds the capacity of the devotee to offer his love and devotion.

According to Sant Faqir Chand Ji the whole creation has been caused by the Will (Sankalpa Shakti) of the Supreme Reality. This Will generate a dynamic spiritual current which started the process of creation through the agency of his Chit Shakti. The creation exists on three planes. The first plane is perfectly spiritual in which the Divine Satta lives in a transcendental spiritual state, completely devoid of mind and matter which exist in the other two planes below the transcendental plane. This transcendental region is called by him as the region of spiritual bliss or as Dayal Desh.<sup>4</sup> The second plane of the creation is called Brahmanda<sup>5</sup> which is ruled by the gods; Brahman, Vishnu and Rudra who are emanations from the Infinite power of the Supreme Being. The existence of Maya is discernible in the Brahmanda or the cosmic plane, but the Lord of the Cosmos is the Master of Maya and not subject to her sway. On this Cosmic plane mind and matter exist, but the mind dominates the matter. The mind in this plane is called Mahat or Cosmic Intelligence. The lowest plane is called pind.<sup>6</sup> On this plane, human beings are meshed in the bondage of Maya and made to suffer. But Sant Faqir Chand Ji says that it is possible for human being (Manava) to liberate himself from the bondage of Maya and to achieve a communion and loving contact with the Supreme Being—Radha Soami Dayal.

The Manavta Dharma states that before the creation, the Supreme Being was in a state of Sunn Samadhi.<sup>7</sup> Through his Mauj (Divine Will) or an inner vibration, a spiritual current with a resonant sound emanated. Thus, the creation is the result of Divya Dhwani or Divine Music. The creation begins from the Param Pada of Radha Soami.

The Manavta Dharma does not agree with Shankara's view which holds Maya as illusion by virtue of which one considers the unreal universe as really existent and as distinct from Brahman.

4 The region of mercy refers to the purely spiritual regions.

5 The region of Universal Mind and pure matter. Second grand division of creation.

6 Material-spiritual region, Region of individual mind and desire.

7 Supreme Father's conditions of intense rapture within Himself.



## The Philosophical Basis of Manav!a Dharma

The Manav!a Dharma also rejects the concept of Maya as Prakriti that we find in Sankhya philosophy. In Sankhya philosophy Prakriti is regarded a Reality independent of Purush but in Manav!a Dharma, it is regarded as the Will of Kal.<sup>8</sup> In the Manav!a Dharma the word Maya relates to a form of matter which covers the spirit entity. This Maya emerges out of kal at a particular stage of creation. The tendency of Maya is downward and outward. It acts through the three Gunas, the five Tattvas the ten Indriyas. Maya also functions as the agency of kal to entangle the Jivas in Karma by providing them with the objects of worldly pleasures so that they may never rise to a higher plane than Antahkarana<sup>9</sup> and Mana.

For the achievement of salvation or Moksha, Sant Faqir Chand ji advises to unite and synthesise the basic concepts of the path of Yoga and the path of love. The Yoga believes in the practices of meditation and intuitive realization while the path of Bhakti believes in loving self-surrender. Love is a Bhava, a matter of feeling which is to be experienced in the heart. Sant Faqir Chand Ji believes in intuition as well as in feelings. His process of Sadhana appeals to the heart because of his greater emphasis on devotion than on dry reasoning of the intellect. He maintains that salvation or Mukti is possible even in this worldly life and it is known as Jeevan Mukti. The salvation which is achieved after passing away from this life is called Videha Mukti. The Manav!a Dharma holds that by establishing spiritual contact with the Supreme Reality, human beings can live in the realm of bliss which is called Salokya Mukti or in the proximity of Supreme Reality which is called Samipya or Sani-dhya Mukti or in the realization of the unity and identity with the Supreme Reality which is known as Sayujya Mukti.

The process of Sadhana in Manav!a Dharma is known as Surat-Shabda-Yoga. The word 'Surat' has a special significance. It is a spirit entity on the individual soul which is aspiring for the realization of his spiritual nature. The Surat is called Jiva when on a lower plane, it associates itself with mind and matter and is oblivious of his true divine nature. It is only when the Surat (the aspiring soul) unites with the Shabda (mystic sound) God-consciousness

<sup>8</sup> Kal or Brahman is the universal mind—the master and presiding deity of the spiritual material region of creation.

<sup>9</sup> Internal constitution consisting of four functions, namely (a) responses at the mental plane, which give rise to thought, (b) the spiritual or attention currents, by means of which thoughts are projected to their objectives and are associated with them, (c) intelligence, which is the source of comprehension and which is the lustre shed by convergence of the spiritual current and (d) the ego, which differentiates one's comprehension from that of others.



can be achieved. The special process of Surat-Shabda Sadhana has to be learnt and practiced under the guidance of the Guru. In the specific Sadhana of Manavta Dharma, the word 'Shabda' stands not only for sound, but also for the resonance caused by the flow of a spiritual current. This spiritual current manifests or reveals itself as harmony or divine rhythm and therefore the Sadhak has to realize the Supreme Reality as the Harmony of Love.

The Yogic process instructed in the Manavta Dharma enables the Sadhaka to gradually rise from the lower state of consciousness to the higher states of consciousness till finally the Sadhaka reaches the highest plane of consciousness that is Daya Desh or Dayal Dhama or Sat Lok. There are intermediary planes of consciousness on which the Sadhaka arrives in his mystic plight of meditative consciousness. The vision of the Sadhaka perceives the Supreme Reality either in the form of Divine Light (Divya Jyoti) or Divine Sound (Divya Dhvani). This view of the Manavta Dharma is corroborated by the Teja Bindu and Nada Bindu Upanishads. In the Gayatri Mantra itself, the Supreme Reality is meditated in the form of a divine light emanating from Savita who is the Supreme existence, consciousness and bliss.

In the philosophy of Manavta Dharma, we find different planes of consciousness, namely Radha Soami Pad, Agam Lok, Alakh Lok, Anami Lok, Sat Lok and Bhanwar Gupha. We find mention of the different Lokas in the Vedas which are known as Bhu, Bhuvah, Swah, Maha, Jana, Tapah and Satya. Sri Aurobindo also in his book 'The Life Divine' describes the seven different planes of consciousness. They are higher mind, illumined mind, intuitive mind, over mind and super mind. In the Manavta Dharma Agam denote the inaccessible and Agam Lok denotes the unapproachable sphere which is just below the Radha Soami Dham. The word Alakh is the next Lok which is invisible sphere and below the Agam Lok. The word Anami means that the Supreme Being being in a state of eternal polarization before creation was a nameless Being. The word Sat Lok denotes the true sphere, heavenly sphere or the stage below Alakh Lok. The word Bhanwar Gupha means a rotating cave. It denotes the stage next below Sat Lok.<sup>10</sup>

Elaborating important metaphysical concepts and concluding that salvation is attainable only in human life, Manavta Dharma arrives at the four essential elements in the teachings : Sat Shabda, Sat Guru, Sat Anurag and Satsanga. Shabd is the first manifestation of the Supreme Being, and a prime source of all energy. All harmony is due to Shabd. It is the current of spiritual energy which accompanies commotion in the Ocean of Energy — The Supreme

10. Manav Dayal Ishwar Chandra Sharma, Siddha Sat Purush Faqir Baba Chamatkaron se pare, pp. 131-136.



The Shabd establishes its contact with the Divine Shabd in the Pashyanti form in his vision or in the Para form in his spiritual experience. The Sadhaka realizes the Supreme Reality either as a spiritual sound which he hears in his soul and which makes him attain the intuitive mind or Sambodhi Manas or as spiritual light which he sees in his meditative vision which makes him attain the state of illumined mind or Pradipta Manas. According to the teaching of Manavta Dharma, this is the Sat Shabd which has to be meditated upon by the Surat or the spirit entity in the state of ardent aspiration. Sat Guru, the second essential element in the teachings of Manavta Dharma reveals the secrets of Sat Shabd. He is a true human embodiment of Radha Soami Dayal. He carries out in this world the representative functions of the Supreme Being and possesses all His attributes — Love, Bliss, Life, Energy, Truth and Spirit. The real form of Sant Sat Guru is the one which the Chaitanya or omniscient being Himself assumes. The role of Sant Sat Guru is like that of a transformer. He receives spiritual currents from the Supreme Being, harnesses them and then charges the devotees with as much love and spiritual bliss as he deems fit. The third essential element of Manavta Dharma is Sat Anurag which is defined as sincere love fervent desire. Such a desire outweighs all worldly desires and gradually raises the fortunate possessor of this lofty passion to the highest region. The fourth and last essential element of Manavta Dharma is Satsang. Satsang means true company or association, it also means Holy service and attendance on Sant Sat Guru. It also means a meeting with the holy saints who can illumined the mind of the Sadhaka and remove all kinds of doubts. There are two types of Satsang, one is external and the other is internal. The external Satsang is the Holy service conducted under the authority of the Sant Sat Guru, attending congregational meetings, listening to Sant Satguru's discourses and enjoying the benefits of Satguru Darshan. Again, there is another type of Satsang which may be styled as internal Satsang—the application of mind and spirit to sound currents at the time of spiritual practice and an effort to elevate them to higher spheres.

These four essential elements of Manavta Dharma have also been described in other philosophical and religious systems like Sanat Sujaniya Chapter of the Mahabharat, and Synthesis of Yoga of Sri Aurobindo. The importance of Sat Guru and Satsang has been described also in Ram Charitamanas of Tulsidas.

From what has been described as Manavta Dharma by Sant Paqr Chand Ji, it is quite evident that his Manavta Dharma is spiritually oriented. He advises that first of all man should realize his divine nature and then manifest his divine potentialities in life and conduct. Since the attainment of God consciousness by man



inculcates in him the divine attributes of Love and Grace, therefore, he practices Love and Grace in human life in the form of social service or service to suffering humanity. Thus, The Manavta Dharma of Sant Faqir Chand Ji rests on a sound spiritual and philosophical foundation. It is quite different from the rational humanism of the renaissance's thinkers for their humanism has no spiritual basis. It is different also from the ethical humanism of Buddhist philosophy. Although, Buddha says that the holy saints should wonder about rendering human service, yet he does not believe in any eternal Supreme Being and his godless humanism has no sure and firm foundation. Then there is the humanism of the materialist thinkers. In this category come the scientists who believe in mechanical evolution and the communists who believe in the equality of all human beings but are unable to explain why all human beings should be treated equal because they do not believe in spiritual love and kinship which is the base of true equality and brotherhood.

The Manavta Dharma is very similar to the approach of humanism of the Sant Mat which preaches the gospel of love as the unifying link between man and man. All the medieval saints like Ramananda, Kabir, Raidas, Nanak and others believe in the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the brotherhood of all mankind because all men are the children of God. In modern age, Rabindra Nath Tagore and Sri Aurobindo are the exponents of spiritual humanism. In the book 'Religion of Man', Rabindra Nath Tagore has explained that love and fellowship is the true religion of man.<sup>11</sup> In the book 'Human Cycle', Sri Aurobindo says that "... brotherhood exists only in the soul and by the soul; it can exist by nothing else. For this brotherhood is not a matter either of physical kinship or of vital association or of intellectual agreement. When the soul claims freedom, it is the freedom of its self development, the self-development of the divine in man in all his being. When it claims equality, what it is claiming is that freedom equally for all and the recognition of the same soul, the same godhead in all human beings. When it strives for brotherhood, it is founding that equal freedom of self-development on a common aim, a common life, a unity of mind and feeling founded upon the recognition of this inner spiritual unity".<sup>12</sup>

11 "We are made conscious of this truth of relationship immediately within us in our love, in our joy; and from this experience of ours, we have the right to say that the Supreme one, who relates all things, comprehends the universe, is all love—the love that is the highest truth being the most perfect relationship." Rabindra Nath Tagore, *The Religion of Man*, p. 100.

12 Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, Cent. ed. Vol. 15, p. 547.



## V

# Some Notes on Hume's "Of Justice" or a Justification of Private Property

*Francisco Zuniga*

### INTRODUCTORY WORDS

In the present paper we want to point out three main points :

First, Hume's concept of Justice (the most ancient of virtues), we think is too narrow because Hume connects it with the economic field.

Second, Hume's concept of moral is too broad and in his Inquiry (and other writings, i.e., The Treatise) it appears mixed with his political-economic thought.

Third, in the last analysis — we think — Hume's "Of Justice" and his Appendix on it; seem to be a justification of private property as against some "extremely pernicious, fanatics though specious ideas"...

We are not going to do a separate analysis of these three points but a general — we hope not too general — analysis of the three.

### OF JUSTICE

According to Hume, Justice is founding on public utility ("the sole foundation of his merit"). The "interests of society" are ever the chief object in view when any decisions must be made as to justice. Justice quite "evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society". This is why Hume was nearer the view of those who envisaged justice as some kind of convention or agreement



and as being adaptable to the actual conditions of life in a given society.<sup>1</sup>

Human society cannot subsist without some kind of government; morals and the virtue of justice are indeed the prime essentials of existence, but the laws of society (or positive law) need further to be upheld and applied through "political society".

The point of chief interest in Hume's view is that society in its political form only arises because of its utility "the advantage it procures to society," and in particular that of "preserving peace and order among mankind" and securing also the rights of property.

Hume says that it is not what has been called "reason" but the feelings which, through sympathy, give rise to the distinction between virtue and vice. His interest is focused in this sympathetic process; all human characteristics that we come to approve because of this process, he calls 'virtues', and that we come to disapprove because of it, he calls "vices". "Virtue" and "vice" for him are not limited to "moral virtue" and "moral vice". As John Stewart says :

"He generally employs the word 'moral' with a very broad eighteenth century meaning—adding—... The title of the book however, probably would lead a casual reader to expect a discussion restricted to morality."<sup>2</sup>

Again, the political parts of the book help to hide Hume's basic argument. In his Introduction to the Treatise he wrote that while our tastes and sentiments are studied in morals and criticism, "men as united in society, and dependent on each other", is the subject matter of politics. But it would have been impossible for him—adds Stewart—to have written perniciously about morals without writing about politics. And, since what he has to say on politics—that is, on the artificial moral virtues—takes up over half the book, and is interesting in the extreme, it tends to become the cynosure of attention. The long illustration submerges the main argument.

So, we have that only in "Of Justice" (Section III, pp. 14-34) the word "property" appears more than 50 times and in the Appendix III (composed of only 6 pages) such a word appears 40 times.

Hume's virtuous man is one who is agreeable and useful both to himself and to others. The roles that everybody ordinary feels morally obliged to perform can be divided into two groups : some

- 1 Hume David, *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, See Prof. Charles Hendel's Introduction p. XXIX,
- 2 J. B Stewart, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1963, pp. 82-83.



duties fall into what we may call the sphere of personal relations, and the rest into the sphere of social relations. The duties of the personal sphere Hume calls natural; the duties of the social sphere he calls artificial.

In the social sphere it is necessary the introduction of certain basic rules of competition. These rules, which Hume calls the principles of "Justice" are three in number; and a group of men competing according to these rules is what he calls a society.

The first of the principles requires the introduction of private property. Every man is to be left undisturbed in the enjoyment of his proper possessions. Ownership is a matter of rights, and rights have their direct effect, not on things, but on men. The rule of conduct therefore must be an artificial principle, one that men follow because they have come to believe that it is a useful rule to follow.

There is, then, a question of the correct criteria to be used in attributing the ownership of the various economic goods to particular persons. The goods of external nature—according to Hume—must be divided and appropriated, for every unappropriated good is an invitation to contention. The rules that Hume sets down are five: present possession, occupation, prescription, accession, and succession.<sup>3</sup>

Why present possession is a relevant test in this situation is that the relation between a man and a good possessed by him is closely analogous so the relation between a man and a good owned by him, so that given the absence of any overruling consideration, a distribution of rights based on present possession is the distribution most likely to prove generally acceptable.

The second situation is the one in which, although the owners of other goods are known, a particular parcel of goods is without a recognizable owner, either because those goods are newly discovered or because the title cannot be traced. Here (present) possession is not enough. The rule applicable to new found goods is occupation, or first possession.<sup>4</sup>

The rule to be applied where no title from first possession can be traced is prescription (or long possession), because of the effects of custom. A man's possessions come to be associated with himself in his own thinking and in the thinking of others.

Other situation is the one in which the goods in question are the products of goods already owned by somebody, or are goods whose former owner had died. In the first case, when new good proceed from goods already owned the rule to be applied is accession.<sup>5</sup> In

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix III, note no. 4, pp. 125-127.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hume, David, *A Treatise on Human Nature*, p. 505.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 5 3b. Accession: "Acquisition of additional property by growth, increase, or other addition to existed property". See also *Treatise*, p. 509.



the latter case, the descendants of the deceased are to succeed to the rights.

The reason according to Hume, for adopting rules for the assignment of rights is that thereby, since subjective judgement about who shall enjoy goods is supplanted, possession is made stable and secure. Inevitably, there will be times when these rules, and the positive laws made to supplement them, will fail to show that any party has a sound and exclusive right to a particular article or estate. But so important is it that the stability of possession be not endangered by a resort to subjective discretion, that it is quite correct, Hume implies, for judges to pretend in such instances that they see a good and absolute title where in truth, there are only conflicting claims<sup>6</sup>

The first principle (or the five criteria above mentioned) prescribes private property. The second (follows from the first) is going to authorize trade. It is that rights over goods may be transferred from one person to another by consent, by consent, and only by consent. By acting in this way, men can continually adapt the assignment of goods to suit the condition of demand and supply prevailing at any time. Or in Stewart words; "Exchange by consent, and only by consent, is the principle which underlies the market. This principle *makes the goods* produced by the division of labor available to all producers. The first of Hume's principles gives society the character of an *association of owners* the second gives it the character of a market."<sup>7</sup>

A third principle is necessary if men are to be as "serviceable to each other, as by nature they are fitted to become".<sup>8</sup> The principle that rights to things may be transferred by consent does not provide an adequate bases for all the trading that is desirable. It provides no foundation for contracts. The remedy is the principle that promises are to be regarded as inviolable. This is the third and last basic rules of economic competition. These are the limits that—according to Hume—and *just man* will respect in his economic relations with others. These are the constitutional laws of society.

Society is founded on property, trade, and contracts. When governments are introduced, their primary task is to support property, trade, and contracts. Just behaviour and governance, according to Hume, are not equally important kinds of activity: a government exists mainly to promote the observance of justice. Accordingly, once he has explained the need for a government, it is

6 Cf. *Treatise*, pp. 530-531 and *Inquiry* pp. 24-25. See also Appendix III p. 25.

7 Stewart op, cit. p. 118. The *Italic* is ours. We must have present to our conclusions.

8 *Treatise*, p. 520.



sufficient for him to say that citizens are to obey their proper governments, and then to set down the tests by which citizens can best ascertain who are their governors.

The activities of governments considered legitimate by Hume are of four different kinds. The basic one concerns the principles of justice. First, a government will have to execute them. By this, Hume means that the government will have to punish violators of the principles. Second, it will have to decide when such violations have taken place.<sup>9</sup> And third, in some instances it is to supplement the principles. "If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow the dispositions of civil law: we shall find that these cases, instead of objections are confirmations of the theory delivered above... Thus, the interests of society require, that contracts be fulfilled, and there is not a more material article either of natural or civil justice: but the omission of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a contract, in *foro humano*, but not in *foro conscientiae*, as divines express themselves. In these cases, the magistrate is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear of the origin of justice and of property, as assigned above".<sup>10</sup>

We can call all these activities executive ones, for although decisions are made in cases and for the establishment of tests, these decisions are merely means to secure justice. This executive activity ordinarily is the most important: the maintenance of the condition in which a general economic system can operate is the chief and the only sufficient reason for the institution of a government.

So, the maintenance of property and of contracts is the chief end of governments. This does not mean, however, that any existing government will confine its activity to the social sphere. But the enforcement of some of the duties in the sphere of personal relationships is never the primary or sufficient reason for the existence of a government.

"No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord. All the other passions, besides this of interest, are either easily restrained or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulged".<sup>11</sup>

There will, then, be laws forbidding attacks up in the person, as well as against violations of property and contracts; here again, the

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. pp. 537-538.

<sup>10</sup> Inquiry p. 28.

<sup>11</sup> Treatise p. 491.



appropriate function of government is strictly executive: it is to enforce standards of conduct which are prior to the government.

In performing these activities the government is to be neutral, equal, and impartial in its penalties, judgements, positive laws, and initiated activities. Natural liberty, in short, is not to be restricted beyond that degree necessary for the maintenance of the society and, the state. When a government restricts natural liberty beyond the point defined by the rules of natural and civil duty, it is ruling unequally, and is exploiting the generality of its subjects for the illusory benefits of the rulers and their partners. Such exploitation Hume calls *slavery* not governance. The median position between a condition of complete natural liberty and a condition of slavery is true civil liberty. Here is the fourth principle, the government is to govern in as calculable a manner as possible; when a government swings too far in one direction or the other, it ceases to govern.

Hume advice us that the problem of reconciling liberty and authority must be solved afresh in every generation by his constant emphasis on the balance and limitation of power.

### CONCLUSION

Hume's concept of justice is too narrow and particularly related with his economic thought and could never be compared with (i.e.,) Aristotle's conception of such a virtue; though he undoubtedly—received influence from the Estagirita particularly from *Nicomachean Ethics* and from *Politics* (second book).

On the other hand, to believe that 'justice is nothing but a matter of convention' could be easily counter attack from a platonic perspective; particularly in the *Republic* (second and fourth book).<sup>12</sup>

Paradoxically, Hume uses the term moral in a very broad sense (including also Economics and Politics) or as Stewart says "with a very broad eighteenth-century meaning". But the point of chief interest in the Inquiry—we think—is to secure the rights of property or to defend the "sacrosant" private property; that at least in page 23 of the Inquiry Hume identifies with justice and in p. 32 Hume says that "property is the object of justice."

If we take some expressions just like "justice is founding on public utility" we must "preserve peace and order among mankind", "the rights of property must be secure", and so on and so forth. These expressions seem to be good in themselves, but the problem is that not few times the private interests of individuals are in first place rather than the interests of society or the public, then utility cannot be a real foundation for those moral distinction.

12 Cf. Plato, *Republic*, trans. A. D. Lindsay, Everyman's Library, New York, 1969.



Actually here and there (*hic et nun*) there are persons who have more properties (money, goods, land, etc.) than they could need in a one hundred years' life; on the other hand, there are millions of individuals who have nothing but desire, thirst, hunger, and dust over his body (nor a meter of land where to be buried). This situation, we think, never could be called a justice one but an onerous and burdensome one.

To the former, this is a "normal" and "deserve" situation justified by the sacred and inviolable principle of property and reinforced by the laws and constitution. To the latter this is an intolerable condition that sooner or later they have to change.

Though we are—in principle—agree with the rights of property and opposed to the Communists point of view on such a matter; we think that private property must be limited (to some extent) looking for the interests of societies instead of individuals. Great land owners must be heavily taxed and agrarian reforms must be improved. It is not just that many people work during all their life in a land that belong to others amassing with their work, sweat, and blood the capital of the privilege groups.

The fruit of work must belong in good part to those who work; the goods produced by the division of labor must be *effectively* available to everybody in a real free market out of monopolies, trusts and multinational companies. Society must have the character of an association of owners not of debtors who try to survive by fighting everyday against all the economic obstacles that this "jungle" presents. Private property if it wants to have some relation with justice must fulfill a social function. It means that men must change their individualistic, selfish and egoistic patterns by socialistic and altruistic ones. We are not saying that all men must possess exactly the same (our ingenuity has some limits); what we are trying to say is that the existent inequalities must be put to an end because these inequalities are destroying peace, truth, and confidence between humankind. If such a desperate rapaciousness prevail, such a disregard to equity (rich countries getting richer at expenses of poor and miserable countries), such contempt of order (that conveys to rebellion and disorder), such stupid blindness to future consequences, as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion and must terminate in destruction to the greater number and in a total dissolution of societies.

Who were the fanatics that Hume has on mind when he wrote the Inquiry we don't know. Religious fanatics? that suppose "that domination is founded on grace and that saints alone inherit the earth..." Political fanatics?; the Levellers?, who claimed an equal distribution of property; or Mr Harrington?<sup>13</sup> All of them? Here

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Inquiry* p. 24. For Mr. Harrington see Stewart p. 360, note no. 18: "In a letter, December 8, 1775, to his nephew, then a



are his words: "But historian, and even *common sense*, may inform us that, however *specious* these ideas of *perfect equality* may seem, they are really at bottom *impracticable*; and where they not so, would be *extremely pernicious* to human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care and industry will immediately break that equality. Or if you check these issues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigency and, instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The most rigorous inquisition, too, is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction to punish and redress it. But besides that, so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny... Perfect equality of possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the authority of magistracy and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as well as property..."<sup>14</sup>

The lessons of the Inquiry are the product—or better ideological product—of an eighteenth-century Scotland who frankly confessed his "love of literary fame" as a "ruling passion" that, we think he accomplished. Though we neither are completely agree with the lessons of the *Inquiry* nor believe that they are the best of Hume's philosophy we feel a profound respect for the way of expressing his thoughts and for his salutary words.

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## VI

# A Study of Personality Profile of Bonded and Free Wage Labour

*R P Pathak & H S. Saksena*

The present study is conducted upon 20 Bonded Labour and 20 Free Wage Labour of Jaunsar Bawar, Distt. Dehra Dun. The aim of the study was to investigate the difference in the Personality pattern, if any, of Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour, with the help of Personality profile, prepared on the basis of the data obtained on Cattels and Eber's 16 P F. questionnaire (Hindi Adaptation). Results show that the Personality Pattern of Bonded Labour Characteristically differ with the Personality Pattern of Free Wage Labour on only three factors: F.I., and Q. Further the difference is also found in degree on the factors: B.F.C. and Q. Lastly the present study shows that both Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour possess some common Personality Traits with regard to the remaining factors.

The problem of Bonded Labour is an old age problem in India. This problem is not only connected with a particular area or region of the Country, but a wide spread problem of the country. This problem of Bonded Labour has been greatly studied by Sociologists from their point of view but has not been studied from psychological view point particularly among the population with Polyandry and Polygamy systems. Some of the sociological studies conducted on Bonded Labour studying their Socio-Cultural set-up, and general functioning of this section of population, gave impetus to plan and conduct the present study.

In this study an attempt is made to differentiate the personality Pattern of Bonded Labour and that of Free Wage Labour, in order



to ascertain whether or not this system of Bonded Labour contributes to or effect the Personality make-up of Bonded Labour, which can or can not be differentiated from the Personality make-up of the Free Wage Labour.

Some of the Sociological studies which gave impetus to the present study are being conducted on "Himalayan Polyandry structure, functioning and culture change—Majumdar D. N. 1966".

Other Sociological studies conducted in the field/area by Saksena R. N. 1962, Social Economy of a Polyandrous People, Parmar Y. S. 1975, "Polyandry in Himalayas," Vidhyarthi L. P. and Rai B. K. 1977 "The Tribal Culture of India," Hussain Nadeem, "Bonded for ever" Dr. Shiv Prasad Dabral, History of Garhwal. "Atkinson", Historical background", Rossapt, Land Settlement, Raturi H. K., Doon District Gazetier. These Studies provide diversified information about Bonded Labour's ways of life, particularly in reference to land owners. An important study on Bonded Labour was conducted and quoted by Dr Pande M. K., Dr. Pande in his book "Bonded Labour in India", has given an elaborate picture of the nature of exploitation of Bonded Koltas by the Land lords. Land lords give Banjar land to Bonded Labour against the loans and take all sorts of work, including the improvement of land from Banjar to cultivating land and when their land becomes useful they again give to Bonded Labour another Banjar land.

It is presumed that the pityful conditions which run throughout the life of Bonded labour and generation to generation would have some impact on the development of their Personality. Kolta enquiry committee also tell us in detail about how the Bonded Labours pass their life.

**OBJECTIVE :** The objective of the present study clusters around the study of Personality characteristics of Bonded Labour and to compare it with the Personality characteristics of Free Wage Labour. The investigator, however, assumes that the system (i. e. Bonded Labour) does not effectively influence the Personality Pattern of Bonded Labour to the extent that it brings forth a characteristic difference on the Personality Pattern from that of Free Wage Labour.

**SAMPLE —** The study was conducted on the two samples each consist of 20 respondents belonging to Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour, respectively.

The two samples were drawn with the help of one to one matched group technique, They were also equated on for other variables, such as sex, caste, education and income, as shown in the following tables.



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Table No. I : Showing the distribution of age.

Sl. No.	Age in Years	No. of Respondents	
		S1	S2
1	28	2	2
2	29	1	1
3	30	4	4
4	32	2	2
5	35	2	2
6	38	1	1
7	39	1	1
8	40	1	1
9	45	4	4
10	50	2	2

Mean Age = 36.80 or 37

Table No. II : Showing the distribution of Education.

Sl. No.	Education	No. of Respondents	
		S1	S2
1	IV	3	7
2	III	5	4
3	II	7	5
4	I	5	4

Table No. III : Showing the distribution of Income.

Sl. No.	Income	No. of Respondents	
		S1	S2
1	201—300	8	3
2	301—400	5	6
3	401—500	5	6
4	501—600	2	5

**TOOL :** Cattell and Eber's 16 PF questionnaire as adopted in Hindi by Kapoor, was chosen for the study and was administered on the informants belonging to the two samples under study.

**Results :** The obtained scores were first converted into sten scores for each of the 16 PF. of both the groups under study. The factor wise means, SD's and t's were calculated for Bonded labour and Free Wage Labour which are given in the following table.



Table No. IV : Showing Means, SD's and t's of 16 PF's in respect of Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour.

Factor	Mean B.L.	Mean F.W.L.	SD, B.L.	SD, F.W.L.	t
A	6.25	6.05	.77	1.02	.69
B	2.45	3.20	.97	1.66	-1.71*
C	2.40	2.90	1.07	1.30	-1.28
E	3.85	3.90	1.80	1.38	-.10
F	3.40	4.05	1.36	.97	-1.71*
G	4.95	5.25	1.75	1.44	-.58
H	4.15	4.55	1.06	1.24	-1.08
I	7.10	6.85	1.48	1.28	.58
L	5.75	6.50	1.54	1.36	-1.60
M	6.25	6.30	1.30	1.27	-.12
N	7.00	6.50	2.19	1.63	.79
O	7.55	7.20	1.43	1.21	.81
Q <sub>1</sub>	3.85	4.05	1.93	1.40	-.36
Q <sub>2</sub>	5.35	5.55	1.49	1.60	-.40
Q <sub>3</sub>	5.65	5.45	1.80	1.16	-.82
Q <sub>4</sub>	7.00	6.65	1.00	1.49	.85

df=38.

\*Significant at .10 Level.

**Interpretation and Discussion :** The above results indicate that Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour do not much differ characteristically in respect of their Personality Pattern. The characteristic difference in Personality Pattern is apparent only on the factors : F.I. and Q<sub>1</sub>, though the degree of this difference is not significant. Accordingly the Bonded Labour are more (as on factor F) sober, prudent, serious and tactum as compared with Free Wage Labour. Similarly Bonded Labour are found (as on factor I) to be Tender minded, dependent, ever protected and sensitive while Free Wage Labours have not shown these characteristics. On the third factor (factor Q<sub>1</sub>) the Bonded Labour possess the characteristics of respectivity, established Ideas, tolerant of traditional difficulties, which are absent in Free Wage Labour.

One personality characteristic on which though the characteristic difference is not there, but the Bonded Labour significantly differ from Free Wage Labour, in degree i.e. B. The other personality characteristic which is found significantly different, in degree, along with characteristic difference; is F. This indicates that Bonded Labour are found relatively to be more, sober prudent, serious and tactum as compared with Free Wage Labour. Slight difference in the Degree (neither significant nor characteristic) is also found on factors C and O; which tell us that Bonded Labour possess lower ego strength. Affected by feeling emotionally less stable and easily upset



(factor C) and are more apprehensive, worrying and depressive (factor O) as compared with Free Wage Labour.

The above analysis concludes that the personality pattern of Bonded Labour does not significantly differ with the personality pattern of Free Wage Labour; as the characteristic difference is found only on three Personality Factors i.e. F.I. and Q<sub>1</sub>; which is sufficient to prove significant difference (i.e. not free from chance effect, as per analysis done on the basis of Binominal) in Personality pattern of Bonded Labour and Free Wage Labour. This finding speaks about the reason that general socio-economic condition of Bonded Labour as well as Free Wage Labour are same; hence the system of Bonded Labour does not sufficiently influence the Personality pattern of Bonded Labour to make it different from that of Free Wage Labour.

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
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SOURCE TRAITS

PERSONALITY PROFILE OF BONDED AND FREE WAGE LABOUR

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## VII

# George Combe and Orson Squire Fowler on the Theory of Heredity

*Cemil Akdogan*

### INTRODUCTION

Many scholars believe that Orson Squire Fowler is fake, unoriginal, and quackery, if compared to George Combe. He borrows ideas from original phrenologists such as Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe and degrades phrenology making it a low art. In a review of Spurzheim's *Phrenology*, *The Ladies's Repository* remarked: "With Dr. Combe phrenology reached its zenith. In the hands of the Fowler, and many other itinerant selfseekers, it has degenerated to the reputation of a humbug."<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately this common belief about fakeness and unoriginality of Fowler does not comply with the facts at least in the theory of heredity. The purpose of this paper is to establish Fowler's creativity and originality against Combe, as far as the issue of heredity is concerned. Indeed Fowler borrowed some ideas from Combe, but he is never an exact imitator or copy of Combe. Neither does he corrupt phrenology. He modifies, enriches, and develops the ideas that he borrows and most importantly, he stamps his personality and the spirit of America on those borrowed ideas. He is a creator, a great writer, and a great phrenologist. He demonstrates his originality both in theory and practice. He theoretically adds new elements to Combe's theory concerning the acquired characteristics and self-improvement. As for the practical side of the theory of heredity, he is the only authority in phrenology in his time.

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<sup>1</sup> Madeleine B. Stern, *Heads & Headlines, The Phrenological Powers*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1971, p. 84.



First, both Combe and Fowler believe in transmission of physical and mental traits from parents to offspring. Not Combe, but Fowler almost exhausts hereditary qualities. Although Combe is satisfied with few examples of hereditary characteristics, Fowler presents too numerous examples, mainly derived from his experiences in his professional life for a quarter of century.

Secondly, phrenologists believe in progress and development in almost every field. Both Combe and Fowler are from this tradition, and take a progressive stand in the theory of heredity. They are convinced that parents pay enough attention to breeding animals, and plants but they do not care about their progeny who are also shaped by the same laws that govern animals and plants.

No doubt Fowler is influenced by Combe's theory of acquired characteristics, but with new elements he makes it much more so. Furthermore, he applies this theory to hereditary diseases, insanity, and intemperance.

Thirdly, in presenting the applicable laws of the theory of heredity in human development, Fowler is unique and the only authority Combe simply ignored the applicability of the issue of heredity. Fourthly, both Combe and Fowler accept that marriages between blood relatives make offspring inferior to parents. Fifthly, both agree that heredity precedes education. And lastly, Fowler popularizes the theory of heredity more effectively than Combe, since Combe deals with only the philosophy of heredity, but Fowler stresses on the applicability of the laws of heredity.

### I. Physical Characteristics

Combe wrote his famous book *The Constitution of Man* in 1821 and philosophically dealt with the theory of heredity which is placed in the general framework of progress. For this reason, he ignored the application of theory, even though he complains about the ill-assorted unions between men and women. In fact, heredity was not a main interest, but a side issue in his book. So, he satisfies with a very brief description of physical characteristics that are inherited from parents to progeny.

He mentions that deafness and dumbness are hereditary. For instance, in the family of Kelley seven children out of eight were deaf and dumb.<sup>2</sup> Forms of brain are also transmitted. The European mind is distinct from that of New Hollander. Each Hindu, Chinese, Negro and Carib inherits a particular form of brain from his parents.<sup>3</sup>

Blind and lame parents do not have blind and lame children and the law of transmission of physical traits may be accepted as wrong,

<sup>2</sup> George Combe, *The Constitution of Man*, Boston, 1841, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 152.



but blindness, and lameness are generally a result of accident and are not constitutional. Otherwise, they would be transmitted hereditarily.<sup>4</sup>

Fowler spent many years to collect data on heredity, and examined the shape of heads of foreigners and native persons for twenty five years. Thus, in covering the physical characteristics that are passed on to offspring from parents, he was thorough.

Physical qualities of races and nations are transmitted. For example, the colour of an African race is hereditary. Not only the colour, but also behaviour, voice, the manner of laughing, form of mouth, colour of eyes, etc., are hereditary. One race or nation is distinct from another one. For example, Caucasians have got a division or furrow in the gristle of nose differently from the native Africans. Fowler specifies the physical qualifications of the Indians and Jews.<sup>5</sup>

Family likenesses, and stature are also transmitted. The Rogers family has got red or light hair, and sandy whiskers for generations. Another family, the Webster family, got large, coarse, and heavy eyebrow which is passed on from one generation to another. Also, the form of body and the face of the Hopkins family persisted to be the same for five hundred years in spite of the intermixed marriages.<sup>6</sup>

If a family has got thin, and plump persons, in the coming generation there will be both thin, and plump persons. In the family of Hatch, all persons were thin for three generations. One day Fowler met a new customer in his office and took him as Daniel Webster, since he resembled to Daniel so much; but he was the sixteenth cousin of Daniel. Daniel and his cousin resembled to each other in carriage, slowness, power of motion, height, weight, colour and coarseness of hair, form and colour of eyes, extraordinary vital and muscular organs, and the same form and expression of face<sup>7</sup>. All these examples show that the general structures of body are hereditary.

Size of body is also transmitted. The sons of giants are giants, and the sons of dwarf parents are dwarf. Concerning Dixon H. Lewis, Fowler writes: "Dixon H. Lewis, the 'weighty' ex-speaker of the lower house in Congress, so large that a chair was made expressly to hold his magnitude, and that he always fills three seats in the state, weights 430 pounds, and has a brother who weighs 400 pounds, and also a sister of the extra delicate weight of over THREE

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Orson Squire Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, New York, 1847, pp. 22-7.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-3



HUNDRED". In Africa there is a nation of dwarfs. So, dwarfness is also transmitted.<sup>8</sup>

Physical strength is hereditary. To support this law, Fowler gives two examples from his ancestors. Jonathan Fowler, the son of a large woman, kills a bear one day by his own hands, and hearing this bravery, the England king orders a picture of this event to be drawn and posted on a wall of his palace. The great son of Jonathan Fowler, Seymour Fowler, also killed a big eagle in a sea.<sup>9</sup>

Physical disability, and physical deformities such as marks, excrescences, twenty-four fingers and toes, thick lips, squints, wens flaxen-locks, early baldness and grey hairs, etc; are hereditary. Longevity, short life, premature death, and beauty are also hereditarily transmitted. For beauty, Fowler writes: "Other nations, especially the Circassians, are famed over the earth for their beautiful woman; and the Persian practice of importing these well-formed wives has greatly improved the looks of the descendants of their nobles."<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, Fowler sums up his argument about the hereditary transmission of physical qualities:

Having established the fact that some of those elements which compose mankind bodily—such as his anatomy, the number, shape, and position of his bones, muscles, and other organs; his physiognomy, or likeness, form of body, stature, longevity, and the like, even his idiosyncrasies—are hereditary, the inference that ALL his physical elements and peculiarities are transmitted from generation to generation, is perfectly obvious."<sup>11</sup>

## II. Mental Characteristics and Propensities

Combe gives the caste of Brahmins in India as an example to support that the mental characteristics are hereditary. The children of this caste are superior to the children of the other castes in intelligence, in being acute and docile.<sup>12</sup>

Combe further says that the same character is transmitted. Haughtiness, inflexibleness, severeness, boldness, rashness, and fictitiousness are transmitted from one generation to another. Mental talents depend on the size of brain which is different in each nation, and the mental dispositions of nations are different depending on their size of brains.

Fowler again does not satisfy with few examples to show the transmission of the mental faculties. He accepts what Combe

8 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

12 Combe, pp. 149-50.



presents concerning mental qualities and further develops the mental characteristics in the theory of heredity.

Like Combe, he also states the interrelation between physical and mental qualities. Forms of head are transmitted, and those forms determine the mental qualities :

In short, the fact already conclusively established, that family likenesses and forms are transmitted, taken in connection with the truth of phrenology, necessarily presupposes and proves that the relative size of those various intellectual organs which give the forehead its form, descend from parents to children, and of course those intellectual powers and predilections which Phrenology shows to accompany these forms. And since the relative size of a PART of the phrenological organs, and of course, relative energy of some of the mental faculties is thus transmitted, of course all the phrenological organs and faculties, in all their various degrees of development, are equally transmitted. Since one is hereditary, of course all are. That same law which entails any part, equally, and for the same reason, hands down all. Indeed, those very laws, in all their respective applications, already shown to transmit the various physical conditions of parents to offspring, equally transmit the mental likeness, their intellectual capabilities, and their moral character.<sup>13</sup>

Mental faculties are different from one nation or race to another. Indians, African race, Jews, Caucasians, and Malaysians have got different mental and physical qualities. Fowler especially gives the mental traits of Jews as an example. All over the world the Acquisitiveness of Jews is famous. From the time immemorial, they have run after richness and have got it. The Destructiveness, mechanical ingenuity, the inhabitiveness, the hospitality, especially moral, and intellectual faculties of Jews are important.<sup>14</sup>

Social faculties such as loving cat, homesickness, and love of family; and cautiousness, approbateness, self esteem and firmness. the moral faculties such as religious feeling; conscientiousness, benevolence, constructiveness, ideality, imitation, and mirthfulness are transmitted from parents to offspring.

For Fowler not only mental qualities, but also propensities are hereditary. Among propensities, Combativeness, Destructiveness, Insanity, excessive and deficient appetite, intemperance, forging, the twin-bearing tendency, Cannibalism and acquisitiveness are hereditary.

Concerning destructiveness and combativeness, Fowler mentions the known figure Nero and his deeds. For intemperance, he urges and warns parents not to drink and appeals to unmarried women not

<sup>13</sup> Fowler, pp. 128-9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135-44.



to choose a mate among drinking men, if they — parents and unmarried women— do not want idiot children.<sup>15</sup>

Amativeness is also a propensity, and Aaron Burr and his uncle have got large organs of Amativeness in the lower and back portions of their heads. "For ages to come will these two" persons "be coupled with seductions the most artful and successful, with sexual indulgence the most gross and unparalleled on record, as well as with the ruin of females the most lovely and unblemished before they encountered these arch seducers. Long may it before another as foul destroyer of chastity again scourges the earth!"<sup>16</sup>

### III. Acquired Characteristics and Self-improvement

Phrenologists believe in development in every field, and in hereditary characteristics which may be increased by education or exercises, and the normal qualities being increased are transmitted to offspring from parents. These acquired qualities may be further developed by offspring and passed on to successive generation, and there is no limitation to this progress. This optimistic stand of phrenologists give people a hope for future.

Parents can make an offspring witty, intelligent, moral, weak, strong and etc., since they, not God, control the future of their progeny. Although they breed their animals, and plants, they do not care about their progeny. Both Fowler and Combe accept that the same laws governing animals and plants are also valid for human beings. In fact they simplify the complexity of the matter of heredity by establishing the similarity between animals and human beings, but this is not a disadvantage in popularizing their case, the importance of progeny; for public can understand simple rules better than the intricate ones. Let us quote from Combe and Fowler. First, Combe writes :

By a proper attention we can preserve and improve the breed of horses, dogs, cattles, and indeed all other animals. Yet it is amazing this observation was never transferred to human species where it would be equally applicable. It is certain that, notwithstanding our promiscuous marriages, many families are distinguished by peculiar circumstances in their character. This family character, like a family face, will often be lost in one generation and appear again in the succeeding. Without doubt, education, habit, and emulation, may contribute greatly in many cases to keep it up; but it will be generally found that, independent of these, Nature has stamped an original impression on certain minds which education may greatly alter or efface, but seldom so entirely as to prevent its traces being seen by an accurate observer. How a certain character or constitution of mind can be transmitted from a parent to a child, is a question of more difficulty than importance.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 148-9.



It is equally difficult to account for the external resemblance of features, or for bodily diseases being transmitted from a parent to a child. But we never dream of a difficulty in explaining any appearance of nature which is exhibited to us every day. A proper attention to this subject would enable us to improve, not only the constitutions but the characters of our posterity. Yet we every day see very sensible people, who are anxiously attentive to preserve or improve the breed of their horses, tainting the blood of their children, and entailing on them not only the most loathsome diseases of the body, but madness, folly, and the most unworthy dispositions, and this too when they cannot plead being stimulated by necessity or impelled by passion.<sup>17</sup>

Fowler also says that the same laws govern both breeding animal and human beings; and parents can control the future of their offspring:<sup>18</sup>

Nor are these hereditary causes and effects hid under a bushel, or beyond human control. They are exposed to full view. Parents can compare—cannot well help comparing—their children with themselves, and drawing these hereditary inferences. Men study and apply these principles in planting seeds, selecting soils, and improving their breeds of domestic animals. They know how, by such application, to secure fleetness, strength, beauty, and other qualities in horses: fattening properties in swine, fine woolled sheep, game and fattening predispositions in fowls and the like. So fully do they understand, and so effectually apply these laws, that they can predict with certainty beforehand, whether the prospective fowl is to be a mule or a race horse, the lamb black or white, the Calf Durham or any other breed. Now since those same laws which govern transmission throughout all its phases, he can of course ascertain and apply them to the production of whatever physical or mental qualities, in offspring, he may desire—can render his prospective children strong, healthy, sprightly, beautiful, intelligent, moral, and the like, as he may choose—can render them amiable or revengeful, proud or humble, coarse or refined, mathematical, mechanical, benevolent, reflective, or whatever else he pleases, or all combined—and thus BY CONSTITUTION “DYED IN THE WOOL”—and even predict their respective characteristics before they see the light. Parents can so unite in marriage as to render their offspring short or tall, diseased or healthy, deformed or well formed, long lived or short lived, peaceful or pugnacious, timid or courageous, honest or unjust, ingenious, musical, witty, acquisitive, communicative, poetical, logical, oratorical, profound, or whatever else may be desired. Those who doubt this in the main, virtually deny either that laws govern this matter of transmission, or else that man can see and apply them; to dispute either of which is to deny our senses.<sup>19</sup>

17 Combe, pp. 150-1.

18 Fowler, pp. 18-9.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 20.



Acquired characteristics and unlimited possibility of progress for human beings are accepted by both Combe and Fowler. Combe asserts that the laws of transmission of hereditary characteristics are determined by phrenology. There are three possibilities. First these traits may be transmitted absolutely, and then the children will be the exact copies of their parents, and no improvement will take place from one generation to another. The second possibility is that children may inherit a combination of traits of their father and mother. Or thirdly the children may inherit the qualities of stock, in addition to this, the acquired characteristics.<sup>20</sup>

Combe rejects the first alternative by depending on some observations. He sees that each child is not an exact copy of one of his parents. He also rejects the second alternative, for a child does not inherit a combination of the characteristics of his father and mother. Then Combe accepts the third alternative. Children not only inherit the general characteristics of their family, but also inherit the acquired characteristics of their parents at the moment of conception.<sup>21</sup> From this law Combe easily can derive the principle of development. The acquired characteristic can be added from one generation to another and no limit can exist for progress.

To support and enlighten the third law, Combe gives some examples. Let us see two examples that he presents. Sir Walter Scott, the father of Napoleon Bonapart, is a very fine person with a talent of eloquence and strong intellect. He marries one of the most beautiful woman, Laetitia Ramolini, who has a firmness in the character. She helps her husband on a horse in fighting with enemy before giving birth to Napoleon, and transmits her acquired characteristics in the field of war to Napoleon at the moment of conception; thus, Napoleon become one of the greatest commanders in the world.

A lady who has got a large brain exercised music as being a music teacher in a school and marries a husband with moderate musical abilities, They have several children with great musical talents, since children are conceived during the period in which their mother were practicing music; thus, the increased form of mother's original talent of music are transmitted to her children.<sup>22</sup>

Besides transmission of acquired characteristics, Combe also accepts that the existing conditions of parents are hereditary. Children of older parents are much more intellectual than the children of younger parents, since a young parent has strong animal propensities and an older parent has strong intellectual qualities.<sup>23</sup>

20 Combe, p. 153.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 159-61.



If Combativeness and Destructiveness are dominant in parents during conception, child will inherit these animal propensities. But if intellectual activity at conception is vigorous in parents, children will be intelligent.<sup>24</sup>

Even, sometimes, parents can have low intellectual faculties, but their children can inherit strong mental faculties, if some external reasons during conception make their parents vigorous intellectually. Also, a child may inherit no moral faculties from a highly moral parent, if the animal propensities of his parent is high at conception.<sup>25</sup>

Again, the geniusness of both parents may not be passed on to offspring, if the parents exert their mental and corporeal functions excessively.<sup>26</sup>

Fowler is of course influenced by the ideas of Combe on transmission of acquired characteristics of parents to offspring, the unlimited possibilities for progress of human beings, and transmission of the existing conditions of parents at conception. But Fowler enriches and modifies Combe's ideas by bringing new elements such as magnetism, and love into the picture.

Fowler believes in the unlimited development of human beings through acquired characteristics :

As, in raising water by means of the pump, one stroke after another raises it higher and still higher, while the valve catches and holds it, so one parent, endowed with only ordinary musical genius, can increase that gift by exercise, and transmit it thus increased to his offspring. They, too, can still further increase it by cultivation, and thus endow their offspring with natural musical genius far superior to what they inherited, and so on for ever. Or, to carry out our figure, we can raise any or all our powers by cultivation just as we raise water by one stroke of the pump, and then the valve of parentage transmits them thus raised to posterity. The next generation can likewise re-increase them by culture, and then parentage transfer both the first and second increase to posterity, to be still farther reaugmented and again transmitted by every generation who choose to avail themselves of the advantages proffered by this infinitely wise provision.<sup>27</sup>

Fowler also accepts Combe's idea on transmission of the particular states of the minds and bodies of parents to progeny at the moment of conception. Just to enlighten this point together with the law of acquired characteristics, he writes a book called *Love and Parentage, Applied to the Improvement of Offspring*. At page 32

24 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

25 *Ibid.*

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 172-3.

27 Fowler, p. 267.



of this book, he gives a quotation from Combe to show that the existing conditions of parents during conception are transmitted :

George Combe, high authority truly, in his "Constitution of Man," gives the following case in point. "In the summer of 1827, the practitioner alluded to was called upon to visit professionally a young woman in the immediate neighborhood, who was safely delivered of a male child. As the parties appeared to be respectable, he made some inquiries regarding the absence of the child's father; when the old woman told him that her daughter was still unmarried, that the child's father belonged to a regiment in Ireland; that last autumn he obtained leave of absence to visit his relations in this part of the country, and that on the eve of his departure to join his regiment, an entertainment was given, at which her daughter attended. During the whole evening, she and the soldier danced and sang together; when heated by the toddy and the dance, they left the cottage, and after the lapse of an hour were found together in a glen, in a state of utter insensibility, from the effects of their former festivity; and the consequence of this interview was the birth of an idiot. He is now nearly six years age, and his mother does not believe that he is able to recognise either herself or any other individual. He is quite incapable of making signs whereby his wants can be made known—with this exception, that when hungry he gives a wild shriek. This is the case upon which it would be painful to dwell; and I shall only remark, that the parents are both intelligent, and that the fatal result cannot be otherwise accounted for than by the total prostration or eclipse of the intellect of both parties from intoxication.

In this passage Fowler cites Combe as a high authority. Furthermore he reads Combe's main book, *The Constitution of Man*, since the passage just given above belongs to this book. As we have already granted, Fowler is influenced by Combe, first, on the idea of development of human beings through acquired characteristics, and secondly, on the idea of transmission of existing conditions of parents, but he is never an exact copy of Combe. Before passing to the originality of Fowler, let us mention one more example that Fowler cites to support transmission of parents's conditions at the moment of conception. Like Combe, Fowler also says that the age of parents determines whether children will inherit mostly mental faculties or animal propensities. The children of younger parents will be more intellectual than the children of older parents.<sup>28</sup>

Now we can concentrate on the creativity and originality of Fowler. Although he accepts Combe's theory of heredity which is interpreted in the general philosophy of progress of phrenologists in Combe, Fowler makes it much more sophisticated by explaining Combe's theory in terms of magnetism. He accepts some magnetic secretions which are controlled by the bodily and mental conditions.

28 *Ibid* , pp. 235-6.



Again let us quote from Fowler to see how he explains the acquired characteristics and existing conditions:

Now, those children that receive existence and constitution when all these sub fluids maintain their usual relative power and activity in parents, will resemble these parents in every particular; but those that receive being and impress when they are angry, or the kindly, or the intellectual, or any other sub-fluid prevails in parentage, and is therefore imparted in existing relative predominance to the materials of life, will inherit these sub-fluids in their then existing predominance or deficiency; some of which may be greater in the child than in either parents, because augmented by increased activity in both parents, and others less than in either, because little excited in either; while those begotten when circumstances have conspired to diminish the combative sub fluid, and increase the moral, for example, or any other, will receive from parentage a proportional endowment of the temporarily prevailing sub-fluids and consequent characteristics: and thus when any other faculty or element prevails, or becomes deficient, in parents at this period; its existing degree of parental action being fully and faithfully represented in these materials, and thereby transmitted to progeny. Furthermore: when one sub-magnetic fluid prevails in one parent, and another in another, at this period, the progeny takes on the then existing combinations of these magnetic fluids, forces, or qualities; and thus of all their other combinations; nor does it matter whether they prevail temporarily, or permanently, so that they but prevail at this period.<sup>29</sup>

In a sense Fowler made Combe's theory more scientific by creating a hidden mechanism —magnetic secretions or sub-fluids— to explain what Combe observationally formulated. Fowler goes beyond observational laws or statements of Combe and by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between Combe's observational laws and his theoretical scheme in terms of magnetical sub-fluids. For example "The existing conditions of parents are transmitted to progeny." is an observational statement or law. We can observe parents and their children and can check whether the existing conditions of parents passed on to progeny or not. Fowler does not stay at the level of observation, but he goes beyond this level, and for instance, expounds a theoretical law, namely, "The Combative sub fluid is little." In this statement, nothing does concern observation. Every term in this theoretical statement refers something behind the observational level. We cannot observe a Combative sub fluid. Then Fowler brings together both theoretical statements and observational statements. For instance he tells: "In this parent the Combative sub-fluid is little". This statement connects both levels. "This man" is an observational term; but "the Combative sub fluid" is a theoretical

<sup>29</sup> Orson Squire Fowler, *Love and Parentage*, New York, 1846, p. 29.



term. In this way, Fowler can explain every statement that Combe can express. Then, Combe depends on his senses and observation. His position is positivistic. Fowler goes beyond observation and in a scientific sense establishes a real theory in heredity. In fact Combe propounds some observational laws of heredity. In this paper many times the term "Combe's theory" were used in a casual way. If we go deeper into the topic of heredity, we cannot assert that Combe indeed has a theory. Fowler transforms Combe's observational laws into theoretical laws and does have a real theory of heredity. He indeed makes Combe's laws much more sophisticated, since he does not depend only on sense organs.

Even the expounding a real theory of heredity is not the only creativity of Fowler. He also enriches Combe's laws in view of love which is a new element. When parents love each other spiritually, they will call mental faculties into action during love making, and their progeny will be intellectual. If there is a discord between parents, they will make love with an animal passion, and their children will inherit animal propensities in a high degree from them.

With love the law of transmission of the existing conditions of parents to progeny can be effectively explained. If parents love each other spiritually at the moment of conception, their mental faculties will be active, and their child will receive the existing mental faculties from parents. Otherwise, children will mainly receive animal propensities.

Love can also be applied to the law of the acquired characteristics. Say that a couple do not love each other at the beginning of their marriage. At this period children will inherit mainly animal propensities. Let us say that later the couple begins to love each other with a spiritual love, and in this case, the spiritual love is an acquired situation, and the progeny conceived at this later period, will receive the influence of spiritual love by being more intellectual.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, Fowler is capable of explaining or applying Combe's laws to a new situation like love. Even this conclusion shows that Fowler never is an exact copy of Combe, or a mere imitator like a parrot. He commands the topic of heredity and Combe's laws fully, otherwise he could not apply them too new matter or element such as love. Also neither does he degrade Combe's laws or phrenology, at least in the issue of heredity.

From a linear point of view, of course. Combe's laws and Fowler's contributions to them are nonsense, but the purpose of this paper is not to criticize either Combe or Fowler. We are just trying to compare both of them and see if Fowler is original or not.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 109.



### III. A—Diseases and Fowler

Fowler also applies Combe's laws to hereditary diseases to which he especially applies the principle of improvement; thus, he further demonstrates that he is in full control of the topic of heredity.

Among diseases, consumption, scrofula, syphilis, gout, apoplexy, cancers, ring-worms, dyspepsia, heart affections, sudden death, cutaneous affections, blindness, deafness, stammering, hemorrhage, dizziness, fits, tic-doloureux, rheumatism, etc., are transmitted.

Fowler believes that not diseases, but the liability to disease is hereditary. Children of hereditarily diseased parents are liable to that kind of disease that their parents have, but they can escape the inherited disease and live a happy life, if they perform the health principles and proper exercises to cure the disease.<sup>31</sup>

Fowler says that "This principle of improvement is INDUBITABLE— a universal LAW OF THINGS— and therefore allows children, weakly by nature, and even diseased, to become stronger and stronger till energy supplants debility and health disease. It is not therefore impossible for diseased parents to have healthy children, and all hereditary diseases to be ultimately eradicated."<sup>32</sup> At the time of conception, if parents have a hereditary disease, that existing condition will be transmitted to progeny. Also if a parent begins to be getting better through exercises, then his progeny will receive the new acquired situation and will be less liable to that illness than his parent. Thus, Fowler successfully applies Combe's principles to a new problem, i.e., diseases.

### IV. Practical Rules of the Theory of Heredity

Although Combe complains about ill-assorted unions between women and men, he is not interested in practice. He deals with heredity from the standpoint of development of human beings which is the general philosophy of phrenologists, but Fowler is interested in both practice and theory. Thus, Fowler is unique, and the only creator.

Fowler first adduces the law of confluence and from it arrives at some practical rules governing the choice of mates. If both parents have the same qualities in a high degree children will inherit those qualities in a degree equal to both parents collectively. Thus, the children will be better or worse than their parents, if the law of confluence is true. For example, "the two rivers of the Robertsons and Henrys united in the person of Patrick Henry's father, and this lingual river unite with that of Winston eloquence, and the confluence of ALL THREE produced the most eloquent man of his age, and

<sup>31</sup> Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, p. 98.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*



probably the world!"<sup>33</sup> If propensities are inherited; then the progeny will be worse than their parents. For instance, Aaron Burr is a product of parents who have the organ of Amativeness in a large size.

From the law of confluence Fowler derives some peractical rules to regulate choosing proper mates in marriages. The question that he specifically asks is that "What temperaments should, and what should not, unite."<sup>34</sup> First practical rule, in choosing the life companion, states that "EXTREMES of temperament should not unite: because, the law of confluence, already demonstrated, will produce offspring having still greater extremes".<sup>35</sup> If both parents have weak lungs, they must not marry, otherwise their progeny will have weaker lung. "But those whose lungs are deficient in size or strength should marry those whose lungs are large and strong, because their issue, being more liable to take on the strong than the weak organs of parents, will be more likely to inherit the strong lungs of the one than the weak ones of the other."<sup>36</sup> Those persons who have propensities in a high degree should not marry.

But Fowler warns that "offsetting should not be carried to the other extreme. Very great defects should never unite with great opposite extremes".<sup>37</sup> If a coarse man marries a finely organized woman, their progeny will be divided into two characters. In him coarseness and fine organization will conflict. "While the sluggish should not marry the sluggish, lest their offspring should be doubly tame and indolent, nor the extra nervous those equally excitable, lest their offspring should be feeble, yet precocious, still the wide-awake should not marry the dull, nor those of low organizations those highly wrought: but those given to extremes should marry those LESS extreme."<sup>38</sup> A fleshy person must marry a lean person, and a person who has light complexion, hair, and eyes, should marry a person who is darker than himself, not too dark. As a last rule Fowler says that well-balanced persons must marry one another, since they do not need an offsetting. A medium person should marry a medium person.

#### V. The children of kinsmen are inferior

The children of cousins or other nearer relatives are inferior, even though the married relatives are intellectual and moral. This situation is against the law of transmission of physical and mental

33 *Ibid.*, p. 246.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 261.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 262.

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.*, p. 263.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 264. 0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



qualities. Both Combe and Fowler agree on the inferiority of children of near relatives, especially cousins.

For instance, the old royal families, especially in Spain and Portugal, marry their near relatives and run out.<sup>39</sup> In another example, "N. P., of W., Mass., a fine looking and intelligent man, of good sense, married his own cousin, and what a set of children! One of them is clump-footed, another has but one eye, and all three of them are very weak in intellect, small in person, and have heads shaped like a flat-iron, point turned downward, flat on top, and their chin making the point."<sup>40</sup>

## VI. Education and Heredity

In both Combe and Fowler the main emphasis is on heredity. Education comes after heredity and simply cannot create or eliminate the mental and physical organs, but can increase their abilities. Both education and hereditary organs are important, but heredity is the root of development.

## VII. Popularization of the Theory of Heredity

As was seen, Combe does not care about practice in the issue of heredity except placing the hereditary laws in the general progressive stand of phrenology; so, he deals only the philosophy of heredity. Furthermore, he furnishes little space to propound his views on heredity in his main book, *The Constitution of Man*, which is already a target of criticism with respect to the relation between religion and phrenology. Some people accused Combe of not believing in God, since his book implies that not God but the laws of nature govern everything. Thus, Combe's main book is not influential in popularization of the laws of heredity. It is a philosophical book and does not offer any practical solution to any problem that mostly concerns layman.

As for Fowler, he writes for public and emphasises on the practical aspect of the theory of heredity. Whenever possible, he does not miss the opportunity and appeals to parents and unmarried women on the momentous importance of the issue. In one of those appeals, he says :

And now, prospective parents, be entreated to pause and consider this whole subject. Does it not commend itself to your investigation and application? And is it not the imperious DUTY of every prospective parent to study and apply it? As our possession of eyes, muscles, reason, speech, etc., imposes on us a solemn obligation to USE them, so nature's proffer of such exalted blessings, renders us guilty if we neglect them. Are the temporal and eternal destinies of your dearly beloved children indeed so trifling? Though you may "neither

39 Combe, p. 159.

40 Fowler, *Hereditary Descent*, p. 227.



fear God nor regard man, "yet be entreated to regard" the bone of your bone and flesh of your flesh. "The destinies of your own dear prospective children lie completely at your control. Nay, you must control them."<sup>41</sup>

His books were sold in thousands, and even a bookstore in New Haven was opened to sell only Fowler's books. He was the most fertile writer among phrenologists and was so popular that his books reached almost every town and village in the United States, since his books were "fresh and racy, intensely American" in style, full of graphic colloquialisms and slipshod grammar."<sup>42</sup> Most importantly, they were practical and low priced.

### Conclusion

Fowler has originality in both theory and practice. Never is he an exact copy of Combe. Although he took the ideas of acquired characteristics, existing conditions in parents, and progress of human beings from Combe, he enriched these ideas and developed them by adding new elements—magnetical sub-fluids and love. Thus, he showed his creativity in theory. As for the practical aspect of the issue, he is surely the only authority. He was a creative man, a fertile writer, and the most famous practical phrenologist in the world. We must change the remark of *The Ladies's Repository* and say, not with Combe, but "with Fowler phrenology reached its zenith", as far as the theory of heredity is concerned.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 281-2.

<sup>42</sup> Stern, p. 64.



## IX

## Mysticism and Existentialism

*M. L. Sharma*

Mysticism is rooted in the existential predicament of man. As the thinking man passes through life he faces disconcerting difficulties and challenges both from external and internal sources. These challenges again occur within a life-span which can be cut short by death at any moment. Man realises that circumscribed as his life is by birth and death it is also subject to an inscrutable fate. His experience often brings home to him the fact that not infrequently what he himself proposes, fate disposes. Helplessness in life's experiences seems to be writ large before him. He feels that external forces of nature and society create circumstances in face of which many of his cherished pursuits and goals prove to be illusory. Man also gradually comes face to face with the truth that there are forces residing with him that also are potent causes of his undoing. There is the sleep of ignorance which makes him forgetful of the true meaning and value of human life. He proceeds through life in a state of complacency and is robbed by his own passions of lust, pride, avarice, anger etc. If he is wakeful to the onslaughts of these internal robbers, he is constantly in warfare with himself because his lower nature of passions and his higher nature of reason pull him in opposite directions. Then there are the sufferings and infirmities of illness and old age to which the human flesh is the natural heir. Add to this sorry state of affairs the irresistible and all-destructive stroke of death, and the picture of man's existential predicament is complete in all its stark luridness.

Existentialism also takes a serious note of the existential predicament of man. Sartre, Jaspers, Camus and Marcel all agree with Heidegger in lamenting that man is 'thrown' in the world of Being, one knows not from where. Man truly exists or stands out from the background of Nature. He as the being-for-itself is pitted



against the world as being-in-itself. Being self-conscious he is free and self-creative and self-transcending. But he has to proceed through life carrying the weight of responsibility arising from his freedom without any hope of succor from the opaque Being-in-itself. Thus the existentialist philosophers find the existing individual in a strange predicament as regards ethical choice because he has nothing to fall back upon for his guidance. Nature as described by science is a dance of blind particles totally indifferent to the moral aspirations of man. Society is itself divided against itself. The bewildered individual can hardly—avoid being either submerged in its customs and traditions or reduced to a function of some group. The Nations State clamours for unconditional obedience of the individual with all its totalitarian might before which individual freedom is the first casualty. God is indeed dead and the individual can no longer look to traditional religion for ethical enlightenment. Thus the individual is left to himself for the resolution of his ethical predicament. But the individual is a riddle to himself in view of the discovery of the psychologists and psychoanalysts that he is ordinarily unaware of the unconscious motives that determine his behaviour. This is how Existentialism paints the existential predicament of the contemporary individual.

Both Mysticism and Existentialism are preeminently philosophies which have a very close relation to life in the sense that they arise from the problems of existence faced by man and offer messages of salvation to him so that he can live by them meaningfully. Moreover, both these philosophies can be said to be intensely personalistic in character inasmuch as they are rooted in the personal experiences of the philosopher as he struggles with life's momentous problems. Again, both Existentialism and Mysticism are subjectivistic in the sense that they insist that truth is not truth unless it is freely appropriated by the individual in his innermost subjectivity. Truth which is merely objective has hardly any significance for the individual who requires a truth which is passionately acquired by him so that he feels committed to it. It is in this sense that the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard who has been acknowledged as the father of Existentialism holds that truth is subjectivity. In his personal life he passed through certain well-marked stages characterised progressively by cynical enjoyment of momentary sensual pleasures, then by acceptance of impersonal universal moral principle and lastly by a surrender to the infinite, transcendent, personal God in complete Faith. He universalised this spiritual itinerary of his personal life and presented his well-known doctrine that every individual in search of authentic existence has to pass through the Aesthetic, the Ethical and the Religious stages respectively for the fullest development of his existential subjectivity. His existential



philosophy is thus a formalisation in universal terms of his personal encounter with Truth. Mysticism also involves a direct, first-hand, intuitive contact with God on the part of the mystic. The mystic does not arrive at the existence of God through the so-called proofs given by the discursive reason. He perceives God intuitively and so the truth of divinity is appropriated by him as his own truth. Of course, there is difference between Kierkegaard's leap of Faith towards infinite personal God visualised as an objective uncertainty and the mystic's immediate contact with God who is experienced as neither personal nor impersonal but as trans-personal. But so far as the nature of truth as subjectivity is concerned there is hardly any difference of opinion between Kierkegaard and any mystic.

Existentialists insist on the primacy of the subject. The shadow of Descartes who made the self-certainty of the self or the subject as the cornerstone of his philosophy has obviously fallen on the entire course of Modern Western Philosophy. The insistence of the Existentialists on the subject-oriented reflection also shows that they have been influenced by Descartes. But there is a fundamental difference between the Cartesian and the existentialist concepts of self. The self of Descartes is an epistemological subject existing in isolation from the world, while the subject as conceived by existentialists is the self—in-the-world, the concrete self existing in relation to other selves and the material world. The existentialists do not regard the subject as merely intellectual in nature. For them the subject is essentially free to choose from among the alternatives presented before him so that he constantly transcends himself by repeatedly renewing his choice. The facticity of his empirical self as constituted by his body, mental dispositions and social situation is for him the being there (*Dasien*), which he tries to transcend in order to appropriate the being-one-self. So the existentialist concept of the self is markedly different from the Cartesian concept.

Mysticism also regards the subject or the self as being of primary importance. But its notion of the self is at variance from the existentialist notion. According to Mysticism to self is to be distinguished from body, senses, mind, intellect and ego-sense which are all encompassed under the object-world. It is the *Ātman* or the pure subject that can never be known as an object that is to be discovered by the mystic by a careful and persistent elimination of every trace of objectivity. All mystical discipline is yoked to the search of the pure Self, and when it is realised it is seen to be identical with the Reality or the Brahman.

After noting some significant meeting-points of Mysticism and Existentialism, we may now consider the comparative value of these philosophies in the context of the moral and spiritual crisis faced by mankind. Existentialism of the atheistic type has been advocated by Heidegger, Sartre and Camus. According to Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, a Hindu man has been



thrown in a world which is devoid of God. If there is no God, then the belief in a universal moral Law also cannot be sustained. Man whose essence consists of the *pour-soi* or consciousness is not only pitted against the *en-soi* or being-in-itself but he can exist only in separation from something or some form of the *en-soi*. While the *en-soi* is full of being, the *pour-soi* is essentially the lack of being, the emptiness or the nothingness. Man, therefore, is simply an inexplicable entity, who can at best be conceived as a fissure or a hole in the *en-soi*. In contrast to the *en-soi* which is necessary being man is merely *detrop* or contingent being. Man as the *pour-soi* is dependent for his being on the *en-soi* because he needs it as a constant presence in separation from which he exists. His fundamental project is to go in pursuit of the *en-soi* in some form or the other and then to unite himself with the being inherent in it so that his native non-being or emptiness could be eliminated by the appropriation of being. But this fundamental project of the unity of the *pour*-and *en-soi* which could become ground of man's self-subsistence is doomed to failure because it is inherently contradictory. The *pour-soi* being of the nature of nothingness is at the opposite pole from the *en-soi* or being. Hence their union is inherently impossible.

Now Sartre's denial of God is more radical and aggressive than that of the traditional atheists. He is not content like Nietzsche with announcing that God is now dead in the sense that whatever relevance belief in God had for the primitive man who lived in constant fear of the formidable forces of nature it has now become irrelevant for the contemporary man who has mastered the forces of nature with the help of science. He strikes at the very root of the idea of God by ingeniously proving that it is a self-contradictory idea. His argument is that God is conceived as the Infinite Conscious Being, and as consciousness and being are contradictories their unity is as impossible as that of roundness and squareness. Therefore the concept of God is of the same category as the concept of round square.

But it is of interest to note that though Sartre denies the existence of God or for that matter he even asserts the logical impossibility of the concept of God, yet he says that the fundamental project of man is to become God. From the very nature of the case such a project can never be fulfilled. As he puts it, "Each human presence in the world is at same time the direct project of metamorphosing his own *Pour soi* into *En-soi* *Pour-soi*... Thus man's passion is the inverse of Christ's, for man loses him-self as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain; man is a useless passion."<sup>1</sup> It is wonderful how

1 Being and Nothingness p. 708 (Quoted from H. J. Blackham's 'Six Existentialist Thinkers'. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).



## Mysticism and Existentialism

the Nemesis of atheism forces Sartre to accommodate God in the scheme of his Godless world and give Him the most significant role of the highest goal of all mankind, though He eludes man for ever.

Though apparently Sartre's atheistic Existentialism is far removed from Mysticism, yet in so far as it emphasises the self-transcending nature of the *pour-soi* it admits that the self is not self-sufficient and it has to look beyond itself incessantly in order to gain the *raison de etre* of its existence. The *pour-soi* from its very nature cannot rest content till he is meta-morphosed in God. Mysticism also declares that the realisation of God is the supreme goal of man. It is astonishing how the two extremes tend to meet in God. At one extreme is the godless existentialism of Sartre which is unwilling to give any place in its scheme of things to any spiritual principle, while on the other extreme is Mysticism which declares that God is the alpha and the omega of all existence. But the irony of the situation is that Sartre who started by positing the sole existence of the dead and inert *En-soi* had to give a grudging and negative status to man in the form of *pour-soi* which he conceived as empty nothingness. The spiritual principle which was thus most reluctantly posited in the form of vapoury nothingness of the *pour-soi* grew by an irresistible Nemesis into God who was an anathema to Sartre. But like the village schoolmaster of Goldsmith Sartre "would argue still, even though vanquished", and as if not to be accused of being responsible for his own undoing he hastened to argue that though God is undoubtedly the ultimate goal of all human endeavour yet He being self-contradictory does not exist. Rather than admit gracefully that God does have the supreme status in the ontological scheme Sartre can go even to extent of saying that "man is a useless passion" because he wants to transcend himself in order to embrace God. As a matter of fact it is Sartre who is contradicting himself but by the device of defence mechanism he projects self contradiction in God.

It is palpable that the philosophy of atheistic Existentialism as propounded by Sartre cannot solve the existential predicament of the contemporary man despite all its promises to illuminate the possibilities of his existence. This philosophy presents a picture of the human presence which cannot inspire the bewildered individual. According to it the *pour-soi* is not responsible for the origin of its own being and yet being absolutely free it is the creator of its own situation in the light of its chosen end. Individual's freedom involves responsibility. He is conscious of being responsible for his manner of being and for whatever happens to him. He is responsible even for the wars that are fought in his time. From the very moment of his origin he has to "carry the weight of the world" on his own, "without anybody being able to lighten the burden". He must have no remorse nor regrets as he has no excuse in view of his total



freedom. Drawing the unenviable picture of the human presence and its meaning Sartre brings home to the individual the dread inherent in the existential situation. "It is just for this reason that the *pour-soi* apprehends itself in dread, that is to say as a being who is not the originator of his own being, nor of the being of the other, nor of the *en-soi* which form the world, but who is forced to decide on the meaning of being, in himself and everywhere outside of himself. He who realises in dread his condition of being thrown into a responsibility which goes back even to his finding himself in the world, no longer has remorse, nor regret, nor excuse; he is no more than a liberty which is itself perfectly revealed and whose being lies in this very revelation."<sup>2</sup> So the theme of the Sartrean Existentialism stands painted in 'dread'-ful colours. The individual is irresistibly drawn towards his destiny of a suffering hero with the fatality of the Greek tragedy. Sartre further warns that any attempt on the part of the individual to take refuge from dread is nothing but self-deception.

Thus atheistic Existentialism can promise only a brave pessimism to the struggling and suffering individual. In other words, his salvation lies in recognising the worldly existence for what it is, a burden of responsibility which ultimately ends in Nihilism. In spite of its heroic posture this philosophy has nothing to offer to the contemporary individual by way of salvation. In sharp contrast to this unrelieved pessimism Mysticism uplifts the suffering individual from the mire of worldly existence and puts him on the pathway to God which as St. Jñāne śvara tells us is bliss surcharged at every step and where the very path is the destination.<sup>3</sup>

Having seen the futile nature of the solution of the existential problems offered by the atheistic Existentialism we may now turn to the theistic Existentialism of Kierkegaard and Karl Jaspers and examine its claim to offer salvation to the contemporary individual struggling to give some meaning to his existence and thereby to win happiness in his life. Kierkegaard was fed up with the falsification of the Christianity at the hands of the established Church of Denmark and the Christian philosophers who either tried to objectify Christianity or reinterpret it rationally for making it agreeable to intellectuals. He pointed out that one does not become a true Christian by acquiring the objective doctrines and rituals associated with the Christianity like moving in Christian society, visiting the church on Sundays, declaring one's readiness to live and die for the defence of the Christianity, swearing by the Biblical doctrines and undergoing the ritual of baptism. True Christianity is subjective and internal nature. It consists in accepting the Christian way of

2 Ibid, pp. 641-42.

3 Jñanesvari, VI, 157-60.



life by a free act of choice in the depths of one's being so that there occurs an internal transformation manifesting itself in the attitude of self-commitment. Similarly, Kierkegaard opposed the efforts of some philosophers to found Christianity on a rational basis. Hegel, for instance, held that the myth of Christ being the Son of God when interpreted rationally only means that every man contains an element of Divinity within him. But Kierkegaard severely criticised all such attempts at the rationalizing of Christianity which only destroy it. The Incarnation of Christ is the very pivot of Christianity and as such it has to be appropriated by the believer by a leap of faith. Reason will never accept the myth of Incarnation because it fails to conceive as to how God who is infinite, omniscient and omnipotent could be incarnated in a finite human being known as Jesus who led a life marked by humiliation and sacrifice on the cross. The gulf between the divine and the human is impassable for the reason. Hence the concept of Incarnation is absurd from its angle. It is faith alone that can embrace without question the revealed truth of Incarnation. This miracle of faith appropriating the objective uncertainty of Christ has been illustrated by Kierkegaard by recalling the episode of the Old Testament involving Abraham. Abraham was ordered by God to sacrifice his tender-age innocent son Isaac, and Abraham calmly sets off for Mount Moriah with Isaac, wielding his knife, in order to carry out the will of God. Kierkegaard extols the life of Faith as being the embodiment of authentic existence. He tells us that the leap of faith alone can take us beyond the fatal Either/Or: the finitude of the aesthetic life the empty infinity of the ethical. Through faith in the paradox of the Incarnation of the Infinite in time we can escape the Scylla of aesthetic existence and the Charybdis of the ethical.<sup>4</sup>

The life of faith brings salvation and opens for man the new dimension of future. It cannot be described in terms of Hegel's rational categories because it is not an idea but a state that has to be experienced. It is the fulfilment of all human endeavour directed towards the perfection of the self. When an individual surrenders unto God Incarnated as Christ by a leap of faith he truly achieves the marriage of the Infinite and the finite in his self, because the Incarnation being the paradoxical manifestation of the Infinite in time makes the synthesis of the Infinite and the finite, the Eternity and time possible for that individual when his finite free-will obeys the Will of God. This embrace of the will of God by the individual's will is not theoretical but existential.

Thus Kierkegaard's meditations on the development of the individual self through the dialectic of aesthetics ethics faith have

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Langan : Recent Philosophy, p. 77. (Random House, New York.).



been designed to drive home the truth that "faith alone can make man whole."

Kierkegaard's Existentialism is the sharpest reaction against Hegel's System which is intellectual to the extreme. Hegel by presuming that human intellect is competent to unravel once for all the mysteries of being and becoming dared to chalk out the systematic details of the absolute Reality in a manner which proclaimed that nothing is hidden from searchlight of intellect. The Reality is fully transparent for the human intellect so much so that whatever is real is rational and whatever is rational is real. So Kierkegaard took his stand on the supremacy of Faith and moreover conceived Faith as being the very antithesis of Reason. He thus matched the rationalism of Hegel with his own brand of irrationalism in order to expose the presumptuousness of the former in face of the mysteries of human existence. Faith not only excludes reason but is also unmindful of ethical considerations. Ethics requires that the goodness of the course of a particular action is definitely determined before it is chosen and that everything is planned in the light of reason. Abraham can never know why he is commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac or how God is going to work it out in the end. So the man of faith unquestionably, silently, and peacefully carries out the Divine command and leaves everything to the Divine will.

However, from the stand-point of Mysticism it is not necessary to banish reason in order to make room for faith because there is no ultimate incompatibility between the two. As St. Thomas Aquinas rightly tells there is no opposition between the Truth of Faith and the Truth of Reason. "Though the Truth of Faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth."<sup>5</sup> Reality is suprarational, but that does not mean that it is irrational. Moreover, faith which is opposed to reason can hardly be distinguished from blind belief. Mysticism also relates the mystic to God, but in it the self of the mystic becomes God. According to Kierkegaard the self in relating itself to God after all relates itself to itself. God seems to be only a bridge between the unauthentic, alienated self and the authentic self. The self in the beginning, the self in the middle and the self in the end may be said to be the watchword of the Kierkegaardian existentialism. The self-transcending nature of the self does lead it to God but the relationship with God far from culminating in the unitive life of bliss only ends in the discovery of the true self. Thus theistic Existentialism of Kierkegaard fails to go all the way on the pathway to God.

5 The Summa Contra Gentiles, Chapter VII, p. 14. (Burn & oates Ltd.).



It may also be noted that the God as conceived by Kierkegaard is transcendent, infinite and personal in nature. The Incarnation in the person of Christ is the highest divinity for him. However, transcendence and infinity of God cannot be reconciled with His personality. Personality implies limitations on account of its determinate character. Determination by characters constituting the personality of God inevitably makes Him finite. Personal God is only an appearance of the impersonal God who in His infinitude is indeterminate in nature. From the view point of Mysticism God transcends even His impersonal nature for the thesis and the antithesis of personal and the impersonal is reconciled in the synthesis of the Multiform God. The mystic experiences the divine in the form of the Lord Shiva for some moments and in the succeeding moments he may witness the form of the Lord Rama or the form of some other deity. So the mystical experience testifies to the Multiform nature of God and makes it clear that God cannot be limited to any type of determinate personality. God's indeterminate nature is not a matter of conjecture or inference for the mystic, but it is a matter of direct experience for him.

Karl Jaspers has also propounded the theistic variety of Existentialism. It will be of interest to juxtapose Jaspers's philosophy with Mysticism. Jaspers put forth the study of Being as the chief task of Science and Philosophy. Science studies the being-there or the independently existing empirical world and tries to reduce its multiplicity to a unified system in an objective manner. But it cannot go far in its efforts to present an objective, unified system of knowledge embracing the totality of the empirical world because human selves with all their freedom, choice, sense of responsibility, love, frustrations and a host of other internal and subjective experiences cannot be described by the objective methods of Science. The self with all its internality belongs to the sphere of being-oneself which is to be distinguished from being-there constituting the external and objective sphere. Hence Science is incapable of achieving its ideal of necessary and universal objectivity. Besides being-there and being one self there is a third form of Being designated by Jaspers as the being-in-itself. These three orders of Being are discontinuous. No single method is competent to unravel the secrets of all these forms. The being-in-itself in its absoluteness transcends the world and to it belongs the unity and totality which science fails to appropriate by its objective method and which philosophy has been perennially seeking to appropriate. However, both the positivist and the idealist philosophers fail to attain the knowledge of the transcendent being-in-itself. The positivist takes his stand on science and tries to reduce philosophy to science, whereas the idealist tries to reduce science to philosophy. The Transcendence of being-in-



itself can only be approached through the being-oneself which itself is self-transcending in nature. Jaspers, therefore, proceeds to philosophize from the stand-point of his own self. Now Descartes also took his stand on the primary certainty of his own self, but his interest in the subject's undoubted existence was only methodological. His purpose was only to arrive at the objective world through the gateway of the self. Descartes did not explore the vitally important elements of the self as they manifest themselves in its liberty, creativity, responsibility, joys and sorrows, perils and triumphs, and perpetual self-transcendence. It is these elements of the existing self that can never be reduced to objectivity that constitute the most significant aspects of existence. It is through them that the Transcendent can be appropriated in its essential nature, because the Transcendent is wholly unobjectifiable.

When the philosopher makes a forward movement in the exercise of his own liberty he comes across limiting situations which make him aware of his groundedness in the Transcendent. Such limiting situations force him to realize the essential finitude and ephemerality of everything in life and the world and thereby to have possibly intimations of the transcendent or God who exists as the all-encompassing ground of both the objective world of being-there and the subjective world of being oneself. The existence of the Transcendent can neither be proved or disproved logically because it is not an object which can be grasped by the categories of reason. Just as the being-oneself is beyond the reach of those categories, the Transcendent also defies them. The influence of Kant on Jaspers is evident in the present context. However, the human self in its act of transcending itself can encounter the Transcendent. But in its liberty it can realise the possibility of a Nietzsche also who said that God is dead. The self can respond to the limiting situations of death or frustration, for instance, in any manner because it is itself a possibility which can actualise itself in its liberty in undetermined directions. Jaspers freely advances in the direction of the Transcendent with a 'philosophic faith', for according to him philosophy of 'Existence' opens the way to the Transcendent. For an individual endowed with 'philosophic faith' everything and every event of the world serves as a sign of the existence of God or the Transcendent. Even the ultimate shipwreck of all earthly hopes serves as a pointer to God because He as the ground of the universe is immanent in joys and tragedies alike.

Jaspers tells us that our knowledge of the Being in its three forms of being-there, being-oneself and being-in-itself is symbolic after all. The universe as a whole is like a secret text written in coded ciphers which can never be expressed in public language. Every individual has to decipher the meaning in his own experience at the



level of his personal existence. He has to be perpetually alert about every happening and every fact revealed in his personal experience because they may give him an intuition of the Transcendent in some favourable moment. philosophies and religions are merely reports of the appropriations of truth by their respective authors. They are a testimony to the existence of the Transcendent, but they cannot be regarded as the deciphering of the enigma of the Being-in-itself. One can enter into the spirit of these philosophies and religions by way of personal communication and be convinced that they do bear witness to the existence of the Transcendent in their own special ways. The ciphers of nature, history and personal existence can be touched by the self in its own choice and decisions when the limit of self-determination is reached and a sort of rapport is established with the Transcendent. It is only when an individual embraces the Transcendent in absolute faith with all his imagination and will that he can calmly take in his stride both his achievements and failures and silently face the ultimate frustration without being unnerved by it. Thus the Existentialism of Jaspers offers 'philosophic faith' to the contemporary individual who no longer finds it possible to embrace 'theological faith'. This 'philosophic faith' enables him to attain an orientation towards the Transcendent and ultimately realise his grounding in it. Such a realization alone constitutes authentic existence.

When we consider Jaspers' Existentialism from the mystical stand-point many resemblances between that philosophy and Mysticism stand out before us. According to Mysticism God is the be-all and the end-all of all existence. In the same way the Being-in-itself or the Transcendent is postulated as the all-encompassing reality by Jaspers. However, for the mystic the realization of God is a fact of his experience, and moreover seeing God face to face culminates in the establishment of the identity of his self with God. For Jaspers the Transcendent remains only a possibility to the end which has to be remotely grasped by an act of 'philosophic faith'. Again, Mysticism and Jaspers regard frustrations, failures and death as the incentives which may lead the existing individual towards God or the Transcendent. Jaspers is very expressive when he calls these experiences as the 'limiting situations' which make the free individual seek the Transcendent as the unlimited ground of everything contingent and evanescent.

But Existentialism of Jaspers like other shades of Existentialism begins and ends with the concern of the existing individual. With all its emphasis on the self-transcending nature of the individual self and its orientation towards the Transcendent this philosophy cannot go beyond the magic circle of the human self. The self in its search for authentic existence has nothing to fall back upon except its



freedom accompanied by a tenuous 'philosophic faith'. This freedom or liberty is nothing more than freedom to suffer heroically with the faith that even the ultimate 'ship-wreck' of all earthly hopes might perchance awaken the individual to the truth of the Transcendent being the ground of both the subjective world of being-onself and the objective world of being there. The realization of the identity of the self and the Transcendent remains a far cry for Jaspers. The ills and the predicament of the self can find their solution only in the realization of that identity which is a state of beatitude and peace. Moreover, merely a faith that it is grounded in the Transcendent offers a poor consolation to the self, unless it culminates in raising of the self to the status of the Transcendent.

Again, according to Jaspers the existing individual is condemned to lead his 'existence, comprising a mixture of achievements and failures in a world which remains on more than an enigma from the beginning to the end. His doctrine of ciphers is nothing but ultimate scepticism masquerading as enlightening knowledge. This doctrine declares that all human knowledge is only an unsuccessful deciphering of the world of nature, history and the Transcendent which remain for ever things-in-themselves, as Kant would like to put it.

From our mystical view point the unenviable conclusions arrived at by Jaspers regarding the ultimate heroic undoing of the individual self and the restriction of its knowledge to mere symbols which fail to decipher the enigma of Reality are the result of his reluctance to leave the magic circle of the existing self. If the self is really grounded in the Transcendent or God, it should be possible for it to realize its true nature as God. But somehow all existentialist thinkers are afraid of facing this obvious implication of the ultimate groundedness of the self in God, because they seem to feel that the self would be lost in the infinity of God. But it seems beyond their comprehension that what the self loses in the aspect of its individuality it gains in attaining its true nature as God. This is tantamount to going beyond Existentialism into the realm of Mysticism. Jaspers' Existentialism is wedded to personalism. It cannot be expected to cross over to Mysticism for fear of losing personal existence even though Mysticism is its logical destination.



## IX

# Homosexuality and Sexual Perversion

Joseph Wayne Smith

### 1. INTRODUCTION :

R. J. Stoller points out in his book *Perversion : The Erotic Form of Hatred*<sup>1</sup> that it is unjustifiable prejudice to regard homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder or disturbance, as for example the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-2)*<sup>2</sup> does. Homosexuality is a sexual preference, not a diagnosis. A proper diagnosis in medicine involves the following :

a syndrome—a constellation of signs and symptoms shared by a group of people, visible to the observer; (2) underlying dynamics (pathogenesis)—pathophysiology in the rest of medicine, neuropathophysiology or psychodynamics in psychiatry; (3) etiology—those factors from which the dynamics originate<sup>3</sup>.

Homosexuality is not a uniform constellation of signs and symptoms and different homosexuals have different psychodynamics underlying their sexual behaviour, as people with all sorts of personalities and of all shapes and sizes prefer homosexuality as their sexual practice. Further, there is no unitary cause for homosexual behaviour.<sup>4</sup> It is

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1 R. J. Stoller, *Perversion : The Erotic Form of Hatred*, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1975), pp. 197-201.

2 American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 3rd edition, (American Psychiatric Association, Washington D.C., 1968). For a critique of the APA's view of homosexuality as a disorder cf. J. Margolis, "The Question of Homosexuality", in R. Baker and F. Elliston (eds), *Philosophy and Sex*, (Prometheus Books, New York, 1975), pp. 288-302.

3 Stoller, op. cit. note 1, pp. 197-198,

4 cf. I. Bieber, H. J. Dain, P. R. Dince, M. G. Drellich, H. G. Grand, R. H. Gundlach, M. W. Kremer, A. H. Rifkin, G. B. Wilbur



difficult then to regard homosexuality as a disease, disorder or disturbance.

Nevertheless homosexuality might be regarded as a *perversion* or *abnormality*, a view recently defended by the right wing sociologist Steven Goldberg<sup>5</sup> and the extreme right wing philosopher Michael Levin.<sup>6</sup> In section 3 I shall attempt to undermine the arguments of these writers. In section 2 I shall show that attempts to show that homosexuality is a perversion by any standard definition of the concept of perversion (or abnormality) fail. It is concluded that there are no good reasons (taking the material examined here as constituting a representative survey) for regarding homosexuality as either perverse or abnormal.

## 2. PERVERSION, ABNORMALITIES AND HOMOSEXUALITY

A perversion or abnormality may be taken to be that which is *unnatural*; homosexuality is frequently taken to be an unnatural act along with coprophilia. But what is an unnatural act? Suppose that we explicated this problematic concept by the following: 'an unnatural act is an act contrary to or outside of nature'. If being 'outside of nature' means 'being contrary to natural physical laws', then homosexuality along with all human activities, is natural.<sup>7</sup> Clearly advocates of the view that homosexuality is perverse because it is unnatural do not mean that homosexuality is unnatural in this sense, but rather that homosexuality violates the natural purpose of sex. According to orthodox Catholics (although not, perhaps according to the New Testament) God intended sex for the purposes of procreation ("God" may also be replaced here by the "selfish genes" of the sociobiologists<sup>8</sup>). Non-procreative sex frustrates the will of God (or the selfish gene's desire to increase its inclusive fitness), and is hence unnatural. The position could be modified slightly so that sexual intercourse that *could in normal circumstances* lead to reproduction, is natural. The main problem with this view is that if the God of the Catholics or the God of the sociobiologists really did regard only procreative sex as natural (or adaptive), then why is it that human beings have

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and T.B. Bieber, *Homosexuality*, (Basic Books, New York, 1962); C.W. Socarides, *The Overt Homosexual*, (Grune and Stratton, New York, 1968).

- 5 S. Goldberg, "What is 'Normal'? Logical Aspects of the Question of Homosexual Behavior", *Psychiatry*, vol. 38, 1975, pp. 227-243.
- 6 M. Levin, "Why Homosexuality is Abnormal", *Monist*, vol. 67, 1984, pp. 251-283.
- 7 cf. M. Slote, "Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion", in Baker and Elliston, op. cit. note 2, pp. 261-267. Citation, pp. 261-262.
- 8 For a critique of sociobiology cf. my *Reductionism and Cultural Being*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984).



non-procreative sexual desires and engage in so much non-procreative sex? In any case if you wish to hold this viewpoint, then you show that homosexuality is a perversion only to find that most heterosexual activities are also perverse. This is a high theoretical price to pay.

This theoretical price must also be paid by anyone who wishes to use Thomas Nagel's model of sexual perversion to show that homosexuality is perverse.<sup>9</sup> Nagel takes perversions to be *unnatural* sexual inclinations rather than merely unnatural practices adopted for non-sexual reasons. Natural sex for Nagel follows a seduction model, one must be possessed by desire, not only for one's partner's body, but for his/her desire and this state of embodiment must involve a complex series of feedback loops involving the awareness of each other's desire and increasing arousal. There is no good reason for accepting this idiosyncratic account of sexual perversion. Again it means that many standard heterosexual inclinations (e.g. for little foreplay and arousal coming from the early stages of sexual intercourse) are perverse. Further, there is no good reason to suppose that homosexuality is a perversion according to Nagel's account of 'perversion', as Nagel's peculiar form of reciprocity may be a preference or inclination of many homosexuals.

The same can be said about the model of sexual perversion given by Robert Solomon.<sup>10</sup> Like Nagel, Solomon believes that non-perverted sex is natural sex. Sexuality however is primarily a means of communicating feelings and emotions to other people through "body language". I shall discuss this model of sexuality in more detail in chapter 6. Here we note that nothing prevents homosexual sexual acts from expressing feelings and emotion of positive value.

Stoller defines the term 'aberration' as follows :

By an *aberration* here I mean an erotic technique or constellation of techniques that one uses as his complete sexual act and that differs from his culture's traditional, avowed definition of normality.<sup>11</sup>

A perversion is a specific type of aberration :

*Perversion*, the erotic form of hatred, is a fantasy, usually acted out but occasionally restricted to a day-dream (either self-produced or packaged by others, that is, pornography). It is a habitual, preferred aberration necessary for one's full satisfaction, primarily motivated by hostility. By "hostility"

9 T. Nagel, "Sexual Perversion", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LXVI, 1969, pp. 5-17.

10 R. Solomon, "Sex and Perversion", in Baker and Elliston, op. cit. note 2, pp. 268-287.

11 Stoller, op. cit. note 1, p. 3.



I mean a state in which one wishes to harm an object; that differentiates it from "aggression", which often implies only forcefulness. The hostility in perversion takes form in a fantasy of revenge hidden in actions that make up the perversion and serves to convert childhood trauma to adult triumph. To create the greatest excitement, the perversion must also portray itself as an act of risk-taking.<sup>12</sup>

Homosexuality, if taken to be an "aberration" does not necessarily involve hostility. Hence homosexuality is not a perversion. By Stoller's account of an *aberration* we would establish that *any* sexual practice (excluding purely procreational sex) is an aberration, as most cultures have accepted definitions of 'normality', which have rendered a wide range of sexual practices abnormal, and hence on Stoller's account, aberrative. Thus an aberration in culture  $C_1$  with a criterion of sexual normality  $N_1$  need not be an aberration in culture  $C_2$  with a criterion of sexual normality  $N_2$ ,  $C_1 \neq C_2$  and  $N_1 \neq N_2$ . The account is thus culturally relative. Further, even if  $N_1$  was an anti-homosexuality norm, it is possible that attitudes in the culture may change for purely non-rational reasons, so that a non-discriminatory homosexual norm  $N_2$  was accepted. Thus something can be an aberration at one time and not at another. Finally, a culture's norms may be unclear, contradictory or unjustified. This is hardly the stuff to incorporate into sound scientific theorizing.

It is concluded that the standard definitions of 'perversion' do not lead us to regard the proposition that homosexuality is a perversion, as being to any degree tenable. These standard definitions are also conceptually obese: if accepted they entail that many paradigm examples of non perverse sexual behaviour is really perverse. So much the worse for the standard definitions.

### 3. LEVIN AND GOLDBERG AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY

Levin argues that homosexuality is abnormal because it is "purely mechanical ... misuse of bodily parts".<sup>13</sup> This argument he regards as a prolegomena to policy issues involving the rights of homosexuals and the rights of those desiring not to associate with homosexuals. He does not systematically detail this relationship, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that a radical right winger such as Levin would like very much to see homosexuality outlawed. He sees homosexuality as a threat to children, because for some obscure reason he seems to think that homosexuality is something a homosexual elementary school teacher will teach students. How this is done, without any crime being committed, remains equally obscure. In any case these irrational dogmas depend upon Levin's conclusion that homosexuality is unnatural, and if his argument for

12 Ibid, p. 4.

13 Levin, op. cit. note 6, p. 251.



this conclusion is defeated, so are his arguments given in justification of specific repressive policy issues.

The basic intuition which Levin appeals to in his argument for the conclusion that homosexuality is abnormal in this :

The erect penis fits the vagina, and fits it better than any other natural orifice; penis and vagina seem made for each other. This intuition ultimately derives from, or is another way of capturing the idea that the penis is not *for* inserting into the anus of another man — that so using the penis is not the way it is *supposed*, even *intended*, to be used.<sup>14</sup>

Levin then attempts to show how such intuitions may be justified by recent work in the logic of functional ascription. He concludes that homosexuality is unnatural and an unwise thing to use one's body for. The unnaturalness of homosexuality explains the fact that homosexuals as a group are "unhappier" than heterosexuals. I shall not discuss the matter of alleged homosexual unhappiness here: let us generously concede the point for the sake of the argument. Note that Levin's argument stands or falls on the justification of the claim that homosexuality is a misuse of body parts.

For Levin an adequate explication of 'S is for F in O' is :

- (i) S conduces to F in O,
- (ii) O's being F is necessary for O to occur or be maintained, or for the maintenance of O's genetic cohort,
- (iii) (i) and (ii) are part of the causal explanation of the existence or persistence of S in O and member of O's genetic cohort.<sup>15</sup>

More simply: "an organ is for a given activity if the organ's performing that activity helps its host or organisms suitably related to its host, *and* if this contribution is how the organ got and stays where it is".<sup>16</sup> Now one of the functions of the penis is to introduce semen into the vagina, and in doing this it has been selected for. But proto-human males who found coitus unrewarding, and consequently did not engage in coitus, would have left no descendants. Levin goes on:

In particular, proto-human males who enjoyed inserting their penises into each other's anuses have left no descendants. This is why homosexuality is abnormal, and why its abnormality counts *predentially* against it. Homosexuality is likely to cause unhappiness because it leaves unfulfilled an innately rewarding desire.<sup>17</sup>

14 Ibid, p. 251.

15 Ibid, p. 256.

16 Ibid, p. 256.

17 Ibid, p. 261.



Recall that Levin was to show that homosexual behaviour involved a misuse of body parts. His criticism of homosexuality is that (non-bi-sexual) homosexuality is a form of sexual practice which is engaged in exclusively to heterosexual coitus, does not result in the production of any descendants. If this was so, then we would expect (exclusive) homosexual practices, if genetically wired, to be selected against by natural selection. Such practices would be self-extinguishing. Obviously (exclusive) homosexuality is not dying out in modern society, if anything it is increasing in its frequency of occurrence in modern populations and a variety of sociobiological explanations have been given for this. Let us concentrate our attention though on the issue of whether an activity such as homosexuality does involve a misuse of bodily parts.

It is an implication of Levin's position that heterosexual intercourse is merely a form of reproduction or has as its very point, propagation. He says "If heterosexual intercourse is not *directly* connected to propagation, what is it?"<sup>18</sup> This is a question-begging claim. Given that the incidence of reproductive sex is low compared to the incidence of non-reproductive sex for pleasure and love in the set of all human heterosexual sex acts, reproductive sex may be viewed as a bi-product of general heterosexuality, not as its cause. This view fits well with all the general uncontroversial biological knowledge about human sexuality. Human beings can *reproduce* only when the female has ovulated, but they may copulate at any time of the month. Sexuality, as I have argued early, is a cultural phenomenon. Hence heterosexual intercourse is *not in general* directly connected to propagation. It may during periods when the human female is fertile lead to conception, but this uncontroversial fact does not establish that "sexuality=reproductive function" or that the very point of sex is reproduction. Without this (unsubstantiated) assumption Levin's argument disintegrates.

To see this consider the functional analysis of the penis, which sees the penis as an organ which is not only capable of urine elimination, and the ejaculation of semen, but also as conducing to sexual pleasure in the male. Thus the penis conduces to sexual pleasure in the male, and it is necessary for such pleasure to occur, or at least occur intensely and swiftly. The intuition appealed to here is that the penis is not merely a reproductive and waste elimination organ, but is also an organ which functions as a sexual organ, as organ for sexual pleasure. To use one's penis for sexual pleasure then is not abnormal. To use it as a paint brush or coat hanger, is. But homosexuals use their penises for sexual purposes, rather than as garden tools. Hence homosexuality is *not* abnormal.

18 Ibid, p. 263.



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Levin may still argue that the anus is not "meant" to be subjected to the thrust of a fully erect penis, and the penis is not meant to come into contact with the contents of the bowel. This has some plausibility. Bowels can be easily damaged and diseases contracted. But all these considerations show is that anal sex is a misuse of body parts. Hetero sexuals, as the letter pages of the pornography magazines show (and often their pictorials as well), may engage in anal sex and some heterosexuals prefer anal sex to coitus. In anal sex the penis gets considerable friction against the bowel lining, and the head of the penis is substantially stimulated by the usually tight anal sphincter. The clitoris can be manually stimulated. Anal sex, it is said, has its advantages over some coital positions if mutual pleasure is your goal. Homosexuals need not engage in anal sex to obtain mutual pleasure — they may mutually masturbate each other just as heterosexual couples may do in foreplay, with the difference that the former masturbation is to orgasm. This involves no misuse of body parts at all.

It is doubtful whether even anal sex does involve a misuse of body parts. Whilst the bowel is an excretory organ, so is the penis. The mere possibility of bowel damage and the transmission of disease does not show that using one's bowel as a sexual organ involves a misuse of the bowel. The tight vagina of a virgin can be damaged by a large erect penis, thrust by an unsympathetic owner, and diseases may be transmitted during coitus. On the other hand, the contact between the penis and excreta on the sides of the bowel can be avoided by use of lubricated condoms.

I conclude that Levin fails to establish that homosexuality involves a misuse of body parts. Basic assumptions made by Levin without any thought of justification, turn out to be *false*. Theoretical "poofster bashing" will have to be conducted on independent grounds by theorists of the right.

Steven Goldberg offers the following definition of 'abnormal behaviour':

*Behavior is abnormal if it forces the individual manifesting it to suffer unnecessary pain. The pain of negative social sanction (such as social ostracism) is unnecessary if the behavior that elicits the negative sanction is caused by a factor that can reasonably be termed "abnormal". A causal factor can reasonably be termed abnormal if it unnecessarily limits one's autonomy and maturation. A causal factor unnecessarily limits one's autonomy and maturation if it is composed of irrational motivating factors or a displacement of emotions and generates behavior that elicits the pain of negative social sanction.<sup>19</sup>*

19 Goldberg, op. cit. note 5, p. 228.



Goldberg devotes some space towards arguing that this definition of 'abnormal behaviour' is non-tautological, claiming that if one does this, then one cannot consider any causal factor as being abnormal. This is however not what is wrong with Goldberg's definition: its vice is that it is viciously circular. To understand what 'abnormal behaviour' means we must first understand what 'unnecessary pain (of negative social sanction)' means. To understand what 'unnecessary pain (of negative social sanction)' means we need to know what the 'abnormality of a causal factor' means. This phrase leads us to the meaning of an 'unnecessary limitation on one's autonomy and maturation', and back to the 'unnecessary pain (of negative social sanction)'. These definitions turn in a closed logical circle and are hence incoherent and totally unsatisfactory.

Nevertheless one could define 'abnormality' as follows: abnormal behaviour forces the individual manifesting it to suffer the pains of negative social sanctions. It is not too difficult to see the errors involved in this account. First, the absence of a negative social sanction about behaviour B immediately means that B is not abnormal. Abnormality hinges then upon the inventiveness and viciousness of a culture's ability to negatively sanction behaviours and this is hardly a satisfactory basis to found any psychiatric theory upon. The reason for this is that the majority of the members of a culture could be suffering from severe mental illnesses and may be quite irrational about the behaviour which they negatively sanction. They may even be inconsistent and negatively sanction heterosexual behaviour, whilst hypocritically engaging in this negatively sanctioned delight themselves! Worse, this definition means that even paradigm cases of sexual perversions, such as coprophilia, if done in private without any real danger of negative social sanctions being mobilized, are not abnormal. Alternatively, if the pervert did not feel pain from the enforcement of negative social sanctions, then the behaviour in question is not abnormal. But this is absurd.

Goldberg's definition of 'abnormality' would be of considerable use to the theoreticians of the Soviet psychiatric camps. Many Soviet citizens press for social change and basic human freedoms and are openly critical of the Soviet political system. There must be, according to Goldberg, something *abnormal* and *perverse* about someone who persists in doing something when he/she knows he/she will be punished. So all protesters are *abnormal*, no matter how just and rational their protest is. It is only one further step to go to say that such abnormal people require psychiatric help. The implications of this are obvious.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

It is concluded that there are no good reasons to regard homosexuality as a perversion or an abnormality in any of the senses of these terms considered in section 2 above. The arguments of Levin and Goldberg for the thesis that homosexuality is abnormal, have been examined and shown to be untenable.



# A Logical Interpretation of Predictability in Science and Philosophy

*Filita Bharucha*

## 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND :

Historically the problem of causation and predictability arose from the times when people started questioning the problem of chance. It was commonly thought that the world consisted of changing things which somehow remained the same throughout inspite of the changes which occur in them. On the other hand, if all the changes were stripped away from that changing entity, one was faced with the dilemma of finding a changeless core. It was then that the theory of continual flux was put forward.

In early times it was Heracleitus (540 475 B. C.), the Greek philosopher who said that the universe is in a flux. Then it was Bergson's 'creative Evolution' that once again expounded the idea of the universe as a stream of perpetual change. He believed that "This is the thing which was so-and-so, and is now something else" can never be found. Bergson conceived the universe as one continuous flow, which is alive, evolution being the movement of flux. He gave his famous principle of 'elan vital' according to which the world is the embodiment of immanent principle of living change, which as it seems to come into existence, progressively creates the evolving universe.

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<sup>1</sup> T. L. Beauchamp ed.: *Philosophical Problems of Causation* (Dickinson Publication Co. Inc., New York, 1976) also see D. Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature* (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London, 1928).



A systematic treatment of causation was provided by Aristotle. It was intended to answer the question 'How does this world order come to be what it is?'

Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes :

- (1) Efficient cause i.e. the cause by which some change is brought.
  - (2) Final cause i.e. the end or purpose for which the change is produced.
  - (3) Material cause i.e. anything in which the change is produced.
  - (4) Formal cause i.e. the form into which something is changed.
- However, in modern philosophy and science one normally means 'efficient cause' when one refers to cause.

In the 17th century Baruch Spinoza who was a monist philosopher gave his equation 'Substance = Nature = God'. He bases his approach on the assumption that if change does exist it can be of two kinds :

(a) Caused by an external agency, (b) Self-caused. However, since for Spinoza substance is the substratum of everything, it can never be caused by an external agency. Besides, substance cannot be self-caused for that would imply a potentiality of becoming something other than substance. Hence Spinoza concludes that the universe is fundamentally changeless. Many philosophers like F. H. Bradley have resorted to the idea of time. They have denied the objective reality of time. For them time is not a factor in the world which is independent of human consciousness. Now if time does not belong to the nature of things then the world must be changeless since the notion of change which entails the conception of before or after also entails the notion of time.

## 2. THE LEGACY OF HUME AND KANT :

Before one arrives at the contemporary scene let us briefly survey the contribution of the two great giant thinkers to the field of causation.

Hume's views on causation were greatly influenced by his epistemological views. He considered three empirical relations contiguity, successive and constant conjunction. Surprisingly to these he added a non empirical one viz. necessary connection. Rationalist philosophers before Hume maintained that an effect must follow its cause. They tried to link causal connection to logical necessitation. Hume set out to show that both the rationalists and all other previous philosophers were mistaken in thinking that there is a relation of necessity or power in causation and that causes can, in no sense, logically entail effects. He maintained that we are never able in any instance whatever to discover any quality which links the cause to the effect and it is constant conjunction that leads us to believe that



objects are necessarily causally connected. According to Hume, necessary connection is not something objective in nature, but it is a subjective feeling of connection that arises in causally linking one object to another. Hume saw no justification for the inferences of the type "All A's are necessarily followed by B" from statements of the type "All X's are followed by Y's". He believed the only relevant explanation was to be in terms of a psychological association of ideas. However it is argued that this psychological explanation does not contribute a philosophical justification.

Hume provided two definitions of causation, one of which emphasizes constancy of conjunction and the other emphasizes the necessary connection in the form of a 'determination of thought'. (a) We may define a cause to be 'an object precedent and contiguous to another and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter'.

(b) We may define a cause to be 'an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression to form a more lively idea of the other'.

It was Kant who placed causality in the status of a 'category' or a 'principle of understanding'. Kant's attempt seems to include both a criticism of Hume and a constructive alternate. Quite frequently Kant appears to be arguing rather than criticizing Hume's theory. He describes the scheme of cause, for example in the following, he says: "The scheme of cause is the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows. It consists therefore in the succession of the manifold in so far as that succession is subject to a rule". The phrase 'subject to a rule' is not easy to interpret, but certainly in some interpretations this account does not appear significantly different from the Humean analysis in terms of constancy of sequence. In other passages Kant suggests that the notion of cause contains a strong empirical component, for example, it appears to be evident from the following lines "Sequence in time is the sole empirical criterion of an effect in its relation to the causality of the cause that precedes it". However, Kant clearly indicates a belief that the synthesis of cause and effect cannot be empirically expressed.

Kant contends that causal connection involves a form of non-logical, nonempirical necessity and that this necessity is a prerational pattern imposed by the mind. But again it is difficult to see how this argument constitutes a reply to Hume, since the latter recognises causal necessity of a similar sort. A relation of necessity between cause and effect which is imposed by the mind is recognised fully as much by Hume as by Kant. Both of them recognized that the locus



of the necessity is a mental activity which builds unity into conjoined perceptions. How, then, are we to understand the difference between Hume and Kant?

The usual approach to this question is to dissect carefully the main arguments throughout Kant's 'Second Analogy of Experience'. This section of his work is generally regarded as containing his reply to Hume. In this section Kant asks how it is possible to distinguish a merely subjective form an objective succession of perceptions. His task is to distinguish a mere change in perceptions (a succession in perception) from the perception of a change in object (a succession in that which is perceived) to show that the former is not sufficient for the latter. He argues that the manifestation of causality in experience is the occurrence of an irreversible or determinate time-order among perceptions for which an empiricism such as Hume's cannot account. One finds in Kant the thesis that "the order in which I apprehend the representations of events is fixed by the events, whereas the order in which I apprehend representations of enduring states of affairs is fixed by me or by accidents". Kant distinguished events from enduring states of affairs by the recognition that event perceptions stand in a fixed irreversible position in the order of representations. Otherwise their seriality could not be distinguished from the seriality of representations or an objective sequence of states of affairs. The notion of an event sequence is said to be the crucial ingredient in Kant's theory of causation because the condition under which one event 'A' cannot occur before another event 'B' is that 'A' is the cause of 'B'. 'A' must uniformly occur before 'B' as its conditioning event because the order of elements is fixed. This is essential of Kant's critique of Hume.

Hume's attempted reduction of the objective content of causal relations to constant conjunctions has received wide acceptance leading to the Modern Regularity Theory. The other theories of causation\* prevalent in the contemporary philosophical thought are (a) Modern Necessity Theories (b) Manipulative Theory (c) Singularist Theory and (d) Theory of Causal Explanation and Causal Context.

### 3. ROLE OF CHANCE :

Clearly these theories are valid if one admits of 'causality' as a principle or concept or description. However, if one considers causation (in the sense of determinism) to be a myth then the role of chance may have to be brought in. With the aspect of causation depleted one may have to consider the role of predictability. The purpose of this section is to examine whether chance exists or is

\* Our detailed study of these theories will be discussed in a subsequent paper.



determinism an absolute principle or a universal law which applies to most individual events without exception.

Goblet believes in an absolute determinism when he says : (1) "The order of nature is constant and its laws suffer no exception". (2) "The order of nature is universal and there are no facts or details concerning these facts which are not regulated by laws. Constant and universal, the laws of nature are completely deterministic".

The mathematician Emil Borel defines change as an unknown cause, an unexplained fact. He says "Fortuitous events are those which depend on causes which are too complex for us to know and to study completely. Science does not ignore it. In fact, science subjects phenomena with unknown causes to the calculation of probabilities and applies the laws of statistics. This allows for a prediction concerning a certain number of facts taken at one time".

Classical physics is an exact science. It is believed that there is a complete determinism and predictability in classical physics in the sense that the outcome of an experiment can be predicted with absolute certainty. Physicists always held the idea of complete determinism as very precious and essential for the very survival of the whole edifice of classical physics. Can chance or probability ever enter into such an exact science? If at all it enters, would it seem to be like a misfit in the whole scheme of decidedly deterministic theories? However, if one looks around at those branches of physics with systems of enormous complexity, as in the kinetic theory of gases, introduction of the laws of probability is unavoidable, not because the deterministic classical physics fails in this case, but due to entirely different reasons. It is worth noting that even in a seemingly simple example of coin tossing the result of which, in principles, could be predicted using the laws of classical physics, we know that the use of probability is indispensable.

In the classical physics it is possible to predict the state of a system obeying classical laws, at any time provided we have complete information about it at some initial time. Equations of motion of classical physics can be solved to obtain the required information provided the so-called initial conditions are completely specified. In the case of a complex system like a gas or even in such a simple case like a coin to be tossed, this is not possible. Hence recourse has to be taken to the use of statistical methods and chance as a 'convenience'. Nevertheless, classical physics is still considered deterministic, chance entering only because complete information is not available for making exact predictions.

The situation is completely different in quantum physics which is supposed to give the correct description of systems on the scale of atoms, molecules, nuclei and elementary particles. Here the



probability does not enter as a 'convenience' but as an essential ingredient of the formalism. The most precise description of nature, in quantum physics, is in terms of probabilities. The uncertainty principle of Heisenberg, in the words of the physicist Richard Feynman<sup>2</sup>, 'protects' quantum mechanics besides maintaining its 'perilous but still correct' existence.

In biology the Mendelian laws of hybrides where the chromosome factors in heredity are biological measures which constantly conform to the calculus of probabilities showing the enormous role of chance. One of the major exponents of chance was Jacques Monod<sup>3</sup> the noted biologist. We shall now outline his views on the nature of chance. He states that "Pure chance, absolutely free but blind stands at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution". Further Monod claims that this is the sole conceivable hypothesis which is compatible with observed and tested facts. Monod distinguishes between an operational uncertainty and essential uncertainty. He considers an operational uncertainty as one whose probability can be reduced to a minimum. However, an essential uncertainty results when one considers the case of 'absolute coincidences', namely, those which result from the inter-section of two totally independent claims of events. He gives the example of say, some Dr. Brown passing by when a hammer drops inadvertently on him. Chance appears to be the essential factor here, unless of course we resort to a Laplacian world where chance is excluded by definition and where Dr. Brown was always fated to die, knocked out by a hammer.

On the microscopic level there exists greater uncertainty. Monod thinks that a mutation is a microscopic (or quantum) event and hence essentially unpredictable. According to some physicists, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle may be given up in near future. However, Monod feels that whatever the future case may be regarding the uncertainty principle in physics, it will always hold good in biology.

Modern biology recognizes the fundamental mechanism of molecular invariance as a basic property of all living beings. Evolution is not a property of living beings because it starts from the very imperfection conserving mechanism. In the highly conservative systems like human beings, the initial elementary events which lead to evolution are microscopic, fortuitous and totally unrelated in their effects upon teleonomic functioning. But once it is 'incorporated', this accident which is essentially unpredictable will be

2 R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton and M. Sands: *The Feynman Lectures on Physics*, Vol. III, (Addison Wesley Publishing Company Inc, Reading, Mass., 1965).

3 J. Monod: *Chance and Necessity*, Tr. A. Weinhouse, (Collina, London, 1972).



mechanically and faithfully replicated and then translated, hence multiplied and transposed into millions of copies. The accident which was drawn from pure chance now enters the realm of necessity and hence of implacable certainty.

Natural selection operates upon chance but it operates under a set of demanding conditions from which chance is excluded. He later mentions that these conditions may not be based on external environment but are dependent on teleonomic performances characteristic of the species. This dependence increases the level of organization within the system. Monod implies that it is due to these stringent conditions that evolution goes along a generally progressive course. However, we would like to ask as to how did such stringent conditions come about? Surely not again by chance! perhaps our question can be regarded as falling under the paradox of species stability.

Monod thinks that the organism's defensive system through antibodies is a very remarkable illustration of phenomena occurring in the most exquisitely precise molecular adaptation known to us, which is based on chance. According to Monod "Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe out of which he emerges only by chance. Neither his destiny nor his duty have been written down. The Kingdom above or the darkness below: it is for him to choose".

Monod's ideas can be summarised as "Destiny is written as and while, not before it happens". We conclude this section with the words of Ovid "Chance is powerful everywhere, let your hook be always hanging ready. In water you least think it, there will be a fish".

#### 4. PREDICTABILITY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS:

Human events contain the element of chance in the measure in which we suppose them to be guided by an intention, by a desire or at least an interest. An event happens by chance when, being able to be guided by an interest which would explain it, it occurs without this intention or even contrary to it. For example, X finds a treasure while digging the foundations of a house. For an absent human intention we sometimes substitute a superhuman one, which is either benevolent or malevolent. This is called 'fate' or 'destiny'.

Even with the vicious role that chance is assigned one can predict certain occurrences. In modern physics predictability is more or less based on laws of statistics. Due to the nature of events in physics, their predictability is for more accurate than those in human affairs. G. P. Henderson<sup>4</sup> in his paper 'predictability in Human

<sup>4</sup> G. P. Henderson: Predictability in Human Affairs in Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. I, London, 1966-67).



Affairs' distinguishes between 'estimate' and 'prediction'. He defines an estimate as an approximate judgement, which is entailed by the evidence and does not purport to be. He defines a prediction as if "most strongly regarded, is a judgement made both as if the evidence available were all that is required and as if precisely it were what the evidence entailed". He then further adds that "a prediction in the strong sense is to an estimate, as a firm belief is to an opinion".

The author distinguishes between scientific and unscientific predictions both in the strong sense of the term and then goes to give the general conditions under which a science can be justified in making strong predictions. These are outlined as follows: First, there must be a recognised technical language or notation along with satisfactory procedures for connecting its accepted principles together and for deriving new ones. Secondly, science must have a particularly long case history. Lastly, science should have well-recognised ways of interpreting its case history in terms of its theoretical apparatus.

Further the author feels that explanations of predictions are sometimes interwoven, for while explaining some present event we might consider its background temporally and otherwise, which may enable us to say something about the reoccurrence of the event. The author then wonders whether there is some reason or principle and not just the degree of exactness why the newer social sciences do not have the same ability as that of the exact sciences. He offers that perhaps there are two plausible reasons :

- (1) The circumstances in which individual human beings act are perhaps the complex.
- (2) The problem of free will in an indeterministic sense : By free will Henderson means "a will which bears on action but which is a law unto itself."

However, Henderson feels that such objections should not stop social sciences from making predictions. Another objection raised is that human beings have the power to falsify predictions regarding themselves. Henderson argues against it as follows :

- (a) The people with reference to whom predictions are made need not know about the nature of the predictions.
- (b) The desire to upset predictions just for the sake of doing so is merely self-sacrificial and may not be a sufficient motive for most people.
- (c) In case one comes across a person for whom it is a sufficient motive one can tell him, "you will do the opposite of what I predict". The moment one specifies what he will do, he will do the opposite. However, one can keep the ultimate correct prediction about his secret and catch him out.



(d) There may be others who are not madly consistent about upsetting each prediction but who, on unusual occasions, upsets them. But then he would be able to do that only if predictions about him were communicated over a long period of time.

Returning to our previous objection that a human being's actions are too many and too complex so as to allow a scientific prediction, we do realise that it is not possible to know enough of an individual's material, cultural and spiritual conditions to enable us to predict his behaviour. The practical difficulty is of such a degree that it is not a difficulty of principle. However, one can envisage overcoming the problem of complex circumstances, in specially studied fields. One can raise the objection as to how one can set up rigid principles to predict human actions and whether a hitherto unformulated law may be needed. To this, Henderson replies that it may be possible to have a fixed set of principles in social sciences, but how would it help to have such a bond on the future. In fact such a complete success of social sciences would imply a freedomless universe. By this we have arrived at the problem of free Will.

The rationalist necessitarian view believed that knowledge must be of necessary truth and hence a scientific proposition must express necessity in some way. However, this view has now been proved inaccurate and science is supposed to just show how things are or happen to be. Science does not in any way necessitate any mode of action, but may show a preference for one cause over another for some explicit reasons. A science may tell us its own technical vocabulary how we act when we act freely and how we act under compulsion. However, all our freedom is within limits, physical, mental and social. Henderson criticizes these determinate who claim that the conception of a limit could be extended inwards, that is, the limits to our freedom is merely a conventional boundary. When we say that "free" action has natural limitations, we do not mean that it is limited all along in the natural way. He thinks that it is curious that we regard scientific predictability as distinct from that of our common (daily) predictability. This he feels may stem from a fear of one's science being controlled by a cynical misuse of science.

It is certainly true that the psycho analytical theories have modified our views of freedom of action and worth of motives. However, this is a welcome change for it points out to us what in particular counts as acting freely or having worthy motives for what we choose to do. However, it is renunciation of concepts like freedom, validity and worth which may be objectionable.

We conclude this section by saying that though predictability be given scientific status we should not mistake the understanding of human behaviour so obtained as portraying the ultimate essence of man.



# Radhakrishnan, Religion, and World Peace

Jerald Richards

My primary focus in this paper will be upon those aspects of the thought of Radhakrishnan that are related to the possible solution of the problem of war in the modern world. In particular, I have in mind Radhakrishnan's views on the place of religion in achieving world peace, his ideas on world unity, and his views about the necessity of replacing violence and warfare with nonviolent methods of conflict resolution.

## Introductory Considerations

By the term "war" I have in mind those types of violent conflict between armed groups of individuals organized for the purpose of either maintaining or gaining political power in a particular nation or geographical region. These organized armed conflicts are either international or intranational in nature. The problem of war in the modern world would include, besides conventional international and civil wars, the threat of nuclear war (including the threat of nuclear holocaust), with the attendant vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the huge expenditure of public monies and human talent in preparation for warfare.<sup>1</sup>

The problem of war is by no means the only crisis of global proportions that we face in the latter part of this twentieth century.

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An earlier version of this paper was read at the Radhakrishnan Centennial Conference, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, April 7-10, 1988.

1 On the definition and facets of war, see Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem*, Second Edition (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1987).



The list of global crises would include the rapid increase in world population, malnutrition, starvation, the exhaustion of our nonrenewable resources, the creation of vast numbers of marginal human beings, economic instability, the suppression of minorities, forms of violence other than warfare, illiteracy, and environmental pollution. But the huge expenditure of money and talent in preparation for warfare<sup>2</sup> and the threat of nuclear war make the problem of war our most pressing problem. In a world of limited resources, until the problem of war can be brought under control, there are not enough resources available (both material and human) to solve our other pressing problems. In addition, the threat of nuclear war tends to chill, or even freeze, human resolve, dash human hopes, generate indifference toward our various problems, and create a general, at times pervasive, malaise of despair, hopelessness, and meaninglessness. A "nuclear winter" and an "ultraviolet spring" could mean the end of life (or life as we know it) on this planet. The thought of the possibility of a "nuclear winter" and an "ultraviolet spring" can lead to psychic numbing, exhaustion, and despair.

### The Thought of Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan addresses the problem of the sense of meaninglessness and its attendant *ennui* and despair. For him, meaning or purpose is found in the recognition of the religious or spiritual dimension of human existence and, ultimately, in the experience of one's union or identification with Ultimate Being or the Absolute. Out of this experience flows the kinds of attitudes and actions that would contribute to world community and world peace, and the eventual solution of our global problems. We shall now consider the specifics of Radhakrishnan's approach.

### The Unity of Religions :

Radhakrishnan believes in the transcendent unity of religions. The ultimate goal of religious belief and practice is a mystical experience of the Absolute, and a resultant sense (or grasp or understanding) of the oneness of all beings and things. In this mystical experience of the Absolute, one intuitively grasps the highest truth, gains "the pure apprehension of the Absolute".<sup>3</sup> Religions differ among themselves due to the accidents of different histories and geographies. Different creedal statements about Ultimate Reality are just culture—and time-bound "historical formulations of the formless truth".<sup>4</sup>

2 See Glossop, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4. For the most current comprehensive data on comparative global military and social expenditures, see Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88*, 12th Edition (Washington, D. C. : World Priorities, 1987).

3 S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Second Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 317.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 327.



One who has gained "the pure apprehension of the Absolute", and subsequently understands that different religions are just different attempts to grasp the nature, and to achieve an experience of, the Absolute, is tolerant toward other and all religions and beliefs. Says Radhakrishnan :

He who has seen the real is lifted above all narrowness, relativities, and contingencies.<sup>5</sup>

And again,

The sense of the present reality of God and the joy of His indwelling make the mystic indifferent to all questions of history. Toleration is the homage which the finite mind pays to the inexhaustibility of the infinite.<sup>6</sup>

This toleration, for Radhakrishnan, is not the outcome of political expediency, skepticism, or indifference. It is not a matter of being tolerant in order to guarantee one's continued existence. Nor is it based upon a general epistemological thesis that truth about reality is not attainable. Nor, further, is it grounded in shallowness of conviction regarding one's religious beliefs. It is not negative, a mere putting up with other beliefs. It is positive, involving an attitude of genuine sympathy and respect toward other beliefs and forms of worship, as well as the willingness to incorporate into one's own view those aspects of other religions one finds important and valuable.<sup>7</sup> This positive attitude of toleration leads to genuine dialog among adherents of different religions, generates mutual understanding, encourages positive fellowship, leads over time to the transformation of irrational beliefs and repugnant practices, and ultimately results in the creation of world unity and world peace.

For Radhakrishnan, the greatest obstacle to genuine religious dialog and the eventual recognition of the essential unity of religions is belief in the finality of one's own religion. This belief leads to exclusiveness and intolerance. Says Radhakrishnan, "Finality of conviction easily degenerates into the spirit of fanaticism, autocratic, over-positive, and bloodthirsty."<sup>8</sup>

#### World Unity and World Peace :

The essential unity of religions, for Radhakrishnan, is grounded in the essential unity of Reality which, in turn, entails the essential unity of the human race. Given these views, it should be no surprise that Radhakrishnan is concerned about world unity and world peace. Essential to the emergence of world unity are the same kinds

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 314.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324. On Radhakrishnan's thinking about toleration, see also his "Religion and World Unity," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol 49/50 (April, 1951), p. 222.



of positive tolerance, mutual respect and regard, and genuine dialg in the social and political arenas as are necessary for unity in the religious arena. In fact, for Radhakrishnan, there is a direct connection between religion and politics. He writes, "religion includes faith in human brotherhood, and politics is the most effectual means of rendering it into visible form. Politics is but applied religion."<sup>9</sup> Essential for human brotherhood, for Radhakrishnan, are the recognition of the value of the individual, freedom to develop individual capacities, equal treatment before the law, political liberty, social justice, economic equality, and racial tolerance. Such values can be developed only in democratic societies.<sup>10</sup> The good of individuals is not the good of atomistic individuals but of individuals in community. A concern for the common good should be of major significance, not only within nations but also among nations.

Concern for the common good among nations that will result in genuine world community requires creative thinking and the realization of new possibilities. Of necessary and fundamental importance for achieving world community is some form of federalism as an alternative to international anarchy and as the foundation for devising alternatives to militarism and the methods of warfare. Writes Radhakrishnan, "A world federal government with powers limited to those necessary for establishing and maintaining law and order among the nations of the world is a practical way of achieving just and lasting peace."<sup>11</sup>

Of course, the existence of some type of international authority would not necessarily entail the total absence of warfare. At least in the early decades of some type of world federalism, coercive violence may be necessary, as a last resort, against rebellious groups, both within and among nations. But the bias of a world federation would be in favor of the development and use of nonviolent alternatives in conflict resolution. For Radhakrishnan, the origination of and inspiration for this nonviolent bias is found in religion or the religious dimension of human existence.

Thinking realistically, effective world federalism will not develop unless we can achieve world understanding or world community. But world community cannot be achieved without significant changes in the current moral, social, and political conditions of the world.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Address to UNESCO Conference, May 30, 1950, quoted in Humayun Kabir, "Radhakrishnan's Political Philosophy," in Paul Arthur Schlipp, editor, *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan* (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 706.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 706-707.

<sup>11</sup> S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion in a Changing World* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1967), p. 157.

<sup>12</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 156-158.



On this issue, Radhakrishnan's thought seems to be caught in a kind of "catch-22" bind. Of fundamental importance for achieving a just and lasting peace is some kind of world federalism. But world federalism will not develop unless we can achieve world understanding or world community. To which, if either, of these alternatives does Radhakrishnan give primacy? Given my reading of Radhakrishnan, it seems he would give primacy to the latter, to the achievement of world understanding and world community. And, for Radhakrishnan, to repeat what I said above, primacy among the ingredients for achieving world understanding is given to religion, or the religious outlook and spirit. Crucial to the functioning of the religious outlook are (1) the ability of the religiously enlightened person to relate to diverse cultural conditions in a spirit of positive and sympathetic toleration, and (2) the cultivation and expression, in the lives of the religiously enlightened, of a number of peace—and community-creating virtues. Chief among these virtues, for Radhakrishnan, are the following: "... quite confidence, inner calm, gentleness of the spirit, love of neighbor, mercy to all creation, destruction of tyrannous desires (including atomistic individualism and selfishness), and the aspiration for spiritual freedom".<sup>13</sup>

Radhakrishnan's approach to religious transformation (and, thus, to socio-political-economic transformation) is elitist rather than grassroots. The model for transformation is the exceptional person or exemplar, including such ancients as Buddha, Jesus, Hosea, Isaiah, Shankara, and Ramanuja, and such moderns as Ramakrishna, Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru.<sup>14</sup> Without the lives, actions, and examples of these exceptional persons, it is highly unlikely that religious and other types of transformation would occur. Radhakrishnan's view of the religious practices of the masses is not very complimentary. On this point, he writes:

A welter of superstitions and taboos, primitive myths and unhistorical traditions, unscientific dogmatisms and national idolatries, constitute the practising religion of the vast majority of mankind today.<sup>15</sup>

For Radhakrishnan, world community and world federalism have become absolute necessities for human well-being in the modern world given (1) the global dimensions of economic, political, environmental, and technological developments and policies, and (2) the nature of modern warfare including, among other things, the mass murder of millions of noncombatants and the potential annihilation

<sup>13</sup> *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 323; see also pp 320-323

<sup>14</sup> See *Religion in a Changing World*, pp 158-160. See also Robert A. McDermott, ed., *Radhakrishnan: Selected Writings on Philosophy, Religion, and Culture* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 23-25.

<sup>15</sup> *ERWT*, p. 290.



of the human race by the firing of nuclear weapons<sup>16</sup> For Radhakrishnan, to return to a point made above, a major contribution of the religious orientation, in generating the placing of strict limitations upon the use of organized violence and in the eventual replacement of violence by other means of conflict resolution, is the bias toward nonviolence. Nonviolence is the ideal of many, if not all, historic religious faiths, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity.<sup>17</sup> However, the historic record of religions has been checked. All too often, violence and warfare have been advocated, supported, or at least acquiesced in.

Nevertheless, for Radhakrishnan, we can and must work toward the gradual realization of the ideal, the displacement of faith in violent force by nonviolent methods of conflict resolution (threat systems, deterrence, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, mutual adaption) leading to alliances, cooperation, and integration.<sup>18</sup> The gradual road to such replacement requires, among other things, the achievement of social, political, and economic justice (both nationally and internationally), rethinking the idea of national sovereignty, and especially a reeducation in values. These transformed values will be universal human values grounded in love, compassion, a sense of justice, and fellow-feeling.<sup>19</sup> The modern exemplar of nonviolence is Gandhi.<sup>20</sup> Those who would be contemporary exemplars should model themselves after Gandhi.

### Comments, Observations and Suggestions

There seems to be no question that religions have functioned historically and function today as organizing wholes that provide meaning and purpose to millions of human beings. A particular religion provides its adherents with a sense or understanding of the nature of Ultimate Being, human nature, the possible relations between human beings and Ultimate Being, how human beings should live, and human destiny. The various dimensions of religion (doctrinal, ritual, mythical, social, ethical, and experiential) touch on all aspects of human life.<sup>21</sup> Against the possible tendency to deny

<sup>16</sup> See *RCW*, pp. 155-156.

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of nonviolence in Hinduism and Christianity, see S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society*, Second Edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), pp. 201-211.

<sup>18</sup> See the conflict continuum that includes these methods in Elise Boulding, "Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace", *Zygon*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December, 1986), pp. 502-503.

<sup>19</sup> See *RS*, pp. 222-229.

<sup>20</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 229-238.

<sup>21</sup> For a discussion of these dimensions of religion, see Ninian Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, Third Edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984), pp. 6-12.

See also Smart's *Worldviews* (New York: Scribner's, 1983).



or to disregard the pervasive influence of religion in the world today, J. W. Bowker would remind us :

Contrary to what Karl Marx predicted (and contrary to what some Western commentators seem to suppose), religion is not withering away. It remains the context, or at least part of the context, in which the majority of people alive on this planet today live their lives or from which they derive important inspiration and judgment for their lives.<sup>22</sup>

However, there are facts about religions that seem to militate against their value as major contributors toward world peace. These facts are their incredible diversity (both internally and externally), the relatively high incidence of religious conflicts (including violent conflicts), and the involvement of religions in larger socio-political conflicts (including violent conflicts and warfare).

### The Problem of Religious Diversity :

It is possible, perhaps probable, that the diversity among world religions is much more profound than Radhakrishnan believed. There is a great diversity of religious belief and practice among religions in the contemporary world, including different views of the Divine, different views about human nature and destiny, and different social, ethical, political, and economic orientations and behaviors. Some of these differences seem to be of a fundamental, radical nature. Even if we focus our attention upon a study of the experiential dimension of religion, more particularly, upon the mystical experiential dimension of religion, in an attempt to isolate a presumed essential or transcendental unity, we discover that the results of more recent comparative research are inconclusive. The plea of many researchers in this area is for the recognition of fundamental differences. Representative of this standpoint is Steven Katz. In sum, Katz argues that a pluralistic account of mystical experiences among world religions does justice to all the currently available evidence without being reductionist (i.e., forcing the evidence into comparable categories) and without making *a priori* assumptions about the nature of ultimate reality.<sup>23</sup>

It would seem that much more research, study, and analysis are needed if Radhakrishnan's claim about the essential, transcendental unity of religions is to be established. Specific epistemological issues that need to be addressed, among others, are (a) the status

22 J. W. Bowker, "The Burning Fuse: The Unacceptable Face of Religion", *Zygon*, Vol 21, No. 4 (December, 1986), p. 417.

23 See Steven F. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism", in Steven T. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 22-74. See also the other articles in this same volume which, on the whole, tend to argue for a pluralistic account of mystical experience.



and verifiability of claims to intuitive knowledge, and (2) the claim that the content of mystical experience is ineffable.<sup>24</sup>

### The Violent Side of Religion :

The violent side of religions is directly related to their diversities of belief and practice, and to the importance of religion in the lives of their adherents. Since a religion provides its adherents with a worldview that organizes all aspects of life into a meaningful whole, giving sense and direction to life, its adherents are passionately committed to it and are deeply disturbed when it is threatened, either by other worldviews or by larger socio-political factors. These disturbances often erupt into violent conflicts. Violence, including its ultimate expression is warfare, has been a part of all religious traditions. Although all (or most) religions contain a culture of peaceableness, they also contain a "culture of violence and war." About this negative side of religion, Elise Boulding writes :

Every religion ... has a religion of holy war, of divinely legitimated violence ... Either God enjoins battle on his people to destroy evildoers, as has happened frequently enough in judaism, Christianity, and Islam, or violence itself is elevated to the realm of the sacred, as a part of the created order, as in some Hindu and Buddhist teachings. This set of violence-justifying teachings has made it possible for every religion to support the state that honors it in time of war.<sup>25</sup>

The negative side of religion either erupts in violence against dissenters and adherents of other religions, or supports and justifies violence by the host nation. This "shadow side" of religion existed not just in past centuries. The twentieth century is no stranger to demonic and destructive forms or expressions of religion. On this point Langdon Gilkey writes,

...in our century intolerable forms of religion and the religious have adppeared: in a virulently nationalistic Shinto, in Nazism in aspects of Stalinism and Maoism, in Khomenei—and in each of these situations an absolute religion sanctions an oppressive class, race, or national power.<sup>26</sup>

Nor is the end in sight of such involvement of religion in violence. Smart writes,

Not only are advances in unity accompanied by hardline backlash phenomena, but the difficult relations between Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Marxism and the friction between radical Hindu and Islamic values could be major factors in warfare over the next thirty years.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> On the special problems of the epistemology of intuition in Radhakrishnan, see Robert W. Browning, "Reason and Intuition in Radhakrishnan's Philosophy", in Schilpp, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-277

<sup>25</sup> Boulding, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

<sup>26</sup> Gilkey, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> Ninian Smart, *Religion and the Western Mind* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 119.



Even if we assume, with Radhakrishnan, the importance of religion in promoting world community and world peace, a great amount of work remains to be done in fostering goodwill and dialog among religions, and between adherents of religions and adherents of other worldviews, before the positive dimensions of religions exert significant influence.

### The Problem of Toleration :

As noted above, Radhakrishnan advances a view of positive as opposed to negative toleration toward religions (as well as ideologies and worldviews) different from one's own. The two aspects of this positive toleration are (1) an attitude of sympathy and respect toward other beliefs and forms of worship, and (2) an appreciation of the values of other religions and the willingness to assimilate into one's own religion what is true, valuable, and best in them. This positive tolerance is grounded in the mystical experience of the Absolute, a belief in the essential unity of religions, and the rejection of the claims to finality, exclusiveness, and or absoluteness.

It has been claimed that, in the final analysis, Radhakrishnan's positive tolerance is limited to a tolerance of his own position, while his tolerance of other positions (including Hindu views different from his own) is merely a negative "putting up with" them as inferior, inadequate, partial, and/or subordinate.<sup>28</sup> In support of this claim, the following lines of argument are advanced: (1) Radhakrishnan judges what is true, valuable, and best in other religions in terms of his nondualistic Advaita Vedantic interpretation of the experience of the Absolute; (2) he is not critical of his interpretation or formulation of the nature and experience of the Absolute, as he is of all other interpretations; (3) thus, he assumes the absoluteness of his understanding and the finality of his interpretation of the Absolute; (4) on the basis of this assumption, he ranks religious beliefs and concepts as higher or lower, and of more or less intrinsic significance; (5) his position leaves little, if any, room for dialog and has frustrated persons who have confronted him and his admirers with a claimed conflict of positions.<sup>29</sup>

In an attempt to rescue Radhakrishnan from this understanding of the limitations of his concept of tolerance, it has been argued that his distinction between a personal God and the Absolute (a major conflicting view among world religions) is a logical rather than an ontological distinction. On this interpretation of Radhakrishnan, the personal God is the relational aspect of divine Being and the

28 See Robert N. Minor, "Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan on the Nature of 'Hindu' Tolerance", *The Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. L, No. 2 (1982), p. 287.

29 See *ibid.*, pp. 275-290.



Absolute is the nonrelational aspect of divine Being. Thus, the personal God is not a lower, illusory representation.<sup>30</sup> But this interpretation of Radhakrishnan's understanding of a personal God is problematic. Even when rejecting the view that the personal God (*Īśvara*) is on a lower level than the impersonal Brahman, Radhakrishnan says :

*Īśvara* is not the ultimate ideal. A Personal God even when theologically sublimated is only a realisation of that which is beyond both being and its opposite nonbeing. We must leave behind the categories of religious thought and have a direct ascent. In the concept of *Īśvara*, we objectify what is essentially nonobjective. We try to naturalize what is beyond nature.<sup>31</sup>

Unless Radhakrishnan would say the same thing about the interpretation of Brahman as impersonal Absolute, then he is either placing the idea of a personal God on a lower level or contradicting himself, in one place claiming parity and in another place disparity of the two concepts of the divine.

Give (1) the problematic nature of Radhakrishnan's thinking about the essential or transcendental unity of religions, and (2) the limitations of his concept of tolerance, it seems that a more fruitful approach to the problem of conflicting truth-claims and practices among world religions would include both the acknowledgment of pluralism (fundamental differences in belief and practice) and the attempt to generate genuine dialog on the basis of mutual regard and respect. Mutual respect would include both constructive criticism of and learning from one another, and moral compassion.<sup>32</sup> One of the goals of dialog would be greater unity among world religions, but a unity, given the limitations of the human mind and the possible inability of establishing much if any common intellectual ground among rival viewpoints, that recognizes diversity and accepts plurality in matters of beliefs and practice<sup>33</sup>.

Given the pressing concern for world community and world peace, and given the facts that major religions are transnational

30 See Ninian Smart, "Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967). Vol. 7, pp. 62-63.

31 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 175-176. Quoted in Minor, *op. cit.*, p. 282. On this issue, see Minor, pp. 280-284.

32 See Harold Coward, *Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985), p. 107. On interfaith dialog, see also, among others, John V. Taylor, "The Theological Basis of Interfaith Dialog," in John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite, eds., *Christianity and Other Religions* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), pp. 212-233.

33 See Coward, *ibid.*, pp. 96, 101-102.



(and thus in a position to influence persons and events in the direction of world community and world peace) and major forces (and sources of meaning and significance) in the lives of millions of human beings, the focus in dialog might best be centered on the ethical dimension of religions (and other worldviews) with the goal of identifying and emphasizing those shared or overlapping beliefs in universal human values that have direct bearing on the constructive solution of our global crises, especially violent conflict between religions, warfare, and the threat of nuclear destruction.<sup>34</sup> Once these major global crises are under some semblance of control, then proponents of different worldviews can go on to dialog about the more particularistic aspects of their respective moral dimensions as well as about their doctrinal, mythical, and experiential dimensions.

#### Finality of Conviction and Intolerance :

A corollary of Radhakrishnan's doctrine of positive tolerance is his view that the greatest obstacle to genuine religious dialog is belief in the finality of one's own religion that leads to exclusiveness, intolerance, and even violent conflict. It is not clear to me that finality of conviction alone is the cause, or even the major element in, intolerance. Radhakrishnan himself, writing about Hinduism and Buddhism, says that the Hindu or Buddhist (or at least the "cultivated" Hindu or Buddhist) may have certainty (an unquestioning belief) in the truth of his religion, but still express an attitude of sympathy and respect toward other religions. Radhakrishnan writes, "It is not historically true that in the knowledge of truth there is of necessity great intolerance."<sup>35</sup> For Radhakrishnan, we can reach stable truth, achieve certainty and depth of conviction, and claim finality or absoluteness for our ultimate viewpoint without any accompanying intolerance.<sup>36</sup> Unless Radhakrishnan is contradicting himself, he is implying that other factors in combination with belief in the finality of one's religious worldview leads to intolerance. These other factors would include specific elements of one's worldview, individual psychological factors, and larger social, political, and economic factors. Relevant elements of one's worldview would include specific views about the nature of God and God's will for mankind. Individual psychological factors would include a sense of insecurity, a desire for power, and the "need" to have the truth. Larger cultural factors would include threats to continuing cultural existence, political ideologies, ethnic differences, and the pernicious influences of mass media in the hands of unprincipled and power-hungry leaders. Given a combination of some of these factors (and

<sup>34</sup> See Smart, *Religion and the Western Mind*, pp. 120-131, who argues for this kind of approach.

<sup>35</sup> *ERWT*, p. 314.

<sup>36</sup> See *ibid.*



the effective combination would vary from individual to individual and from culture to culture), a belief in the finality of one's religion (and the sense of meaning associated with this religion) can be and often is exploited in ways that generate intolerance and the eruption of violent conflict. In these conflicts, belief in the finality of one's political or economic ideology may override belief in the finality of one's religion, leading to the subordination or ignoring of the religious beliefs.

Some clearer sense of the nature of worldview epistemology might help us to understand how an adherent of a particular religious worldview can have finality of conviction about his religious beliefs, while at the same time engage in genuine dialog with adherents of other religions in openness to new insights and truth. Worldviews seem to be epistemologically "soft" (to borrow a term from Ninian Smart)<sup>37</sup> in that alternative worldviews are possible and cannot be ruled out *a priori* as implausible, and in that proof for a particular worldview does not yield logical certainty. That worldviews are epistemologically "soft" does not, for Smart, entail relativism. Various tests — "... consonance with science, richness of relevant experience, capacity to bear fruits," and consistency — can be applied to them.<sup>38</sup> So that the best linguistic handle to apply to them is "soft non-relativism."<sup>39</sup> Assuming this analysis of worldview epistemology is correct, proponents of a particular worldview cannot claim logical certainty or absolute finality for their beliefs. But quite legitimately they can claim finality of conviction and/or psychological certitude for them. At the same time, they can be open to the search for new truths and new perspectives on the truths they hold in genuine, compassionate dialog with others.<sup>40</sup>

Whether the acceptance of such a worldview epistemology is necessary for genuine tolerance and dialog may be debatable, but Smart and others seem to imply they can be generated only by its acceptance. But to accept such an epistemology, not only by the leaders but also by the ordinary adherents of a particular religion requires a high degree of maturity and self-confidence, and a deep sense of meaning and purpose in one's own existential viewpoint. This may be too much to expect of most people. To accept the

<sup>37</sup> See Smart, *Religion and the Western Mind*, p. 124.

<sup>38</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 125. Given the "shadow side" of religions, the application of tests and of criticism is a necessity.

<sup>39</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> See Langdon Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications", in John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, eds., *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987), pp. 44-47, where Gilkey develops a view similar to the view of Smart. He calls it "relative absoluteness".



limitations of knowledge opens up the possibility of meaninglessness, and can create anxiety. This anxiety, in turn, can lead to claims of final truth as well as to intolerance. Using the philosopher as an example, Reinhold Niebuhr illustrates the dynamics of this possible problem. He writes,

The philosopher is anxious to arrive at the truth; but he is also anxious to prove that his particular truth is the truth. He is never as completely in possession of the truth as he imagines. That may be the error of being ignorant of one's ignorance. But it is never simply that. The pretensions of final truth are always partly an effort to obscure a darkly felt consciousness of the limits of human knowledge lest he fall into the abyss of meaninglessness. Thus fanaticism is always a partly conscious, partly unconscious attempt to hide the fact of ignorance...<sup>41</sup>

In spite of the difficulty, for leaders and followers alike, in achieving and maintaining a proper balance between finality of conviction and openness to genuine dialog, such a balance would seem to be necessary for the generation of international understanding and world peace, regardless of the particular worldview epistemology one adheres to.

#### Attitude Changes and Nonviolence :

In conclusion, two things Radhakrishnan considers important contributions of religion toward world peace, the necessity of changed attitudes and the bias toward nonviolence, are worth special notice.

Although attitudes and environmental conditions often interact with one another in a dialectical fashion (e.g. favorable changes in environmental conditions may lead to the softening of belligerent attitudes toward others, or positive changes in attitudes toward others, may lead to positive changes in attitudes toward others may lead to attitude changes in their attitudes toward us as well as in attempts to bring about more favorable environmental conditions), it seems that attitude changes are foundational and necessary for any substantial moves toward world peace. Primary attention must be given to a reeducation of values. Radhakrishnan's emphasis on the nurturing of a spirit of positive and sympathetic toleration, a number of peace and community-creating virtues (love, compassion, a sense of justice, and fellow-feeling), and rethinking the idea of national sovereignty (replacing or combining patriotism with humatriotism)<sup>42</sup> should be

41 Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Human Nature* (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964 (1941)), pp. 184-185.

42 On the term humatriotism, see Theodore Lentz, "Introduction", in Theodore Lentz, ed. *Humatriotism* (St. Louis : The Future Press, 1976), p. 28. See the discussion of this concept in Glossop, *op cit*, pp. 223-227.



the core of this reeducation in values, which would lead to the reformation of the operations and policies of national governments, and the eventual reforming of the nation system.<sup>43</sup>

One attitude change that is a necessity is the change from the readiness to reluctance to use violence to settle disputes and conflicts. It may be that the religious bias in favor of nonviolence is the major contribution religion can make toward the abolition of war and the establishment of world peace. Although the tendency in conflict situations, by both individuals and nations, is to use violence early on in a conflict, the chances of peace would be much greater if there existed a general attitude that conflicts should be settled by nonviolent means, and that limited and restrained violence should be used, if at all, only as a last resort. This attitude shift could be promoted by a dissemination of the philosophy and techniques of nonviolence,<sup>44</sup> as well as by increased exposure to the lives and thoughts of persons like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.<sup>45</sup>

43 On these reformations, see Glossop, *ibid.*, pp. 218-302.

44 See the many works of Gene Sharp, including *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, Publishers, 1973), *Social Power and Political Freedom* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1980), *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian Based Deterrence and Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), and *National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense* (Omaha, Nebraska: Association for Transarmament Studies, 1985 (1970)).

45 See Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1958), Krishnalal Shridharani, *War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939), Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), John J. Ansbro, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Making of a Mind* (New York: Orbis Books, 1982), and James Melvin Washington, ed., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1966). On the need for this attitude shift from violence to nonviolence, see Glossop, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.





# Ahimsa : A Unique Contribution of Jain Tradition

*B. M. Chamke*

The cultural and visionary image of our Bharat has been dazzling very brilliantly in both the conscious and unconscious minds of this world from time immemorial. It is unopposedly and unpolemically admitted that this Bharat Bhumi of ours has invented and visualized a life-goal, a soul-principle, the Ahimsa, in its pure, unalloyed and glossy form to the human eye.

It is nevertheless very essential and demanding here to have a survey in and to find out the exact tradition which has discovered and put forth the life-principle, the Ahimsa, for the upliftment of the entire kingdom of living-beings, and especially for the emancipation of human beings groping in darkness helplessly.

From time immemorial the vedas have discussed the inscrutable and gnawing, mysterious and occult problems in the universe with a philosophical and visionary zeal and insight. However the metaphysical and intuitional aspects of the Vedas, could not succeed in solving the problems, and so they remained restricted and moved around the occult logicalism that what the material and efficient causes were that have brought this universe into existence and to a fullfledged state and preserved the species to this day. If we have a survey with a subtle and critical insight in this globe and all comprehensive journey of the Vedas we come across that the Vedas have never referred to Ahimsa somewhere in their journey, never dealt with its nature—its universality, eternality and realizing soul-vision efficacy. The Vedas are action-predominated, Karma-Pradhana, and believe in polytheism, Bahudevata-avada. They remained, it seems, continually entangled in finding out what the first ground was of this changing and transient world and of the variety of objects appearing therein.



They were exclusively busy in interpreting the meaning and nature of Karma, Yajna, Moksha etc. In times of Vedas, in sacraments and religious activities, Yajna, animals were sacrificed openly in the pit of the holy fire so that the host, the sacrificer, the Yajnic, might gain some fruits in his future life. Only the Yajna-Karma was the ultimate aim, the life-goal of the people. The philosophy of life in this period was centered around the ideal that there was heaven for meritorious and corresponding hell for sinful. It was assumed in those days that heaven was only for those who fulfilled the religious activities, Yajna-Karma, laid down by the authorities, and the heretics and ill-minded who did not believe in and so were not loyal to such activities were pushed up into the hell. In those days such religious injunctions were prevalent as the consequence of Yajna-Karma was a reward, and irreligious activities and misconduct met with punishment. But it is worth noticing here that in Vedic period no trace of Ahimsa is found. Ahimsa was never thought of somewhere; it could not occupy a significant place and could not be a matter of discussion as an independent and important principle of life. That Ahimsa is a life-principle, that it is the source of morality, religion, truth etc. could not catch up the sight of the scholars and authorities; on the contrary himsa or inflicting of sufferings, in the name of Yajna-Karma was deeply rooted in the Vaidic life and was approved by the royal seal and by supreme religious authorities too. In short, in Vaidic period himsa was a socio religio-political way of righteous and virtuous life whereas Ahimsa was unknown or rather a chimera.

The Vedas are action-predominated, Karma Pradhan, and are never advising. In their Karmic activities the people by extolling and praising the different types of deities—Surya, Agni, Varuna, Indra etc.—supplicated them to protect them from the natural calamities, to overthrow and destroy the enemies, to shower upon them the prosperity and glory, to safeguard their lives from diseases, murderous animals etc. To evade the assaults and calamities caused by the diseases, death; ill treatment by some unknown power they put a strait upon the variety of deities; and it is for this reason they performed so many religious activities life sacrificing living animals in the blaze of the Yajna etc; and it is this was the goal of their lives. And so we come across the fact that the people in Vaidic period have never dealt with the Ahimsa as a self-existent, self-illuminating, universal and life-principle. On the contrary, sacrificing innumerable, helpless and dumb animals in the name of Yajna-Karma, himsa, a principle of the brutes, barbarous, and uncivilized people, was the respectable banner of devoutness, morality and righteousness, swinging proudly very high in the skies.

At the end of Vaidic period Upanishadic thought line sprouts. Upanishadic thought was a natural growth and an advance over



Vaidic assumptions. Critical and subtle study of the Upanishads also brings us to a regrettable and despondent end that even in the Upanishadic period, too, we find, attention was not paid to Ahimsa as a supreme principle and to its observance. What happened exactly one cannot guess correctly, either it seems to the wise that people in Upanishadic period must not be able to grasp the light of the self illuminating principle, the Ahimsa, or they must be totally unaware of the sovereignty and Divinely power of this Self-existent principle.

When we analyse the insight of both the Vedas and Upanishads we find that Vedas are action-predominated, Karma-pradhana, whereas the Upanishads, knowledge-predominated, Jnana pradhana.

Upanishadas are, no doubt, the philosophical and cultural treasure of the out-put of Indian geni.

Having been ruthless critic and subtle interpreter of this entire universe and the ground of the transient things appearing therein and of the nature of ultimate Brahman, Jiva (self), Jagat (World) etc. the Upanishads could succeed in educating and moulding the minds in a particular direction, and so were admirably extolled and praised of their extraordinary geni that enthralled the insight and imagination of the people all over the world.

The Upanishads lost themselves in looking far and beyond searching out why for and at what point the beginning of this universe sprouted; in if the universe came to an end, why and how; and in intuiting if there was any ultimate Reality or any ultimate Cause that was omniscient and omnipresent. Even in upanishadic period we come across the fact that philosophers and theologians never turned their eye towards Ahimsa. The entire philosophical current in those days moved ahead analysing and interpreting all the essential aspects of human life here and that to come; but in this current there is not trace of, nor any reference to or nor any interpretation of Ahimsa is found occupying some significant place. The Upanishads are a more exalted logical and philosophical advance over the Vedas. Monotheism and spiritual life of the Upanishads were a need of those days in place of Vaidic polytheism and sacrificial routines. It was rather a journey from external to internal. All this advancement nevertheless was laudable and praiseworthy and was accorded with what the times were awaiting for. Ahimsa, the universal and supreme soul-principle and Himsa its contrary were not, as we skip through the Vaidic and Upanishadic literature, in the visionary perspectives of their seers; it naturally then leads to the conclusion that these two principles must have shed light on, must have been interpreted with an inner vision and intuition in some other system and have been put forth for a well-balanced and peaceful life that



ultimately may visualise what is eternal, self existent and abode of Bliss.

Jain tradition is as old as the Vaidic one. Some scholars even claim it to be prior to Vedas since there occurs a trace of some Teerthankars in Rigveda. History has recorded this antiquity of this tradition. Niragranthi or Shraman are the other titles of this system which very significantly expose the very essence of this tradition to the human eye. With Mahaveer back to Rishabhadeva all the twenty four Teerthankars are included in this tradition. The knowledge—the metaphysics, logic, psychology etc, contained in this tradition is found in Jain Agmas particularly in Acharanga and Sutrakritanga. All the Jain Agamas seem to be centered around the supreme principle, the Ahimsa. To discover the Ahimsa principle for human understanding, to interpret its intuitional and spiritual foundation, to advise the human society that without Ahimsa human beings are no more than animals and ultimately to direct them that Ahimsa in speech, deed and mind is the sole way to ultimate liberation etc, have been very heart of all the Jaina Agamas and the Jain tradition as a whole.

As the scientists and mathematicians have invented some unknown principles in Nature and have extended a helping hand in shaping and forming human life, so the Jain tradition peeped into the heart of this universe and there it found the soul-principle, the Ahimsa, which it offered to the human society and explained and fed into their hearts with mother's affection that Ahimsa was life, life was Ahimsa, without Ahimsa man was brute as without flame lamp was nothing and with Ahimsa man was Parmatma.

Discovery of Ahimsa, worship of Ahimsa etc. are a valuable and unique contribution of Jain tradition to human society, and for this the whole human race is indebted to it for ever.

Though there are some points in common between Upanishadic and Shramana tradition yet Jainism has its own peculiarity which proves that the heart of Jainas is Divine Abode and the spiritual lore of theirs is the light of the Paramatma.

The intuition of the Upanishads determinantly came to the conclusion that there was only one Reality, only one soul which was common to all the creatures working as a common axis. In their view the soul is eternal, absolute, conscious, infinite, omnipresent, omniscient and of the nature of bliss. In expounding and clarifying the nature of the ultimate soul, the length and breadth, depth and vision of the Upanishads have remained throughout continually at work. On the contrary the Jain thought line has lost itself in analysing and interpreting the nature of self or soul from metaphysical point of view no doubt, but it intuitively felt that this whole



universe of ours was not stringed around one and only one soul-thread or it did not sail by one and only one soul-boat; but it is, as Leibnitz holds, a conglomeration, a composite of an infinite number of souls or selves. Each and every body composed of one or more elements, Jainas hold, has its own soul which is absolutely independent of the other ones. The creature, Jainas advise, that has rather a more evolved intellect should undergo an austere penance and try to realize the ultimate nature of his own soul; and realization of soul is itself an eternal Bliss, an ultimate Liberation. To attain the ultimate salvation is not thrown upon the individual by some external agency or means but a rigorous and austere penance alone is the sole cause of this salvation, the Kaivalya.

To achieve the deliverance the lower matter is to be subdued by the higher spirit. The soul rises to the top of the universe where the liberated dwell when it is free from the weight loaded upon it by Karma bandha; this was the advice of the Shramana tradition. In the zeal of freeing the soul from the fagot of the past Karmas, the Shramana tradition introduced the supreme principle, the Ahimsa. The Jain tradition realized and saw ... intuitively that the unalloyed and glossy state of Ahimsa when not achieved, Liberation was impossible. The purified state of soul could be achieved and its ultimate and all compressive state could be realized and seen face to face only through the crucible of the pure Ahimsa, the mother of the whole universe; and it is this was the very core of the teaching of the Shramana tradition.

In this whole universe everywhere there is suffering<sup>2</sup> and so each living being afflicted of and vexed by these sufferings endeavours to emancipate itself from them. So this Jain tradition directs and sheds light on the path that the Jivas should know what the absolute and ultimate Ahimsa is; they should first under the directions of the realized preceptor, the Guru contemplate the ultimate state of Ahimsa<sup>3</sup>, should abide by the verdict of Ahimsa, and their entire lives should be the arena where all types of austere and rigorous penance should be performed. As the water to fish so the Ahimsa to man. Ahimsa in speech in mind and with physique is the ultimate way to soul-realization, the Liberation. Like Upanishds Jain tradition has accepted the way of knowledge, Jnanamarga, no doubt, but unlike Upanishds this tradition has glorified and sublimated the Karmamarga that took its stand on an absolute Ahimsa. About the criteria of the pure, affirmed and prescribed Karma, the Upanishads have said nothing and prescribed nothing; on the contrary they have

१ आचारांग प्रथम श्रुत स्कंध

२ बहू दुक्खा हु जन्तवो (आचारांग-६-१-४)

३ करिस्सं वहं काळे वेस्सं (आचारांग-१-१-५)



put on any restriction on sexual tenancy, violence Himsa<sup>4</sup> etc. Only the achievement of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality was the summum bonum of the Upanishads. Bhagavan Mahaveer accepted the way of knowledge no doubt but he yoked the way of knowledge with that of the action in which he emphasized the purity of conduct solely based upon the soul principle, the Ahimsa.

Mahaveer has very skilfully and ingeniously extolled the importance of Ahimsa in Sutrakritang<sup>5</sup>. In Upanishads we come across the conception of future life, but there is no consistent theory about it. There are evidences that in Upanishadic period the belief in rebirth was yet in immature condition.

Jainas have raised an objection against the Upanishadic conception that the Karma-bandha (hoard of actions) cannot drag the soul into the whirl-pool of the cycle of rebirths, it cannot throw its effects upon the soul so that it can not be ensnared into the circuit of rebirths. To remain unaffected by and solitary from rebirths and to perform and increase the store of Karmas cannot simultaneously go hand in hand. This is, Jainas hold, an unimaginable impossibility. Karma and rebirth are like the two sides of one and the same coin, one cannot exist without the other.

The Karma-bandh being Samsarabhimukha, (inclined towards worldly life) the soul when in touch with the Karma cannot evade the round of rebirths.

The Jain tradition very strongly argues that those who hold that even though the soul is loaded down with Karma yet need not face the birth cycle cannot be Atmavadi (Idealistic); and it is this conception Mahaveer has insisted on throughout. Nirvana is absolutely the result of the complete annihilation of the Karma-bandha.<sup>6</sup> Achievement of salvation or Moksha is absolutely subject to the condition that soul is totally free from both the Dravya-Karma and Bhava-Karma. In this actionless and desireless state alone soul is absolutely free and purified (Vishudha). Ahimsa is the sole and exclusive means of cleansing and purifying the soul of its Karmic layers. Ahimsa is the only one and sole cause of abandoning and extinguishing the Karma bandha (Action stock); and so it is alone the sole ferry that can take the soul to the ultimate deliverance, the Nirvana. It is those aspirants or ascetics alone can be called Keval Jnani, the seers, who have mastered completely and overcome the power of desires and passions and have unexceptionally and absolutely relinquished the Karma (action) both mental and physical.

4 Chbandogya Upanishad—3-17-3.

५ एयं खु नाणिणो सारं जं न हिंसई कंचणा ।

अहिंसा समयं चैव एयावन्तं वियाणि ॥ (सूत्रकृतांग १-११-१०)

६ आचारंग-१-१-४-७



They are the Keval Jnani, (seers or knowers) alone whom even the motives of action, the Karma-bhavana can never touch<sup>7</sup>, Jainas hold.

In Shramana tradition alongwith Ahimsa and good conduct, Aparigraha, uncovetousness, the unwanted hoard of wealth and life-commodities are insisted upon. To maintain an equilibrium and balance in life so that ascetic may see a spiritual vision, it is advised in Acharanga-1 that the Anagaras must have a knowledge of Shada-jivanikaya.

In upanishadic vision Brahman alone is said to be real, and soul is assumed to have no any distinctions. In this universe, Upanishads hold, there is only one soul. It is second to none. It is all in all, conscious, infinite and has no beginning, no end. Distinctions in soul that we come sometimes across in Upanishads are just casual and never real and absolute.

It is for this reason the seers of the Upanishads felt no need to inculcate and instill Ahimsa into actual life and erect a human society on the Ahimsa-footing. On the contrary against this Upanishadic ground Jainas held that there was a plurality of individual selves and so there was a need for their emancipation from. Karmic load; and to attain liberation Ahimsa was the sole means. But the Upanishadic conception of nature of soul was absolutely different from that of the Jain tradition. So in Upanishadic times Ahimsa was not known as some independent principle and so could not occupy the central place in human life; and so it was not thought of, not insisted upon persistently as an axis of life, as a supreme life principle that was alone the means of soul purification and ultimate liberation.

Bhagwan Mahaveer, an offshoot of Shramana tradition, has from metaphysical and psychological points of view accepted, in contrast to Upanishadic and Vaidic angle of thought, an infinite number of selves as Leibnitz did and put forth a theory of Monodism.

Naturally Jain tradition was psychologically bound to frame some rules and disciplinary principles centered around strict and rigorous morality guiding human conduct so that in this world no Jiva should suffer from injustice and inhumaness and might realize the ultimate soul vision. The world full of Jivas should be a co-operating and helping system in which the Jivas may have a mercy over each other and their way to salvation may be easier and clean; and it is this was the motive that tapped from inside the hearts of

७. अस्सेए लोगांसी कम्मसमारमा  
परिमाया भवन्ति से हू मुणी  
परिमाय कम्मे त्ति बेमि—आचारांग-१-१-७  
न कम्मुणा कम्म खवेन्ति वाला  
अकम्मुणा कम्म खरन्ति धिरा—सूत्रकृतांग-१-१२-१५



the Jain seers and it is here the soul-principle, the Ahimsa, incarnated.

While explaining the essence and significance of Ahimsa the following word-pearls have been oozed from Mahaveer's inner voice as —

All living beings naturally strive hard to acquire maximum pleasure. Miseries are rejected and death at the cost of anything is disliked; and this is the very inborn tendency of the species of living beings. Exception to these is an impossibility at normal level, at abnormal level the matter is different. Therefore Himsa or affliction to others is inhuman, so one should not inflict suffering upon any type of creature.

Ahimsa is axiomatic, Ahimsa is the goal of life. Ahimsa is the supreme compassion and benevolence. Ahimsa is the Mahavrata (a great vow). Ahimsa is the highest virtue. Ahimsa is the root of spiritual life. Ahimsa is the paramount merit. Ahimsa Parmo Dharmah. Ahimsa is eternal, universal and infinite. Ahimsa is humane. Ahimsa is not cowardice but a weapon of the courageous. Ahimsa is the law of the species. Ahimsa is the mortification of the flesh and sacrifice of whatever comes in the scope of mind and body. Ahimsa is self-sacrifice. Ahimsa is the sacrifice of the entire range of life. Ahimsa is the mother of whatever exists. Ahimsa is the soul power. Shraman tradition thus being full of compassion has advised the human society to walk in the light of Ahimsa.<sup>8</sup>

Bhakta Mahaveer himself underwent a very austere and rigorous penance since he belived to realize soul penance was the proper means of meditation and contemplation.<sup>9</sup> Further Mahaveer has advised that Apramada, abstinence or self-control too is as much essential as the penance. Apramada is the very base of Ahimsa and Himsa (infliction of suffering) originates from pramada, the non-control. Buddhism is also in conformity with the law of Pramada and Apramada that Pramada is death state while Apramada is that of deathlessness.<sup>10</sup>

Mahaveer has advised to allow to enter the Apramada into the mind deeply since it is the means of self-purification. To Jainas the inner purity, abstinence, self-control etc. as much go on increasing, so much the inclination towards external things go on disappearing and at a point a feeling of total abandonment, absolute sacrifice arises. External attraction towards the pleasure giving objects goes on increasing horribly and hideously in proportion with the internal

८ आचारांग-२-३-४

९ देवदत्त महाकल (दशवे द-२७)

१० अप्रमदो अतिमो विमोहो ममज्ञानोऽहंकारश्च ममत्वं Collection, Haridwar



love and affection, the Mamatva. Internal disappearance of love and affection, the Mamatva, is the cause of external sacrificial feelings. As body is healthy with medicine swallowed up in so soul is purified when obstructed of all the internal enemies, the Kashayas. In the light of these rules and laws the Jain tradition has framed very strong and grim ideals for the purification of conduct so that the clever and ingenious intellect of man may not find any excuse or loop hole therein.

As contrasted to Buddhism, by virtue of the rigorous and grim ideals framed for an ideal and purified conduct by the Jain tradition it has itself survived in India while Buddhism has passed away owing to its Shital Marga, the flexible life way.

Jainism offers us a so deep and subtle analysis of Himsa, the infliction of suffering, and Ahimsa, the innocence, that no other philosophy in the world is found capable of having done so. If we come across somewhere else the interpretation of Ahimsa, we are bound to say that it appears to be nothing but a version of Jain thought in different forms, rather allow me to say that it is a more softened and twisted and a vulgarized form of the original Jain understanding. Jainas have pronounced very conclusively that it is the Pramada and Apramada that are the very foundations of Himsa and Ahimsa respectively when they took into account the constitution of human body and the nature of the practical life.

Gandhiji in his writings and speeches at number of places very frankly confessed that the vision of Ahimsa he received from the heart of Jainism. And, he further remarked, on sucking the nectar oozing from the Ahimsa, the supreme life principle laughing in the very heart of Jainism, my body turned into total sacrifice and my mind into absolute Ahimsa. Further he says that Ahimsa is the light of ultimate Reality, the Parmatma who removed all my miseries and depressedness, despair and darkness. It brought me face to face with the ultimate Paramatma, and my mind realized the vision of ultimate Ahimsa and became Ahimsa itself. So in my private and political life I could easily tolerate all types of conjunctures and my body could face hard and hot with a laughing countenance. The battle field teaches one how to conquer enemies whereas Ahimsa teaches how to conquer oneself.

These are so many sublime exclamations pronounced by Gandhiji about Jainas' heart, the Ahimsa.

In the end Gandhiji proclaimed and thundered—it is the healthy democracy alone in which Ahimsa is honoured and is brought into action.



## IV

# Some Notes on H. G. Creel "Confucius and the Chinese Way"

*Francisco Zuniga*

### INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The present paper is going to consider the utmost characteristics of Confucius life and philosophical ideas particularly those related with his ethical teachings and it is going to be based in the Analects of H. G. Creel "Confucius and the Chinese Way."

We had already read the 20 books of the Analects and we are going to do some commentaries on them. We are going to do a summarize-review of this book following the same system-structure of the author himself.

We think that this book is a very good aim on the comprehension of Confucius life and philosophical influence not only in Oriental philosophy but in Western thought.

"Among a large fraction of mankind, Confucius has for many centuries been considered the most important man that ever lived. His philosophy has played a part in the development of some of the most basic social and political conceptions of the modern West. In eastern Asia his name is still invoked in ideological struggles by the most conservative and by some of the most radical, who seems by means of varying interpretations to show that Confucius favored their views."<sup>1</sup>

For us whose main interest-at the present moment-is to lean about philosophy of education and political thought in Oriental Philosophy, this book constitutes a fortunate source where we can drink the more fresh "water" of this great thinker.

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<sup>1</sup> Creel, H. G., *Confucius and the Chinese Way*, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1960, p. XL.



"... This man, portrayed by tradition, seems an inadequate cause for the effects attested by history. A possible explanation is that tradition does not accurately portray the Confucius who lived. This book is an investigation of that possibility..."<sup>2</sup>

The adequate interpretation of his biography, and his main philosophical ideas in his educational teachings and its consequences in eastern-western academic life it is our entire responsibility.

### Confucius : tradition and truth

Of Confucius' ancestry we have no certain knowledge. He was born in the state of Lu, in a town, Tsou. The traditional date given for his birth, 551 B. C., is at least approximately correct. No early work names either his father or his mother, this supports the tradition that he was orphaned at an early age. It is hard to determine what was the social position of his family.

Nevertheless, it is probable that his ancestors had been aristocrats, however minor. He was educated and had some leisure for such pursuits as archery and music. This is best explained on the ground that he was, as tradition says, a man of aristocratic ancestry, even though impoverished. Anyway Confucius taught that nobility depends on the mind and the spirit, not the pedigree, and a man's worth depends on what he is, not on what his grandfather was.

Tradition says that Confucius came of noble ancestry and was the descendant of kings. Tradition paints him as a strict pedant, laying down precise rules for men to follow in their conduct and their thinking. The truth is that he carefully avoided laying down rules, because he believed that no creed formulated by another person can excuse any man from the duty of thinking for himself.

As a young man he had to earn his living at tasks that bordered on the menial. From this he gained, and never lost, a deep sympathy for the common people.

The essentials of his teachings were simple. Everywhere about him he saw men struggling against each other, but he refused to believe that was the natural state of society. He thought it was normal for men to cooperate; to strive, not to get the better of each other, but to promote the common welfare.

The role of education is very important in Confucius' teachings. He tried to educate young men to be good ministers. For such education he accepted the poor and humble on exactly the same basis as the rich and well born. He demanded only two qualifications: intelligence and industry,

He was trying to produce a bloodless revolution. He wanted to take the actual power from rulers who inherited thrones and give it



to ministers chosen on the basis of merit. For Confucius it was not enough to be a teacher, he wanted to direct the government of a state and to see the world of which he dreamed come to life under his hand.<sup>3</sup>

Confucius' teachings (his doctrine) were changed and elaborated, but two principles remained: the insistence that those who govern should be chosen not for their birth but for their virtue and ability, and that the true end of government is the welfare and happiness of the people. Thus there grew up the theory of the "right of revolution", according to which it is not only a right but a sacred duty to overthrow a wicked ruler.

He was not, basically, a scholar, but a reformer, seeking a way out of the near chaos of his world. He believed that government should be administered for the benefit of the whole people. And he reached the conclusion that no sovereign formula could guarantee this. This goal, he believed, could only be reached if the government were continuously administered by men of the highest personal integrity, trained for government service and so devoted to the cause of the public welfare that they would die, if necessary, rather than betray it.

Confucius taught his students of a world in which war and hatred and misery would be replaced by peace, good will and happiness. He offered them little, save the chance to work to make the dream come true. He drove them unmercifully, insisting that only by intense study and self-cultivation could they become worthy to be officials in the new kind of administration.<sup>4</sup> He chided them for laziness, ridiculed them for stupidity, and lashed them with scorn if they betrayed his principles. Confucius' vocation was government; his mission, to save the world.

If he had stayed in Lu, enjoying a sinecure and strolling about with his pupils, he would have remained a preacher; by setting off in his hopeless quest he became a prophet. The picture of this venerable gentleman, in some respects still unsophisticated, setting off in his fifties to save the world by persuading the hard-bitten rulers of his day that they should not oppress their subjects, is in some ways ridiculous. But it is a magnificent kind of ridiculousness, found only in the great.

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3 Confucius was finally given an office, in his native state of Lu, that carried a respectable title but probably involved no real authority. When he saw that he could accomplish nothing he resigned his post, and set off on travels which took him to a number of states, in search of a ruler who could use his way. He never found one...

4 He said that the man of honor will accept rank and salary only if he is able to contribute effectively to good government.



Yu Jo said: "From the birth of mankind until now, there has never been the equal of Confucius." This admirable man, the uncrowned king, died in 479.

### Confucius : the teacher

Uncounted millions have been teachers. But the number of teachers who have changed the course of human history, as individuals and solely by their instruction of the young, is small indeed. The fact that Confucius did so gives peculiar interest to the methods and content of his teaching.

Acting as a private individual, he took as his students men of every condition who seemed to be good material. He trained them with the intention of bringing about a different and, as he believed, a very much better kind of government. His objective in education was, therefore, a practical one. But it was no means narrowly practical. Far from it, he should, in fact, be as nearly as possible the ideal man, from every point of view.

He definitely should not be a mere specialist in some particular technique. The Master once defined the complete man as one possessing wisdom, free from covetousness, brave, accomplished, and well versed in courtesy, ceremonial and music. This was undoubtedly a model that he held before his students. He not only preached\* but practiced a democratic attitude.

Physical comfort and wealth were not, he believed objects for which the true gentleman might strive. The Master said, "If wealth were a proper object of my search. I would do whatever were necessary to get it, even if I had to become a groom holding a whip. But since it is not a proper object, I shall follow after that which I love."<sup>5</sup>

Confucianism as a philosophy has never opposed the pleasures of the flesh in moderation, and Confucius personally did not disapproved of enjoyment unless it was incompatible with virtue and integrity. In recognizing the profound psychological truth that pleasure is not merely a desirable but even a necessary part of life, Confucianism was unique among the principal philosophies of ancient China; so he told his students to plan their lives including relaxation.

He himself said that he refused to teach dullards and declared that he will instruct "only those who were bursting with eagerness" for enlightenment. He probably tried, too, to avoid wasting his time with students whose aim was merely to achieve wealth and position; men who pretended to be concerned with higher things,

\* Mencius quotes Confucius as having said, "I have no talent for making speeches."

5 H. G. Creel, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.



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yet were ashamed of shabby clothes and coarse food, he dismissed as "not worth talking with." He lamented, however, that it was "hard to find one willing to study for three years without thought of material reward."

Those of his students who did not have homes nearby probably lived in Confucius' house. His method of instruction seems to have been completely informal. There is no mention of classes or set examinations. Instead, Confucius conversed with one or a few of them at a time, sometimes talking himself and sometimes questioning them. Books, it would seem, they were expected to study for themselves, but the Master suggested what they should study and discussed particular passages with them.

Thus the first task was to take the measure of each pupil. Confucius was, as every good teacher must be, a careful student of character. One of his devices, reminiscent of modern psychiatry, was to put his students at ease and then ask them to state their ambitions, freely and without reserve. On such occasions he could be a good listener, hearing them out with no interruption or comment, smiling, if he did so, only to himself. But all the time they talked, he was storing away impressions, studying how to take advantage of their good points and overcome their weaknesses. Once having made his analysis of the individual, the Master shaped his instruction accordingly. He sometimes gave different students entirely different answers to the same question.

Confucius was not informal in his teaching methods alone. A little later, Chinese teachers stood very much on their dignity and expected their students to accept what they said without question. Confucius, however, treated his students with an easy informality and a lack of strict discipline that such later teachers would have found shocking. This was not accidental. It corresponded with his philosophy of government and his philosophy of knowledge. In every sphere his emphasis was not on punishment for wrongdoing but on stimulus to rightdoing not on coercion but on persuasion; consistently his emphasis was positive rather than negative.

Confucius concentrated on gaining the complete confidence of his students. This was easier because he had a genuine liking and respect for the young.<sup>6</sup> His attitude was that of a father, an elder brother, or an older friend. He made no attempt to impress his disciples with mystification and declared that he had no secrets from them. Rather than constantly demanding loyalty from them.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 60. A young person he said "should be treated with the utmost respect. How do you know that he will not, one day, be fully the equal of what you are now? It is the man who has reached the age of forty or fifty without having done, anything to distinguish himself, who is not worthy of respect."



Confucius demanded no such blind faith. Indeed, he could not, since he had no such sublime certainty that he was in possession of absolute truth himself. And he was wise enough to know that if students are to be something more than phonograph record they must learn to think for themselves. They cannot do this while at the same time regarding the teachers every word as sacrosanct. Confucius did not become angry if his students disagreed with him; sometimes he said frankly that they were right and he was wrong.<sup>7</sup> Even when he was convinced that they were in error, he did not attempt to bludge on them with the authority of a book, of antiquity, or of himself as a teacher. He tried to convince them by reason and, if he could not, let the matter drop.

All this does not mean that he was an easy teacher in the sense that he expected little of his students. On the contrary, it is clear that he expected a great deal. He was in position to demand the more because he made it clear to them that the ultimate responsibility for what they should make of themselves was theirs. Nor would it be correct to suppose that he never reproved his disciples<sup>8</sup>.

The basic point that he pounded at his students, again and again, was sincerity, sincerity. "If a man lacks sincerity", he told them, "I don't know how he can get on, any more than a wagon could without a yoke for attaching the horses." "...in everything you say be sincere and truthful, in all your actions be honorable and careful, and you will get along very well even among the barbarians".

The man who covers his inner weakness with a harsh and overbearing manner is no better, he declared, than a thief. Yet even sincerity, admirable and indispensable as it is, is not enough. One may be completely sincere and equally mistaken. Confucius told his disciples that while something may be said for the man who is determined to stand by his word at all costs, and to finish whatever he starts regardless of the circumstances, this was not his ideal of conduct. The gentleman, he said, while he might have faults, must always be ready to correct them.

Furthermore, he told them, it is not enough to be sincere merely in thought and speech. True sincerity calls for action. If necessary, one should be prepared to give up his life for the sake of his principles.<sup>9</sup>

7 He knew the words most essential for any scholar's vocabulary: "I don't know." He sought information by asking questions and did not care if this caused people to think him ignorant. Cfr. p. 60

8 Tsai YU, the disciple whom Confucius was always scolding and whom he once said it was useless to reprove, declared that the Master was the greatest man who had ever lived. Cfr. p. 81.

9 Cf. Ledge, J. op. cit. pp. 86-87.



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Confucius made his students feel that theirs was the highest of all callings. Its rewards, in so far as he set them forth, consisted only of the inner peace and exaltation that come from the assurance that one is trying to do that which is, above all other things, worth while. Its duties were many and onerous.

Self reliance and independence were favorite themes. "The gentleman seeks within himself; the small man seeks from others."<sup>10</sup> "... one who is strict with himself yet indulgent with others avoids resentment." "Even when merely walking with two others," Confucius said, "I can always learn from them. I select their good qualities to imitate, and their bad qualities to avoid." "When you see an admirable person, think of emulating him; when you see one who is not so, turn inward and examine yourself!"

Confucius was the most learned man of his day. Both in his own day and later he was considered an exceptionally studious person. Everyone agrees that he studied books; but when we ask whether he also wrote, or even edited books, we find ourselves in the midst of a controversy that has long divided Chinese scholarship.

In a rather obscure context Confucius refers to himself as a "transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients." This has commonly been taken to be a denial that he wrote anything. But since we do not know the circumstances under which it was said, or the time at which it was said, it really proves very little.

If he did not write books, he nevertheless read them and used them in his teaching. He had assimilated the results of his reading to a coherent system of thought that was his own; he was not the kind of scholar whose utterances consist chiefly of a patchwork of quotations. Nor did he, in discussion, have constant recourse to written authority to bolster his arguments; he was far more interested in whether an argument was reasonable than in whether it could be found in a book. Not infrequently his originality predominated to such an extent that he used quotations in a way that paid little heed to the meaning of the original work.

Confucius was not primarily a scholar, any more than he had intended primarily to be a teacher. He was a man who found the world about him full of misery and wanted to exchange it for happiness. In working for this end he used many tools, among them books. But his interest was not in knowledge for its own sake.

He explicitly deplored extensive learning that could not be turned to some practical use, not because it was bad in itself but

10 Cf. Jaspers, K. *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus*, New York, A Harvest Book, p. 48.



because it was a luxury which the state of the world could not afford, neither in Confucius's days nor today.

### Confucius: the philosopher and reformer

For the philosophy of Confucius we have two principal kinds of sources. On the one hand there is the *Analects*, not written by him but in the main composed near his own time and on the basis of traditions preserved by his disciples. On the other, we have a variety of later works (some falsely attributed to his authorship) that interpret his thought in terms of the later Confucianism.

Our first problem concerns the source of Confucius' ideas. He has often been represented as one who was merely attempting to revive the glories of a real or fancied golden age of antiquity. The disciple Tzu-kung declared that Confucius needed no teacher in the ordinary sense since he was able to learn of the doctrines of the early Chou rulers, King Wen and King Wu. Mencius said that Confucius transmitted a teaching handed down from the mythical early emperors, Yao and Shun. One contemporary Chinese scholar has asserted that Confucius was not merely a reactionary but in fact a "counter-revolutionary" since (in this scholar's opinion) his whole desire was to undo the changes that had taken place in Chinese life and restore the past.

On the other hand, it seems clear that his role, in the changing world in which he found himself, was that of one who articulated and rationalized those changes which he found desirable, tried to suppress those of which he disapproved, and attempted to guide the course of Chinese culture in the way he believed it should go. He believed in it, apparently, but he was not much interested in it. It had to do with the realm of forces beyond man's control. But Confucius was interested in making over an intolerable world into a good world; what nothing could be done about did not concern him very much. He was occupied with the very practical problem of how best to utilize such ability as we have to act effectively.

The central conception in the philosophy of Confucius is that of the Way<sup>11</sup>; this has come to be, in much of Chinese thinking, a metaphysical conception, but it was not so far Confucius. The Way is the way in which Confucius thought that individuals, states, and the world should conduct themselves and be conducted.

From one point of view, Confucianism might be defined as the philosophy of the Chinese family system. He did not believe that the interests of family and state were fundamentally opposed; quite the reverse. It was in the family, as he saw it, that the individual learned those attitudes of obedience and cooperation, and learned

<sup>11</sup> Its equivalent is the Tao, i.e., in Taoism.



the experience in socialized activity, which made it possible for him to be a useful citizen or official.

Confucius wished to welcome all men everywhere, "within the four seas, all men are brothers." It is worthy of note that Confucius betrays no chauvinistic bias against the non-Chinese "barbarians."<sup>12</sup> Certainly Confucius would have liked them to become "civilized" according to Chinese standards. His ideal state, however, was the world. "The true gentleman, in the world, is neither predisposed for anything nor against anything; he will side with whatever is right."

Confucius believed that all men were potentially equal; he was not awed by rank nor contemptuous of poverty. But those whose opinions were entitled to respect were those who realize their potentialities by study and by the cultivation of virtue. Thus the opinions of one enlightened man might count for more than those of a multitude of the unthinking crowd. His thinking was characterized by an absence of dogma, a clear realization of the necessity of suspended judgement, and an espousal of intellectual democracy that, in its forthright acceptance of the minimal philosophic conditions of scientific thinking, is altogether remarkable.

No person has the right to regard himself as the sole appointed guardian of the truth. If your opinion differs from mine, we must discuss the matter; perhaps there is some truth in both our views, and something nearer the truth may lie between them. The necessity for such compromise follows logically, of course, from the conception of the world as cooperative, and it is essential to democracy.

Confucius was also a reformer. He knew the common people were severely oppressed and almost without any rights; their rulers might use them as they would. He was profoundly disturbed with this situation and so dedicated his life to the attempt to make a better world.

Confucius never directly denounced feudalism. But he wished to make, in the practice of government, changes so sweeping that what was left would have had little resemblance to a feudal order. He wanted that the whole people enjoy peace, security and plenty.

Here is the essence of Confucius' political thought. Not negative punishment but positive example; not tirades about what the people should not do but education as to what they should do. Not a police state dominated by fear but a cooperative commonwealth in which there is mutual understanding and good-will between the rulers and the ruled. Instead of a predatory world in which the powerful lived by exploiting the weak, he wished to see a cooperative

12 Waley even attributes to him "a certain idealization of 'noble savage' "



society in which each contribute what he could do best, for the sake of all.

As a reformer he demanded from his "knights" (gentleman or "weaklings") spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to the common good, for the constructive purpose of peace, that men usually reserve for the strife of war. As weapons he gave them pens, and as shields books. He gave them a mission: to go forth boldly and replace the mighty in the seats of power, governing the world in the name and the interest of humanity.

As he died, the hope for success must have seemed to him a forlorn one.

### Some Conclusions

The result for the understanding of Confucius is not easy. Not only were the facts about his life and thought (from man to myth) completely distorted; much worse, his whole historical background was so falsified that it was no longer possible to see him in perspective. Furthermore, the new currents in Chinese thought produced great changes in the conception of Confucius.

There is very little indeed about the life of Confucius, there is no biography nor even the material for one; all it records is a very few scattered incidents, of which some are quite evidently not based on fact.

Taoism and Legalism were among the doctrines that more harm had caused to Confucius and Confucianism comprehension. Both were archenemies of Confucianism. The real harm done to Confucianism by Legalism, i.e., was not its suppression, but its perversion. It is impossible to date the infiltration of Legalist doctrine into Confucianism with entire precision; it appears to have continued well into the Han period; but one thing is clear: by the time the Legalists had completed their work of sabotage, the nature of the thinking of Confucius had been thoroughly obscured.

Inevitably a large proportion of those who called themselves Confucians became more or less responsive to the wishes of those who dominated the government, and Confucianism came sometimes to be used as a tool for the control and even for the oppression of the people.

In spite of this dark panorama one thing is clear; nobody was ever able to divorce Confucianism from its early function as the champion of the rights of the people against despotism, a force favoring social and political amelioration if not revolution. Confucians of integrity did not sell their consciences to nobody in exchange for favors to their group.

It would be easy to liken the "fights" of Confucius, which on the surface accomplished little or nothing, to those of the celebrated



knight of La Mancha who tilted at windmills. But there are significant differences. Don Quixote was an echo of the past, imitating the knight-errantry that was at its last gasp. Confucius was a prophet of the future; his philosophical journey which apparently accomplished so little, became a pattern for several succeeding centuries. The travels of Don Quixote, by ridiculing chivalry, sounded the death knell of the knighthood he admired. Confucius, through the doctrines he vainly sought to practice in his wanderings, assured that later travelers in his footsteps would utterly destroy the oppressive hereditary aristocracy which he detested.

In fact, Confucius had made a remarkable beginning toward democratic government, but too little had been added to the principles which he formulated. And principles are not enough. For effective democracy the people in general must have an effective voice in choosing their rulers. This requires that specific techniques for this purpose be created. In China these were never developed; this achievement took place on the other side of the world.

All this (and more) is true of Confucius. It helps to explain why, as he himself said, no one fully understood him even in his own days, and why latter generations have often seriously misunderstood him. It helps to explain the fact that this man, who lived so long ago and was so obscure in his lifetime, left behind him an influence that continues to affect men's thoughts and actions even in our own day.



## V

# Problems and Perspectives of Comparative Religion

B. P. Siddhashrama

## I. INTRODUCTION

The application of comparative method of enquiry is one among the most conspicuous features of modern research methods. "comparative method is the unbiased co-ordination of all comparable data irrespective of context or age"<sup>1</sup>

Comparative Religion which is a subject of serious and Scientific study of the principal religions of the world is relatively a recent development. The foundations of this important study were laid in the later part of the Nineteenth century. Since then Comparative Religion has gained the attention currency of many workers. The growth and development of this Science is related to two main factors according to Dr. Radhakrishnan<sup>2</sup> — the publication and deep study of the 'Sacred Books of the East', and the growth of anthropology. An impetus was given to the study of Comparative Religion by Federick Max Muller, an investigator of the Indo-Aryan religions, by his Lectures and publications of Fifty volumes entitled 'Sacred Books of the East'. Dr. Estlin Carpenter, of Manchester college, Oxford, continued the valuable works of Max Muller with patience and dedication. Carpenter's works are mainly based on Indian Theism and the relation between Buddhism and Christianity. Again, Sir Edward Tylor, also of the Oxford, by his works on 'Primitive Culture' and 'Anthropology', gave us a new venue of an anthropological approach to the study of religion. Thus the concept

1 James Hastings (Ed.): *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (1930) Vol. 10, p. 664.

2 S. Radhakrishnan: *East and West in Religion* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Fifth Edition. 1967) p. 13.



of evolution, as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, "Stimulated the growth of Science of anthropology, and so indirectly of Comparative Religion"<sup>3</sup> Anthropology discovers the general gradation of progress of society from crude and undeveloped to more developed forms. Therefore, for anthropology, religion is a phase of human culture obeying the same laws as do other social institutions.

## II. MEANING AND SCOPE OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Comparative Religion can be defined as a Science of religion which offers comparison of the various features of the religions formed on different traditions and cultures. Comparative Religions only shows the similarities among the principles of different religions, but also exposes the differences between them. A.C. Bouquet, while writing a book on 'Comparative Religion' asserts that, "it is a survey and comparison of the great religions of the world"<sup>4</sup>. Thus by adopting the method of comparison and contrast, it delineates the salient features of the living religions of the world in a scientific spirit.

Study of a religion in isolation cannot highlight its salient features and values since the study becomes one sided. To quote the famous paradox of Goethe, "He who knows one language knows none"; similarly we cannot know and understand our own religion unless it is studied in juxta-position with other religions. We get a fuller understanding of other traditions as well as our own only by a rational and respectful study of other Faiths. So Comparative Religion as a popular, simple and interesting enquiry, familiarizes peoples with the miscellanies of religions and endows them with the policy of recognising the divergent opinions.

The modern living religions, as one sees, are not adventitious growths but are progressive developments of their ancient forms. Comparative Religion has to necessarily dwell into the history of the different extent religions in order to get a comprehensive idea of the developments that have occurred in the various religions. The study of history of religion has to take cognizance of the environmental conditions and the influence and growth of culture, tradition and civilization as these aspects are intertwined with religion.

Comparative Religion gathers, collates and explains religious phenomena. It is very extensive in its scope for it undertakes the study of different living religions, their forms of worship, dogmas, rituals etcetera. As Geo W. Gilmore observes, "The aims of the study includes the collection, collation and explanation of religious

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> A. C. Bouquet : *Comparative Religion* (Cassel and Comp. Ltd. London, (1961) p. 10.



phenomena in order to discover the nature, genesis, development and laws of religion".<sup>5</sup>

Infact the area of religion has been immensely widened by comparative study. Comparative Religion discovers the whole realm of primitive religion, it reveals the practices of primitive tribes and offers explanations to what would be inexplicable to those do not study the historical growth of the religions. By comprehensively reviuwing the various Sociological aspects and historical growth of religion, the Comparative Religion has a profound bearing on the human race and its upliftment.

Comparative Religion is said to be a scientific enquiry into Religions. Although the word 'Science' appears to be alien to the realm of Religion, in its wider sense it just implies a rational, detached enquiry into the tenets of religion. It verifies and systematises learning in religion. In addition to enquiring into the diverse religions, the comparative study inevitably culminates in synthesis of new principles and a Universal Faith. Geo W. Gilmore observes that "the time is nearer when the expression 'Science of Religion' may be admitted and when the Scientific method into religious enquiry will not only be permitted but privileged".<sup>6</sup>

The aim of Comparative Religion is definitely not to show or proclaim that the absolute manifestation of religious spirit takes place in any particular religion, excluding the others. This is not possible since determination of absoluteness of any religion is a very difficult endeavour, for analogous phenomena are found in different religions. This brings us to the conclusion that no religion is unique. It only shows as sense of narrowness when one proceeds to uphold one's own religion to be 'the true' religion. It is necessary for one to approach the study of Compative Religion with an open mind and a willingness to accept all religions. To quote Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "Its main function is to pursue truth in an atmosphere of freedom and fairness even in a subject like religion where passions are easily roused. The different religions are like partners in a quest for the same objective".<sup>7</sup>

Compative Religion studied with imagination and restraint, with sympathy and reverence brings into view the common background of different religions and thus imprints on our minds the unity as much as the multitudinousness of human nature. The faith in the Universality of God is instilled in us by Comparative Religion.

5 Geo W. Gilmore : *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*, Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson, (1959) Vol. III p. 193.

6 Ibid, p. 191.

7 *East and West in Religion*, p. 29



It inculcates in mankind not only tolerance but genuine respect and appreciation for all religions.

Comparative Religion as a philosophical discipline is concerned with values which are Universal in nature. Spiritual values as we know have relevance for human life in a general way. Srivastava observes very rightly, "The aim of Comparative Religion is to accelerate the process of human evolution and to infuse in man the growing sense of religious sensitivity, thereby furthering the inwardisation of religious values in human society."<sup>8</sup> Thus Comparative Religion not only directs man to improve his religious sensitivity but also to further pursue religious values.

### III. PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Comparative Religion has a few peculiar problems of its own. It is natural that a comparative, Critical and evaluative study of sacred Scriptures, beliefs and practices, would receive stringent objections from the staunch believers of Faith, who are indignant about any kind of enquiry into religious beliefs. But an important point that one should be very clear about is that Comparative Religion by itself is not any special or new religion but is only a method of studying different religions.

One reason for the protests raised is that it is imagined that comparative Religion as Scientific study of religion is a danger to religion itself. For a Scientific study is detached study and all religions should be treated in an absolutely impartial and detached manner. Such a neutral and cold approach to religious matters is naturally not favoured by most men of Faith. Again, detachment could also mean a cut-and-dry attitude. Religions are living Faiths and not a mere set of externals like rituals ceremonies etc; what is more important for a living religion is its internal structure, the beliefs and convictions all of which add up to a particular way of those who follow the Faith. And it is very essential for one who wants to make a thorough Comparative study to have in him a religious sensitivity. "In a way, the study of religions is not only a study of their objective features as found in them externally, but also of the inner faiths and commitments associated with them in reference to their followers. Therefore, any scientific study in this sphere will have to be scientific in somewhat a specific sense<sup>9</sup>. An objective-knowledge-seeking attitude has to be adopted by one to make this study fruitful. And instead of being completely detached, one could tend to be a bit sympathetic towards other religions. This is necessary for a truly scientific study."

<sup>8</sup> Srivastava Rama Shankar ; *Comparative Religion*, (Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, (1973) p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Kedarnath Tiwari : *Comparative Religion* (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1983) p. 5.



tific study of religion. Truth is higher than any religion, it is Universal and not the monopoly of any one race. A truly scientific approach will ultimately give an insight far greater than any small loss, that is feared to occur in the process.

Another objection that is Commonly raised is that comparison means resemblance. If one religion is like the other than one finds himself stranded with the claims of superiority and uniqueness. But then, one must not forget that comparison itself reveals innumerable subtle differences and it is to be noted that the points of similarity donot belittle the points of differences. Even if one desires to put forth claims of superiority of one religion, it is necessary all the more, to know and appreciate the claims and contents of others.

If Comparative Religion discovers that many elements of higher religions are primitive and low the religionists will immediately object to the claims of such discoveries. They would refuse to acknowledge that some religious beliefs are of a degrading character. Dr. Radhakrishnan in his book 'East and West in Religion' very clearly traces the rites of Sacrifice and communion which are the very bases of Christianity to very primitive beliefs. But then it is realized that even from dark insignificant corners of age and time we derive much spiritual illumination. And sometimes even in religions of primitive age one found deep yearnings for God.<sup>10</sup> Again tracing the historical derivation of religious ideas is very much different from a critical determination of their value. Comparative Religion is concerned about such values of Religions rather than the origin of religions per se. Comparative religion is axiological in character. The unessential contents of religion are eliminated by a Scientific and comparative study. Although Comparative Religion may not support orthodoxy, it in facts shelters the eternal and universal tenets of each and every religion.

#### IV. PERSPECTIVES OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

If Comparative Religion is to be a real academic study, it should not only be Comparative in a scientific spirit but also to an extent critical and evaluative. Evaluation necessitates the idea of a certain standard; and human tendency is such that one tends towards using one's own faith as the evaluation standard. This must be avoided since comparative study is an issue of great delicay and hence one should take utmost care of not being unfair to any faith. To execute the task of evaluating and critically appraising another religion requires a lot of tolerance and sympathy towards other religions on one's part.

Though the procedure of evaluation is truly subjective, there are a few distinctive points to be kept in view in order to make evalua-

10 See : *East and West in Religion*, pp 16-18



tion objective and acceptable to others. When an evaluative statement is made with regard to a certain religion, then that statement should be considered fair, by that particular religion to which it refers. Professor Bahm very aptly observes, "...Comparative Religion does not exist in its fullest and fairest sense until judgements are based upon standards common to all of them and until each religion that proposes a standard of its own by which to measure other religions, is also measured by standards proposed by other religions. 'Comparative Religion' as a study cannot approach being an 'objective Science' until those who study it become willing to commit themselves to comparisons based on objective standards".<sup>11</sup> Hence right evaluations if made should be with an open mind and the standards that are derived from one's own Faith are not to be imposed on others.

## V. IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Today, in this Scientific age, when the world has in a sense, become small, and mutual contacts among various cultures are inevitable, we must recognise the existence and value of other religions besides our own. Hence the field of Comparative Religion is of vital importance to man. The world today is full of chaos and confusion with enmity brewing amongst men, resulting in much bloodshed—often in the name of religion. In situations as that of the present times, Comparative Religion has a very significant role to play. It instils love in man and develops the universal brotherhood. Comparative Religion brings proper understanding, co operation and unity in Faiths, for it finds humanity bound with more enduring links than mere material, economic and political ones. Also it offers a new appreciation of tradition and cultures. Radhakrishnan says "For any religious internationalism, a study of comparative Religion is the indispensable basis. It gives the foundations, which cannot be overthrown, of all religions. It is essential to day when religious thought has reached a distinctive stage in its development which alarmists characterize as a crisis".<sup>12</sup> Thus for a stable unity among mankind the invisible but deeper bonds of ideas and ideals should be strengthened.

Explaining the philosophical and Spiritual basis of different religions, Comparative Religion instigates in man the willingness to synthesise the religious values and principles of the different living religions. And such a synthesis would perform the herculean task of uniting humanity. Comparative Religion may also develop a religion of unity-in-diversity, where all religions co-exist. Such a

11 A.J. Bahm : *The World's Living Religions* (Arnold Heinemann, 1964) p. 13.

12 *East and West in Religion*, p. 40. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



synthetic religion which comprehends all religions into unity, offers man diverse paths leading to the same goal. The influences of one religion on the other leading to their unification also widens our horizon and comprehension. Such a religion of unity--indiversity is one that comprehends science. Dr. Bhagwan Das observes, "Science, in the limited sense of physical science is imperfect science, is one part of religion. Religion in the full sense, is larger science, is the whole of science".<sup>13</sup>

Religion should be based on rational and ethical criteria and should be essentially humanistic in approach. It should be such that has relevance for mankind as a whole not only in principles but also in practice. It is again seen that comparative Religion shows that different religions, based on different cultural traditions, manifest the hidden path to humanity for the realization of absolute bliss, divinity and perfection. Such a synthetic Religion or Comparative Religion which is truly Scientific in its nature leads to universal Religion which is all-pervasive and all-comprehensive and pleads for unity of humanity. It is not bound by the consideration of a particular caste, creed or sect. It is the source of religious and spiritual aspirations of humanity, and is the real foundation and basis of mutual understanding, Love, friendship, service, universal peace and tranquility.

Thus the establishment of such union between one religion and another, and also between science and religion in the place of the conflict that has been raging between them so far, will make the beginning of a new and beneficent era guided and governed by scientific religion i.e. Comparative Religion. When the followers of every religion develop tolerance and sympathy towards religions other than their own, Society will find itself sheltered under religious—harmony quite naturally. Hence with the loss of fanaticism and dogmatism, there will evolve in the variegated and heterogeneous humanity, a religious co-operation and unity which will in its fullest scope contribute towards the establishment of Universal-Peace.

13 Dr. Bhagwan Das : *The Essential of all Religions*  
(Kashi Vidya Pitha, Varanasi, 1939) p. 47.



## VI

## Philosophy and Painting in Contemporary West European Culture

*Ivanka Raynyva*

At first sight the relation between philosophy and painting seems so remote as for example the relation between dialectics and cycling. But such a link not only exists, and we not only could penetrate into the depths of French philosophy without realising its deep interaction with the artistic consciousness, but we hardly could realise the essence of the contemporary culture, if we were not able to outline those common characteristics that unite its different spiritual spheres. Thus for example the strong two sided and dialectical dependence between the philosophic and scientific knowlege, so characteristic for the western philosophy as a whole, is being accompanied in France by the not less strong double dependence between art-aesthetical and philosophical ideas. Such teachings as Bergsonism, personalism, existentialism, structuralism and philosophical hermeneutics could hardly be given a meaning without accounting this interaction, — which for the moment is underestimated in the historico philosophical investigations. And on the contrary, — to what one insufficiently pays attention in contemporary knowledge is the fact, that the modern conceptions on painting, music, literature, etc., collide, and they solve, though in a non philosophic manner, particular typically philosophical problems, as those of the matter, the space, the time, the movement, the subject and the subject-object interrelation, the single—common, the concrete—abstract, the shape—contents, the essence—phenomenon, etc. Thus, as in the beginning of the century, a number of *private scientific* conceptions on space, matter, etc., were formed, so new *artificial* conceptions, influenced or not by given



philosophical ideas and having exerted or not an influence upon given other ones, were shaped too.

Still with impressionism, that emerged as a reaction against academic realism with its visual conformism, the principle of depicting *not* of real forms and colours, but of perceiving the things not such as they are, but such as they are perceived, is being raised. The real things prove to be only the reason for reproduction of the own mood in dependence on which one and the same object (as for example the Cathedral of Rouen in Monet's *cyclus*) may be depicted in a most different way. Laying on its basis the principle of subjectivity and individual experience, impressionism interchanges the stable with the instantaneous, the clear contours and the linearity are being blurred, the geometric perspectivity and the three dimensional space give way to the etherial. Thus, at the very beginning, modern painting puts the extraordinarily important question about the "new", subjective reality as an abstraction of the objective, i.e. the subjective and the objective concreteness. A particular significance in this respect acquires Gauguin's understanding of art as an "abstraction" (8, 194). As far as the artistic subject is something derived from nature, but not nature itself or some "second copy" of its, Gauguin is doubtlessly right, and in this sense not only art, but also any spiritual creative work (scientific, philosophical, etc.) could be qualified as an abstraction. But in a number of cases this would lead to peculiar attempts to "clean" painting from any objectively existing objectness and shape (Malevich, Mondrian), as it was the case in philosophy with Husserl's phenomenological reduction.

Though intimism and symbolism (neotraditionalism, nabism) turn towards the "objective harmony", they admit that nature serves only as a reason and that the common law, the God's order, must be searched. Here however appears the real danger of a rupture between idea and object and the declaration nature to be extraordinarily subjective, occurs as it happens with Helmholtz's theory of symbolism and Poincaré's "empyriosymbolism". It is not occasional that nabists like M. Denis begin to stress upon the double, subjective and objective deformation, and O. Redon initiates the phantastic symbolism, aiming at inspiring life "into fabulous beings according to the laws of the plausible." (10, 40).

But doubtlessly the first great scandal of the XX<sup>th</sup> century flares up at the exposition of the Fauvists in the Salon d'Automne in 1905. Reasonably D. Avramov marks down that "with them the detachment from the exact resemblance of nature, acquires the character of a real provocation. Here the last remainder of the volume modelling already disappears." (2, 157). As a matter of fact a similar provocation is also observed in the successive scandal — the cubism.



Apollinaire remarks that the cubists present the public with more "brain" than "sensitive" works and this new painting is "clean", as similarly to the clean music and literature. "As it is with any deity", he says, "so the painters create after their own image and likeness. Only the photographers produce reproductions of nature." (1, 11). That is why there is nothing to wonder that cubism which began its development as being "integral" an "naturalistic", still connected with the three dimensional space and including elements of the objective reality, goes through "orphism", breaking up with the latter, and ends with "purism" putting away all "superfluous" elements. On a conceptual plan the latter is essentially a peculiar transformation of the Mahist principle for "economy of thought" which underwent a criticism by Lenin (7, 166 — 168), the aim being in this case to achieve an economy of practical means. In accordance with P. Spassova's thesis that "also the art which consciously runs aside from reality, is in spite of all connected with it" (14, 2). I want to note that even in its extreme variants cubism is a particular reflection of a number of essential objective processes. Like the futurists the cubists depend on depicting life in the big city, and the dynamics in the epoch of scientifico-technical progress.

The machine-aesthetics of Leger discloses cubism as an incarnation of the geometrical order in the producing life, and the painting of Dellone presents the thunder of the industrial world. Here too, as in the well-known Modern Style, Jugendstil and Style 1900, the taste towards contemporaneity, glorified by Apollinaire, finds its way. The great poet does not know that due to some irony of fate he will become victim of this same contemporaneity — the First World War.

A direct response reaction of the latter are the successive two scandals in art — dadaism and surrealism. They emerge not only, and even not so much as related to painting, but as literary schools.

Being an antiart aimed at the bourgeois valuables that failed, at the false moral and rationality, dadaism confesses a peculiar irrationalism and nihilism. At that, as also later in Adorno's "Negative Dialectics", the negation is understood as something just destructive. Dada negates not for being able to replace these values with others, not for being able to offer an exit from absurdity, but to recreate that absurdity in a strengthened form and to shock by means of a scandal. The ideal aim of this destructive act is "the nil". Philippe Soupault writes: "Why being stubborn (there is nothing), there has never been anything." (Art and Beauty: "NIL" 9, 19).

The dadists deny the general laws and the coherence not only in reality, but in thinking too. T. Zara creates senseless "verses" out of little words written on small pieces of paper, mingled in a hat and thrown at random upon the table. The painter M. Duchamp



illustrates the magazine "391" with a whiskered Joconda. Captivated by total negation of this movement logically comes to its own blast. One part of its members, headed by A. Breton, direct themselves toward a new, constructive activity and establish the group of surrealists. The purpose of the surrealistic revolution, uniting the members, is to destroy the repressive factors by an antisocial activity, using all means to demolish the ideas of family, fatherland, religion, etc. As with the utopists, the enlighteners and the romantics, here it is also falsely thought that life will change with the change of ideas. The mockery with Ubu in the XXth century means a mockery not only with the bourgeois society, with the "good tone" and the commonly accepted norms, but also with the civilisation as a whole. As Marcuse will later see in the outsiders the representatives of revolution, so the surrealists glorify the drunks, narcomans, exhibitionists, murderers, the mad and others, on behalf of that "free society", where everything will be allowed and which certainly would come true if the dream could be merged with reality, as Breton (3, 27-28) craves for. But they merge only in their artistic works, in art, transformed into a sublimation of anger and disagreement or into sacrament and poetry, in service of a refuge from reality.

It would be naive, however, to think that all art conceptions were *immediately* conditioned by the social being. It is false for example to think that abstractionism is the fruit only of the social-historical situation of the 20's and 30's. As a trend that fetches down the long year attempts of supermatism and neoplasticism, it unfolds really in 1931, when in Paris the group Abstraction-Creation is established, but in reality it was born still in the end of the first decade: 1909. Picabia, washing off an aquarel, creates the first abstract vision, and in 1910 appears the first abstract canvas of Kandinsky. I think (and this is very important from a philosophical view) that abstractionism originates in distinct *own artistic searchings*, on the basis of which lie the oppositions "concrete form — abstract form", "subjectivity — desubjectivation". Thus, while a L. Leger raises the subject as a main acting "person" in painting, the basic intention of the abstractionists is just the opposite — cleaning off from subjectivity and reaching the "clean reality". Art is an immediate expression of the general — as something consciousnessless and moving, states Mondrian (see: 15, 134 135). So in the XXth century-art the extraordinarily important *problem of realities*, characteristic for the middle age philosophy, is revived.

What conclusions could we make of the above said ?

The well-known literature critic V. Dneprov remarks that the "image of Arlequino pierces not only the XVIIIth century painting, but also the one of the XXth century. A peculiar essay could be



written on the nuances of his philosophical sense. The rueful false glamour. The Human and the Ostentatious. The strength of the workday and the divinification of the holyday. (...) Reality and illusion ..., etc." (4, 269). It seems to me that the processes in modern culture could be resembled just to the Arlequinade, to an attempt to overcome the bifurcation between the outer (objective) and inner (subjective) reality through directing the movement "subject — object" into the reverse direction, the object being put independence on the subject. On a philosophical plan this means using Kant's "Kopernican Turn" for overcoming dualism itself between the phenomenal and noumenal being, but this time not by identifying the being with the thought (Fichte, Hegel), but by restoring the unity of being into the so called subjective concreteness, where the trans-phenomenal being is put in dependence on its constitution into a phenomenal consciousness (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). This essential trend towards *subjectivation* or *anthropologisation of the ontological problematics*, resembling a new sort of Socratic revolution, represents also the deep differentia specification of the modern culture, differentiating it from the classical one. This is most clearly seen in art-painting. W. Hoffmann writes, that the modern pictorial thinking stemmed from a fundamental change in the relationship to reality originated in the revolutionary discovery, that visible reality is only one manifestation of the real, that the visible exterior world can be defined only in relation to man ... (5, 35). The same reversion can also be watched in the renaissance of the modern western philosophy in person of Kierkegaard, creator of the style and method of philosophizing by the subjective thinker (6, 235-242) whom in private the existentialists do originate from. This turn characterises also the contemporary music (Debussy, Ravel, Satie) and the religious modernism (Bergsonism, Teilhardism, personalism, etc.), sanctioned by the Roman church.

The direction towards the subject of painting is quite nuanced and varies from the endeavour to originality in creative work (Gauguin, Degas, Redon), till negation of the objective reality as such a one (Malevitch). With putting the objective reality in dependence on the subject, the extreme abstract products of modern culture return in essence to the Berklian *esse est percipi*. But it must not be forgotten that the performed turn towards "subjective concreteness" contains a number of valuable moments, which should become a special object of investigation of the science of art and the philosophical understanding. In this respect it is useful to remind the creative role of abstraction, understood in the most common sense.

Particularly characteristic of the modern culture is the tying up of subjectivity and the abstraction itself with the irrational components — with the intuition (under the influence of life's philosophy,



Bergson, Husserl), with the subconscious (under the influence of Freud), with mystery (Redon, Chirico, Marcel), with the absurd (Kierkegaard, Dada, the Surrealists, Malraux, Sartre, Camus), with hystery and delirium (Dada, the surrealism), with imagination and the imaginative (Ribot, Bachelard, Sartre), with love (Breton, Mounier, Nedoucelle), etc., — components, examined as moving forces par excellence of the real creation and the real life.

As far as art is not a science and the creative process by itself cannot be explained by way of a proper rationality, the "irrationalisation" of art leads to more positive results than its "rationalisation" (purism, suprematism, etc.), though also with the first, one often comes to extremes that turn it into an antiart. Not occasionally Renoir states: "Today we want to explain anything. But if a picture could be explained, then this would already not be art" (viz. 11, 240). In this sense P. Spassova has reason to insist that "... the science of philosophy, as an attempt for a logically argumentated and systematised putting of those same most general questions is not at its place neither in the theatre, nor in the cinema, nor even in literature..." (14, 122) and her criticism against the literature creations of Sartre is appropriate. Something more. Just the introduction of intuition, of taking to heart, of the essential contemplation (Wesenschau), of the existential clearing up (Existenzerhellung) and the revelation, i.e. transformation of philosophy into a product of art, or its mystification leads to obscuration and even liquidation of its specificity. With this I do not want to deny a priori the possibility of a "successful" interpenetration between philosophy and literature, philosophy and painting, philosophy and cinema, etc., but this is so rare indeed, as are the happy marriages. I cannot and I do not want to deny the conquests like the ancient eastern eposes, the poems of Kheziod, the dialogues of Plato, Brune and Fontenelle, the utopies of Moor and Campanella, the novels of Rabelais, "Attempts" of Montaigne, "Thoughts" of Pascal, "Faustus" of Goethe, the novels of Dostojevsky, Hess, Frisch, Golding, the plays of Shakespeare, Ibsen, Durrenmatt, the architecture of the ancient temples, depicting the principles of the world structure, the icons and pictures, of Bosch, Broegel, Gruenewald, Durer, Arcimboldo, Fussli, Redon, Vrubel and others, the poetry of Khayam, Saadi, Goethe, Nerval, Holst, Dickinson, Roerich, the music of Bach and Beethoven, the films of Griffith, Bergmann, Tarkovsky, etc. I would not like to reject the philosophical publicism, nor the boundless possibilities of art. But such a synthesis rarely succeeds, because only universally developed, enlightened people manage to succeed in it. As it is known, a good philosopher, even when he understands something of art, is rarely able to create such a one, at that as good as well. And on the contrary, a great painter will rarely endeavour to write philosophical



treatises. It is also necessary to understand that the "alloy" in question is not possible in philosophy, but rather in art, and not by occasion Roerich forbodes that just "art is the banner of the future synthesis" (12, 401). Because art can *incarnate* in an own, original way definite (although not of all kinds) philosophical ideas, while philosophy may only reflect upon some quite general and not specifically pictorial problems of art. Anyhow philosophy deals with universal laws of development of nature, the thinking and the society, something, that some philosophers, as the existentialists and the personalists try to deny. Troubled with the fact that they want to escape from the kingdom of the abstract, undistinguished ideas, they turn towards the subjective method of Kierkegaard, by which they come to poetisation (Heidegger), novelisation, dramatisation and essayisation of philosophy (Sartre, Camus, Beauvoire, Marcel, Mounier). The single and individual as a unique and unrepeated, are counterposed to the common. The necessity and the regularity are interchanged with occasionality and freedom of will, the categories of thinking — with the existential and the negative concepts (negatites). "The sense of seriousness" is being ridiculised (13, 721) in order to be changed with a really non-serious philosophy, relying on the old dadaistic and surrealistic weapon of the effective scandal. But history of painting and of philosophy shows that reality can not be changed to the good only by a scandal. It could not be changed only with painting or philosophy. And this is still less possible only by using armed acts without the presence of a highly human culture.

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## VII

## The Upanishads and Buddhism

*Biraja Kumar Tripathi*

The Upanishads constitute the source books of all the systems of Indian Philosophy, orthodox and heterodox. They are the fountain head of several doctrines which are picked up by the later thinkers and developed into different systems of philosophy like Jainism, Buddhism, Samkhya and Vedanta. "Later systems of Philosophy display an almost pathetic anxiety to accommodate their doctrines to the views of the Upanishads, even if they cannot farther them all on them".<sup>1</sup> Observes Dr. Radhakrishnan. Corroborating this view Prof Ranade has said "... the Upanishads supply us with various principles of thought, and may thus be called the Berycynthia of all the later systems of Indian Philosophy."<sup>2</sup> That the Upanishads are rich in philosophical contents and packed with forceful and appealing ideas is evident from the powerful thought waves that they have emanated—thought waves that could penetrate deep into the distant future and thereby lay the philosophical, cultural, and religious foundation of India. The present day philosophy of India is only a systematic and explicit representation of the hidden treasures of the Upanishadic philosophy. Their doctrines even though propounded mostly in poetry are so sound and satisfactory, convincing and thought provoking that even the heterodox systems, more particularly, Buddhism, are not free from their impact." There is no important form of Hindu thought, heterodox Buddhism included which is not rooted in Upanishads."<sup>3</sup> An attempt, therefore, is made in the following lines to locate the points of agreement between the orthodox Upanishads and the heterodox Buddhism. Though it is difficult to allocate any definite date as to when the Upanishads were composed yet it is an accepted fact that most of the Upanishads were

1 S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol, I, p. 138.

2 Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy; p. 131.

3 Bloom field; The Religion of the Veda, p. 51.



composed prior to the rise of Buddhism and a few of them after Buddha. Dr. Ranade held that Upanishads and Buddhism were contemporaneous.<sup>4</sup> "Buddhism is only a later phrase of the general movement of thought of which the Upanishads were the earlier."<sup>5</sup> thinks Dr. Radhakrishnan. There is not much time-gap between them so as to cause any major difference in the core of their teaching. On the contrary the temporal gap between them is so feeble that it seems that before the Upanishadic era finally disappeared Buddhism had slowly and implicitly emerged causing a magnificent overlapping or synthesis of the teachings of the Upanishadic sages and the mendicant Buddha. Buddhism is not altogether a new phenomenon; it is, on the contrary, more or less, revival of the old doctrines of the Upanishads. "Buddha himself admits that the dharma which he has discovered by an effort of self culture is the ancient way, the Aryan path, the eternal dharma."<sup>6</sup>

To begin with the phenomenal or the space-time-causality world appears *tuccha* to both-anity or unreal for the Upanishads and *asukham* or sorrowful for the Buddha. The world fails to provide supreme bliss to both. Everything in the world is transient or evanescent, nothing is permanent or eternal. While the Buddha considers it *Ksanikam*, the Upanishads call it *Svabbhāvāh* (ephemeral). Buddha had certainly *Naciketas* in mind when he asks; "How is there laughter, how is there joy, as the world is always burning? Why do ye not seek a light, ye who are surrounded by darkness? This body is wasted, full of sickness and frail; this heap of corruption breaks to pieces. Life indeed ends in death".<sup>7</sup> Overwhelmed by the sights of a dead body, a diseased man and an old man with a bent back bone Buddha renounced the world but came back again to cry like the Upanishads that the world is full of sorrow and suffering; that everything here is momentary and short lived. Death and destruction reign supreme in this world and man is only a fallen and frustrated creature overpowered by the mighty forces of nature. But all these are only echoes of the Upanishads and so. Buddha had little difficulty in introducing his philosophy with which the general mass was already familiar. Thus in the *Maitri Upanishad* it is stated "What is the Use of the satisfaction of desires in the foul smelling and unsubstantial body, which is merely a conglomeration of *ordeur*, urine, wind ..... What is the use of satisfaction of desires in this body which is afflicted by lust, anger, covetousness. ... Verily all this

4 R. D. Ranade : *Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 132.

5 S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 470.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 360.

7 *Dhammapada*, XI. 146, 148.



world merely decays."<sup>8</sup> Likewise it has also been stated "O Death, ephemeral are these, and they waste away the vigour of all the senses that a man has. All life, without exception, is short indeed".<sup>9</sup>

Though man is reduced to a helpless creature subject to all sorts of misery and melancholy his inner potentialities have not been denied by the Upanishads nor by Buddha. Once given the scope man has the instinctive urge within himself to rise above and transcend his finitude, relativism and merge himself in the infinite ocean of blissful consciousness. What is needed is only his endeavour to "know thyself," to manifest himself fully and completely and to free himself from the finite covering. Man always forgets that he is divinity or infinity concealed. Ignorance or avidya conceals the true nature of his self; dissociates Atman from Brahman though they are one and identical. Ignorance therefore is bondage both for the Upanishads and Buddha. It is this ignorance which makes the jiva cling to his gross physical body, keeps him away from the truth and is responsible for the false sense of 'I' or egoism. Buddhism and Upanishads are unanimous on this point. "In both, egoity is the result of avidya, in both it is the non-possession of the saving Knowledge that hides from us the Truth".<sup>10</sup> But with the dawn of right Knowledge or Knowledge of ultimate truth the jiva realizes his greatness, rises above the phenomenal tumults and becomes enlightened, or a Buddha and finally in an ecstasy he proclaims." That thou Art..." The final message of the Buddha—"And now brethren, I take my leave of you; all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence"<sup>11</sup> ——— is only a restatement of the Upanishadic cry 'Lead me from darkness to light.....'<sup>12</sup> Nirvana of Buddha is only a synonym of Moksha of the Upanishads. Moksha or salvation can not be attained by sacrifice or by undergoing penance. It is not a boon to be acquired by rituals, nor a gift from the above but consists only in realizing the true nature of human potentialities. It is not going to heaven but only perception of truth. In short acquisition of vidya or knowledge is salvation for both Upanishads and Buddhism.

Law of Karma is another point of agreement between the two. For Buddha man is the maker of his own destiny; his future is in his own hands. He can not escape the effect of his own actions. He reaps what he sows. That is to say, for Buddha, there is a qualitative affinity between the actions and their respective results, between the cause and its effect. A good action will yield good result and

8 1-2-7.

9 Kathopanishad, 1.126.

10 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 416.

11 Mahaparinibbanna Sutta.

12 Brhadaranyaka Upanishad.



bad action, bad result. But the source of this doctrine can be traced to the Upanishads. According to Upanishads, the soul assumes new body according to its action and knowledge<sup>13</sup> and a man can be holy by holy actions and sinful by sinful actions.<sup>14</sup> The private conversation between Jart Karava and Yajnavalkya as found in the Brihadaranyaka is only a discussion about Karma theory.

It is further interesting to note that even the anatta-vada of Buddha has its root in the Upanishads. The denial of soul as a permanent substance is not altogether a new theory of the Buddha. Instead one gets indication of it when the Kathopanishad says that when a man dies people think differently about his soul. While some feel that it still continues to exist, others think that it cease to exist.<sup>15</sup> Again, the saying of the Chhandogyapanishad that in the beginning Not-being alone existed and later on Being was born out of it, has its reflection in Buddhism. "When in his commentary on the above passage, Shankarcharya states that this may refer to the doctrine of the Buddhists, who said that "Sadabhava" alone existed before the creation of anything, he is right in referring to the doctrine of the Buddhists. The metaphysical maintenance of Not-Being has its psychological counterpart in the maintenance of the theory of the denial of soul."<sup>16</sup>

Finally, it is to be seen that Buddha almost adopted the style of describing the Absolute even though he, for all purposes, did not accept any such reality. The Absolute, for Buddha, is incomprehensible and so he avoided all discussion about it. Buddha argued that the finite man can not think of the Infinite, cannot harness the infinite by any logic or reasoning. It is beyond his mind and senses and so cannot be described by words or proved by argument. But this is certainly the Upanishadic style of describing Brahman or the Absolute. The Absolute according to the Upanishads is incomprehensible to the relative and logically indemonstrable. Buddha admits this type of description of the Absolute as found in the Upanishads whole heartedly. Again, when Buddha compares<sup>17</sup> Nirvana with the expiring flame which has no more wood to burn he has certainly Svetasvatara<sup>18</sup> in mind which describes Paramatma as the fire the fuel of which is totally consumed. Keeping in view all these it has therefore been rightly observed ".....all the main rudiments of Buddhism are present in embryo in the Upanishads: the doctrine of Not-Being the doctrine of Denial of soul, a contempt of sense pleasure bordering upon pessimism, the order of mendicants, the idealistic theory of Knowledge, and finally the doctrine of Karma<sup>19</sup>.

13 Kathopanishad; 11.5.7.

14 Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, III. 2, 3.

15 1.1.20

16 R. D. Ranade : Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, p. 132.

17 Digha Nikaya, ii, 15 and Majjhima Nikaya, 72.

18 IV. 19.

19 R. D. Ranade : Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, p. 133.



## VIII

## The Professionalization of Science

*Cemil Akdogan*

Today layman is aware of only the outcome of science, the technological products of science such as automobiles, electricity, television, telephone, radio, etc. The relationship among science, universities, government and industries does not concern him at all. Such an indifferent attitude about scientific discovery is the result of the gap between laymen and scientists. Science is a professional field and so esoteric that laymen cannot really understand what is going on in research laboratories.

But the professional status of scientists is a very recent phenomenon which goes back only to the mid-decades of the nineteenth century. Even when the Scientific Revolution took place in the seventeenth century, scientists were far from professionalism. Science was only an activity of amateurs who had wealth and leisure. The sons of aristocracy pursued science for the sake of science without entertaining the idea of profit or utility from science. Specialization in science had not taken place yet. A philosopher or a scientist usually covered all the fields of knowledge. Education in schools was classical.

The Industrial Revolution and the process of professionalization changed all this. In the middle decades of the nineteenth century with the chemistry oriented dyestuff industry science and technology for the first time began to interact in the real sense and from then on science undoubtedly became a pivotal mover in the society. The power of science in socioeconomic development could no longer be denied, since after the late nineteenth century science became a significant factor in changing society through technology.

In order to understand the emergence of science as a profession we must compare and contrast the educational and professional



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opportunities which affected science in France, Germany, England and the United States of America.

## I

In France the French Revolution, as a catalytic change, affected science and immediately professionalized it. French government supported science by offering jobs to first rate scientists at the universities and by setting up prizes to inspire meritorious research in science. Furthermore, some good administrative jobs were given to scientists.

First, some sweeping reforms in education were made. All universities and schools which had been affiliated with church or classical education were closed down. With Ecole Centrale a new educational system was put into practice. Condorcet, the architect of this new system, gave the priority to natural sciences as being antidotes to prejudice. According to him a republican man had to be unprejudiced, rational and critical.<sup>1</sup>

Ecole Polytechnique established as an engineering school to take care of the practical needs of the Republic contained both theoretical and practical sciences. For the first time this school introduced research laboratories to physics and chemistry. This unique school also drew many foreign students such as Justus Liebig. With the employment of the first-rate French scientists at this school France rushed science to professionalization and united teaching with the actual research work. For instance, Monge, Fourier, Lagrange, Laplace, Prony, Poinsot and Berthollet became professors in Ecole Polytechnique. Students mostly from middle or lower classes began to attend this school after succeeding in competitive entrance exams.<sup>2</sup> Although research laboratories were introduced to Ecole Polytechnique, universities did not have research laboratories of their own.<sup>3</sup>

Centralization had first proved itself useful, but later it became a hindrance to scientific education in France. As a result France lost her leadership in scientific education to Germany after the first decade of the nineteenth century, especially after Napoleon militarized Ecole Polytechnique.

## II

Luckily and due to her political structure, in Germany education was decentralized. Each state was responsible for its university.

1 Everett Mendelsohn, "The Emergence of Science as a Profession in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in Karl Hill, ed., *The Management of Scientists*, p. 9. And Also L. P. Williams "Science, Education and the French Revolution," *Isis*, XLIV (1953), pp. 311-30.

2 Mendelsohn, pp. 10-4.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 31-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



This caused a friendly competition among different state schools in Germany. As in France, in Germany too, support came from the government. Germans did not eliminate the universities that still were a continuation of Medieval universities, rather added natural sciences and more importantly, research laboratory to them. In this way universities have got a right to continue. Besides this radical reform in universities, Germans established Technisches Hochschulen, the technical schools, patterned after the Ecole Polytechnique in France to meet the industrial and commercial interests of the society. With such a superb educational system, Germans trained a great number of second-rate scientists who could make research in the industries (especially chemistry-oriented dyestuff industry) in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the German universities were professional schools rather than places of liberal education. They trained students for the various civil services, the churches, the law, medicine and teaching, and, of course, degree requirements.

In addition to universities, Germany got a variety of secondary schools, Gymnasias, Realschulen and various trade schools, Gymnasias that trained students for universities restricted their curriculum to the classics and mathematics.

Germany's excellence came from using research laboratories in universities. Some scientists, Henry Rose, Gusiav Magnus, and Purkinje established research laboratories in a part of their dwellings. Due to the importance of chemical industries Liebig's research laboratory in chemistry at the university in Giessen gained much wider reputation. Especially the doctoral theses that flowed from Liebig's research laboratory awakened a sharp interest in it. Liebig, inspiring and passing his enthusiasm to his students, achieved to train his students as scientists in their most productive and creative period by having them done the serious research work in the laboratory. Laboratory instruction were further spread over to the centers that Liebig's students went.<sup>4</sup>

Germany's professional scientists also achieved in establishing a society, Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher and Arzte because of an envy of the centralization of science in France and England. Each year German scientists gathered in a different city in Germany and opened their gatherings with the enthusiastic support of the King. They communicated their research results to their colleagues in these meetings. This society was administered solely by professional scientists who had published some articles besides their doctoral dissertations, and the presidents of the society were changed annually to keep the society dynamic. To establish such a society was essential to draw public attention to the society and the problems

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-22.



of the professional scientists. Getting together under a particular organization gave a power to the professional scientists to ameliorate the conditions of their profession and to obtain further financial support from government and public. Although scientists in Germany got support from the government, they enjoyed a remarkable atmosphere of freedom.

### III

In England, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were no professional scientists. In the universities liberal education was significant. In the eighteenth century, London, the capital city lost its dominance over the scientific affairs. With flourishing industries some provincial societies, among them essentially the Lunar Society of Birmingham, were established outside of London in those very cities where industries were blooming. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, mathematics gained a significant place in universities, but nothing professional out of it came out.

The Royal Society was established by amateur scientists in the seventeenth century. Although the King offered his blessing to the society, he did not help it financially. The members performed experiments and sought natural laws without looking for any profit from the science. Each member, being a natural philosopher, worked at least in the several branches of science, or sometimes covered all the fields. Thus, the Royal Society was not a professional association.

Universities offered an education which consisted of seven liberal arts, after graduation there were faculties of divinity, law and medicine. And this form of liberal education improved its position against the professional training. Moreover, university education was prerogative of upper classes, i.e. classical or liberal education was an upper class education. Normally the children of upper classes either would get a post in church, law or medicine, or live their life in leisure.<sup>5</sup>

In the eighteenth century along with the development of industries some scientific societies were established outside of London, in Leeds, Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, and Newcastle. But these societies were also not professional. Scientists in these societies individually tried to solve the problems of industries by the application of scientific knowledge. Among these societies the Lunar Society of Birmingham stands distinctly. The members of this society consists of manufacturers, scientists and engineers. Mathew Boulton was the manufacturer of metal products, and partner with

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23-5.

<sup>6</sup> D. C. L. Cardwell, *The Organisation of Science in England*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, (London, 1972), p. II.



James Watt in the production of steam engines. Erasmus Darwin was physician, poet and dabbler in scientific speculation, Thomas Day was philanthropist, and interested in politics and metaphysics. Richard Lovell Edgeworth was the inventor of miscellaneous mechanical contrivances, and interested in education and agriculture. Samuel Galton, the grandfather of Francis Galton, was gun manufacturer and mine operator. Joseph Priestley was physicist and chemist. William Small was physician and metallurgist. Jonathan Stokes was physician, botanist and chemist. James Watt was inventor, engineer and chemist. Josiah Wedgwood was potter and chemist. John Whitehurst was instrument maker and geologist; and lastly William Withering was physician, botanist and chemist. These extraordinary people gathered together not formally, but informally. Their mutual interests were more important than formal gatherings. They communicated with one another. They participated in similar projects. Even sometimes manufacturer and inventor worked together, especially in the case of Boulton (the manufacturer) and Watt (the inventor of steam engine). Their interests were very broad. Almost there was not any technological subject that was excluded from their interests. Application of science to practical problems was the main purpose of this society. Being an informal group, they did not hold any records of their activities. Our knowledge of the society comes from mainly the letters and sometimes some books of the members. The members also communicated with Benjamin Franklin in the U. S. They were a very active group. They brought all raw materials that they needed from other parts of England, and if necessary from Europe.

The significance of the Lunar Society of Birmingham mainly came from the role that it played in the operations of the Industrial Revolution in its early phases. Before profiting from steam engine power, industries were placing themselves along the rivers. When Watt perfected and made the steam engine's turning machinery possible, industries such as textile industry chose any site where labor, transportation, and raw materials were suitable without looking for a riverside any more. Lunar Society, besides steam engine design, took interest in the improvement of transportation. Wedgwood, Priestley, Watt, and Keir were also involved in ceramic works. Watt, furthermore, dealt with pottery. Glass works of Keir and the participation of members in the agricultural revolution were also important. In these attempts, the members of the society applied the available scientific knowledge and processes to the technical problems of the industrial revolution. But let us also mention that even for this society science was not the handmaid of science, since the society also made contributions to science. For instance one of the members, Priestley is a famous chemist. In summary,



there was a smooth and reciprocal interaction between science and technology in this society<sup>7</sup>.

In the eighteenth century British universities mathematical studies gained a distinct place, maybe due to the respect paid to Newton. Mathematics was accepted as a part of classical or liberal education. In this, maybe the traditions of English Platonism also played a role. But there was no idea to train professional mathematicians, because for the persons who would choose law as a profession, mathematics was accepted as a sharpening tool of mind. Written exams also gained importance, since they were accepted as a fair and objective way of honoring students and also appointing people to college offices. They were a cheap way to classify students with accordance to their scholastic achievements.<sup>8</sup>

Another factor why amateurism prevailed is the undeveloped state of different branches of science. This is true in spite of the establishment of some special societies such as the Linnean, the Zoological, the Geological, the Astronomical and the Royal Institution. These societies were established because of Joseph Bank's tyrannical administration of the Royal Society, which at this time was no more than a gentlemen's club in which social fellows outnumbered the scientific ones. What England lacked in the eighteenth century was not great scientists, but professional scientists. With the great scientists such as Herschel, Joseph Black, Davy, Faraday, Dalton, Playfair, Priestley, Cavendish, and Brewster, England had gotten more than her share of the first-rate scientists (amateurs).

In the nineteenth century British educational system was in bad shape. Although Germany had a great number of professional scientists due to her excellent educational system, England was not able to have professional scientists. Organization of science in England became strong towards the middle decades of the century, and scientists did not receive state aid and a due attention from the public. Lastly, Germany excelled Britain in the dyestuff industry due to her having professional scientists.

Between 1800-1890 in British universities the Tripos (mathematics and theoretical physics) was a highly specialized examination. But there was nothing professional about the Tripos, which at least at the beginning could not create professionals because of its more limited applicability than chemistry and experimental physics. Students taking the Tripos were not necessarily most talented and

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<sup>7</sup> Mendelsohn, p. 6, and Robert E. Schofield, "The Industrial Orientation of Science in the Lunar Society of Birmingham," *Isis*, Vol. 48 (1957), pp. 409-11. Schofield in his book, *The Lunar Society of Birmingham*, gives a detailed account of the Lunar Society.

<sup>8</sup> Cardwell, p. 20.



furthermore were attracted to the other tempting professions such as law. In addition to this, primary and secondary school in England did not offer any teaching post to the graduates of the universities. The Tripos was accepted as complementary to liberal education, and professional studies had no place in the university. Law was studied at the Inns of Court, medicine at the London hospitals, and for the clergy no special education was required. Engineers were trained in the old craft apprenticeship. The universities were only concerned with the liberal education of the men of the upper classes who would live leisurely or choose a proper profession in church, medicine and law. The Tripos was a test taken for proving the talents of the students. In conclusion, the university was not a place with a center of research with the purpose of advancing knowledge, and science was still being conducted by amateurs<sup>9</sup>.

To apply science to technological problems and to educate the children of working class a new school, the mechanics' institute was instituted. This institution would meet four purposes: (1) it would inject science into the workshops to obtain science-based inventions, (2) diffuse science widely to obstruct ignorance and superstition, (3) hasten the progress of industry increasing the number of people pursuing it, and lastly, (4) by means of this institute, science and education would lessen the bad effects of labor division. The leaders of this movement saw that science could be effective on technology. For this reason the main purpose of these schools was to teach the sciences underlying technology: and pure sciences such as mathematics, chemistry, physics, astronomy, botany, meteorology, the theory of steam engines, etc. were taught in these schools. But unfortunately such a positive step did not last too long and eventually died out, because mechanics institutes mostly relied upon part time or voluntary lecturers, and standards were low.<sup>10</sup> Due to bad primary education, students even were not able to read and write, thus, lecturers had to begin first teaching reading and writing to the students. With the failure of this institution the children of working class lost the only chance to be trained in sciences, and let us point out that university education became available only to the children of the upper classes. Since higher education was not free and talented children from lower classes could not afford going to the university colleges. The scholarships were very inadequate. So odds were against poor classes and the great bulk of the society could not profit from higher education. This situation was fortunately corrected with a reform made later in the century; thus, potentially talented students from lower classes could attend universities.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-9.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-44. 0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



Educational system in England was retrograde, and young chemists began to go to the German Universities well before 1850. Students going to Germany saw that scientists there were professionals. For instance Liebig received a good salary, a free house, very adequate running expenses, a salaried assistant and a salaried laboratory steward. When Liebig went to England, the professed that England was not a land of science, since there only utility or practical results were admired. Liebig's diagnosis was somewhat true, but not wholly, since matters were much more complicated than Liebig thought. For instance, when Dalton, a pure British scientist, died, an extraordinary funeral was arranged and last respect to the famous scientist was paid in due way.

In England the utility of science was overemphasized, since universities did not play their role properly. Science was a must, since it lay behind industry. If universities did not do their duty in teaching science, how would public appreciate its significance? Though science paved way for industries, scientists also recognized that the need for independence in training and research is essential.

The universities for English gentlemen were closed to research and the advancement of learning. As seen before, the emphasis was upon the examinations. And science was conducted by amateurs. Moreover, the secondary schools were not in need of science master-ships under the influence of the educational system of universities.

From the sixties to the nineties England was not capable of producing even sixty professional scientists to serve as part-time inspectors of her technical schools.<sup>11</sup> If we return our attention to Germany, we will see that German success came from the research laboratory of Liebig in Giessen and especially rested upon the excellent educational policy laid down by Von Humboldt in the first decade of the nineteenth century.

German educational system offered teaching posts at all levels including the primary schools, the State secondary schools; the Gymnasias, the Progymnasias and the Realgymnasias, the trade schools and the polytechnics and the universities. According to Friedrich Paulsen's view, the philosophy faculty in the eighteenth century provided the training of other faculties (divinity, law and medicine) and the function of providing teacher training. In Germany, first, educational machinery was set up and in the 1850's the number of professional scientists in German schools and universities must have exceeded those in the industries. Definitely, German educational revolution preceded the applied science revolution by quite a few years and there was no connection with applied science.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 263. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



As for organizations of science, in 1831 we witness that the British Association was formed against the Royal Society which was a target of critics as being composed of men ignorant of science, and with the inspiration of Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher and Arzte to improve the interests of British science. This society was a result of a common feeling that the British Science was in decline.

The Royal Society failed to encourage science. By the year 1830 non-scientific fellows outnumbered scientists. 30 percent of the members could be counted as contributors to science. Many members never submitted a paper for publication. Among the ten bishops only one was contributor, and among 63 noblemen no one wrote a paper. The naval and army officers were somewhat better off. One or two among them were prolific. As for clergymen, only 8 out of 74 contributed scientific papers. The number of contributions of 63 men of law were 28, and 16 of these papers were written by only one person, namely David Brewster. It was not until 1860 that scientific fellowmen outnumbered the fellowmen in the Royal Society. After this reform in the society, the scientific contribution normally increased.<sup>12</sup>

The British Association for the Advancement of Science was established to promote the interests of scientists in 1831 and did not repeat the mistakes of the Royal Society. First of all, it was not a place for aristocrats who were seeking notoriety. All members of philosophical societies throughout England were accepted as members, provided they paid a low subscription fee. Like its German counterpart, the British Association gathered at different places each year to lessen the burden to travel to the same place all the time. The members stressed that the executive power of the society would be in the hands of working scientists. Appointments to the administrative posts of the society were changed annually.

More importantly, this society was looking for second or third rank scientists. Geniuses already did not require a society to gain renown. Thus, the British Association nationally tried to encourage the real cultivators of science, and sought support for science from the government. For this it stressed on the utility of science. Scientists and their well being was the direct concern of the society which tried to find a place for scientists in the society and to get respect and due attention from public. Although England did not lack great men of science, her science did not have organizational support, did have few posts for scientists, and did lack an educational system to train professional scientists. Prizes, like government medals, or pensions were also few.<sup>13</sup>

12 Mendelsohn, pp. 24-8.

13 *Ibid*, pp. 28-33.



In France, for instance, the government distinctly recognized the existence of science. Patronage to science was substantial. More than one million and a half of francs were spent annually for science in France, although in England, George IV awarded only ten small pensions which had already stopped. Encouragement of science was not a British phenomenon, but the British Association eagerly tried to change this situation.<sup>14</sup>

The laboratory training in chemistry had been greatly expanded in the 1890s by the establishment of the Royal College of Chemistry, the Putney Engineering College and the Pharmaceutical Society. One decade later in the examination syllabuses the progressive sciences were added and state aid began through the agency of the new Science and Art Department. The examination system still continued even being associated with professionalism.

Meanwhile, Cambridge Analytical Society came into existence to reform English mathematics, and the society dispersed itself as soon as it realized its aim. Another establishment, the "X" Club, took the claims of science and scientific education before the government. Science did not touch primary and secondary schools in England, and there were no posts in these schools for the candidates to look for teaching posts after graduation from the university. Another move in the educational stage was to reduce the number of subjects that were included in the exams in order to eliminate cramming.<sup>15</sup>

Finally let us deal with the excellence of Germany over England. The beginning of applied science started with the German dyeing industry between 1858 and 1862. England was capable of being independent of foreign dyestuffs as she was the leader of the world in textile industry. Raw materials concerning dyestuff were abundant and cheap. Capital was also available. The reason why England gave the leadership to Germany in the dyestuffs is her lacking the highly trained and professional chemists, in other words, not geniuses but second and third rate scientists.

Aniline dye industry sprang up from a scientific discovery in organic chemistry. Animal and vegetable dyes were replaced by scientifically compounded substances. Furthermore, further research would produce better dyestuffs from coal-tar. Germany surpassed England in this application of science to dyestuffs. She imported coal tar from England and processed it with her highly skillful and professional chemists. Subsequently Germany also surpassed England in electrical engineering industries. Since not transportation or raw materials but skill was dominant.<sup>16</sup>

14 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

15 Cardwell, p. 106.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 237-9.



National scientists naturally require state aid on a large scale and in England, state did not help science, especially in the crucial period from 1850 to 1880, and England lagged behind Germany.<sup>17</sup> Probably another reason, the conservatism of British manufacturer was also important. Manufacturer might have given importance to application only. But the substantial reason was no doubt educational. Written exams were always being criticized in being arbiters of science education. Research must have been given more importance than exams in the training of research scientists.

Nevertheless the utility argument used in seeking support for science was good for both government and industry, moreover it originally was an English argument stemming from Bacon.

For the first time in England, the great exhibition of 1851 ostensibly signaled to the government and to the industries what science could do especially in steam engine design. The surplus funds of the exhibition were spent to promote science. A land was bought and some scholarships were established. With the exhibition of 1862 in Paris, British scientists acknowledged that indeed England had achieved little after the first exhibition held in 1851 and thus a self consciousness of a decline in British science began.

Chemical industries were also quite distinct in the exhibition and they were science based industries. Whewell and especially Playfair tried to show to the manufacturers that all industrial processes are science-based. Playfair eagerly defended that pure scientific research, although not given immediate profits, was a guarantee in insuring that profits or utility would flow from the scientific research in the future. Even the theoretical science one day would result in some application. Thus in England, too, science did not become the handmaid of technology.<sup>18</sup>

#### IV

In the U. S. at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was almost impossible to arouse public or private support for science, but this picture began to change in 1815. American scientists were working in the universities in the nineteenth century. But in the eighteenth century their home was private laboratory, and scientific instruction was conducted by men called natural philosophers who had broad interests and taught all the topics.

In the nineteenth century laymen simply could not comprehend the esoteric language of science. For instance, laymen could understand chemistry with Lavoisier. But after Lavoisier, non-professionals angrily reacted to the changes that took place in chemistry.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-1.



Benjamin Silliman established *American Journal of Science and Arts* which became the main vehicle for science to become esoteric. Silliman was an editor protecting the honor of science.

Scientists also propounded some norms of profession, and they were careful not to conflict with clergy. They said that science was searching for natural laws of the universe that God created. But theologians also were dealing with natural laws. The strategy of the scientists was not to conflict with theology but to stress on the normal value of science and to show that science was complimentary to theology. Theologians would have to give up deriving natural laws from Bible, since Bible's purpose was salvation and God's overall plan for universe, and scientists had to investigate natural laws freely to discover only how God did things.

On this issue of religion, when it was necessary, the profession of science usurped one of its members and denied him access to journals as in the case of Robert Chambers. The whole profession in the person of Asa Gray denied him. This was done to protect the profession of science.

In 1890 the first professional society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science was established and a standing committee directed the affairs of the society. The society behaved as an arbiter in the matters of assigning research projects to members, appointing investigating committees, reporting on controversial papers, and ruling on priority among members. Scientists as professionals, tried to obstruct any direct appealing to people on a matter of science. First, members were accepted to this society indiscriminately, later some restricted rules were instituted to allow only the contributors of science to hold an office and vote. Later all the members of the society elected new members by ballot.

For support to appeal to the practicality of science was a necessity. Even scientists whose interests were not immediately connected to utility were also anxious to appeal to the utility of science. Joseph Henry, for instance, was in this category. Especially government was criticized for its niggardliness towards science and a comparison was made with England whose government was helping scientists. People were somewhat suspicious of the value of scientists, but pressing on the utility of science, scientists counteracted to this. People, of course, could not understand anything in science, except its utility. As Daniels defends, although American scientists appealed to public for support on the basis of utility, they pursued science in a pure form, i.e. science did not become a handmaid to practicality.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> George H. Daniels, "The Process of Professionalization in American Science: The Emergent Period, 1820-60," *Isis* LVIII (1967), pp. 151-66.



## V

Lastly let us shortly review today's relationship between government and science.

In the nineteenth century France and Germany was accepting grants from government and in British and American scientists a suspicion appeared concerning the freedom of science in France and Germany. If political situation affects science, then can science be free? In case of America after World War II, American scientists clearly saw that science is not independent of political life, and the interrelationship with government will not necessarily make science slave to practicality.

In military application of science in the twentieth century America, science worked completely free from any outside pressure. Science itself invented some sophisticated nuclear weapons and military planners tried to adopt themselves to these new scientific discoveries.

Scientists are no longer outside of the government and industries. They greatly influence both government and industries and consciously understand their responsibility in the American Society and shape government policies by advising the President of the U. S. and the Congress by means of committees, and they get high posts in almost every branch of the government. This direct relation between government and scientist is one of the most important reasons in explaining the dynamism of American Society.

In the Soviet Union a political revolution was made and all ties were broken with the traditional systems of education and a great emphasis was put on scientific and technological training. Thus scientists today can rise to positions in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy.

In European countries generally the relation between government and science is not direct. Scientists do not directly participate in government policy, but they are connected to government through high civilian administrators.

Today a substantial portion of the budgets of major countries are appropriated for military research and development programs, and mostly scientists have a large share from these appropriations. American government makes contracts with universities and private corporations, and scientists in these institutions make the necessary research in inventing new weapons. Of course, scientists' creativity is not limited only to weapons or military.<sup>20</sup>

20 Don K. Price, "Science-Government Relations," in *The International Social Encyclopedia*, pp. 100-105.



## CONCLUSION

Professionalization was a result of some internal and external factors. Specialization and the establishment of some special societies concern only internal development of science. The new professional scientist wanted to discuss his research among his peers dealing with the same field and also specialized scientists published special journals covering only their esoteric fields.

And, mostly depending on the Industrial Revolution, an external factor, the social origins of scientists shifted from aristocracy to middle and lower classes. Science, as we have seen, moved from capitals to the provincial areas where industries flourished. For instance, in England, London was the center of scientific activity until the Industrial Revolution broke out.

When science was applied to industries, scientists sought support from public by stressing on the utility of science. Since science had reached such a level that no longer amateurs or individual scientists could cope with the emerging problems of research which required great sums of money, Although science sought financial support, it has never become the handmaid of industry. Scientists claimed that if science was supported, then the nation would be strong and the industries would improve quickly.

Also in the educational field the applied science was emphasized, and some technical schools such as *Ecole Polytechnique* in France, the *Technisches Hochschulen* in Germany were established and supported by the governments of different countries.

In spite of the conflict with old traditional universities, scientists finally achieved to provide a proper education to train scientists. Due to her failure, England lagged behind Germany in providing a proper education in training of scientists. As we have seen, Germany had succeeded in reforming her educational system well before the Industrial Revolution. Finally, science settled in universities comfortably at the same time enjoying support from government.

Today, scientists are in full command of their profession, and being politically-oriented give shape to government policies; find new sophisticated weapons; and guide the improvement of industries.

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## IX

## Ayer on Empirical Propositions

J. N. Misra

Ayer's views regarding empirical propositions have not been constant throughout. They have been varying from time to time. In this paper I will explain them in chronological order and then will also try to point out certain inconsistencies occurring in them.

(A) His views according to *Language, Truth and Logic* (First Edition, 1936).

According to this view, all empirical propositions are validated in the same way, i.e., empirical propositions do not differ in their methods of validation among themselves.

So, here, he rejects the view of certain other philosophers as Schlick etc. (which is the view that he himself admits at a later stage) that, among empirical propositions, there is a special class of propositions (ostensive or basic propositions) the validity of which consists in the fact that they directly record an immediate experience, and so they are the only empirical propositions which are certain. The other empirical propositions (non-basic or non-ostensive propositions) are simply hypotheses which derive their validity from their relationship to these ostensive propositions.

Rejecting this above view he says that no empirical proposition can be purely ostensive for the notion of an ostensive proposition appears to involve a contradiction in terms. It implies that there could be a sentence which consisted of purely demonstrative symbols and was at the same time intelligible. But this is not even logically possible. A sentence which consists of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterising that to which it was supposed to refer. That is to say, one cannot in language point to an object without describing it. If a sentence is to express a proposition, it cannot



merely name a situation but it must say something about it. And in describing a situation one is not merely registering a sense-content but is also classifying it in some way or the other, which means going beyond what is immediately given. But a proposition would be ostensive only if it recorded what was immediately experienced without referring in any way beyond. Since it is not possible, it follows that no empirical proposition can be ostensive. Consequently it also follows that no empirical proposition can be absolutely certain.

Accordingly he holds not merely that no ostensive propositions ever are expressed, but that it is inconceivable that any ostensive proposition should ever be expressed.

Ayer's this criticism against basic propositions can be compared with that of Jayanta Bhatta when he in his *Nyāya Manjari*, criticizing indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa*), says that we cannot perceive mere being apart from its qualities which is just to say that we cannot point to an object without describing it.) (*nāhi bhedaṁ binā sattā grahitum api śhakyate*).

Thus there are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. Empirical propositions are one and all hypotheses which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense-experience. The propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense-experience. Since all empirical propositions are, thus, hypotheses which are continually subject to be verified in further experience, it follows not merely that the truth of any empirical proposition is never conclusively established (i.e. it is rendered only probable) but that it can never be conclusively established; for however strong the evidence in its favour, there can never be a point at which it may be impossible for a further experience to go against it. Logically there is no reason why this verification procedure should not continue indefinitely. Thus it is never just a single hypothesis which an observation confirms or discredits, but always a system of hypotheses.

But in practice, from a purely pragmatic motive, we assume certain types of observations as trustworthy and do not go on a further series of verification. Since the hypotheses are designed to enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations, the function of a system of hypotheses is to warn us before hand what will be our experience in a certain field, i.e., to enable us to make accurate predictions. The hypotheses may therefore be described as rules which govern our expectation of future experience.

Ultimately it can be concluded that the validity of an empirical proposition (hypothesis) is tested by seeing whether it actually fulfills



its function (to enable us to anticipate experience) Accordingly, if an observation to which a given proposition is relevant confirms to our expectations, the truth of that proposition is confirmed. But it cannot be said that the proposition has been proved absolutely valid, because it is still possible that a future observation will discredit it. One can only say that its probability has been increased. On the other hand if the observation is contrary to our expectations, the proposition may be considered to have been confuted (if we are not interested to preserve it by adopting or abandoning other hypotheses). But it cannot be said that the proposition has been invalidated absolutely, for it is still possible that future observations may lead us to re-establish it. One can only say that its probability has been diminished.

(B) His views according to *'The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge'* (1940) and *Language, Truth and Logic* (Second Edition : Explanatory Introduction, 1946).

Here he says that there are basic or ostensive propositions which record immediate experience, and so are conclusively verified by the very occurrence of the experience to which they uniquely refer. Therefore they are certain or incorrigible (i.e. it is impossible to be mistaken about them except in verbal sense). Thus here he admits the view of Schlic etc. which he himself criticized in the first edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*.

Indeed, in a verbal sense, it is always possible to misdescribe one's experience, but if one intends to do no more than record what is experienced without relating it to anything else, it is not possible to do factually mistaken. The possibility of basic or ostensive propositions (the mere recording of one's present experience) does not serve to convey any information either to any other person or to one-self; for in knowing a basic proposition to be true one obtains no further knowledge than what is already afforded by the occurrence of the relevant experience. Of course, the form of words that is used to express a basic proposition may be understood to express something that is informative both to another person and to oneself, but when it is so understood it no longer expresses a basic proposition. It was simply for this reason that he rejected the possibility of basic or ostensive proposition in the first edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*. But this is a verbal or terminological point which is not of any great importance. By another argument also he strengthens the possibility and incorrigibility of basic proposition, when he says, "The series of verification (as emphasised in first edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*) cannot be prolonged indefinitely. In the end it must include at least one proposition that is believed, not merely on the ground that it is supposed by other propositions but in virtue of



what is actually observed (i.e. it must include at least one proposition that is directly verified)<sup>1</sup>

Thus he revives the view that there are ostensive propositions and that they are certain. Now coming to the non basic propositions he says that they are verified by deducing some observation-statement (statement which records an actual or possible observation) from them in conjunction with certain other premises, without the observation-statement being deducible from those other premises alone.

(C) His views according to *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956).

Here too he admits the possibility of basic or ostensive propositions. But they may not be incorrigible or certain because the assessment of their truth may also be revised. Since however strong evidence may be in their favour, there can never be a point at which it may be impossible for further experience to go against it. So here Ayer concedes that basic propositions may be mistaken factually also. Consequently basic propositions (which record immediate experience) are also probable. Thus Ayer says, "There is no class of empirical statements which are incorrigible. However strong the experiential basis on which an empirical statement is put forward, the possibility of its falsehood is not excluded"<sup>2</sup>.

Now coming to the validation he says that basic propositions derive their validity (probability) from immediate experience which they uniquely refer. But now as basic propositions are corrigible, there is an indirect method of validation for them also because other basic propositions can confirm or falsify them or the future experiences which they do not directly record may render them probable. This is a departure from the all earlier views of the logical positivists because no body had maintained that there are basic propositions but still corrigible. Non basic propositions derive their validity (probability) from their relationships to these basic propositions which are more probable than them because of having reference to immediate experience.

Now, for the sake of precision, let us, place the exposition of empirical propositions in a tabular form.

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- 1 *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 109, N. Y. St. Martin's Press, 1940.
  - 2 *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 71, N. Y. St. Martin's Press, 1956.
  - 3 *Language, Truth and Logic* (1st and 2nd editions).
  - 4 Are There Synthetic A Priori Truths ?  
— C. D. Broad, *Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XV.



## Exposition of Empirical Propositions

Kind of Propositions	Validity	Criterion of Validity	Method
Empirical According to L.T.L. (1st Ed. 1936)	Probability	Observation	Material (Weak verification)
Empirical according to F.E.K. (1940) and L.T.L. (2nd Ed. 1946)			
1. Basic Proposition	Certainty	Direct Observation	Material (Strong verification)
2. Non-basic Proposition	Probability	Indirect Observation	Material (Weak verification)
Empirical According to P.K. (1956)			
1. Basic proposition	Probability (Higher Degree)	Direct and Indirect Observation	Material (Weak verification)
2. Non-basic Proposition	Probability (Lower Degree)	Indirect observation	Material (Weak verification)

Notations : L.T.L. stands for *Language, Truth and Logic*  
 F.E.K. stands for *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*  
 P.K. stands for *The Problem of Knowledge*

So far, we have been giving the exposition of Ayer's views on empirical propositions, let us, now, come to the inconsistencies occurring in these views.

(A) His views according to *Language, Truth and Logic* (first ed.) 1936).

Here he says that there are no basic or ostensive propositions along with the acceptance of phenomenalism or reductionism. But this is inconsistent because if there are no basic or ostensive propositions, then what that is to which other propositions (non-basic) are to be reduced. If there is no class of neatly definable basic propositions, then phenomenalism in the classical sense is discarded. Later on Wittgenstein himself rejected classical phenomenalism because he thought that there is no set of propositions that is ultimately basic and into which all other propositions are to be analysed.

Reductionism cannot be maintained without accepting ostensive concepts or propositions. This is so, in other words, to the concept of analysis also. Being an analyst Ayer will have to accept the possibility of basic or ostensive propositions. As a matter of fact this paradox of analysis is to be accepted that while being an analyst



the possibility of basic or ostensive propositions is to be taken for granted. Without accepting basic propositions the analysis will lead itself to an unfathomable abyss which is further a more disastrous situation. So instead of accepting the position of denying the basic propositions together with affirming analysis it would have been much better on the part of Ayer to accept basic propositions along with adopting the method of analysis.

(B) His view according to *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940) and *Language, Truth and Logic* (2nd Ed. 1946).

Here he maintains that basic propositions are certain because they record immediate sense content, and so no further experience can confute them.

He proves that no further or later experience (sense datum) of mine can confute my previous or earlier sense content (sense-datum) because my earlier and later sense data, at least, are numerically different. Similarly he says that no other person also can confute my sense-content because his sense datum also will be at least numerically different from my sense datum. So far, he is of course correct. But from this he jumps to the conclusion that no subsequent experience can confute my previous basic proposition. Thus he identifies the basic proposition with the relevant sense-content itself, which is a gross logical blunder.

(C) His view according to *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956).

Here Ayer says that basic propositions are probable like all other empirical propositions. So all empirical propositions are verified weakly. Thus his strong sense of verification has no possible application. This is not only just a matter of fact that we fail to verify any empirical proposition strongly or conclusively, but it is theoretically impossible and unthinkable to verify a proposition strongly or conclusively. From this it follows that the phrase 'strong verification' not only does not have an application to anything but its application to anything is unthinkable. Thus this phrase (i.e. strong verification) becomes meaningless. Thus weak verification also becomes meaningless because it may have meaning only in relevance to the concept of strong verification.

In addition to the above objection, against this view of Ayer his own earlier objection seems to me to be valid. Without refuting his earlier objection denying the possibility of basic proposition, he has adopted this view. In his *The Problem of Knowledge* he has not replied that objection that a set of demonstration symbols do not form a proposition. A sentence must contain descriptive words also and hence basic propositions are not propositions at all.



## Book Reviews :

**G. C. Nayak :** *Philosophical Reflections*, pp. 160, published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Distributors : Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, Bangalore and Madras, Price Rs. 65/— (1987).

Dr. G. C. Nayak, the author of these philosophical Reflections is professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar. The present volume is collection of 18 scholarly articles on various topics of philosophy written by Dr. G. C. Nayak at different times. They are : 1. Illumination through Analysis: A Study in Vedantic conception vis-a-vis the Madhyamika, 2. The Philosophy of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, 3. Satori in Zen Buddhism, 4. The Noble Truths, 5. Maya: The Advaitin's Gordian Knot, 6. Significance of Knowledge in Sankara and Yajñavalkya, 7. Tolerance in Advaita, 8. Transcendental Secularism, 9. Freedom in Indian Thought: Some Highlights, 10. Rationalism of the Gita, 11. The Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyabhushana, 12. The Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, 13. Analytical Philosophy: Its Multiple Facets, 14. The problem of Universals, 15. What is Living and What is Dead in Religion? 16. A plea for Communism, 17. Values: Dharma and Moksha, and 18. Can there be a Synthesis of Eastern and Western Thought.

All the eighteen essays included in this book are reflections of Dr. G. C. Nayaka, a teacher philosopher at different times on various philosophical themes—Advaita Vedanta, Buddhism, Rationalism in Indian Thought, Sri Aurobindo, Bhagavadgita, Values and Religion, and Analytical philosophy. He has touched many aspects of philosophical thinking particularly in Indian background. The essays are very well written in clear and understandable language depicting author's viewpoint. The style and presentation are nice and brings forth many aspects of philosophical thinking in India. The author claims that in these reflections are analytical and critical and so he has justified the inclusion of a chapter on Analytical philosophy: Its Multiple Facets. Dr. Nayak claims to be independent and free in discussing the philosophical themes.

The essays are very well written and cover many fields of philosophy, Religion and Indian Culture. These essays give a thorough and critical understanding of several philosophies, such as Sri Aurobindo, Shankar and Buddhism, and their philosophies. We are sure the book will attract students of philosophy as well others who are interested in deepening the philosophical understanding.



The book has been dedicated to two great Indian National philosophers of eminence: Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Chairman Indian Council of Philosophical Research, and Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty, Vice Chairman University Grants Commission, New Delhi. The author as well as the Indian Council of Philosophical Research deserve congratulations for bringing out the collection of Dr. G. C. Nayak's Philosophical Reflections in print. This is really a good collection of Philosophical essays contributed by eminent teacher of Philosophy of the Utkal University. The book will attract many readers and will help them in developing interest in philosophical thinking. The book is very well documented and several quotations from original Sankrit texts have added to the glamour of the book. In the end quite an exhaustive index has been provided to make it a good reference book also.

**Bandishte, *The Ethics of Bertrand Russell*, A Lipika Prakashan, 6-A Sneh Nagar, Navalakha, Indore, 1984, pp. 216, Price Rs. 50/—**

The book under review is an appreciable attempt to critically present as a body Russell's ethical ideas scattered in his various scholarly Works. The contemporary world needs an ethics more than anything else to guide it in the face of various man-made dangers which persistently threaten to disturb human society. The present book claims to suggest that Russell's ethics, if practised widely and sincerely, can show a path to ward off such dangers and contribute significantly to human happiness and general peace.

The book contains six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to Russell's Philosophy in general and his ethics in particular. It also gives a plan of the general discussion in the subsequent chapters. The second chapter deals with theory in ethics and the author, very consistently, explains what Russell, means by such terms as religion, philosophy, science, ethics, right, good, reason, wisdom and feeling. Russell, a la Hume, follows empiricist's method consistently in all the disciplines, be they ontology, logic, epistemology, religion or ethics. 'Ethics is an attempt to bring about harmony and order in the field of human desires. Russell abhors abstruse transcendentalism and develops an ethics that is centered around man and his society. The fourth chapter of the present book evaluates Russell's criticism of various traditional beliefs such as those in the existence of God, immortality of soul, and freedom of Will etc. and asserts that in Russell's ethics it is the individual that is the centre and source of values. The individual is an end in himself, and hence ethics must concentrate upon basic human needs, namely, good health, sufficient income, successful job, and happy interpersonal relations. Like the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, the author says, Russell's vision of a happy human society is based on four



fundamental facts that (i) there is at present general dissatisfaction in society, (ii) this dissatisfaction has human cases, (iii) dissatisfaction can be mitigated and (iv) there are methods to do so.

In the fourth chapter the author discusses the eightfold path suggested by Russell for the establishment of an ideal society. The path consists of right attitude, right knowledge, right individual, right sex, right society, right education, right economics and right politics. The eightfold path may lead to a frictionless society. In the fifth chapter the author very appropriately compares Russell's ethics with those of Moore, Dewey and Sartre and suggests that the ethics of Russell is superior to others' on the ground that 'We get concrete guidance from Russell about the ordering of our daily lives, while other philosophers are mostly theoretical'. (p. 138).

In the final chapter the author makes 'a sort of recapitulation and an overall evaluation' of what is established earlier. Discussing the role of linguistic analysis, the author rightly says that it is only a tool and not an end in itself. Ethics must not be lost in the guagmire of linguistic jugglery but 'must pay due attention to the burning issues in the world, in fact, to the burning world itself'. (p. 141). He claims that Russell's ethics satisfies not only this test but also other tests of a good ethics, namely, the tests of originality, comprehensiveness, consistency and usefulness as laid down by Blanchard. The author considers various criticisms against Russell's ethics and dismisses them as unsound. Russell, according to our author, combines in himself Marx as well as Buddha (p. 151) and his 'ethics is not a mere theory, it is an urgent mission of life' (p. 152).

The presentation of Russell's ethics and its concepts is consistent and highly commendable. However, a number of printing mistakes have been left uncorrected. Mistakes like Awathee, spread (preface), skeoth, adolercence, jointed, Whitebed, allround (p 6), these (7), allright (28), remeber (78), acive (92), controversial (93), considered (94), earlier (97) and many others could have been corrected by adding a page of errata which, like bibliography is missing.

Despite these printing mistakes, the book is written in a scholarly style, with a clarity of concept and a flawless language. One may not agree with Russell's ethics which may in fact be interpreted to subscribe to individualism, and that is the final fate of all empiricistic ethics, in spite of his claims to the contrary, but none can disagree with his ideal of a happy human life. The present book may not be justified in claiming that Russell's ethics is flawless much less of the fact that it is the only consistent one, but there is no gainsaying that it is one of the significant ethical systems. It may not show the way to solve the personal ethical problems, but it definitely



provokes further thinking in the same direction. The book is worth reading by any scholar interested in ethics in general and Russell's ethics in particular.

Dr. G. N. Mishra

Swami Shyam : *Bhagavad Gita*, pp. 224, I. M. I. Valley of Gods, Himalayas, Kullu, H. P. India.

The Bhagavad Gita by Swami Shyam is the most Precise and Comprehensive rendering. This book is entirely different from the existing renderings available. The whole Gita is divided into : Introduction, Why the Gita should be read, The importance of the Gita and the Story of the Gita. The eighteen chapters of the Bhagavad Gita have been depicted according to the nature and spirit of the chapters as follows : I The Questioning State of Mind : *Arjun Vishad Yog*; II. Teaching based on Deep Knowledge : *Saankhya Yog*; III. Teachings on the Nature of Action : *Karma Yog*, IV. Teachings on Gyaan, Gyaan Karm Sannyasa Yog Karma, and Sannyas Yog, V. Teachings based on the Source of Action : *Karm Sannyas Yog*; VI. Yoga Through Meditation : *Dhyaan Yog*; VII. Teachings based on the True Nature of Form and Formlessness : *Gyaan Vigyaan Yog*; VIII Information about the Indestructible Brahman : *Akshar Brahma Yog*; IX. The Yog of the Supreme Secret of Life : *Raaj Vidyas Raaj Guhya Yog*; X. The Yog of Divine Manifestations : *Vibhooti Yog*; XI. Teachings through the Cosmic Vision : *Vishwaroop Darshan Yog*; XII. Teachings on one pointedness through Devotion : *Bhakti Yog*; XIII. Teachings about the field and the knower of the field : *Chhayatray Chhayatragya Vibhaag Yog*; XIV. Teachings based on the three Gunas : *Gunatraya Vibhaag Yog*; XV. Teachings about the Supreme Person : *Purushottam Yog*; XVI. Teachings on Godly and Ungodly Natures : *Daivaasur Sampad Vibhaag Yog*; XVII. Teachings based on the Division of Faith : *Shraddha Tray Vibhaag Yog*; XVIII. Teachings on Liberation Through Knowledge and Surrender : *Moksha Sannyas Yog*.

Going through the contents of the book a reader can very well understand and imagine the subject matter of the Bhagavad Gita. Swami Shyam's book has given a unique interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita which is based upon a symbolic analysis of its personages, stories and concepts. In his very lucid introduction Swami Shyam explains Gita means: "that knowledge spoken by him who knows all about the Truth as the Whole". The sage Vyaas, the author of the Gita, was completely competent in this respect: he understood the phenomenon of ignorance—that it is ignorance which causes trouble, pain and suffering to humanity. The Gita is the expression of Vyaas's capability and knowledge. It is meant to be read, heard, and grasped by those who are blind to the reality of how this universe



manifested and how man came into existence. The Gita begins with a discussion of the names, forms, and things which an ignorant man clearly perceives upon enquiry. The knowledge contained in the Gita is the eternal light. The sage Vyaas described the Truth of the universe, and to do so he adopted war as his metaphor because every human being can identify with war. From moment to moment there is constant struggle on war going on in man's mind. The message of the Gita is, in reality, not the description of the war, the story of a battle between two kings; it is the eternal message concerning how the unfit, confused, ignorant human mind can be transformed into a being enlightened with awareness that is able to deal with every situation confronting humanity. The Gita is a universal formula. Properly applied, it will always produce perfect health, happiness and the knowledge which never divides the Truth of Oneness into parts or varieties.

Swami Ji has very clearly and precisely given the Introduction, Why the Gita should be read, the importance of the Gita and the Story of the Gita which helps the reader to understand the background of the Gita which is very important indeed. One unique thing which is noticed in this book is that generally the words such as Yoga, Krishna ending in 'a' but Swami Ji has emphasised that those who do not know original Sanskrit will be put to wrong pronunciation. The book is meant for westerners so he has deleted the vowel 'a' in the end of Yoga, Krishna and Arjuna so that the foreigners or those who have no knowledge of Sanskrit may not pronounce words wrongly. Through his remarkable revelation Swami Shyam has unlocked the mysterious depth of the Gita's teachings.

Swami Shyam has explained the various terms used in the Bhagvad Gita in very simple, effective way. He has very lucidly explained the ideas and technical terms used in Gita in his own way but with simple illustrations. Many terms have been interpreted in Swami Ji's unique style making the meaning clear.

It is a very well written commentary of the Bhagvadgita. This will attract readers both from India and foreign countries. Swami Ji deserves our immense appreciation for the wonderful commentary on the Bhagwadgita.

**Dr. Kamal Kishore :** *Shrimadbhagwad Gita — Gītā Pratipaditīka* pp. 206, Publisher Dr. Kamal Kishore, Laxmiganj, Lashkar, Gwalior 1, Price Rs. 30/- (1987).

Dr. Kamal Kishore, who has brought out this unique commentary on the Bhagwadgita is professionally a medical graduate. He has beautifully done an anatomical dissection of the great book 'Shrimad Bhagwadgita' wherein he has not only given word to word translation of all the sholkas as such, left to someone to understand



and interpret in real sense the object of Gita — a book of universal truth and religion, but has also stressed the importance of few important words like: *Ishwar*-as adiyagya; *Brahma*- as Para Prakriti or Prana itself; *Ātmā* — as Adhyatma Dharna; *Māyā* — as astitva Rashmi Shakti; *Bhakti* — as Samaj Ka Adhar; *Adhideva* — as Purusha; Karma — as *Preranādāyak Tyāg*; and *Janam Maran* — *Moksha*, *Antkā*, *Janma* and *Punarjanma*.

He has laid emphasis on these eight words, which according to him are the real significant elements of Gita and bear the greatest foundation of the valuable book which has been misinterpreted, misrepresented by many great scholars according to him. Views may differ. Gold remains in whatever form it is presented and perhaps the basic idea behind this book remains to put forward gold as gold. He has tried to explain these significant words in his own unorthodox way.

*Adhiyagya* — called the great *Yagya*, main *Yagya* according to Gita means *Ishwar* (God) i.e. main *Yogya* which is present in body and self. Krishna says 'Dedicate with devotion and you will find me (God) in your body'; *Brahma*, according to him does not indicate the literal meaning as *Ishwar*. According to Lord Krishna *Brahma* is *Prakriti* or *Prāna* itself. Both these *Apara* and *Para Prakriti* constitute life of every individual. Thus *Brahma* is nothing but an admixture of *Para* and *Apara Prakriti*; *Atma* is nucleus of life and brings one nearer to *Adhiyagya* (God) and Self; *Maya*; *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* all these *gunas*, which are born with in the body find into its own clutches. One who has dedication in me, can remove these clutches and is fit for salvation; *Bhakti*: According to Kamal Kishore the *Bhakti* is basic need of society; *Adhideva*, i.e. *Purush*- every born individual is Gita's *adhideva*; *Karma*: Work with dedication is Karma; *Janma Marana* — The great Pandits those who know the real truth care only for value of life and not for living or dead.

Dr. Kamal Kishore's attempt of retranslating the Gita in its literal sense is an eye opener to all the readers to read it again and again and unfold the real treasure lying in the depth of this wonderful religious and philosophical work. A new interpretation of the traditional words has been provided by Dr. Kamal Kishore which is itself revealing and meaningful. We congratulate Dr. Kamal Kishore on this publication which is different from the existing translations and commentary.

Dr. M. C. Sharma, M.S.,

Dr. Harendrachandra Paul : *Jalaluddin Rumi and his Tasawwuf or Rumi and His Sufism*, pp. 455, Published by Mrs. Shobha Rani Paul. M I. G. Housing Estate, Block C/2, 60/67, B. T. Road, Calcutta 700 002 (India) Price Rs. 180/-



Dr. Harendrachandra Paul's this book is the approved D Litt. Thesis in Persian of the University of Calcutta. Dr. Paul is a great scholar and has contributed large number of papers in various Journals, in Bengali, Urdu, Persian and English.

The present book is divided into three Parts as follows : Part I Life of Jalaluddin Rumi which is divided into five chapters: I. Name and titles, birth place, parentage and early life, II. Education (both theological and spiritual), III. Teaching and guidance IV. Contemporaries and their faith and regard, V. Character and Genius and their influence on the next generations. Part 2 Tasawwuf (or Sufism) and Its exponents consisting of I. The terms religion, Arts, Science, Philosophy, Mysticism and Tasawwuf, II. On the origin of Tasawwuf, III. A Chain of Islamic Mystics, and IV. Sufi System and Its Philosophy; Part 3 Rumi's Tasawwuf—Its Philosophy and Practice is divided into two sections, Section A Rumi's Mystic Philosophy consisting of Chapter I Conception of God—His Unity and Attributes, His Unity and Attributes of God, II. Conception of Life and Death, III. Sufi Concept of Satan, IV. Conception of Good and Evil, V. On Predestination and Free Will; and in Section B—Rumi's Mystic practices which includes three chapters : I. Prayer and Its Sufi Exposition, II. Mystic State of Ecstasy and Constancy to God, and III. Rumi's Religion of Love. Besides all mentioned above he has added five Appendices (i) System of transliteration (ii) Bibliography, (iii) A short Synopsis of the Mahanavi Vol. I, (iv) The King and the handmaiden—an illustrative story and V. Errata.

This book is a very good informative and exhaustive book on Muslim faqir, saint Jalaluddin Rumi and his Tasawwuf. Dr. Paul in the first part dealt with the life of Jalaluddin Rumi in which he describes about his parents, birth place, parentage, teaching guidance and the contemporaries and their faith and regard. He has very ably discussed Religion, Arts, Science, Philosophy, Mysticism and Tasawwuf in Rumi's Philosophy. He has discussed chain of Islamic Mystics and critically examined Sufi System and its Philosophy. In Part 3 he has considered and examined Rumi's Mystical Philosophy and discussed the concept of God. His unity and attributes, and attributes of God, Conception of Life and Death, Conception of Good and evil, On Predestination and Free will and in Section B he describes Rumi's Mystic Practices, describes Prayer, Mystic State, and Rumi's Religion of love.

Dr. Paul has very critically examined the various concepts of Rumi's Philosophy and mysticism and explained them nicely and made the concepts clear. This book will provide guidelines for such forthcoming books on the subject. This book will prove useful for the students of Philosophy, Religion and general reader.

This is one of the best books based on Sufism of Rumi. We congratulate the author for nice presentation in a beautiful style and language is simple and clear and understandable.



